From Bosaso to Guardafui: Why America’s New Pact with Puntland Changes the Strategic Map


A WDM Editorial

Historical dating from the Italian colonial era in Somalia

Today’s bilateral security agreement between the United States and Puntland, authorizing the expansion of the American presence in Bosaso, should not be dismissed as simply another counterterrorism arrangement. It is better understood as the latest chapter in a much larger geopolitical story—one that begins not in Bosaso, but at Cape Guardafui (Ras Asayr), where the Gulf of Aden meets the Indian Ocean. According to the Puntland Presidency, the agreement focuses on strengthening cooperation against terrorism and enhancing maritime security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.¹
For decades, Cape Guardafui has been treated as a forgotten headland. In reality, it is the natural Suez Canal of the Horn of Africa. Long before satellites, GPS, and electronic navigation, ships sailing between Europe, the Middle East, India, and the Far East depended upon the lighthouse at Cape Guardafui to safely negotiate one of the world’s most hazardous coastlines. Italian colonial authorities understood its commercial significance so well that they established a system of collecting navigation fees from international vessels passing the Cape.²
The Cape was not merely overlooking global commerce.
It was helping to organize it.
This is why Cape Guardafui deserves to be viewed as the natural counterpart to the Suez Canal—a maritime asset whose value lies not in engineering, but in geography itself.
History demonstrates a simple principle: great powers do not choose geography; geography chooses great powers. The United States’ decision to deepen its partnership with Puntland should therefore be seen within the broader strategic context of securing one of the busiest maritime corridors on Earth. While the immediate justification is counterterrorism and maritime security, history teaches that enduring military partnerships are almost always built upon enduring strategic geography.³
For years, WDM has argued that Puntland’s greatest untapped resource is neither oil nor minerals, but its location. Nature placed Puntland astride the junction between the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. While Somali politics remained consumed by internal constitutional disputes, global powers quietly continued studying the map.
Today’s agreement suggests Washington has reached the same conclusion.
Years ago, Puntland attempted to transform Cape Guardafui into an international maritime service and tourism hub through a Swiss-backed feasibility study that proposed fuel facilities, freshwater supply, hospitality services, and support infrastructure for international shipping and cruise liners. The project reportedly received favourable technical assessments and support for private-sector engagement.
It ultimately failed—not because the economics were flawed, but because Puntland lacked internationally recognized sovereign authority to conclude agreements of such strategic magnitude. Questions surrounding Somalia’s constitutional arrangements and the international legal status of the surrounding waters proved decisive.⁴
Ironically, the same strategic sensitivity that once discouraged commercial investment now appears to justify expanded international security cooperation.
This represents a remarkable geopolitical reversal.
Bosaso is not simply another port. It is the logistical gateway to Cape Guardafui. Any long-term effort to secure the Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb, and the approaches to the Red Sea inevitably elevates the importance of the Bosaso–Guardafui maritime corridor.
That corridor has become increasingly significant as Houthi attacks have disrupted Red Sea shipping, piracy concerns have persisted in the western Indian Ocean, and competition among the United States, Gulf states, China, Turkey, and European powers has intensified.⁵
There is another lesson hidden in Guardafui’s history.
For generations, rumours circulated in international maritime circles alleging that the inhabitants around Cape Guardafui practiced cannibalism after lighthouse keepers mysteriously disappeared. Lloyd’s of London reportedly increased insurance premiums as fears spread through commercial shipping networks.
The reality appears to have been far less sensational.
Local communities allegedly persuaded isolated lighthouse keepers to abandon their posts and settle nearby. With the lighthouse extinguished, vessels struck reefs, creating opportunities for salvaging valuable cargo washed ashore. What later became folklore was, in reality, an early example of how misinformation could distort international markets while masking an informal maritime economy.
Even the old Somali saying—”Bad ka soo bax, boqor baa leh” (“What the sea yields belongs to the King”)—captures an ancient understanding that maritime wealth belongs to legitimate political authority. Long before the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea codified maritime rights, Somali coastal communities already understood sovereignty in practical terms.⁶
Today, the strategic importance of Cape Guardafui is no longer merely historical.
Conflict in the Red Sea, renewed great-power rivalry, expanding military deployments, and growing concern over global supply chains have all returned international attention to the Horn of Africa. The same geography that Italian administrators monetized, that Swiss planners sought to develop, and that Puntland long recognized is finally being rediscovered by the wider world.
The Bosaso agreement is therefore more than a security pact.
It is an implicit acknowledgement that Puntland occupies one of the world’s indispensable maritime frontiers.
If Puntland can match this renewed international interest with constitutional stability, strategic planning, and long-term investment in maritime infrastructure, today’s agreement may eventually be remembered not simply as the expansion of an American military presence, but as the moment Cape Guardafui finally re-entered the geopolitical imagination of the twenty-first century.
The natural Suez Canal of the Horn of Africa was never hidden.
It was merely waiting for history to catch up with geography.

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Notes
Puntland Presidency, Official Statement on the Bilateral Cooperation Agreement Between Puntland and the United States, Bosaso, August 2, 2026.
Richard Burton, First Footsteps in East Africa (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1856); Italian Colonial Administration records on the Capo Guardafui Lighthouse.
International Maritime Organization (IMO), Safety of Navigation: Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean (London: IMO, various editions).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, December 10, 1982.
BBC News, “Why the Red Sea Is One of the World’s Most Strategic Shipping Routes”; United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), Federal Government of Somalia Engages ISIS-Somalia with Support from U.S. Forces, April 18, 2025.
I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, 4th ed. (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002); Lidwien Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).


Bibliography
Burton, Richard. First Footsteps in East Africa. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1856.
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). “Why the Red Sea Is One of the World’s Most Strategic Shipping Routes.”
International Maritime Organization. Safety of Navigation: Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean. London: IMO.
Kapteijns, Lidwien. Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
Lewis, I. M. A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. 4th ed. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002.
Puntland Presidency. Official Statement on the Bilateral Cooperation Agreement Between Puntland and the United States. Bosaso, August 2, 2026.
United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay, December 10, 1982.
United States Africa Command. Federal Government of Somalia Engages ISIS-Somalia with Support from U.S. Forces. Press Release, April 18, 2025.

Bosaso Changes the Strategic Map: The U.S.–Puntland Pact and the New Reality in the Horn of Africa


By WDM Editorial Board


Puntland-US Cooperation Deal

The agreement signed in Bosaso between Puntland and the United States is more than another security memorandum. It is a geopolitical milestone that reflects a changing balance of power in the Horn of Africa. For the first time, Puntland and Washington have publicly formalized a bilateral arrangement authorizing the expansion of the U.S. military presence in Bosaso. What had been a year of military cooperation has now become institutional policy.
The significance lies not merely in the expansion of a military base, but in what that expansion says about Somalia, the region, and the international community’s evolving strategic calculations.
The immediate justification is straightforward. Puntland has emerged as the principal local force confronting ISIS-Somalia in the Cal Miskaad mountains while simultaneously protecting one of the world’s most important maritime corridors. The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have become increasingly contested waters, threatened by piracy, regional conflict, and the wider confrontation involving Iran and the United States. Bosaso offers Washington an ideal forward operating location from which to address all three challenges.
Yet the agreement is also a consequence of political realities inside Somalia.
For years, the Federal Government insisted that all international security partnerships must pass through Mogadishu. In practice, however, Somalia’s prolonged political paralysis, constitutional disputes, and weakened federal institutions have steadily reduced Mogadishu’s ability to exercise effective authority across the country. International partners increasingly appear to be dealing with political realities rather than constitutional theory. The Bosaso agreement reflects that shift.
The timing is equally revealing.
Following the withdrawal of the United Arab Emirates from Bosaso after the collapse of its defence relationship with the Federal Government, a strategic vacuum emerged. Military infrastructure that had been built over many years suddenly lacked an external operator. Washington has now moved decisively to occupy that strategic space before another regional or global power could do so.
Geopolitically, this makes perfect sense.
Bosaso sits at one of the world’s most valuable maritime crossroads, overlooking the approaches to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the wider Red Sea corridor. Control, surveillance, and rapid deployment from this location carry significance extending far beyond Somalia itself. At a time when global shipping faces unprecedented uncertainty, every major power understands Bosaso’s value.
But this agreement should also serve as a wake-up call for Somalia’s political class.
When external powers increasingly negotiate directly with Federal Member States, it is less a triumph of federalism than a reflection of the failure to complete Somalia’s constitutional transition. International actors prefer predictable and capable partners. Where national institutions cannot provide that certainty, regional authorities inevitably fill the vacuum.
This creates both opportunities and dangers.
For Puntland, closer cooperation with the United States may strengthen counterterrorism capabilities, improve maritime security, and potentially attract broader economic engagement in sectors such as ports, fisheries, energy, and minerals. If managed transparently and within constitutional principles, such cooperation could contribute to regional stability.
However, strategic partnerships must never become substitutes for Somali political reconciliation. Military cooperation cannot replace constitutional settlement. Security arrangements cannot permanently compensate for unresolved questions of sovereignty, federal authority, and the distribution of powers between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States.
The Bosaso pact therefore raises profound constitutional questions that Somalia can no longer postpone. If regional governments are increasingly entering major international security agreements independently, then Somalia’s federal architecture requires urgent political clarification rather than continued ambiguity.
The coming weeks will reveal much. AFRICOM’s detailed position, the legal framework governing the expanded base, the duration of the agreement, and, above all, Mogadishu’s response will determine whether this becomes a source of constructive cooperation or another chapter in Somalia’s constitutional confrontation.
One conclusion, however, is already unmistakable.
Bosaso is no longer merely Puntland’s principal port. It has become one of the most strategically important security hubs in the Horn of Africa. The agreement signed on 2 August 2026 confirms that international powers increasingly see Puntland not simply as a regional administration, but as an indispensable security partner in one of the world’s most volatile strategic theatres.
History may ultimately remember this agreement as the moment Bosaso moved from being a regional port to becoming a central pillar in the architecture of Red Sea security—and as another reminder that, in geopolitics, power ultimately follows capability, stability, and strategic geography rather than constitutional aspirations alone.

BREAKING: Reports Claim U.S.–Puntland Security Pact at Bosaso — Confirmation Still Pending



By WDM Editorial Desk


EDITOR’S NOTE: This is a developing story. The reported agreement has, at the time of publication, not been independently confirmed by the Puntland State House, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu, or other official sources. Readers should treat the claim as provisional pending formal verification.

——–
Reports circulating on Sunday suggest that Puntland State and the United States have concluded a bilateral security agreement that could significantly expand American military cooperation at Bosaso. If confirmed, the reported pact would represent one of the most consequential security developments in the Horn of Africa in recent years, strengthening cooperation on counterterrorism, maritime security, and regional stability.
The report remains unverified, but it does not emerge in a vacuum. Over the past year, senior U.S. diplomatic and AFRICOM delegations have repeatedly visited Puntland, holding discussions centered on counterterrorism cooperation, maritime security, and strategic investment. Those engagements have increasingly pointed toward deeper security relations between Washington and Garowe.
Should the agreement prove authentic, its timing would be strategically significant. Following Somalia’s federal government’s cancellation of its security arrangements with the United Arab Emirates earlier this year, the Emirati military presence at Bosaso has reportedly been scaled back, potentially leaving valuable infrastructure available for a new security partnership. For Washington, Bosaso offers an important position overlooking the Gulf of Aden and supporting operations against ISIS-Somalia in the Cal Miskaad mountains while helping secure one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors.


Politically, such a development would also intensify the constitutional debate between Puntland and Mogadishu. A direct security arrangement between the United States and Puntland would almost certainly provoke strong reactions from the Federal Government of Somalia, which has consistently maintained that foreign security agreements fall under federal authority.
At this stage, however, facts must prevail over speculation. Three questions require immediate clarification:


Has a formal agreement actually been signed?
What is the precise scope of the reported cooperation?
Will official confirmation come from Puntland, AFRICOM, or the U.S. State Department?


Until these questions are answered, WDM urges readers to distinguish between credible strategic possibility and verified fact. The trajectory of U.S.–Puntland cooperation has been visible for months, but the existence of a formal basing agreement remains to be independently confirmed.


WDM will continue to monitor developments and provide updates as authoritative information becomes available.

FOUNDING PUNTLAND STATE CHARTER

Article 5
Fundamental Rights
Every citizen of Puntland shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms, including:
Equality before the law.
Protection of life, liberty, and dignity.
Freedom from unlawful arrest or detention.
Freedom of movement.
Freedom of expression within the limits of the law.
Freedom of religion consistent with Islam.
Freedom of assembly and association.
Protection of private property.
The right to education.
The right to work.
Equal opportunity in public employment.
Access to justice before independent courts.
Protection against discrimination.
Respect for privacy, family, and the home.
The right to participate in public affairs.
These rights may only be limited by law where necessary to protect public order, morality, national security, or the rights of others, and any such limitation must remain consistent with this Charter.

THE PREAMBLE OF THE PUNTLAND CHARTER OF 1998


In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful, and on behalf of the people of Puntland:
Recognizing that our country has experienced severe destruction, hardship, and instability caused by dictatorship, civil war, and the absence of law and order;
Believing that the Somali people require a government founded on peace, justice, and the rule of law;
Affirming the principle of self-determination, while striving for the unity of the Somali people based on justice and mutual understanding;
Convinced that peace, freedom, and reconciliation among Somalis can only be achieved through dialogue and cooperation;
Determined to contribute to the reconstruction of Somalia and to enable the Somali people to regain their rightful place among the nations of the world;
Committed to establishing within our communities a peaceful, just, prosperous, and cooperative society;
Therefore, assembled in the city of Garowe, we adopt this Charter establishing the Puntland State as part of a future Federal Republic of Somalia.
Accordingly, we hereby approve and adopt this Charter as our fundamental law.

