WDM Editorial

A Somali voice in a global journal

GAROWE, Puntland, Somalia — The email from the editors of Environmental Policy and Governance arrived in October 2026. Ismail H. Warsame’s manuscript, “Environmental Governance and the Vocational Skills Deficit in Fragile States: A Comparative Policy Review of Somalia, Yemen and Liberia,” had been accepted. The journal is published by Wiley and edited by Andy Gouldson, and it has a long record of printing serious work on how societies look after their environments. Getting in is hard.

We think this acceptance is worth more than a line in a publication list. Most research on fragile states is still produced by people who study them from a distance. Warsame lives and works in Garowe. His article takes an argument formed here, in Puntland, and puts it in front of the people who shape environmental policy research worldwide.

The question he asks is one the field usually skips. A ministry drafts an environmental policy. A government adopts it. Then who goes out and does the work?

Policy without hands

His answer is that fragile states are not mainly short of rules. They tend to have plenty of laws, national strategies and donor frameworks. What they don’t have is enough trained people to enforce the rules, keep watch over forests, pastures and fishing grounds, repair the damage and earn a decent living from the land and sea without wrecking it.

The article started as a study of Somalia alone. That study followed four kinds of damage: plastic pollution, illegal fishing, worn-out rangelands and frankincense trees tapped beyond what they can bear. Warsame traced each one back to the same weak spot, the country’s technical and vocational education and training (TVET) system.

Put plainly, if there are no fisheries officers, no one patrols the coast. If there are no extension workers, damaged rangeland doesn’t recover. Untrained harvesters overtap frankincense trees, and without technicians, rubbish piles up. The gap in skills becomes a gap in protection, and the damage moves into it.

Three countries, one pattern

Was this a Somali problem, or something bigger? To find out, Warsame added Yemen and Liberia to the study. At first glance the three have little in common. They are in different regions, they have different histories and their crises are at different stages.

Somalia has lived through decades of state collapse, has a long coastline and depends on pastoral economies that are under heavy strain. Yemen is torn apart by a war that has not ended, and its fishing communities and already scarce water are both at risk. Liberia is about two decades past its civil wars and still rebuilding, with its forests and mineral wealth on the line.

That is why the comparison works. If the same shortage of skilled people shows up in all three places, it is hard to call it a local quirk. It looks more like part of what fragility is. It also gives readers well beyond Somali studies a reason to pay attention.

What the article adds

Two groups of researchers rarely read each other’s work. Environmental governance scholars write about institutions, regulations and money. Education and labor scholars write about jobs, employability and growth. Warsame brings the two together. In his account, vocational skills are part of the governance system itself, as necessary to making environmental policy work as any law or budget.

This has practical consequences. Aid programs that pay for strategies and plans but not for the people to carry them out will keep falling short where policy meets the ground. And vocational training could be built around environmental goals, instead of being treated only as a way to create jobs.

For fragile states, there is good news in this. Building skills does not have to wait for a strong central government. Regional administrations, universities and communities can start now, even while national politics remains unsettled.

Earned through review

The article did not reach its final form easily. It began as a single-country study, “Environmental Degradation and the Vocational Skills Deficit in Somalia.”

For Environmental Policy and Governance, Warsame widened it to three countries. In October 2026 the journal sent back a major-revisions decision and asked that the piece be considered as a review article. He rewrote it along those lines, and the revised version was accepted later that month under a new title that reflects its comparative and policy focus.

He had until January 2027 to submit the revision. He met the reviewers’ demands nearly three months early, which speaks to how solid the research was and how well he knew his material.

Why it matters for Somalia and Puntland

For Somali readers, and for the partners who work with Somali institutions, none of this is abstract. Puntland’s frankincense groves, fishing grounds and rangelands are part of the Somali case, and each one needs people trained to look after it.

Warsame knows this from experience, not only from research. He was Puntland’s first chief of Cabinet, from 1998 to 2004. He later worked with the joint U.N. and World Bank Secretariat on Somalia’s Reconstruction and Development Programme, then coordinated aid for the Transitional Federal Government with the European Union. In those years he saw firsthand how plans written in capitals and donor offices ran up against what local institutions could actually do.

So the article comes from someone who has been in the rooms where aid priorities are set. He has now checked what he saw there against evidence from three fragile states.

Conclusion

This acceptance is a real contribution to the field. The article puts vocational skills on the agenda of environmental governance research. It shows that Somalia, Yemen and Liberia share the same problem. And it brings a Horn of Africa scholar who has also worked as a practitioner into a conversation that too often talks about fragile states rather than with them.

The article is now in production at Wiley. Its message should hold long after the current round of policy debates: environmental protection in fragile states will work only when the people responsible for it have been trained to do the job.

A WDM Editorial
Warsame Digital Media — Commentary and Critical Analysis
Oct. 18, 2026
The federal investigation of Rep. Ilhan Omar has taken a turn that deserves more careful attention than the headlines it is generating. According to a report by The New York Times published Oct. 16, federal investigators seized the cellphone of Omar’s sister, Sahra Noor, earlier this year, reviewed family text messages on it and used that information to help persuade a federal judge to authorize the Oct. 12 search of Omar’s Washington residence. The report rests on three people familiar with the investigation. The Justice Department has not confirmed the seizure, and Omar’s office declined to comment directly on it.
Much of the coverage has treated this as a revelation of guilt — the “explosive text” that “triggered the raid.” It is nothing of the sort, at least not yet. What it is, if accurate, is a window into how the government built its path to one of the most consequential searches ever carried out against a sitting member of Congress. That path deserves scrutiny on its own terms.

What is actually known
The outlines of the case are now reasonably clear from multiple reports. A federal grand jury is examining alleged fraud and false statements in immigration paperwork filed by Omar and relatives, reportedly dating to the 1990s. Investigators have issued more than a dozen grand jury subpoenas, including to Noor and at least one other family member. Agents from Homeland Security Investigations, the investigative arm of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), searched Omar’s home on Oct. 12 and reportedly removed her phone, passport, notebooks and computers. The White House border czar, Tom Homan, had confirmed a federal criminal investigation roughly a month earlier.
Omar’s lawyers have said the search was neither justified nor lawful. Omar herself has called the investigation part of a decade-long campaign of “baseless lies,” and she is on the ballot in a midterm election less than three weeks away.
What is not known is far more important. The text messages have not been disclosed. Their content, their authorship, their context and whether they say anything at all about the immigration filings at issue remain unknown to the public. No charge has been filed. No court has found wrongdoing. No denaturalization proceeding has been opened.
A federal judge signing a search warrant means the government persuaded that judge there was probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be found at the location searched. That is a real threshold, and it should not be dismissed. But it is a low one by design, and it is reached in a one-sided proceeding in which the target has no voice. Warrant applications rely heavily on the government’s own characterization of its evidence — including, here, its characterization of private messages exchanged among family members.
Family text messages are an especially slippery foundation. They are written in shorthand, in-jokes and shared memory. In Somali families, they frequently move between Somali and English, rely on clan and kinship references outsiders misread, and reference events decades old through the lens of oral rather than documentary memory. A line that reads as an admission to an agent unfamiliar with that world may read as something entirely different to the people who wrote it. Whether the warrant application handled this material with care is precisely the kind of question that can only be answered if the application is eventually tested in open court.

The documentation problem at the heart of the case
Reports indicate the government’s theory may hinge on whether Omar, or her late father on her behalf, misstated her age or family relationships in refugee and immigration paperwork. Her father died in 2020, which complicates any effort to establish who said what, and why, more than 30 years