Somalia at a Crossroads: The Cost of Dysfunctional Federalism

By Dr Abucar Aden Cadde


Somalia has survived colonial partition, civil war, terrorism, famine, and repeated political crises. Yet the gravest danger it faces today comes not from abroad but from within: the failure of its political class to govern as one nation rather than as competing factions.
It is worth recalling that Somalia’s federalism was never a system designed and imposed top-down. It emerged de facto out of the state collapse of 1991, as regions organized themselves independently amid the vacuum left by civil war. That reality was later given legal form — first by the 2004 Transitional Federal Charter, which established the Transitional Federal Government and formally recognized a federal structure as the basis for reconstituting the state, and then by the 2012 Provisional Constitution, which entrenched federalism as the governing framework of the Federal Republic. Federalism, in other words, was a negotiated response to an existing fact on the ground — not an ideological blueprint imposed on a unitary state. Understanding this origin matters: much of today’s friction stems from the fact that the system was built to accommodate a fractured post-war reality before its institutions, revenue-sharing arrangements, and constitutional boundaries were fully worked out.
That unfinished business is now compounded by a more direct betrayal: the same leaders who took office under the Provisional Constitution are, in practice, undermining the very federal system it establishes. Term extensions without constitutional basis, unilateral changes to electoral processes, and the selective application of federal law all weaken the framework that gave these leaders their legitimacy in the first place. A constitution cannot anchor a federal system if the officials elected under it treat its provisions as negotiable whenever they become inconvenient.
This is now the country’s central liability. The Federal Government and the Federal Member States too often act as rivals rather than constitutional partners, spending their energy contesting authority instead of coordinating policy. The cost falls on ordinary Somalis: each month lost to political disputes is a month without better schools, hospitals, roads, jobs, or security.
Beneath this dysfunction lies a deeper problem — the absence of a national identity that consistently outweighs clan calculation. Clan remains a legitimate part of Somali social life, but when it becomes the primary currency of politics, national institutions cannot mature. The current impasse between the Federal Government and opposition figures is a symptom of this: political competition is healthy, but only within constitutional bounds and a culture of dialogue and compromise. Left unresolved, this polarization risks reversing hard-won gains.
Border security and cross-border migration also demand serious, evidence-based national debate — not neglect, and not exploitation for political advantage. So does the persistent erosion of public trust from corruption and weak governance, despite the billions in international support Somalia has received. Transparency and competent administration are prerequisites for state-building, not optional extras.
Somalia’s underlying assets remain considerable: a strategic position at the mouth of the Red Sea, Africa’s longest mainland coastline, natural resources, an entrepreneurial population, and an engaged global diaspora. But potential does not build a state — vision, discipline, and leadership do.
Nations rarely collapse overnight; they erode gradually, as leaders normalize division, hollow out institutions, and trade long-term national interest for short-term expediency. The responsibility for reversing this pattern lies first with Somalia’s political leadership, whose legacy will be judged not by the offices they held but by whether they strengthened the Republic, upheld its Constitution, and improved citizens’ lives.
Federalism is not the enemy — dysfunctional federalism is. Opposition is not the enemy — paralysis is. Regional diversity is not the enemy — the absence of national purpose is.
Somalia’s future depends less on the ambitions of individual politicians or clans than on whether the country can re-embrace one governing principle: Somalia must come before faction, region, or clan. If that principle prevails, Somalia’s prospects remain bright. If it does not, the greatest threat to the Republic will come not from abroad, but from the failure of its own leaders to protect what has been entrusted to them.m, famine, and repeated political crises. Yet the gravest danger it faces today comes not from abroad but from within: the failure of its political class to govern as one nation rather than as competing factions.
It is worth recalling that Somalia’s federalism was never a system designed and imposed top-down. It emerged de facto out of the state collapse of 1991, as regions organized themselves independently amid the vacuum left by civil war. That reality was later given legal form — first by the 2004 Transitional Federal Charter, which established the Transitional Federal Government and formally recognized a federal structure as the basis for reconstituting the state, and then by the 2012 Provisional Constitution, which entrenched federalism as the governing framework of the Federal Republic. Federalism, in other words, was a negotiated response to an existing fact on the ground — not an ideological blueprint imposed on a unitary state. Understanding this origin matters: much of today’s friction stems from the fact that the system was built to accommodate a fractured post-war reality before its institutions, revenue-sharing arrangements, and constitutional boundaries were fully worked out.
That unfinished business is now compounded by a more direct betrayal: the same leaders who took office under the Provisional Constitution are, in practice, undermining the very federal system it establishes. Term extensions without constitutional basis, unilateral changes to electoral processes, and the selective application of federal law all weaken the framework that gave these leaders their legitimacy in the first place. A constitution cannot anchor a federal system if the officials elected under it treat its provisions as negotiable whenever they become inconvenient.
This is now the country’s central liability. The Federal Government and the Federal Member States too often act as rivals rather than constitutional partners, spending their energy contesting authority instead of coordinating policy. The cost falls on ordinary Somalis: each month lost to political disputes is a month without better schools, hospitals, roads, jobs, or security.
Beneath this dysfunction lies a deeper problem — the absence of a national identity that consistently outweighs clan calculation. Clan remains a legitimate part of Somali social life, but when it becomes the primary currency of politics, national institutions cannot mature. The current impasse between the Federal Government and opposition figures is a symptom of this: political competition is healthy, but only within constitutional bounds and a culture of dialogue and compromise. Left unresolved, this polarization risks reversing hard-won gains.
Border security and cross-border migration also demand serious, evidence-based national debate — not neglect, and not exploitation for political advantage. So does the persistent erosion of public trust from corruption and weak governance, despite the billions in international support Somalia has received. Transparency and competent administration are prerequisites for state-building, not optional extras.
Somalia’s underlying assets remain considerable: a strategic position at the mouth of the Red Sea, Africa’s longest mainland coastline, natural resources, an entrepreneurial population, and an engaged global diaspora. But potential does not build a state — vision, discipline, and leadership do.
Nations rarely collapse overnight; they erode gradually, as leaders normalize division, hollow out institutions, and trade long-term national interest for short-term expediency. The responsibility for reversing this pattern lies first with Somalia’s political leadership, whose legacy will be judged not by the offices they held but by whether they strengthened the Republic, upheld its Constitution, and improved citizens’ lives.
Federalism is not the enemy — dysfunctional federalism is. Opposition is not the enemy — paralysis is. Regional diversity is not the enemy — the absence of national purpose is.
Somalia’s future depends less on the ambitions of individual politicians or clans than on whether the country can re-embrace one governing principle: Somalia must come before faction, region, or clan. If that principle prevails, Somalia’s prospects remain bright. If it does not, the greatest threat to the Republic will come not from abroad, but from the failure of its own leaders to protect what has been entrusted to them.

A Voice Falls Silent, but a People’s Memory Endures: Farewell to Ahmed Ali Egal


A WDM Editorial

The Late Singer Ahmed Ali Egal


Check out this video, ahmed cali cigaal

There are public figures who occupy office, and there are public figures who occupy the hearts of a people. Ahmed Ali Egal belonged unmistakably to the latter.
With his passing, Puntland—and Somalia as a whole—has lost not merely a singer or a poet, but one of the enduring custodians of Somali cultural memory. His was a voice that entertained without becoming trivial, inspired without becoming arrogant, and united without demanding allegiance. Such figures are rare in any generation.
Ahmed Ali Egal understood something many politicians never do: nations are sustained not only by constitutions and governments but by songs, poetry, language, and shared memory. Where politicians often divided, artists like him reminded Somalis of what they still held in common.
His music carried the rhythm of the Somali soul. His poetry reflected both the beauty and the burdens of a people who have endured conflict, displacement, and political fragmentation. He belonged to Puntland by origin, but his artistic legacy belonged to every Somali who ever found hope, comfort, or pride in his words.
In times when public life is increasingly dominated by political quarrels, clan rivalries, and endless constitutional disputes, the death of a cultural icon is a sobering reminder of what truly outlives power. Presidents leave office. Governments rise and fall. Political slogans fade. But the songs that become part of a people’s identity endure for generations.
That is why Ahmed Ali Egal’s passing deserves to be mourned not as the loss of an entertainer, but as the departure of a national treasure.
A society that fails to honour its artists slowly loses its memory. Cultural figures preserve the emotional history of a nation. They teach values that no legislation can enforce and inspire unity that no political decree can command. Somalia desperately needs more builders of culture and fewer merchants of division.
Today, we extend our deepest condolences to his family, friends, colleagues, admirers, and to the people of Puntland and Somalia everywhere.
May his poetry continue to be recited.
May his songs continue to be sung.
May his example remind future generations that true greatness is measured not by political office or military rank, but by the lasting imprint one leaves upon the conscience of a people.
Ahmed Ali Egal has departed this world.
His voice has not.
Rest in peace, cultural giant. Somalia is richer because you lived, and poorer because you are gone.

Ref:. Candour Over Convenience: President Deni’s Tribute to Abdullahi Yusuf and the Puntland Story

Ahmed Farah Yare responds to the article: Candour Over Convenience: President Deni’s Tribute to Abdullahi Yusuf and the Puntland Story


President Said Abdullahi Deni’s tribute to his predecessor, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed — founder of Puntland State and later President of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government — is a fitting reminder of what good leadership looks like. It offers society both the lessons worth learning and the mistakes worth avoiding.
It is a rare trait among sitting leaders to honor their predecessors rather than diminish them. By recognizing Abdullahi Yusuf’s legacy, Deni reinforces political continuity, models a culture of institutional respect, and gives the public a clearer sense of Puntland’s founding purpose and historical trajectory.
This kind of gesture is not incidental. Great leaders distinguish themselves not only by their own achievements but by how they treat those who came before them — and how deliberately they cultivate the next generation of capable administrators. In doing so, they ensure that a state’s gains are sustained rather than reset with each transition of power, and that regional progress compounds over time instead of starting from zero.

Puntland at 28: A Legacy Forged Through Struggle, Worth Defending


By Abdiladif Ahmed


Puntland’s 28th anniversary should be more than ceremony. It is an occasion to reckon with the history that produced it, the sacrifices behind its institutions, and the challenges that still test them.
Puntland’s story cannot be told through 28 years alone. Decades of struggle of its residents preceded its foundation It was  shaped by resistance to tyranny and  collapse of Somalia’s central state, the civil war that followed, and the human devastation — displacement, lost lives, destroyed livelihoods, dismantled institutions — that drove communities across the country, including Puntland, to seek order through self-governance. What exists today was built through loss, compromise, and the sustained effort of generations. It is a historical inheritance, not the property of any administration, faction, or leader.
Twenty-Eight Years of Challenges
Since 1998, Puntland has faced internal political disputes, armed confrontation, boundary disputes, piracy and maritime crime, terrorism, clan tension, and recurring conflict with Somalia’s federal government over the shape of federalism itself.
Its coastline has made it a target for smuggling and organized crime, while extremist groups — most notably the Islamic State-linked militants entrenched in the Golis Mountains — have exploited insecurity and geographic isolation, prompting sustained counter-insurgency operations.
Sool remains the sharpest test. The question of SSC-Khaatumo cannot be set aside within Puntland’s history, as these territories still constitutionally form part of Puntland State. That question hangs unresolved and must be addressed — a matter further complicated by Somaliland and the Federal Government’s own competing claims in the region. Puntland State’s disputes with the Mogadishu Regime have been similarly strained by disagreements over constitutional violations, elections, and resource-sharing — culminating in Puntland’s March 2024 decision to withdraw recognition of the Federal Government after parliament passed constitutional amendments Puntland considers illegitimate. Puntland has since operated with what it calls “the powers of an independent state based on both Federal and State constitutions,” pending an inclusive constitutional process of the federal arrangements.
That Puntland has preserved institutional continuity through all of this is itself the measure of its resilience.
The Risk of Fragmentation
Political disagreement is normal; it becomes dangerous when turned into institutional confrontation, or when clan identity is used as a political weapon rather than treated as one thread of Somali social life. Clan should never substitute for constitutional authority or shield anyone from accountability.
Puntland’s future cannot rest on manipulating clan divisions or personal rivalries. It requires constitutional institutions, the rule of law, and public accountability to sit above narrow political calculation — with lawful, institutional means, not informal pressure, as the response when that line is crossed.
The Responsibility Ahead
Entering its 29th year, Puntland’s task is neither complacency nor nostalgia, but renewed commitment to:
Institutional integrity and constitutional governance,
The rule of law and equal accountability,
Political dialogue over confrontation
National unity and social cohesion,
Professional, disciplined security institutions,
Defense of Puntland’s territorial and political interests through lawful means,
Counter-terrorism and prevention of violent extremism,
Sustainable economic and social development, and
Accountable political leadership.
None of this is secured by dismantling institutions, deepening division, or concentrating power without checks. It is secured by strengthening institutions and keeping political authority subject to law.
Conclusion
Puntland’s 28th anniversary is not only a marker of distance traveled — it is a reminder of what was spent to travel it. The responsibility of this generation is not just to celebrate what was built, but to protect, reform, and strengthen it, so that the sacrifices behind it were not made in vain.

Puntland at 28: The Enduring Power of Institutions Over Personalities


A WDM Editorial


As Puntland marks its 28th Anniversary, it is fitting to reflect on the leadership that shaped its journey. The images above symbolize two generations of that story: Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the founding president who led Puntland’s establishment in 1998, and Said Abdullahi Deni, the current president whose recent tribute reaffirmed the importance of preserving Puntland’s institutional memory.
Twenty-eight years after its establishment, Puntland remains one of the most significant political achievements in modern Somali history. Its existence was not accidental. It was born from the conviction that Somalia’s state collapse demanded institution-building rather than endless waiting for the restoration of authority in Mogadishu.
That vision was championed by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and the generation that founded Puntland. They chose constitutional governance over anarchy, administration over chaos, and political order over warlordism. Their work demonstrated that functioning government could emerge even while much of Somalia remained engulfed in conflict.
President Said Abdullahi Deni’s recent remarks honouring Abdullahi Yusuf were therefore more than a tribute to a predecessor. They were an affirmation that institutions endure only when successive leaders possess the confidence to acknowledge those who laid their foundations. In a political culture where predecessors are too often ignored or remembered only when politically convenient, such candour reflects statesmanship.
Puntland’s greatest achievement has never been the success of one individual. It has been the endurance of its constitutional institutions across changing administrations and difficult political moments. Leaders come and go; institutions survive only when history is respected rather than rewritten.
As Puntland celebrates twenty-eight years, the most meaningful tribute to its founders is not nostalgia but renewed commitment to the principles upon which the state was built: constitutionalism, the rule of law, accountable government, devolution of power, and service to the public.
The legacy of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed belongs to history. The responsibility of President Said Abdullahi Deni belongs to the present. Together, they represent two chapters of the same continuing story—a Puntland whose strength lies not in personalities, but in the institutions that continue to serve its people.
Happy 28th Anniversary, Puntland State of Somalia. May the next generation preserve the courage to build, the wisdom to reform, and the integrity to honour history while shaping the future.

Candour Over Convenience: President Deni’s Tribute to Abdullahi Yusuf and the Puntland Story


A WDM Editorial

Yusuf & Deni

Deni’s Speech. Take a watch:


There are moments in politics when what is left unsaid reveals more than what is spoken. Then there are rarer moments when a leader chooses candour over convenience, history over political calculation, and institutional memory over personal rivalry. President Said Abdullahi Deni’s remarks at the launch of Ambassador Mohamed Abdi Affey’s book belonged to the latter category.
Speaking about the late President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed has never been politically effortless. His legacy remains one of the most consequential and contested in modern Somali history. To some, he was the uncompromising soldier who restored order from chaos and founded Puntland in 1998. To others, he was an authoritarian figure whose confrontational style shaped many of the political conflicts that followed. Like most nation-builders emerging from state collapse, he was neither saint nor villain. He was a historical actor operating in extraordinary circumstances.
That is precisely why President Deni’s tribute mattered.
Rather than reducing Abdullahi Yusuf to political symbolism or avoiding his legacy altogether, Deni acknowledged a simple historical reality: Puntland did not emerge by accident. It was a deliberate political project born from the conviction that waiting for the resurrection of a collapsed state in Mogadishu was no strategy at all. Puntland’s founders chose institution-building over paralysis, governance over anarchy, and constitutional order over endless warlordism.
That decision changed Somalia’s political trajectory.
Long before federalism became the accepted framework for rebuilding Somalia, Puntland had already demonstrated that functioning institutions could be constructed from the periphery outward. Whatever one’s opinion of Abdullahi Yusuf personally, that historical contribution cannot honestly be erased. Puntland became proof that Somalis could rebuild government even while the national state remained in ruins.
Acknowledging that fact is not hero worship. It is historical integrity.
Great political leaders understand that institutions are larger than individuals. They also understand that institutions cannot survive if every incoming administration rewrites history to suit its own political needs. Nations that erase their founders eventually lose sight of why they were founded in the first place.
President Deni’s remarks reflected that understanding. By speaking respectfully of a predecessor whose legacy remains politically sensitive, he positioned himself not as a competitor for historical credit but as a custodian of Puntland’s institutional continuity. That distinction matters.
At a time when Puntland faces renewed constitutional disputes with the Federal Government, reaffirming the principles upon which Puntland itself was founded sends a powerful message. Puntland’s defence of constitutional federalism is not simply the policy of one administration. It is the continuation of a political philosophy established in 1998: that stable governance begins with functioning institutions, respect for constitutional order, and the devolution—not the monopolization—of political power.
The setting made the message even more significant. Ambassador Mohamed Abdi Affey has observed Somali politics from regional and international vantage points for decades. A book launch attended by diplomats, policymakers, and scholars was an appropriate forum to remind both domestic and international audiences that Puntland’s history is part of the wider story of state-building in the Horn of Africa, not merely another chapter in Somalia’s endless political rivalries.
History should neither canonize nor condemn without context. Abdullahi Yusuf’s record, like that of many founders, contains achievements, controversies, successes, and failures. Historians will continue debating his methods and decisions, and they should. Mature societies do not fear such debates. They encourage them.
What deserves recognition is President Deni’s willingness to engage that history without resorting to either convenient silence or selective remembrance.
That is what statesmanship looks like.
The strongest institutions are built not merely by those who found them, but by those who are secure enough to honour their foundations without becoming prisoners of personality cults. Puntland’s story belongs neither to Abdullahi Yusuf alone nor to any administration that followed him. It belongs to the people who chose constitutional governance over collapse and institutional continuity over political expediency.
President Deni’s tribute served as a timely reminder that political maturity begins with historical honesty. Leaders come and go. Institutions endure only when successive generations possess the confidence to acknowledge both the triumphs and imperfections of those who came before.
In Somali politics, where history is too often weaponized and predecessors are remembered only when politically useful, candour itself becomes an act of leadership.
That may ultimately be the most enduring message of President Deni’s remarks.

The Welfare State: Can Somali Unity Survive the Withdrawal of Western Aid?


By Ahmed Hassan Humbus


Let’s stop hiding behind diplomatic pleasantries and face the brutal reality: Somalia is not a functioning sovereign republic. It is a hollowed-out, internationally subsidized welfare state on permanent life support. For decades, its national budget, its military apparatus, and its entire humanitarian sector have been completely bankrolled by financial injections from the United States and the European Union. The country is addicted to foreign charity. But what happens when the money stops? If this vital economic lifeline is abruptly severed while the nation remains completely encircled by Al-Shabaab, the myth of Somali unity and sovereignty will violently shatter.
An immediate aid cutoff would not just cause a crisis—it would trigger an absolute catastrophe. Let’s be honest about the military: the Somali National Army (SNA) is fundamentally dependent on foreign cash for basic salaries, training, and logistics. Cut the Western funding, and the army collapses from within. Unpaid soldiers will desert, morale will hit zero, and mutinies will break out. At the same time, multilateral peacekeeping forces—who only stay because the EU and UN foot the bill—will pack up and leave overnight. This massive security vacuum will be an open invitation for Al-Shabaab. While Mogadishu goes bankrupt, Al-Shabaab remains financially self-sufficient through ruthless local extortion and illicit trade. They will out-source, out-gun, and out-maneuver a paralyzed central government, seizing territory at will and forcefully conscripting thousands of abandoned, desperate youths.
Furthermore, let’s strip away the illusion of federal unity. The federal structure in Somalia is not bound by patriotism or shared national values; it is held together solely by the distribution of international cash managed by Mogadishu. The moment the federal government loses its ability to hand out foreign aid and development projects, its authority vanishes. Federal Member States will have absolutely zero incentive to look to the capital for leadership. Regions will bypass Mogadishu entirely, aggressively striking independent, treasonous security and economic deals with regional puppet-masters like Ethiopia, Kenya, or Gulf states just to survive.
In the midst of this chaotic collapse, the ultimate fracture of the old union will become irreversible. Somaliland, which has already maintained its own democratic governance, currency, and relative stability for decades, will definitively go its separate way. Freed from the anchors of Mogadishu’s endless instability, Somaliland will successfully achieve its long-sought objective and take its rightful seat as a fully recognized, independent UN member nation. This political fragmentation will leave the rest of the country in a state of brutal balkanization, dragging the remaining southern regions right back into bloody, clan-based resource wars over ports, airports, and grazing lands.
If the rest of the country survives this collapse, it won’t be because of its political class. A bankrupt Mogadishu will be forced into a humiliating scramble, begging non-Western powers for survival. Countries like Turkey, Qatar, the UAE, and China will gladly step into the vacuum—but their help will not be charity. They will demand geopolitical assets, military bases, and natural resources, renting out remaining Somali sovereignty to the highest bidder. Domestically, the government will finally be forced to strip the local business elite of their free ride, aggressively taxing powerhouse industries like telecommunications and remittance firms that have profited for years while contributing next to nothing to the state. Ultimately, the only thing standing between the population and total starvation will be the diaspora, whose remittances will become the final, desperate safety net for an abandoned population.
The region must wake up from this delusion. Somali unity is a house of cards built on a foundation of foreign charity. If the West withdraws its support while terrorism knocks on the door, the federal system will implode. While Somaliland secures its independent future on the global stage, an aid-free southern Somalia will not be a unified nation. It will be a fractured, highly militarized failed state, forced to bargain away its dignity piece by piece just to keep the lights on.

Somalia Doesn’t Have a State Problem — It Has a Leadership Problem”

By Abdiladif Ahmed


Calling Somalia a “failed state” has become a reflex in international discourse. But repetition is not accuracy. Somalia’s failure is not the state itself — it is the recurring failure of those entrusted to lead it. States do not appoint relatives, reward loyalists, auction public property, or mistake personal power for national service. Leaders do.
Somalia holds the fundamental ingredients for national success: a strategic location linking Africa, the Middle East, and global trade routes; abundant natural resources; a youthful population; and a society that has shown extraordinary resilience through decades of conflict and institutional fragility. The tragedy is not a lack of potential — it is the chronic failure of successive leaderships to convert that potential into governance.
Patronage as Policy
For decades, corruption, nepotism, and patronage have hollowed out Somalia’s public institutions. Public office is too often treated as private inheritance rather than public trust: merit waits outside while clan affiliation and political loyalty are shown in first. Somalia’s political elite have mastered one skill above all — turning temporary political arrangements into permanent systems of patronage. Where loyalty is promoted faster than competence, institutional performance becomes secondary to political survival, ministries manage coalitions rather than deliver services, and national planning gives way to the next political fire.
Accountability mechanisms have fared no better. Oversight institutions remain weak, financial transparency inadequate, and enforcement inconsistent. When accountability becomes selective, corruption stops being individual misconduct and becomes an operating system — leaving citizens to wonder whether audits are meant to catch irregularities or simply record them.
This is not merely a governance problem. Corruption and administrative dysfunction deter investment, constrain economic diversification, and drive youth unemployment. Weak institutions also blunt the state’s ability to counter terrorism, transnational crime, and illicit finance — no country can secure itself while hollowing out the institutions meant to provide that security.
Speeches Without Reform
Somalia has never lacked speeches promising reform; it has lacked reforms that survive the speech. Every administration arrives promising transformation; too many leave behind unfinished institutions and recycled slogans. If declarations built nations, Somalia would already rank among the most developed.
Yet Somalia should not be defined by its governance failures alone. Its people continue to invest, educate, build businesses, and demonstrate more confidence in the country’s future than much of its political class has earned. The strategic location, growing commercial sector, regional integration, and youthful demography remain intact. What has been inconsistent is the leadership responsible for managing them.
The Way Forward
Somalia’s future depends less on inventing new institutions than on letting existing ones function with integrity and independence: constitutional governance, an impartial judiciary, transparent public finance, merit-based recruitment, and accountable security institutions. Above all, it requires leaders who treat public office as a constitutional responsibility, not a personal investment.
Somalia’s obstacle is not a shortage of capable citizens or national resilience. It is the recurring habit of conflating the state with the government, the government with the ruling elite, and the national interest with personal survival. Countries rarely fail for want of ability — they falter when leadership chooses patronage over professionalism, and loyalty over competence.
Somalia is not condemned to instability. Its challenge is not state failure — it is leadership failure. Once governance rewards merit over proximity and accountability over impunity, Somalia’s defining trait will no longer be its resilience in surviving bad leadership, but its capacity to prosper under good leadership.

Somalia Doesn’t Have a State Problem — It Has a Leadership Problem”

By Abdiladif Ahmed


Calling Somalia a “failed state” has become a reflex in international discourse. But repetition is not accuracy. Somalia’s failure is not the state itself — it is the recurring failure of those entrusted to lead it. States do not appoint relatives, reward loyalists, auction public property, or mistake personal power for national service. Leaders do.
Somalia holds the fundamental ingredients for national success: a strategic location linking Africa, the Middle East, and global trade routes; abundant natural resources; a youthful population; and a society that has shown extraordinary resilience through decades of conflict and institutional fragility. The tragedy is not a lack of potential — it is the chronic failure of successive leaderships to convert that potential into governance.
Patronage as Policy
For decades, corruption, nepotism, and patronage have hollowed out Somalia’s public institutions. Public office is too often treated as private inheritance rather than public trust: merit waits outside while clan affiliation and political loyalty are shown in first. Somalia’s political elite have mastered one skill above all — turning temporary political arrangements into permanent systems of patronage. Where loyalty is promoted faster than competence, institutional performance becomes secondary to political survival, ministries manage coalitions rather than deliver services, and national planning gives way to the next political fire.
Accountability mechanisms have fared no better. Oversight institutions remain weak, financial transparency inadequate, and enforcement inconsistent. When accountability becomes selective, corruption stops being individual misconduct and becomes an operating system — leaving citizens to wonder whether audits are meant to catch irregularities or simply record them.
This is not merely a governance problem. Corruption and administrative dysfunction deter investment, constrain economic diversification, and drive youth unemployment. Weak institutions also blunt the state’s ability to counter terrorism, transnational crime, and illicit finance — no country can secure itself while hollowing out the institutions meant to provide that security.
Speeches Without Reform
Somalia has never lacked speeches promising reform; it has lacked reforms that survive the speech. Every administration arrives promising transformation; too many leave behind unfinished institutions and recycled slogans. If declarations built nations, Somalia would already rank among the most developed.
Yet Somalia should not be defined by its governance failures alone. Its people continue to invest, educate, build businesses, and demonstrate more confidence in the country’s future than much of its political class has earned. The strategic location, growing commercial sector, regional integration, and youthful demography remain intact. What has been inconsistent is the leadership responsible for managing them.
The Way Forward
Somalia’s future depends less on inventing new institutions than on letting existing ones function with integrity and independence: constitutional governance, an impartial judiciary, transparent public finance, merit-based recruitment, and accountable security institutions. Above all, it requires leaders who treat public office as a constitutional responsibility, not a personal investment.
Somalia’s obstacle is not a shortage of capable citizens or national resilience. It is the recurring habit of conflating the state with the government, the government with the ruling elite, and the national interest with personal survival. Countries rarely fail for want of ability — they falter when leadership chooses patronage over professionalism, and loyalty over competence.
Somalia is not condemned to instability. Its challenge is not state failure — it is leadership failure. Once governance rewards merit over proximity and accountability over impunity, Somalia’s defining trait will no longer be its resilience in surviving bad leadership, but its capacity to prosper under good leadership.

Somalia: Separation or Confederation-No 3rd Option

Forget the framing of Somalia “risking” fragmentation. It is already happening. Three federal member states have suspended relations with Mogadishu since 2024. A breakaway region got its first-ever sovereign recognition in December. The president is governing on a legally contested term extension. This isn’t a warning sign — it’s the current state of play.
What actually happened: Puntland pulled recognition of the federal government back in March 2024.[14] Jubaland followed in November 2024 after Mogadishu slapped a treason warrant on its president.[14] Then, on March 4–5, 2026, Parliament rammed through a permanent constitution — ending the 2012 provisional framework, extending presidential terms from four years to five, locking in a one-person-one-vote system — without Puntland, Jubaland, or the opposition coalition on board.[10],[8] President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s original mandate expired May 15, 2026. The new amendments retroactively gave him another year anyway.[9]
The third state nobody’s talking about: South West State suspended ties with Mogadishu too, on March 17, 2026 — accusing the federal government of arming local militias and pushing unconstitutional centralization. The Somali Future Council (now Puntland + Jubaland + the Salvation Forum) backed the move within hours.[11] It didn’t last: the Somali National Army rolled in and installed a federal loyalist by March 30.[11] That’s the tell. Mogadishu is now willing to use troops, not just politics, to reverse a state’s defection — which means Puntland and Jubaland aren’t watching a hypothetical, they’re watching a preview.
Somaliland got there first. On December 26, 2025, Israel recognized Somaliland as a sovereign, independent state — the first UN member ever to do so, after three decades of Somaliland governing itself with no international recognition at all.[1],[2] Netanyahu called it consistent with the Abraham Accords; Somaliland’s president said they’d seek to join.[1] Almost everyone else objected: 14 of 15 UN Security Council members pushed back at an emergency session (the US was the lone holdout),[3],[4],[5] and the African Union, the OIC, the Arab League, and IGAD all separately condemned it.[5],[6] None of that stopped Israel’s foreign minister from visiting Hargeisa a week and a half later.[7]
Why the objections don’t matter as much as they sound: universal condemnation from every relevant regional body didn’t reverse anything. That’s the actual lesson for Puntland and Jubaland — international disapproval is not a check on this kind of move, it’s just noise that accompanies it.
Who else has skin in the game: Turkey’s the biggest external player by far — Camp TURKSOM, the Gorgor special forces it trained, a naval presence, and now F-16s based in Mogadishu since early 2026.[13] That buildup is tied to Mohamud personally, not to federal institutions broadly. Gulf states run their own relationships with Puntland’s and Somaliland’s ports directly. Add Israel’s new interest in Somaliland — including quiet talk of it as a relocation site for Gazans — and you’ve got a country where outside powers are increasingly betting on factions, not on Mogadishu.
Where this goes: Two realistic outcomes remain. Either a negotiated confederation — foreign policy, currency, and defense held centrally, everything else devolved to regions that are already running themselves — or continued piecemeal fragmentation, state by state, with Mogadishu using force where it still can (South West State) and losing ground where it can’t (Puntland, Jubaland, Somaliland). A clean single breakup isn’t really on the table. This messier version already is.

——-

Sources
Reuters, “Israel recognises Somaliland, Somalia’s breakaway region, as independent state,” December 26, 2025.
CNN, “Somaliland: Israel becomes first country to formally recognize region as independent state,” December 26, 2025.
Times of Israel, “UN Security Council to convene emergency meeting on Israel’s Somaliland recognition,” December 28, 2025.
France 24, “UN ambassadors condemn Israel’s recognition of Somaliland,” December 30, 2025.
Peoples Dispatch, “Global outcry against Israel’s recognition of Somaliland,” January 2, 2026.
AllAfrica, “African Union Condemns Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland,” January 8, 2026.
PassBlue, “Israeli Actions in Africa Complicate Somalia’s Presidency of the UN Security Council,” January 7, 2026.
ConstitutionNet, “From Provisional to Permanent Constitution? Assessing the End of Somalia’s Constitutional Review Process.”
ICNL, Somalia Civic Freedom Monitor, updated 2026.
Eu SEE / Hivos, “Jubaland Opposition to Federal Constitutional Process Threatens Inclusive Civic Participation,” March 10, 2026.
Horn Review, “Meles Zenawi’s Prescience: The Case for SWS, Puntland and Jubaland and the Domino Effect,” March 26, 2026.
African Security Analysis, “Monthly Forecast: Somalia,” June 24, 2026.
Middle East Forum, “Turkey Holds Somalia’s Constitution Hostage,” June 4, 2026.
Wikipedia, “Constitutional Crisis in Somalia,” and “Israel–Somaliland relations.”

The Horn at a Crossroads: AUSSOM’s Funding Crisis and Washington’s Regional Pivot


Somalia is entering one of its most precarious moments in years. Washington has moved to terminate the UN’s logistical backbone for the African Union mission (AUSSOM) by year-end, even as it deepens direct engagement with Puntland, Jubaland and Somaliland outside Mogadishu. This week, both tracks converged: troop-contributing countries gathered in Kampala for an emergency summit on the mission’s survival, while a US congressional and AFRICOM delegation toured Kismayo, Garowe and Hargeisa. Together, these moves mark a shift from a Mogadishu-centric security architecture toward a more fragmented, regionally driven one — with real consequences for state-building, counter–Al-Shabaab operations and humanitarian access.
The UNSOS cutoff: the central shock
On July 1, 2026, the US Mission to the African Union informed the AU Commission that Washington would not support renewing the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond AUSSOM’s current mandate, which expires December 31, 2026. The US said it would not oppose renewing AUSSOM’s Chapter VII mandate itself, but would oppose any renewal that includes UNSOS or other UN logistical or operational support — support that currently underwrites roughly $500 million a year in fuel, food, medical evacuation, transport and equipment reimbursement for AUSSOM’s approximately 11,800 uniformed personnel. Without it, the mission is widely assessed as operationally unsustainable heading into 2027.
This followed, but is distinct from, a separate January episode: the US suspended all assistance to the Somali Federal Government on January 7, 2026, after accusing officials of destroying a US-funded WFP warehouse in Mogadishu and seizing 76 metric tons of food aid. That freeze was short-lived — Washington resumed WFP food distribution on January 29 after Mogadishu acknowledged responsibility — but it set the tone for a year of hardening US frustration with the federal government’s governance and accountability, culminating in the July UNSOS decision.
Kampala: contingency planning under pressure
Uganda is hosting the second Extraordinary Summit of AUSSOM Troop-Contributing Countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Somalia) at Speke Resort Munyonyo, July 29–31, under the theme “To Sustain the Stabilisation Process in Somalia.” Chiefs of defense met first, followed by defense ministers, with a heads-of-state summit closing the gathering. Uganda’s CDF, Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, has already warned that reduced funding is forcing troop-contributing countries to scale back operations and that “alternative arrangements” are now unavoidable. The summit’s recommendations go to the AU Peace and Security Council and, ultimately, the UN Security Council, which must decide in December whether — and in what form — AUSSOM continues.
Washington’s regional tour
The convergence is not accidental. This week’s Congress-AFRICOM delegation to Kismayo, Garowe and Hargeisa is the latest in a pattern of direct US engagement with federal member states that has intensified through 2026 — including a May visit by Acting Ambassador Justin Davis and AFRICOM’s Col. Shane Jones to Garowe, where talks centered on Puntland’s minerals, fisheries and oil potential rather than traditional aid. That visit came days after Puntland formally withdrew recognition of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration, when his four-year mandate expired on May 15 — a rupture that has hardened federal-regional distrust well beyond the routine friction visible in earlier disputes, such as Mogadishu blocking aircraft carrying armed security details for regional leaders ahead of unity talks.
Puntland, Jubaland and Somaliland control the ports, airports and counterterrorism assets that make them natural interlocutors as Mogadishu’s leverage erodes. Each has calibrated its response differently:
Puntland frames US engagement as validation of its role as security partner and investment gateway, pairing counter-ISIS gains in the Calmiskaad mountains with a “trade, not aid” pitch on minerals, fisheries and hydrocarbons. It has previously used access as leverage when it felt sidelined, and its withdrawal of recognition from Mogadishu signals it will keep doing so.
Jubaland stays close to Washington on counter-Al-Shabaab cooperation while keeping its language studiously “national unity” rather than separatist — pragmatic hedging rather than open rupture with Mogadishu.
Somaliland folds every high-level US visit into its long-running case for recognition, pointing to its elections and to Berbera’s port as evidence it is the more reliable partner — even as Washington officially maintains a “one Somalia” policy.
Across all three, the pattern is the same: public hospitality toward the US, private conditionality on funding and control, and hedging against a Mogadishu that may lose both AUSSOM’s backing and Washington’s patience at the same time.
Humanitarian and security stakes
Roughly 6.5 million Somalis face acute food insecurity in 2026, and any degradation of AUSSOM’s footprint risks further restricting humanitarian access in contested areas. Al-Shabaab retains the capacity to exploit reduced patrols and delayed logistics, and localized clan competition over land and water continues independent of the national-level crisis.
Three scenarios
Managed drawdown with regional compacts. Kampala produces a stop-gap financing plan, and the US formalizes bilateral security arrangements with the federal member states — stabilizing Somalia around a patchwork of externally backed regional security zones as Mogadishu’s authority narrows.
Operational contraction, insurgent gains. Without alternative financing, AUSSOM contracts to major towns, ceding rural ground to Al-Shabaab and worsening humanitarian access.
Political rupture. Deepening federal-regional mistrust — already visible in Puntland’s withdrawal of recognition — hardens into parallel governance, with federal member states and Somaliland negotiating security and economic arrangements directly with external partners, bypassing Mogadishu altogether.
The center is losing its monopoly on both security and aid. Increasingly, the Horn’s next chapter is being written as much in Garoowe, Kismayo and Hargeysa as in Mogadishu — and in Kampala’s emergency planning for AUSSOM’s survival.

Constitutional Crisis, Governance Failures, and Federal-State Tensions in Somalia: A Critical Political Assessment

By Abdiladif Ahmed

Made non-binding

Somalia’s democratic future depends on constitutional governance, institutional accountability, credible elections, and unwavering respect for the rule of law. When constitutional mandates are disputed and electoral timelines repeatedly slip, the legitimacy of state institutions is inevitably called into question. Against this backdrop, the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has faced mounting criticism over allegations of corruption, nepotism, poor governance, and an unprecedented concentration of executive power.
Critics argue that rather than strengthening democratic institutions, advancing national reconciliation, and consolidating Somalia’s fragile federal system, the current administration has deepened political polarization, weakened public confidence, strained relations with Federal Member States, and intensified constitutional uncertainty.
Electoral Delays and Constitutional Legitimacy
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s original four-year mandate, dating from his May 2022 election, was due to expire on May 15, 2026 — roughly ten weeks ago. In March 2026, however, parliament passed, and Mohamud signed, constitutional amendments extending both the presidential and parliamentary terms from four to five years, pushing national elections to 2027. The government frames this as a necessary step to complete preparations for Somalia’s first one-person-one-vote elections.
Opposition leaders reject this extension outright, arguing that parliament had no authority to unilaterally rewrite the electoral calendar and that the amendments amount to what one opposition coalition has called a “constitutional coup.” In their view, remaining in office on the basis of a self-extended mandate undermines constitutional order, weakens the rule of law, and raises profound questions about the legitimacy of the federal executive. They contend that continued postponement of elections erodes democratic accountability, diminishes public trust in state institutions, and sets a dangerous precedent whereby constitutional deadlines become subordinate to political expediency.
This is, in short, a genuine and unresolved legitimacy dispute rather than a settled fact: the government maintains its mandate is constitutionally valid until 2027, while the opposition maintains it expired in May 2026. Diplomatic efforts by the United States and United Kingdom to mediate a transition agreement collapsed in mid-May 2026 without resolution, leaving both positions in place.
Allegations of Corruption, Nepotism, and Institutional Erosion
Critics further allege that the administration has become increasingly characterized by corruption, political patronage, and nepotism. They argue that appointments to senior public offices have too often reflected political loyalty and personal affiliation rather than merit, competence, transparency, and the national interest.
According to these critics, such practices have weakened state institutions, discouraged professionalism within the civil service, diminished administrative effectiveness, and undermined public confidence in government. They contend that corruption and patronage have diverted scarce national resources away from security, development, and essential public services while entrenching networks of political privilege.
It should be noted that these allegations, as presented here, remain general in nature; they are not tied to specific documented cases in this assessment and would require independent verification, audit, or investigation to substantiate. Many observers nonetheless argue that Somalia cannot build effective institutions or achieve long-term stability without restoring merit-based governance, strengthening independent oversight, and enforcing meaningful accountability across public institutions.
Allegations of Political Intimidation
Several opposition figures have alleged that political pressure, intimidation, and administrative restrictions have constrained their ability to participate freely in Somalia’s political process. Critics argue that these practices have narrowed democratic space, discouraged legitimate political competition, and weakened constitutional pluralism.
They maintain that democracy cannot flourish where opposition parties are unable to organize, campaign, and criticize government policies without fear of political retaliation. These allegations remain matters of political dispute and would require independent investigation and judicial scrutiny to establish the underlying facts.
Federal-State Relations: Puntland, Jubbaland, and South West State
Relations between the Federal Government and multiple Federal Member States have deteriorated considerably since the March 2026 term-extension amendments, raising broader concerns about the future of Somalia’s federal constitutional order. Puntland, Jubbaland, and — as of March 2026 — South West State have all suspended cooperation with Mogadishu, aligning through the opposition Somali Future Council coalition.
Critics argue that instead of pursuing dialogue, constitutional consultation, and cooperative federalism, the federal government has increasingly relied on confrontational political strategies that have deepened mistrust between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States.
Regarding Puntland, critics contend that the federal government’s push for the term-extension amendments and broader electoral reforms has unnecessarily strained relations with one of Somalia’s longest-standing federal administrations, which denounced the extension as an illegal power grab. They argue that Puntland’s constitutional autonomy should be respected and that disagreements should be resolved through constitutional dialogue rather than confrontation.
Similar concerns have been raised regarding Jubbaland, where tensions with Mogadishu — rooted in a 2024 federal treason warrant against Jubbaland’s president and disputes over electoral processes and revenue-sharing — have persisted for over a year. South West State’s break with the federal government in March 2026 followed its own accusations that Mogadishu was arming militias to destabilize the region and pursuing unconstitutional centralization. Critics argue that the widening rift across three federal member states reflects an expansion, rather than a resolution, of Somalia’s constitutional tensions.
Governance Failures and National Consequences
Critics maintain that corruption, political favoritism, institutional weakness, and prolonged constitutional disputes have distracted the government from Somalia’s most pressing national priorities, including defeating terrorism, strengthening the economy, improving public services, completing constitutional reforms, and enhancing national security.
According to these critics, persistent governance failures have weakened institutional capacity, discouraged domestic and international investment, reduced public confidence, and contributed to continuing political instability. They argue that sustainable national development cannot be achieved while constitutional disputes, allegations of corruption, and political polarization continue to dominate the national agenda.
Foreign Influence and National Sovereignty
The government’s management of foreign partnerships has also become the subject of increasing political scrutiny. Critics argue that the administration has become increasingly reliant on external political and security partnerships, raising questions about transparency, national sovereignty, and parliamentary oversight.
Opposition figures and independent analysts have questioned the government’s relationship with Türkiye on specific grounds. The March 2024 hydrocarbons agreement, which grants Turkey’s state oil company exploration and production rights across three offshore blocks, reportedly was not fully disclosed to Somalia’s parliament before its terms became public through Turkish ratification proceedings — and allows Turkey to recover as much as 90% of production costs before Somalia receives a share of profits, with disputes to be resolved through arbitration in Istanbul rather than Somali courts. Somalia’s own parliamentary Natural Resources Committee has reportedly characterized the agreement as unconstitutional. Similar transparency concerns have been raised about port and security arrangements, with one analysis alleging that the government’s share of port revenues fell sharply under a Turkish concession arrangement.
Critics contend that Somalia’s offshore hydrocarbons, fisheries, strategic ports, and critical mineral resources should be managed through transparent legal frameworks, constitutional oversight, and independent public accountability to ensure that the Somali people remain the principal beneficiaries of their national wealth. More broadly, opponents argue that excessive centralization of decision-making in foreign affairs has marginalized Federal Member States, weakened institutional checks and balances, and reduced public confidence in national governance.
Supporters of the government reject these criticisms, maintaining that international partnerships, including those with Türkiye, are intended to strengthen Somalia’s security, infrastructure, and economic development, and that Turkey remains one of Somalia’s most significant security partners, having trained thousands of Somali soldiers over the past decade. These competing perspectives remain the subject of ongoing political debate.
Constitutional Accountability
Political accountability remains the cornerstone of constitutional democracy. Regardless of political affiliation, all public officials are expected to operate within constitutional limits, respect electoral timelines, uphold institutional independence, and adhere to the rule of law.
Critics argue that Somalia requires stronger independent institutions, credible elections, judicial independence, effective anti-corruption mechanisms, and meaningful political dialogue to restore confidence in public governance. They further contend that durable political reform depends upon constitutional adherence, institutional integrity, and respect for democratic norms.
Conclusion
Somalia stands at a defining constitutional moment, with the federal government and a growing opposition coalition of federal member states holding fundamentally incompatible views on the legitimacy of the current presidential and parliamentary mandate. Allegations of corruption, nepotism, institutional mismanagement, and deteriorating relations between Mogadishu and Puntland, Jubbaland, and South West State have intensified debate over the country’s democratic direction.
Opponents argue that lasting political stability cannot be built upon centralized authority, weakened institutions, or prolonged constitutional uncertainty. Instead, they contend that Somalia’s future depends upon resolving the current electoral impasse through negotiation, strengthening institutional accountability, combating corruption, promoting merit-based public administration, reinforcing cooperative federalism, and ensuring that political competition is conducted within the framework of law, constitutional order, and democratic principles.

A Rebuttal: Former Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke and the Constitutional Test of Statesmanship

What Sharmarke has actually said publicly (as of this week)


His recent public statements have been about de-escalation, not confrontation. He said he does not believe Puntland will declare itself independent, arguing that the current political tensions require dialogue and consensus  (Hiiraan Online) , and said Puntland’s grievances with the Federal Government of Somalia should be addressed through political engagement rather than confrontation  (Hiiraan Online) . Just yesterday, he warned against a possible armed conflict in Galkacyo, arguing that Puntland authorities should not use military force against other Puntland Security Forces without a clear legal reason  (Puntlandpost) , and urged Puntland authorities to exercise restraint, stressing that the situation required dialogue, de-escalation and a negotiated settlement rather than military action (RaxanReeb). 

Worth noting: this was an opinion/commentary piece, and its claims about Sharmarke’s stance don’t fully align with his most recent public statements (which have emphasized dialogue and restraint).

Ali Mahdi Noor

Former Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke and the Constitutional Test of Statesmanship


Instead of serving as a moderating and unifying voice during a politically sensitive period, former Somali Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke has come under criticism from political opponents and sections of the Puntland community. They argue that his perceived sympathy for irregular armed groups and extra-institutional political mobilisation risks undermining constitutional authority, deepening political divisions, and destabilising Puntland.
To these critics, the contradiction is difficult to ignore. A former Prime Minister, twice entrusted with defending the Constitution and the rule of law, is now seen as favouring political confrontation over constitutional process. They contend that experienced statesmen should strengthen institutions, encourage dialogue, and uphold democratic norms—not contribute to political polarisation.
Critics further argue that supporting leaders accused of seeking unconstitutional extensions of their mandates is incompatible with democratic governance. In their view, political legitimacy flows from constitutional order, accountable institutions, respect for term limits, and peaceful transfers of power—not personal loyalties or political strategies that inflame division.
Some also contend that Mr. Sharmarke has aligned himself too closely with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s political agenda, raising questions about the independence and impartiality expected of a former national leader. They point to persistent allegations of patronage politics, arguing that, whether ultimately substantiated or not, such perceptions weaken public confidence in democratic institutions and the integrity of political leadership.
At its core, the debate is about the responsibility of former national leaders. Those who have occupied the country’s highest offices are expected to defend constitutional governance, reinforce institutional stability, and promote national reconciliation. Critics argue that any departure from those principles risks deepening political tensions rather than resolving them.
History rarely remembers leaders for their political alliances or short-term victories. It remembers those who defended the Constitution when it was under pressure, protected the rule of law when it was inconvenient, and placed the national interest above partisan calculations. That, ultimately, is the constitutional test of statesmanship.


Abdiladif Ahmed

Diplomatic Friction Raises Questions About Governance and Accountability in Somalia

Recent reports have intensified political debate amid claims of travel-related restrictions involving individuals connected to senior Somali leadership, reportedly linked to actions by Kenyan authorities. The developments have drawn significant public attention following earlier controversies involving senior Somali officials.

The reports include allegations relating to financial activities and other matters involving certain individuals; however, these claims remain unverified, and no official statements have been issued by the individuals concerned or the Somali Federal Government.

Broader Governance Concerns

These developments have renewed debate among political commentators and policy analysts about governance and institutional accountability in Somalia. Critics argue that political patronage, nepotism, and clan-based considerations have, at times, undermined merit-based appointments and institutional performance.

More broadly, controversies involving senior officials can affect public trust, institutional credibility, and a country’s international standing, including its diplomatic relations with partners such as Kenya. Effective governance depends not only on individual conduct but also on transparent vetting processes, independent oversight, and adherence to the rule of law.

Where serious allegations arise, they require impartial investigation, due process, and clear public communication. Ultimately, government credibility rests on its ability to enforce accountability consistently, uphold institutional integrity, and ensure that public office is guided by competence and the national interest.

Abdiladif Ahmed

Meritocracy Wanted; Patronage Need Not Apply

Somalia deserves a government where competence unlocks opportunity, integrity commands respect, and public office is treated as a constitutional trust—not a political inheritance. Instead, governance increasingly resembles a patronage marketplace in which loyalty is the favored currency and merit is asked to wait outside the door.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration, many experts argue, has too often prioritized political patronage over merit. When allegiance becomes the main qualification for public office, institutions stop serving the Republic and begin serving political interests. The predictable results are weakened governance, eroded public trust, and institutions that spend more time preserving alliances than solving national problems.

Somalia has already paid a steep price for authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism, political exclusion, and clan-based polarization. Those are not proud chapters to be repeated; they are lessons that demand to be remembered. A nation that persistently rewards the same governance failures should not be surprised when it inherits the same crises. Repeating yesterday’s mistakes will not build a different future.

Concerns from Somali scholars, constitutional experts, and policy analysts reinforce this warning. Disputes over electoral processes and constitutional governance risk eroding legitimacy, widening political divisions, and straining relations between the Federal Government and several Federal Member States, including Puntland and Jubbaland. A federation cannot be strengthened by governing through perpetual constitutional confrontation.

No country has appointed itself into prosperity by sidelining competence. Corruption does not become reform because it is wrapped in polished rhetoric. Nepotism does not become reconciliation because it is spoken with patriotic language. Political favoritism does not become state-building because it is labeled strategic leadership. A different slogan cannot disguise the same old machinery.

Somalia’s greatest asset has never been political patronage. It lies in honest professionals, dedicated civil servants, entrepreneurs, scholars, constitutional lawyers, security specialists, innovators, and young people whose talents far exceed their political connections. Yet merit too often waits in the wings while loyalty walks straight into positions of influence.

The real national loss is not another controversial appointment; it is the quiet departure of talent, the steady politicization of institutions, and the normalization of mediocrity. Every qualified candidate overlooked weakens state capacity. Every institution subordinated to political convenience weakens the nation itself.

History is unforgiving. It rarely recalls how many loyalists a leader appointed; it remembers whether institutions became stronger or weaker, whether the rule of law expanded or contracted, and whether the nation emerged more united or more divided. Patronage may buy today’s political comfort; only meritocracy earns tomorrow’s respect.

Analysts also warn of threats to institutional resilience: allegations of extremist infiltration into public institutions and rising political mistrust within the federal system. These risks transcend party lines and require transparent investigation, credible safeguards, and evidence-based policies. Ignoring structural vulnerabilities is not a viable national-security strategy.

For these reasons Somalia’s intellectual community cannot afford the silence of neutrality. Academics, constitutional lawyers, policy experts, civil society leaders, and professionals have a civic duty to defend constitutional governance, institutional independence, accountability, and evidence-based policymaking. Their loyalty should belong neither to personalities nor factions, but to the Constitution, the State, and the Somali people.

Somalia does not need a political culture in which surnames eclipse qualifications, access substitutes for ability, and proximity to power displaces professional excellence. It does not need unity that is applauded in speeches while patronage weakens institutions. The country needs leadership that values competence over connections, institutions over personalities, accountability over convenience, and the national interest over partisan calculation.

Ultimately, leadership should be judged not by how many allies are rewarded with office but by the quality of institutions left behind. States are not built on patronage networks or political indebtedness. They are built on merit, protected by the rule of law, reinforced by accountability, and sustained by leaders who treat public office as a responsibility—not a private franchise.

Abdiladif Ahmed

The State of the Middle East War: Tactical Victory, Strategic Stalemate


By WDM
The battle is still underway.
The United States and Israel may have succeeded in decapitating much of Iran’s senior political and military leadership. By any conventional military standard, that was an extraordinary tactical achievement.
Yet the war has not ended.
Instead, Iran’s regime remains intact, its armed forces continue to fight, and Tehran appears more assertive than before. Rather than collapsing under the weight of the initial assault, Iran has demonstrated that removing leaders does not necessarily remove a state’s capacity—or determination—to resist.
The strategic centre of gravity has now shifted to the Strait of Hormuz. With Iran asserting control over the waterway and the United States attempting to enforce its own maritime blockade, one of the world’s most critical energy corridors has become the principal battlefield. The consequences extend far beyond the Middle East, affecting global trade, energy markets, and international security.
This is the paradox of modern warfare.
Winning the opening battle does not guarantee winning the war.
If the objective was to force Iran into strategic submission, that objective remains unfulfilled. Instead, the conflict has entered a prolonged contest of endurance, deterrence, and economic pressure.
History repeatedly reminds us that tactical brilliance does not automatically produce strategic success. A government can lose its leaders and still retain its will to fight.
The decisive question is no longer who struck first or who struck hardest.
It is who can outlast the other politically, economically, and militarily.
The Middle East war is therefore far from over.
The opening strikes may have rewritten the battlefield.
The final outcome will be decided by who controls the strategic consequences.

Danish PM Attends Meeting That Ended in His Wife’s Dismissal


A Story Almost Impossible to Imagine in Somalia


According to a widely shared account, the wife of Denmark’s prime minister was employed as a teacher at a public school. After concerns were raised about her performance, the school principal summoned her to an official disciplinary meeting.
As is common in such proceedings, she chose to bring someone to accompany her as a witness. That person happened to be her husband—the Prime Minister of Denmark.
The outcome was remarkable. Despite the presence of the country’s most powerful elected official, the meeting concluded with the teacher being dismissed from her job. Even more striking, the media and political opposition questioned whether the prime minister should have attended at all, arguing that his presence could be interpreted as an attempt to influence the disciplinary process.
Now imagine the same scenario in Somalia.
The questions would be very different:
How could a school principal even summon the prime minister’s wife?
If she were summoned, would the meeting genuinely focus on her professional shortcomings?
If the prime minister attended, who would dare dismiss her?
More fundamentally, how could the spouse of a sitting prime minister even hold an ordinary teaching job without attracting accusations of favouritism or political privilege?
The contrast goes beyond two individuals. It reflects two very different political cultures. In one, public office is expected to remain separate from the rule of law and institutional decision-making. In the other, state power is too often seen as a shield against accountability rather than a responsibility to uphold it.
That difference may explain more about governance than a thousand political speeches.

—–
Source: Abdirahman Hassan Anteeno. Relayed by Ahmed Farah Yare

A Community Organiser in Far Places

The Crown of Knowledge Is Character


By WDM | Commentary and Critical Analysis

والمـال إن لم تدخره محصنا بالعلــم كـان نهايـة
الإمـــــلاق
والعلــم إن لم تكتنفه شمائــل تعليه كان مطيـــة الإخـفــــاق
لا تحسبن العلــم
ينفع وحـــده مـا لم يتـوج ربــــه أخلاق

هذه الأبيات الشعرية تعبر عن أهمية العلم وال أخلاق والمال. إليك ترجمتها بكلمات واضحة وبسيطة:
المال والعلم: المال يحتاج إلى علم ليحفظه، والعلم يحتاج إلى أخلاق ليرتفع شأنه.الأخلاق: العلم وحده لا يكفي إن لم تكن معه أخلاق حسنة.هل تريد مني أن أشرح لك معنى هذه الأبيات أكثر أو أساعدك في ترجمة نصوص أخرى؟

Suudi Yalaxow, a Somali warlord-turned a Federal Senator without a formal education once said, “Aqoontu naf ay gashay rabtaa” ( education needs a character to live in).

One of the finest lessons preserved in classical Arabic poetry is that wealth, knowledge, and character are inseparable foundations of a successful life and a prosperous nation.
The poet teaches that wealth without knowledge eventually disappears into poverty. Knowledge without noble character becomes a vehicle for failure. And knowledge alone is of little value unless it is crowned with ethics.
That timeless wisdom speaks directly to our age.
Today, societies celebrate academic degrees, professional titles, and financial success. Yet corruption thrives, institutions weaken, and public trust evaporates. The problem is not a shortage of educated people. It is a shortage of educated people with integrity.
A dishonest lawyer can pervert justice. A corrupt engineer can endanger lives. An unethical politician can destroy a nation. Intelligence without morality is not a blessing—it is a national liability.
The same is true of wealth. Money can build schools, hospitals, businesses, and opportunities. But without knowledge and integrity, it becomes an instrument of greed, patronage, and corruption.
This is why education must be more than the transfer of information. Its highest purpose is to cultivate honesty, humility, discipline, and a sense of public duty. A society that rewards credentials while neglecting character is preparing its own decline.
The Arab poet understood centuries ago what many modern leaders still fail to grasp:
The true crown of knowledge is not a diploma, but character. The true guardian of wealth is not a bank, but wisdom. And the true foundation of a great nation is neither money nor education alone, but the integrity that gives both their purpose.

——

Ahmed Farah Yare contributed to this commentary.

Somalia’s Greatest Threat Is Not Foreign Powers—It Is the Failure of National Vision

By Dr. Abucar Aden Adde

Virginia, USA.

History warns those who are willing to listen.

In his study of Fascist Italy’s colonial ambitions, Dr. Abucar Aden Adde draws attention to an entry in Galeazzo Ciano’s diary in which Benito Mussolini reportedly discussed the possibility of turning Majeerteenia (Migiurtinia) into a concession for international Jewish settlement because of its strategic location and natural resources. Whether such a proposal was ever realistic is less important than what it reveals: powerful states have long viewed Somali territory through the prism of their own interests. Ref: (https://ismailwarsame.blog/2026/07/24/when-fascist-europe-looked-to-puntland-a-forgotten-diplomatic-note-and-the-strategic-value-of-majeerteenia-2/).

The lesson is timeless. Somalia’s sovereignty has never been guaranteed by geography alone. It has depended—and still depends—on the strength, unity, and vision of its own people.

Today, Somalia’s greatest danger is not an invading army or a foreign conspiracy. It is internal weakness. Political fragmentation, corruption, fragile institutions, clan rivalries, and the absence of long-term national vision have created openings that external actors naturally exploit. Weak states invite influence; strong states command respect.

Too much of Somali politics remains trapped in short-term survival. Leaders compete for power rather than build institutions. Clan calculations outweigh national priorities. Personal ambition replaces public service. As trust in government declines, the state’s ability to defend its sovereignty weakens.

Foreign governments will always pursue their own strategic, economic, and security interests. That is the nature of international politics. Somalia’s responsibility is not to expect others to safeguard its sovereignty, but to build institutions capable of safeguarding it itself.

Somalia possesses extraordinary advantages: the longest coastline on mainland Africa, vast marine resources, a youthful population, and a strategic location linking Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean. But potential without vision produces little. Prosperity requires competent leadership, accountable institutions, and a shared commitment to the national interest.

The warning preserved in Ciano’s diary is therefore not about a proposal that never materialized. It is about a political truth that remains relevant today: weak states invite outside designs.

Somalia’s future will not be decided in foreign capitals. It will be decided by whether Somalis choose unity over division, institutions over personalities, merit over patronage, and national vision over clan politics.

History has already delivered its warning. The responsibility now belongs to this generation.

When Fascist Europe Looked to Puntland: A Forgotten Diplomatic Note and the Strategic Value of Majeerteenia

Warsame Policy & Media Network (WAPMEN)
Critical analysis, news and commentaries

A WPMEN Editorial — July 24, 2026

History has an uncomfortable habit of exposing truths that modern politics prefers to ignore. One such truth lies buried in an obscure Italian diplomatic note from 1938 — only a few lines long, yet revealing how the world’s great powers once viewed what is today Puntland.

In his diary entry of 30 August 1938, Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano recorded a striking conversation with Benito Mussolini. According to Ciano’s account, the Duce spoke of a plan to turn Migiurtinia into a concession for international Jewish settlement, citing the region’s considerable natural resources as grounds for exploitation.

This was not an offhand remark. It came at the highest levels of Fascist Italy, at a moment when Europe was marching toward the Second World War — while Mussolini was weighing Hitler’s designs on Czechoslovakia, he was also contemplating the future of Migiurtinia (Majeerteenia) in northeastern Somalia.

The significance is hard to overstate. The region was not viewed as a barren colonial outpost; it was regarded as territory with genuine economic value — an assessment made by the colonial administration itself, an authority whose only real interest was extracting profit from conquered land.

A Region Undervalued by Its Own

Today, many Somalis casually dismiss Puntland as merely another federal member state. Yet eighty-eight years ago, one of Europe’s most expansionist regimes considered the region significant enough to feature in high-level geopolitical planning. That contrast should prompt some hard questions: What did Italian colonial planners understand about Puntland’s economic potential that successive Somali governments have failed to investigate or develop? Why did foreign powers recognize strategic value in the region while contemporary Somali politics remained — and remains — mired in clan rivalry and constitutional dispute?

History repeatedly shows that outsiders often see a country’s value before its own leaders do. Puntland sits on one of the world’s most strategically important maritime crossroads, commanding the approaches to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Its coastline runs more than 1,600 kilometres, and it holds rich fisheries, untapped mineral prospects, hydrocarbon potential, and direct access to one of the busiest trade corridors on Earth. None of this is a recent discovery — colonial planners understood it nearly a century ago.

Strategic Value and the Roots of Federalism

The 1938 note also sheds light on something else that is often overlooked: Puntland’s role as the principal champion of a federal Somalia was not a political accident. It was grounded in the region’s own history and geography. For centuries, the Majeerteen Sultanate maintained functioning political institutions, maritime commerce, and diplomatic relations with foreign powers. Italy’s own assessment of the region’s strategic and economic worth — Mussolini’s remark included — was simply another acknowledgment of what was never an ordinary colonial possession.

When the Somali state collapsed in 1991, Puntland’s founders did not call for a return to an all-powerful centralized government. They understood, from hard experience, that concentrating authority in Mogadishu had repeatedly produced instability, exclusion, and eventual collapse. Instead, they envisioned a Somalia built on the devolution of power, constitutional power-sharing, and regional self-government within a united state — a vision rooted in historical reality, not emotion or opportunism. A region that had long exercised meaningful political autonomy, and understood its own strategic worth, naturally concluded that Somalia’s future depended on sharing power rather than monopolizing it.

Puntland’s founding in 1998, and its sustained advocacy for federalism since, therefore amounted to more than a regional political project — it became the intellectual and constitutional blueprint for rebuilding Somalia after civil war. Whatever one thinks of federalism today, it is hard to deny that this vision emerged from lived historical experience rather than political convenience.

A Missed Strategic Opportunity

There is a real irony here: Fascist Italy recognized Puntland’s importance almost ninety years ago, however cynically, in service of imperial ambition — yet many Somali politicians today still underestimate the very region that supplied the constitutional framework on which modern Somalia now rests. Rather than building institutions capable of unlocking this potential, successive governments have spent their energy on political intrigue, centralization battles, and zero-sum struggles for power.

The note is also a reminder that Somalia has never existed in geopolitical isolation. External powers have always viewed Somali territory through a strategic lens — sometimes military bases, sometimes maritime routes, sometimes natural resources, and, as this note suggests, occasionally even demographic engineering.

To be clear, the lesson here is not that Mussolini’s proposal deserved consideration — it did not. It emerged from a fascist colonial worldview that treated occupied territories as assets to be disposed of without the consent of the people living there, a mentality that belongs in history’s museum of failed empires. The real lesson is different: if colonial powers saw Puntland as strategically indispensable in 1938, why have so many Somali leaders since failed to grasp its importance? Why has nearly a century passed without a coherent national strategy for developing one of the Horn of Africa’s most strategically located regions?

Conclusion

A nation that forgets how others once valued its territory risks undervaluing it itself. History is not simply about remembering the past — it is about understanding why powerful states make the decisions they do. The Fascists saw value in Majeerteenia because they were thinking strategically, even though their objectives were morally bankrupt. Modern Somali leaders can learn that strategic lesson without inheriting the colonial mindset behind it.

Puntland is not strategically important because Mussolini said so. His words matter only because they inadvertently confirm what serious geopolitical planners already understood: northeastern Somalia occupied an important place on the world’s strategic map long before today’s political disputes existed. Its later role as the champion of a devolved, federal Somalia was no historical accident — it was the logical political expression of a region whose history, geography, and institutional traditions had long set it apart within the Somali peninsula.

That reality has not changed. What has changed is the quality of leadership entrusted with managing it. The evidence is there. The question is whether Somalia is prepared to learn from it — or will keep letting others recognize Puntland’s value before its own leaders do.

Somalia’s Governance Crisis: Stop Blaming One Man

It is politically convenient to blame Hassan Sheikh Mohamud for Somalia’s collapse. He deserves criticism for executive overreach, constitutional manipulation, and weakening democratic institutions. But to pretend that Somalia’s crisis begins and ends with one man is to misunderstand the disease.
Somalia’s governance crisis is a collective failure. All of us as citizens have failed.
The presidents of the Federal Member States cannot wash their hands of responsibility. Many condemned authoritarianism only after it turned against them. Before that, they tolerated it, legitimized it, or quietly benefited from it. No story illustrates this better than that of Abdulaziz Hassan Mohamed “Lafta Gareen.” He stood firmly behind Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s political project as Villa Somalia steadily accumulated power. The weakening of constitutional checks and balances did not alarm him because the system appeared to serve his own interests. But power built on expediency rarely remains loyal. Once Lafta Gareen had served his political purpose, he too found himself cast aside by the very system he had helped sustain.
The lesson should not be lost on Sheikh Aden Madoobe, who now occupies the position Lafta Gareen once held through a political process widely criticized by opponents. Those who believe proximity to Villa Somalia guarantees political survival should study Somalia’s recent history carefully. Nor should Ahmed Abdi Kaariye “Qoor Qoor” ignore the warning. His current political difficulties increasingly resemble the trajectory that ended Lafta Gareen’s dominance. In Somalia’s politics, today’s trusted ally can become tomorrow’s expendable liability once political calculations change. The machinery of unconstitutional power has no permanent beneficiaries—it eventually consumes many of those who helped build it.
As Villa Somalia accumulated power, other regional leaders also remained silent because the same concentration of power served their own political interests. Federalism was never meant to produce miniature dictatorships. Yet that is precisely what much of Somalia has become.
Nor are international donors innocent bystanders.
For years, billions of dollars have poured into Somalia in the name of state-building, while institutions remained weak and political elites became stronger. Too often, aid has reinforced patronage networks instead of dismantling them. Stability became the overriding objective; accountability became an afterthought. The result is a political economy in which access to donor resources matters more than delivering public services or respecting constitutional governance.
This is why replacing Hassan Sheikh Mohamud alone will solve nothing.
If the same political culture survives, the next president will inherit—and likely exploit—the very same machinery of patronage, elite bargaining, and institutional capture. Somalia does not merely have a leadership problem; it has a governance system that rewards impunity and punishes accountability.
The country needs more than a change of faces. It needs a return to constitutional rule, genuine checks and balances, empowered legislatures, an independent judiciary, transparent federal-state relations, and donor assistance tied to measurable institutional reforms rather than political expediency.
Until federal leaders, regional presidents, and international partners all accept their share of responsibility, Somalia will continue to change presidents while preserving the very system that keeps failing its people.
The tragedy is not that one leader has failed. The tragedy is that an entire political class—and too many of its international partners—have learned how to survive by managing failure instead of ending it. Unless that political culture changes, Lafta Gareen will not be the last ally to discover that unconstitutional power protects no one—not even those who once believed they were indispensable.

When Fascist Europe Looked to Puntland: A Forgotten Diplomatic Note and the Strategic Value of Majeerteenia

A WDM Editorial

A diplomatic note from the former Italian Foreign Minister, 1938. Read its translation below in the text.


History has an uncomfortable habit of exposing truths that modern politics prefers to ignore. One such truth lies buried in an obscure Italian diplomatic note from 1938. It is only a few lines long, yet it speaks volumes about how the world’s great powers once viewed what is today Puntland.
In his diary entry of 30 August 1938, Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano recorded a remarkable conversation with Benito Mussolini:

The Translation of the note:
“The Duce… also informs me of his plan to make Migiurtinia a concession for international Jews. He says that the country has considerable natural resources that the Jews could exploit…”


Pause and think about that.
This was not an offhand remark. It was a discussion taking place at the highest levels of Fascist Italy while Europe was marching toward the Second World War. Mussolini was simultaneously discussing Adolf Hitler’s plans over Czechoslovakia and contemplating the future of Migiurtinia (Majeerteenia) in northeastern Somalia.
The significance is profound.
The region was not viewed as a barren colonial outpost. It was regarded as a territory possessing “considerable natural resources.” That assessment came from the colonial administration itself—people whose primary interest was extracting economic value from conquered lands.
Today, many Somalis casually dismiss Puntland as merely another federal member state. Yet eighty-eight years ago, one of Europe’s most expansionist regimes considered the region sufficiently valuable to feature in high-level geopolitical planning.
This should force Somalis to ask difficult questions.
What did Italian colonial planners know about Puntland’s economic potential that successive Somali governments have failed to investigate or develop? Why were foreign powers already identifying strategic value in the region while contemporary Somali politics remains trapped in endless clan rivalries and constitutional disputes?
History repeatedly demonstrates that outsiders often recognize the value of a country before its own leaders do.
Puntland occupies one of the world’s most strategic maritime locations. It commands the approaches to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Its coastline stretches for more than 1,600 kilometres. It possesses rich fisheries, untapped mineral prospects, hydrocarbon potential, and access to one of the world’s busiest maritime trade corridors.
These are not recent discoveries. Colonial planners understood them nearly a century ago.
The 1938 diplomatic note also illuminates another historical reality that many observers continue to overlook. Puntland’s emergence as the principal champion of a federal Somalia was not an accident of modern politics. It was grounded in its own history, geography, and strategic importance.
For centuries, the Majeerteen Sultanate maintained functioning political institutions, maritime commerce, and diplomatic relations with foreign powers. During the colonial period, Italy itself regarded the region as strategically valuable because of its location and natural wealth. Mussolini’s reference to Migiurtinia was yet another acknowledgment that this was no ordinary colonial possession.
When the Somali state collapsed in 1991, Puntland’s founders did not advocate the return of an all-powerful centralized government. They understood from history that concentrating authority in Mogadishu had repeatedly produced instability, exclusion, and eventually state collapse. Instead, they envisioned a new Somalia based on the devolution of power, constitutional power-sharing, and regional self-government within a united Somali state.
That vision was neither emotional nor opportunistic. It reflected historical reality. A region that had long exercised significant political autonomy and understood its strategic value naturally concluded that Somalia’s future depended upon sharing power rather than monopolizing it.
The establishment of Puntland in 1998 and its subsequent advocacy for federalism therefore represented far more than a regional political project. It became the intellectual and constitutional blueprint for rebuilding Somalia after civil war. Whether one supports or opposes federalism today, it is impossible to deny that Puntland’s federal vision emerged from historical experience rather than political expediency.
Ironically, while Fascist Italy recognized Puntland’s strategic importance almost ninety years ago for imperial ambitions, many Somali politicians today continue to underestimate the very region that supplied the constitutional framework upon which modern Somalia now rests.
Unfortunately, Somalia’s political class has rarely demonstrated comparable strategic thinking. Instead of building institutions capable of unlocking this immense potential, successive governments have devoted their energies to political intrigue, centralization battles, and zero-sum struggles for power.
The 1938 diplomatic note also reminds us that Somalia has never existed in geopolitical isolation. External powers have always viewed Somali territory through strategic calculations. Sometimes those calculations involved military bases. Sometimes maritime routes. Sometimes natural resources. Occasionally, as this note suggests, even demographic engineering.
The lesson is not that Mussolini’s proposal deserved consideration—it did not. It emerged from a fascist colonial worldview that treated occupied territories as assets to be disposed of without the consent of their inhabitants. That mentality belongs in history’s museum of failed empires.
The real lesson is different.
If colonial powers regarded Puntland as strategically indispensable in 1938, why do so many Somali leaders today fail to appreciate its importance? Why has nearly a century passed without a coherent national strategy for developing one of the Horn of Africa’s most strategically located regions?
A nation that forgets how others valued its territory risks undervaluing it itself.
History is not merely about remembering the past. It is about understanding why powerful states make the decisions they do. The Fascists saw value in Majeerteenia because they were thinking strategically—even if their objectives were morally bankrupt.
Modern Somali leaders should learn the strategic lesson without inheriting the colonial mindset.
Puntland is not strategically important because Mussolini said so. Mussolini’s words matter because they inadvertently reveal what serious geopolitical planners already understood: northeastern Somalia occupied an important place on the world’s strategic map long before today’s political disputes.
The fact that Puntland later envisioned and championed a new Somalia based on the devolution of power was therefore no historical accident. It was the logical political expression of a region whose historical experience, strategic location, and institutional traditions had long distinguished it within the Somali peninsula.
That reality has not changed.
What has changed is the quality of leadership entrusted with managing it.
History has preserved the evidence. The question is whether Somalia is prepared to learn from it—or continue allowing others to recognize the value of Puntland before its own leaders do.

The Goofka Doctrine and the Future of Somali Federalism


By Ismail H. Warsame


Somalia did not adopt federalism because politicians suddenly embraced decentralization. It adopted federalism because centralized rule destroyed the Somali state. The Provisional Constitution was meant to ensure that no government in Mogadishu could again dominate the rest of the country through patronage, coercion, or clan politics.
Yet that is precisely what many Somalis now fear is happening.
The growing accusation against President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is not simply one of political interference. It is the allegation that he is governing through what many call the “Goofka doctrine”—a politics that elevates clan loyalty above constitutional federalism and seeks to extend Mogadishu’s influence by cultivating loyalists inside the Federal Member States.
South West State is widely seen by critics as politically subdued. Jubaland has resisted repeated attempts at federal pressure. Puntland now believes it has become the next target, with fears that Mogadishu is searching for local proxies to divide the state from within rather than confront it openly.
Whether every allegation is true is almost secondary.
The real danger is that Somalia’s unfinished Constitution makes such accusations entirely believable.
Where constitutional powers remain undefined, patronage replaces law. Where institutions are weak, political clients become more valuable than constitutional partners. Every federal vacuum eventually becomes an opportunity for political capture.
Puntland must therefore remain vigilant. Garowe and Bosaso should pay close attention to attempts at candidate engineering, security manipulation, financial dependency, and narrative warfare disguised as “national unity.” Federal cooperation must never become federal subordination.
But Puntland must also avoid a familiar trap. Not every governance failure can be blamed on Mogadishu. Corruption, weak administration, and political complacency cannot be excused by invoking external conspiracies.
Both Villa Somalia and the Federal Member States have constitutional obligations.
The centre must stop treating federal states as political territories to be conquered.
The regions must stop treating federalism as a shield against accountability.
Somalia’s future depends on neither central domination nor perpetual regional confrontation. It depends on completing the federal project: clarifying constitutional powers, strengthening independent institutions, respecting regional autonomy, and ending the politics of clan patronage.
The greatest threat to Somalia today is not one politician.
It is the belief that constitutions can be replaced by loyalists.
Once that becomes the accepted rule of politics, federalism survives only on paper—and Somalia risks repeating the very mistakes that caused the collapse of the state.

The Presidency Has Failed Somalia: Time to Abolish the Office Before It Abolishes the Country

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/e-presidency-has-failed-somalia-time

The Presidency Has Failed Somalia: Time to Abolish the Office Before It Abolishes the Country

A WDM-Style Editorial Essay


For more than six decades, Somalis have searched for better leaders. They have changed presidents, prime ministers, constitutions, political systems, military rulers, transitional governments, and federal arrangements. Yet the country remains trapped in the same vicious cycle of dictatorship, corruption, clan patronage, institutional collapse, and recurring political crises.
Perhaps Somalis have been asking the wrong question.
The real problem may not be who becomes president. The real problem may be the presidency itself.
That office has become Somalia’s most destructive political institution. It is the black hole into which constitutions disappear, institutions collapse, public resources are looted, and national unity is sacrificed. Every election becomes a struggle not over ideas or policies, but over who captures the presidency—and with it, the power to dominate everyone else.
The office no longer serves the state. The state exists to serve the office.
The Presidency Produces Kings, Not Public Servants
The Somali Constitution formally envisages a parliamentary system. In practice, however, Somalia operates under an increasingly imperial presidency.
Every president eventually attempts to become bigger than the Constitution itself.
Parliament becomes an inconvenience.
The judiciary becomes a political instrument.
Independent commissions become extensions of Villa Somalia.
Security institutions become personal guards.
Public resources become political weapons.
The result is predictable. Every administration centralizes authority, weakens oversight, rewards loyalists, punishes critics, and governs through patronage rather than law.
Different personalities.
Identical outcomes.
The Presidency Has Become the Engine of Clan Conflict
Every presidential election turns into a national clan confrontation because everyone understands one uncomfortable truth:
The presidency controls everything.
It controls appointments.
It controls contracts.
It controls foreign aid.
It controls security forces.
It controls intelligence agencies.
It influences justice.
Naturally, every clan views State House not merely as an office but as political survival itself.
Winning becomes everything.
Losing becomes unacceptable.
Thus Somalia has unintentionally designed the perfect constitutional machine for permanent instability.
Even the Federal Member States copied the disease.
Instead of creating decentralized democracies, they merely established smaller presidential kingdoms where regional presidents exercise similar powers with similar consequences.
The infection spread because the constitutional virus was never cured.
Somalia Does Not Need Another Strongman
Every election produces promises of a “new beginning.”
Every president promises accountability.
Every president promises constitutionalism.
Every president promises national reconciliation.
Then reality intervenes.
Power changes people because concentrated power always changes institutions before it changes individuals.
The presidency rewards personal loyalty over competence.
It encourages fear rather than consultation.
It transforms public office into personal property.
No constitutional amendment can permanently restrain an office built upon excessive concentration of authority.
The office itself must be redesigned.
Replace One Man with Collective Leadership
Instead of electing another political emperor every four years, Somalia should abolish the presidency entirely.
Replace it with a Council of Chairpersons exercising collective executive authority.
No single individual would possess overwhelming constitutional power.
The chairmanship would rotate annually among council members.
Executive decisions would require collective deliberation rather than presidential decree.
Power would become shared rather than monopolized.
Politics would become negotiation rather than domination.
Such an arrangement would significantly reduce the zero-sum struggle that has poisoned Somali politics for generations.
Nobody would be able to capture the State because nobody would own the executive.
This Is Not Political Fantasy
History demonstrates that constitutional systems can change.
Armenia transformed itself into a parliamentary republic by substantially reducing presidential authority and strengthening parliament.
Georgia followed a similar path by converting the presidency into a largely ceremonial institution while vesting executive authority in parliament and the prime minister.
Moldova attempted the same transition, although later constitutional complications led to the restoration of direct presidential elections.
These examples reveal two important lessons.
First, constitutional reform is possible.
Second, institutional culture matters more than constitutional text.
Somalia should not mechanically copy foreign models. It should design a uniquely Somali solution that reflects its own political realities rather than imported constitutional theories.
Reform Peacefully—or Risk Revolutionary Change
Across Somalia, frustration continues to grow.
Allegations of corruption.
Abuse of public office.
Illegal land seizures.
Misuse of security institutions.
Constitutional violations.
Political exclusion.
Public confidence continues to erode because citizens increasingly see institutions serving politicians rather than politicians serving institutions.
History offers an unmistakable warning.
When peaceful constitutional mechanisms cease to deliver accountability, societies eventually seek justice outside constitutional frameworks.
Revolutions rarely begin because people love instability.
They begin because institutions stop working.
Somalia should never allow itself to reach that point again.
A National Constitutional Convention
This transformation cannot emerge from Villa Somalia alone.
Nor should it.
It requires a genuinely inclusive National Constitutional Congress bringing together federal institutions, Federal Member States, traditional leaders, civil society, legal scholars, political parties, women, youth, and the wider Somali public.
The task would be straightforward:
Decide whether the presidency still serves Somalia.
Examine alternative executive models.
Redesign the constitutional architecture.
Build institutions that distribute power instead of concentrating it.
Secure broad public legitimacy before implementation.
This would be constitutional renewal—not constitutional improvisation.
Stop Searching for Better Presidents
Somalia has spent generations searching for the perfect president.
It has searched in civilians.
It has searched in generals.
It has searched in Islamists.
It has searched in technocrats.
It has searched in returning diaspora.
The search has produced disappointment after disappointment because the problem was never merely the occupant.
It was always the office.
A constitutional system that repeatedly manufactures institutional crisis deserves fundamental redesign, not cosmetic repair.
The boldest reform Somalia could undertake is not electing another president.
It is abolishing the presidency altogether.
Only then might politics cease revolving around personalities and begin revolving around institutions.
Only then might citizenship become more important than clan arithmetic.
Only then might Somalia finally replace the politics of rulers with the politics of governance.
The presidency has had its historical opportunity.
It failed.
Now the Republic deserves something better.

About

I write because Somalia deserves honest analysis, not comforting illusions.
After serving as Chief of Staff at the Puntland State Presidency (1998–2004) and later with the UN and World Bank Joint Secretariat for Somalia’s Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), followed by service as National Aid Technical Coordinator (NATCO) with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and the European Union, I chose an independent path: to analyse, question, document, and challenge those in power—regardless of political affiliation or clan.
This blog is dedicated to critical analysis, historical perspective, and evidence-based commentary on Somalia’s politics, governance, security, federalism, and state-building. I believe that sustainable peace and accountable government begin with informed public debate, intellectual honesty, and the courage to confront uncomfortable truths.
I am the author of four books, including Talking Truth to Power in an Undemocratic Tribal Context. My writing reflects the WDM philosophy: fearless, independent journalism that places facts, history, and the public interest above personalities, propaganda, and tribal loyalties.
I live and work in Toronto, Canada.
Contact:
ismailwarsame@gmail.com
nattco.somalia@yahoo.ca
@ismailwarsame

Beyond the Gunfire: The PDF–PSF Confrontation Is a Failure of Governance, Not a Clan War


A WDM Editorial


As fighting unfolds between the Puntland Defence Forces (PDF) and rebellious elements of the Puntland Security Force (PSF), one dangerous temptation must be resisted above all others: do not reduce this confrontation to a sub-clan grievance.
That would not merely be intellectually lazy; it would be politically reckless.
The bullets flying around Bosaso are not the inevitable consequence of ancient clan rivalries. They are the predictable result of years of institutional neglect, constitutional ambiguity, weak political leadership, and repeated failures to build a unified state security system. Personalising the conflict or attaching it to sub-clan identity only obscures the real disease while inflaming the symptoms.
This crisis did not begin yesterday. Nor did it begin with the current exchange of fire. It has been developing for well over a decade.
The Original Sin
The PSF was created as an elite counter-terrorism force outside the normal constitutional security architecture of Puntland. Professionally trained and externally supported, it became an effective fighting force against terrorism. Yet its institutional design contained a fatal flaw.
It evolved as a parallel security institution rather than an integrated component of Puntland’s constitutional chain of command.
That distinction matters enormously.
Every functioning state has one fundamental principle: there can be only one legitimate chain of command for the use of force.
The moment a military or security unit develops operational autonomy beyond civilian authority, the seeds of future confrontation have already been planted.
For years, successive Puntland administrations postponed confronting this contradiction. Instead of resolving it through legislation, institutional reform, political dialogue, and constitutional clarity, leaders preferred temporary political accommodations.
Temporary solutions eventually produce permanent crises.
Parallel Security Structures Never Remain Neutral
History offers countless examples.
Whether in Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, parallel armed organisations eventually become political actors. Once an armed institution acquires its own command, funding, external relationships, and internal identity, it naturally begins to defend its organisational interests.
This is not unique to Puntland.
It is the predictable behaviour of institutions operating without clear constitutional boundaries.
The longer such ambiguity persists, the greater the risk that competing political centres begin to seek influence over those forces.
That is precisely where Puntland now finds itself.
Loyalty Cannot Be Switched Without Consequences
Reports and accusations that elements of the PSF have aligned themselves with the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud represent more than an ordinary political disagreement.
If armed personnel established to serve Puntland decide—without constitutional authorization—to transfer their operational loyalty elsewhere, the issue immediately ceases to be an internal personnel dispute.
It becomes a constitutional challenge to Puntland’s authority.
No government anywhere in the world can tolerate armed units independently choosing which political authority they will obey.
Civilian governments may change.
Political parties may change.
Presidents certainly change.
The chain of command cannot.
If security personnel become free agents, the state itself begins to dissolve.
Puntland Also Bears Responsibility
Acknowledging this does not absolve Puntland’s own leadership.
Quite the opposite.
This confrontation reflects years of failure by successive Puntland governments to solve the PSF question before it reached today’s dangerous stage.
Instead of creating a comprehensive legal framework governing elite forces, governments repeatedly postponed difficult decisions.
Instead of integrating all armed units under one constitutional structure, exceptions multiplied.
Instead of strengthening parliamentary oversight and civilian accountability, security policy increasingly revolved around executive decisions.
Instead of building institutions, politics often focused on personalities.
The result is today’s crisis.
Governments cannot indefinitely postpone institutional reform and then express surprise when institutional contradictions eventually explode.
This Is Not About General Diano
Nor is it about any individual commander.
Nor should it become a referendum on President Said Abdullahi Deni.
Nor should it become a political campaign for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
The issue is much larger.
Tomorrow another president will occupy Garowe.
Another president will occupy Villa Somalia.
Another generation of commanders will emerge.
If the constitutional questions remain unresolved, the same confrontation will simply return under different names.
Somalia has already wasted too many decades replacing personalities while preserving dysfunctional institutions.
Stop Weaponising Clan Identity
Perhaps the greatest danger now is the attempt to mobilise public opinion through sub-clan narratives.
Every Somali political crisis eventually attracts voices eager to transform institutional disputes into collective clan grievances.
That temptation must be rejected.
A soldier who violates constitutional authority does not represent his clan.
A government enforcing lawful authority is not fighting a clan.
The law deals with individuals, commands, and institutions—not bloodlines.
Once communities begin interpreting constitutional disputes through the lens of genealogy, rational politics becomes impossible.
Justice gives way to revenge.
Citizenship gives way to tribal mobilisation.
The state slowly disappears.
One State Cannot Sustain Multiple Armies
This principle is universal.
Puntland cannot function indefinitely while maintaining multiple armed organisations operating under uncertain legal arrangements.
The answer is not revenge.
Nor humiliation.
Nor collective punishment.
Nor endless military confrontation.
The answer is institutional reform.
That means establishing the PSF’s legal status beyond dispute, clarifying its chain of command, ensuring transparent budgeting and civilian oversight, integrating or restructuring parallel forces where necessary, and creating a negotiated framework with the Federal Government to prevent overlapping mandates and competing loyalties.
Anything less merely postpones the next crisis.
The Moment for Political Courage
Military victories can restore temporary order.
They cannot resolve constitutional contradictions.
Only politics can do that.
Only institutions can do that.
Only leadership willing to place the interests of Puntland above temporary political calculations can do that.
The fighting around Bosaso should therefore serve as a national warning.
States are not destroyed only by external enemies.
Sometimes they slowly weaken because governments postpone difficult reforms, tolerate institutional ambiguity, and allow parallel centres of armed authority to emerge until confrontation becomes inevitable.
Puntland still has an opportunity to correct that mistake.
But only if it understands one fundamental truth:
This is not a war between sub-clans. It is a struggle over the constitutional monopoly of legitimate force.
The sooner Puntland resolves that question through law rather than gunfire, the stronger both its democracy and its security will become. The longer it delays, the more likely today’s confrontation will become tomorrow’s recurring tragedy.

Historical Perspective: Puntland Was Founded on the Principle of One State, One Force


The significance of Laag extends far beyond a military engagement outside Bosaso. It reaches back to the very philosophy upon which Puntland was founded in 1998.
From its inception, Puntland rejected the warlordism that had consumed southern Somalia following the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. While Mogadishu descended into the rule of competing militias, shifting alliances, and neighbourhood warlords, Puntland’s founders consciously pursued a different path. Their objective was not merely to establish another clan administration, but to build a functioning regional state governed by law, institutions, and a unified security apparatus.
President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed understood a principle that remains as relevant today as it was nearly three decades ago: a government that does not control the gun cannot control the state.
Whenever signs of lawlessness emerged, the response was expected to be swift, lawful, and decisive. Political disagreements were never to become excuses for maintaining private armies or rival chains of command. The authority of the state was expected to prevail because without that authority there could be no investment, no commerce, no justice, and no lasting peace.
Laag is therefore not simply about defeating one rebellious force. It is about reaffirming the constitutional doctrine that Puntland has only one government, one command structure, and one legitimate security establishment.
Those who continue to imagine that political influence can be maintained through armed formations are living in yesterday’s Somalia. The era of warlords, self-appointed generals, and privately controlled military units brought nothing but destruction to the Somali Republic. Puntland was established precisely to escape that destructive cycle—not to reproduce it.
The lesson should resonate throughout Puntland. Political competition is legitimate. Criticism of government is legitimate. Peaceful opposition is indispensable in any constitutional order. Armed defiance of the state is not.
The monopoly over the legitimate use of force belongs exclusively to the Puntland State.
Anything less invites the very anarchy from which Puntland painstakingly rescued itself.
Laag should therefore be remembered not as the beginning of another political feud, but as the moment Puntland recommitted itself to its founding covenant: one Constitution, one government, one security command, and one rule of law.

Mogadishu Repeating Itself: Has Somalia Returned to the USC Era?

By WDM Editorial Board


History has an unforgiving habit: when its lessons are ignored, it returns—not as memory, but as reality.
That is the uncomfortable question of confronting Somalia today. Can anyone honestly explain how Mogadishu under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud fundamentally differs from Mogadishu under the old United Somali Congress (USC), when General Mohamed Farah Aydeed dominated the political and military landscape?
The personalities have changed. The uniforms are different. The speeches are more polished. International donors have replaced wartime patrons. But beneath the surface, many Somalis increasingly see familiar patterns emerging.
During the USC era, political power radiated from Mogadishu while military campaigns stretched into the regions. Baidoa became a battlefield. Jubaland became a theatre of endless confrontation. North Eastern Somalia, including Galkayo, experienced repeated military pressure. Central Somalia descended into instability as competing factions fought for influence rather than building institutions.
Three decades later, the questions refuse to disappear.
Why has confrontation once again become the preferred language of politics?
Why are relations between Mogadishu and several federal member states repeatedly defined by coercion instead of constitutional dialogue?
Why has trust between the centre and the regions deteriorated so dramatically?
These are not rhetorical questions. They strike at the heart of Somalia’s fragile post-war settlement.
The tragedy is that Somalia already answered these questions once before.
The Provisional Federal Constitution was not written merely as another legal document. It was drafted after decades of civil war precisely to prevent the return of the winner-takes-all politics that destroyed the Somali Republic. Federalism was not created because it was theoretically perfect. It emerged because decades of conflict demonstrated that excessive centralization had become politically unacceptable to large sections of the country.
The Constitution was therefore a peace agreement as much as a governing framework.
Its purpose was simple: replace military competition with constitutional negotiation.
Replace coercion with consultation.
Replace domination with power-sharing.
Replace force with federalism.
Yet today many Somalis struggle to identify where that constitutional settlement actually survives in practice.
Where is the Provisional Constitution that was supposed to end the civil war?
Where are the constitutional safeguards that protect federal member states?
Where are the institutions meant to resolve disputes peacefully?
Where is the Federal Government acting as an impartial national government rather than appearing, to many critics, as another contestant in Somalia’s endless political competition?
These questions become even more pressing whenever constitutional disputes are answered politically instead of legally.
A genuine federal government does not measure its success by expanding its influence over every regional administration. It measures success by building consensus among diverse political communities.
Federalism demands restraint.
It requires compromise.
It requires acceptance that not every disagreement constitutes rebellion.
Most importantly, it requires recognition that Somalia today is not Somalia of 1969.
Attempts to govern through political pressure or military leverage risk reopening wounds that have never fully healed.
This is why comparisons with the USC period resonate with many observers—not necessarily because today’s circumstances are identical, but because the underlying political logic appears disturbingly familiar.
When regional tensions multiply simultaneously, when constitutional dialogue weakens, when military language begins replacing political language, and when distrust between Mogadishu and the federal member states becomes the defining feature of governance, history begins casting a very long shadow.
Somalia cannot afford another cycle.
The country has already paid too high a price.
Entire generations have grown up knowing little except instability.
Millions have been displaced.
Economic opportunities have evaporated.
Foreign actors have repeatedly filled the vacuum created by domestic political failure.
No responsible Somali should wish to revisit that road.
The solution is not another military victory.
It is not another constitutional shortcut.
It is not another concentration of power in one political centre.
The solution lies in returning to the principles that ended the worst years of civil conflict: constitutionalism, negotiated federalism, respect for regional autonomy within the constitutional framework, and political dialogue before political confrontation.
History offers Somalia two paths.
One path leads back to the logic of the early 1990s, where every political disagreement eventually becomes a security crisis.
The other follows the unfinished promise of the Provisional Constitution, imperfect though it may be, where disputes are settled through institutions rather than force.
Somalia’s future depends on choosing the second path before the first becomes irreversible.
The greatest danger facing the country today is not simply political disagreement. It is collective historical amnesia.
A nation that forgets why it adopted federalism risks rediscovering why it needed it in the first place.

Disarm Them All Before It Is Too Late: Puntland Cannot Afford Another Armed Challenge


By WDM Editorial Board


Reports of armed confrontation between armed forces in Laag, outside Bosaso City today are deeply disturbing and wholly unacceptable.

Whatever the immediate trigger, one fact remains beyond dispute: Puntland cannot tolerate competing centres of armed power. Political disagreements are inevitable in every society; private armies are not.

This is not simply another security incident. It is a test of whether Puntland still possesses the political will to defend the very foundations upon which it was built.
Puntland did not emerge from chaos by accident. It was painstakingly constructed through reconciliation, consensus, institution-building and the painful lessons of Somalia’s state collapse. The architects of Puntland understood one fundamental truth: a government that does not control the instruments of force is not a government at all. The moment armed groups begin operating outside the authority of the state, the state itself begins to wither.
That is why Bosaso matters.
Bosaso is not merely Puntland’s commercial capital or its busiest seaport. It is the economic lifeline of the State and one of the Horn of Africa’s most strategic maritime gateways. Every gunshot fired near Bosaso sends a damaging message to merchants, investors, shipping companies and ordinary citizens: that security can no longer be taken for granted. No economy prospers under the shadow of rival militias.
Somalia’s tragic history offers an unmistakable warning. States do not collapse overnight. They decay gradually when governments begin making excuses for armed groups, tolerate politically connected militias, or allow clan loyalties to override the rule of law. What begins as a “temporary arrangement” eventually becomes permanent disorder. Before long, politics is no longer conducted through dialogue and institutions but through the barrel of a gun.
Puntland must never walk that road.
The Government of Puntland must therefore act decisively, impartially and within the law. Every armed formation operating outside the recognised security institutions should be disarmed, demobilised and disbanded without exception. There should be no sacred cows, no politically protected militias, no selective justice and no double standards. The law either applies equally to everyone or it protects no one.
This is not a call for indiscriminate force. It is a call for the restoration of lawful authority. Those with legitimate political grievances have numerous constitutional avenues through which to express them: dialogue, Parliament, the courts, traditional mediation and peaceful political organisation. Carrying weapons outside the state command is not political participation; it is an assault on constitutional order.
Puntland’s early administrations understood this principle. Whenever individuals attempted to challenge public order through displays of armed strength, the state’s response was swift, lawful and unmistakable. Disorder was confronted before it became rebellion. Agitators were summoned, questioned and, where necessary, prosecuted. The objective was never revenge. It was deterrence. It was to send a clear message that no individual or clan stood above the law.
Unfortunately, that institutional culture has weakened over time. Too often, governments have confused patience with indecision and compromise with surrender. Armed actors have become emboldened because they increasingly believe the state lacks either the courage or the capacity to confront them. Nothing could be more dangerous.
Traditional elders, religious scholars, business leaders and civil society also have a solemn responsibility. They must reject every attempt to normalise armed politics. Silence today may become regret tomorrow. Every respected voice in Puntland should speak with one message: differences belong around negotiating tables, not behind gun barrels.
The confrontation near Laag must therefore serve as a national wake-up call. Puntland stands at a crossroads. One path leads towards stronger institutions, professional security forces and the supremacy of law. The other leads towards fragmentation, parallel military structures and the slow erosion of everything Puntland has painstakingly built since 1998.
History will not remember how many excuses were offered for today’s confrontation. It will remember whether Puntland’s leaders had the courage to defend the State when it mattered most.
The message should therefore be unmistakable and final: all forces of instability operating outside the authority of Puntland State must be disarmed and disbanded immediately. No political ambition, no clan calculation and no personal grievance can ever justify maintaining parallel armed forces.
The first duty of any government is not to negotiate with illegality but to uphold the law. If Puntland cannot enforce that simple principle, it risks surrendering tomorrow what generations sacrificed to build yesterday.
The time for hesitation has passed. Restore the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Defend Bosaso. Defend Puntland. Defend the rule of law—before another avoidable crisis becomes another irreversible chapter in Somalia’s long history of self-inflicted decline.

——-
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Bosaso’s Calm, Garowe’s Warning: Why Economic Compromise Cannot Substitute for Security Cohesion


By Ismail H. Warsame


The recent agreement between the Puntland Government, DP World (Dubai Ports) and the merchant community over cargo charges at Bosaso Port is a welcome development. After days of tension that threatened to disrupt Puntland’s busiest commercial gateway, the government demonstrated flexibility by reducing the disputed fees, while merchants accepted a compromise that allows trade to resume.
That is good news for everyone.
A functioning economy depends on predictability, and Bosaso Port is the economic heartbeat of Puntland. Every interruption at the port affects importers, exporters, transport companies, consumers, and government revenues alike. Governments should be firm in defending the public interest, but wisdom also lies in knowing when dialogue produces better results than confrontation. In this instance, compromise served the broader public interest.
Yet the successful resolution of the commercial dispute should not obscure the larger questions confronting Puntland.
Economic disagreements can often be settled around a negotiating table. Security disputes rarely can.


Despite the easing of tensions at the port, Bosaso continues to host armed units formerly associated with Puntland’s security forces under General Mohamud Diano. Reports have alleged that these forces are now aligned with the Somali National Army (SNA) rather than the Puntland administration. Whatever the precise facts on the ground, the existence of competing claims of loyalty inevitably raises concerns about institutional cohesion and the state’s monopoly over the lawful use of force.
These concerns appear to have had practical consequences. Reports indicate that President Said Abdullahi Deni relocated from the presidential residence on the outskirts of Bosaso to another part of the city because of security considerations. Whether viewed symbolically or operationally, such a move illustrates the sensitivity of the prevailing security environment.


Meanwhile, attention shifted to Garowe.
General Jimcaale was seen publicly displaying a heavily armed militia on the outskirts of the Puntland capital. Public demonstrations of armed strength are seldom ordinary events. They communicate political messages as much as military capability, particularly during periods of heightened political uncertainty.
His route into Puntland attracted additional attention. According to reports, he travelled from Mogadishu through Laascaanood before entering Puntland territory. Earlier, he had been received in Mogadishu by the Federal Government and was subsequently announced as commander of the so-called 54th Division of the Somali National Army, a military formation whose operational status has itself been the subject of public debate.
Taken individually, each of these developments might be interpreted differently. Taken together, however, they point toward a broader institutional question: how should overlapping political authority and competing security structures be managed within Somalia’s federal framework?
History suggests that this is not a trivial question.
Throughout history, governments—regardless of ideology—have regarded divided military loyalty as one of the greatest threats to state stability. Economic disagreements can be negotiated. Political disagreements can often be mediated. Competing chains of military command are considerably more difficult to reconcile.


One historical episode illustrates this principle.
During the final years of Ethiopia’s Derg government, relations between Addis Ababa and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) deteriorated over the movement’s desire for greater operational independence. The disagreement culminated in the detention of SSDF Chairman Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed by the Ethiopian authorities.
According to accounts of those events, elements within the SSDF protested Yusuf’s detention, creating what Ethiopian authorities regarded as an unacceptable military challenge.
Mengistu Haile Mariam reportedly summoned senior SSDF figures who had not been detained and explained his government’s position in memorable terms:
“My government itself came to power through an army mutiny that overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie. We cannot allow you to demonstrate such an example before our own forces in the Ogaden.”
Whether recounted as political history or as an illustration of statecraft, the episode conveys an enduring lesson. Governments that themselves emerged from military upheaval are often especially alert to any signs of fragmentation within armed institutions. More broadly, states generally regard divided military allegiance as an existential concern because it directly affects their ability to maintain constitutional order.
This historical parallel does not suggest that different political contexts are identical. Rather, it highlights a consistent institutional reality: governments tend to view competing armed loyalties as fundamentally different from ordinary political disagreement.
That distinction remains relevant today.


The agreement at Bosaso Port demonstrates that dialogue can resolve commercial disputes when parties are prepared to compromise. It is an encouraging example of pragmatic governance.
Security, however, demands something more than compromise alone. It requires professional institutions, clearly defined chains of command, public confidence, and a shared commitment to constitutional authority. Without those foundations, even successful economic negotiations may offer only temporary relief while deeper structural tensions continue to accumulate beneath the surface.
Puntland has built a reputation over many years for relative stability compared with much of Somalia. Preserving that reputation will depend not only on maintaining commercial confidence but also on strengthening institutions capable of managing political disagreement without allowing security fragmentation to take root.
The lesson from Bosaso is therefore twofold.
First, flexibility in economic governance can reduce unnecessary confrontation and strengthen public confidence. Second, economic stability cannot be separated indefinitely from institutional security. Prosperity rests not only on functioning ports and active markets but also on credible public institutions that exercise authority through law rather than through competing armed actors.
Bosaso may have regained commercial momentum.


The more consequential challenge now lies in ensuring that institutional cohesion keeps pace with economic recovery. History suggests that governments can survive difficult negotiations over taxation and trade. The more enduring test is whether they can preserve the unity, professionalism, and legitimacy of the institutions entrusted with safeguarding the state itself.

Jimcaale militia in the outskirts of Garowe City.

Beyond the Clan: Why Somalia’s Future Depends on Making Citizenship More Important Than Lineage

-Part II-

Learning from Successful States

Somalia need not search for solutions in theory alone. History offers numerous examples of societies that successfully reduced the political importance of ethnicity, tribe, religion, or regional identity without attempting to erase them altogether.

Singapore inherited a deeply divided society consisting of Chinese, Malays, Indians, and other minority communities. Rather than outlawing ethnic identities, the government deliberately strengthened state institutions while enforcing equal standards within the civil service. Recruitment became increasingly merit-based, corruption was aggressively prosecuted, and public housing policies deliberately mixed communities to reduce segregation. Ethnic identity remained culturally important, but competence became the currency of government.

Botswana followed a different but equally instructive path. At independence in 1966, it was one of the poorest countries in Africa. Rather than allowing tribal competition to dominate the state, Botswana built a professional bureaucracy, respected constitutional institutions, and maintained prudent management of public resources. Traditional leaders retained respected advisory roles through the House of Chiefs, yet executive authority remained accountable to constitutional government. The coexistence of traditional authority and modern state institutions became a source of stability rather than conflict.

Rwanda, despite its own unique historical context, pursued another lesson after the 1994 genocide. The state deliberately discouraged ethnic mobilisation in public administration while simultaneously investing heavily in institutions, public order, education, and service delivery. Although Rwanda’s political model remains debated internationally, its experience demonstrates that rebuilding public institutions can gradually reduce the political salience of inherited identities.

South Korea presents yet another example. Following war, poverty, and authoritarian rule, advancement within government increasingly became tied to education, professional examinations, and administrative competence. Economic transformation followed institutional reform rather than preceding it.

The common denominator across these diverse experiences is unmistakable.

None attempted to abolish historical identities.

All sought to make those identities progressively less decisive in determining access to state power.

That is precisely the lesson Somalia should embrace.

Federalism and Meritocracy Are Compatible

One of the most persistent misconceptions in Somali political discourse is that federalism somehow prevents meritocracy. The evidence suggests otherwise.

Federal systems exist successfully across the world, including the United States, Germany, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, India, and Nigeria. Their federal arrangements recognise regional diversity while maintaining national standards for constitutional governance, public finance, defence, and civil service professionalism.

Federalism does not weaken the state.

Weak institutions weaken federalism.

Somalia’s federal system emerged from historical necessity after state collapse and civil war. It reflected political realities that could not simply be ignored. Attempting to dismantle that settlement through recentralisation would likely intensify rather than resolve political tensions.

Instead, federal institutions themselves must become increasingly professional.

Regional administrations should compete through better governance rather than stronger clan mobilisation. Citizens should compare governments according to schools built, hospitals functioning, roads completed, security maintained, and corruption reduced—not according to the genealogy of office holders.

Competition between governments can become an engine of national progress if institutions rather than clans become the basis for political legitimacy.

The Roadmap to Meritocracy

Somalia’s transformation requires neither revolutionary rhetoric nor constitutional romanticism. It requires disciplined institution-building sustained across decades.

The first priority remains security. Armed forces, police services, and intelligence institutions must recruit, train, promote, and discipline personnel according to professional standards rather than political patronage. Security institutions that represent the republic rather than particular constituencies become the foundation upon which every subsequent reform depends.

Second, the civil service must become genuinely professional. Competitive examinations, transparent recruitment procedures, performance evaluations, and protection against arbitrary political dismissal should gradually replace informal patronage networks. Public office must be viewed as national service rather than political entitlement.

Third, judicial independence requires strengthening. Judges cannot administer impartial justice while fearing political interference or clan retaliation. Equal application of the law remains the cornerstone of constitutional government.

Fourth, education must produce citizens rather than merely graduates. Civic education should emphasise constitutional rights, public ethics, institutional accountability, peaceful political participation, and national responsibility. Students should understand not only where they come from but also the obligations they owe to the republic they collectively share.

Fifth, corruption must become politically expensive. Anti-corruption commissions, independent auditors, parliamentary oversight committees, and investigative journalism must function without intimidation. No democracy survives when corruption becomes normalised.

Finally, economic opportunity must expand beyond political patronage. Young entrepreneurs should succeed because they innovate, invest, and create employment—not because they possess privileged political connections.

Meritocracy ultimately depends upon equal opportunity.

Without opportunity, merit becomes merely another slogan.

Citizenship Above Lineage

The Somali Republic cannot be rebuilt by asking citizens to forget their history.

Nor can it succeed by pretending that lineage no longer matters.

Instead, Somalia must establish a new hierarchy of public values.

A Somali may remain proud of his or her clan while recognising that public office belongs to the nation.

A judge should be respected because of integrity.

A soldier because of courage.

A teacher because of knowledge.

A doctor because of competence.

A minister because of performance.

A president because of constitutional leadership.

Not because of genealogy.

When public confidence shifts from lineage to institutions, political culture itself begins to change. Elections become contests over programmes rather than clan arithmetic. Public administration becomes increasingly predictable. Investors gain confidence. Citizens begin expecting fairness instead of favours.

That is how nations mature.

Policy Recommendations

To translate this vision into practice, Somalia should pursue the following long-term national programme:

  1. Preserve traditional elders as advisory and reconciliation institutions while removing routine executive functions from clan structures.
  2. Establish an independent national civil service commission responsible for merit-based recruitment and promotion.
  3. Introduce transparent procurement systems for all public contracts.
  4. Strengthen judicial independence through constitutional guarantees and professional training.
  5. Expand civic education from primary school through university with emphasis on constitutional citizenship.
  6. Professionalise security institutions through unified standards of recruitment and promotion.
  7. Create independent anti-corruption agencies with genuine prosecutorial authority.
  8. Encourage political parties organised around policy platforms rather than clan alliances.
  9. Strengthen federal institutions through cooperation rather than political confrontation.
  10. Promote national symbols, public service ethics, and constitutional patriotism capable of uniting citizens beyond inherited identities.

None of these reforms will produce immediate miracles.

Institution-building is measured in decades, not election cycles.

Conclusion: The Unfinished Republic

Somalia stands at a historical crossroads.

One road continues the familiar cycle of clan mobilisation, institutional weakness, corruption, insecurity, and political fragmentation.

The other road is undoubtedly more demanding. It requires patient institution-building, constitutional discipline, accountable leadership, professional public administration, and citizens willing to judge governments by performance rather than lineage.

The choice is not between clan and state.

The choice is whether the state remains permanently subordinate to the clan.

Somalia’s greatest national project is therefore neither abolishing clan identity nor glorifying it.

It is restoring the proper relationship between society and government.

The clan should remain a respected social institution.

The state must become an impartial constitutional institution.

That is the distinction upon which Somalia’s future depends.

The republic will not endure because Somalis stop belonging to clans.

It will endure because every Somali, regardless of lineage, comes to believe that citizenship offers greater protection, greater opportunity, greater justice, and greater dignity than political patronage ever could.

Only then will Somalia complete the unfinished journey from kinship to constitutional nationhood.


Notes

  1. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
  2. Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014).
  3. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
  4. I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia, 4th ed. (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002).
  5. Ken Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia,” International Security 31, no. 3 (2006–2007): 74–106.
  6. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail (New York: Crown, 2012).
  7. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
  8. African Development Bank, Governance in Africa (Abidjan: AfDB, various editions).

Bibliography

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown, 2012.

African Development Bank. Governance in Africa. Abidjan: African Development Bank.

Fukuyama, Francis. Political Order and Political Decay. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014.

Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Lewis, I. M. A Modern History of Somalia. 4th ed. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002.

Menkhaus, Ken. “Governance without Government in Somalia.” International Security 31, no. 3 (2006–2007): 74–106.

Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.


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WDM Editorial: The Gathering Storm in Puntland: Leadership Is Measured by the Crises It Prevents

By Ismail H. Warsame

History rarely begins with catastrophe. It starts with signals—subtle at first, then harder to ignore. Puntland is now at such a moment.

A tense stand-off around the Port of Bosaso, renewed reports of piracy along the coast, rising political polarization, and an increasingly rigid approach to conflict management are converging into a pattern that demands attention. None of these developments alone guarantees crisis. Together, they form a warning.

States do not collapse because of a single dramatic event. They deteriorate when warning signs are dismissed, when political disputes harden into hostility, and when institutions are drawn into competition rather than stability. Puntland has travelled this road before. It should not do so again.

Bosaso sits at the center of this moment. It is not merely a city; it is Puntland’s economic lifeline and one of the most strategic ports in the Horn of Africa. Its stability underpins trade, employment, and investor confidence. When uncertainty surrounds Bosaso, the consequences ripple outward—business slows, costs rise, and livelihoods are threatened. Political brinkmanship around such a critical asset is not a local matter. It is a statewide economic and security risk. Strategic infrastructure must remain above political confrontation.

Equally concerning are renewed signs of piracy. Piracy does not reappear by chance. It emerges where governance weakens, where coordination falters, and where political focus shifts inward. Puntland once demonstrated that piracy could be defeated through cooperation among security forces, communities, and international partners. Allowing even a limited resurgence would represent more than a security lapse; it would signal a deeper failure of governance. Piracy is not just a crime. It is a symptom of instability.

Yet the most troubling trend may be political inflexibility. Disagreement is natural in any political system. The danger lies in confusing stubbornness with strength. Effective leadership requires the confidence to engage, negotiate, and compromise. No government possesses a monopoly on wisdom, and no opposition holds a monopoly on patriotism. When leaders stop listening, tensions rise. When tensions rise unchecked, conflict follows.

Puntland’s history offers a different model. Since its establishment, it has often managed internal disputes through dialogue—through elders, institutions, and negotiated settlements rather than sustained violence. That tradition of political accommodation has been one of its greatest strengths. Abandoning it now would be a costly mistake. Inclusion is not weakness; it is the foundation of durable governance.

Security and politics are inseparable. When political legitimacy weakens, security institutions come under strain. When dialogue collapses, space opens for criminal networks, extremist groups, and external actors. Stability cannot be enforced through security measures alone. It must be built through political cohesion.

There is still time to change course. Crises remain manageable when addressed early. The immediate priority should be de-escalation: reducing tensions, restoring dialogue, and relying on institutional processes rather than improvisation. Security forces must remain professional and impartial, focused on protecting citizens rather than participating in political disputes. Traditional elders, business leaders, civil society, and religious figures all have a role in calming the situation before it spirals.

The cost of miscalculation is always higher than expected. Political actors often believe they control events—until they do not. Somali history offers too many examples of situations that appeared manageable until they were not.

Leadership, in the end, is not measured by rhetoric or displays of toughness. It is measured by outcomes: whether citizens feel secure, whether economic life continues uninterrupted, and whether crises are resolved before they become conflicts. The leaders who endure in history are not those who win avoidable confrontations, but those who prevent them.

Puntland stands at a defining moment. The warning signs are visible. The choice is clear: pursue dialogue, flexibility, and political maturity—or risk a path toward instability that will be far more difficult to reverse.

The time to act is now, before the whispers become a crisis that can no longer be contained.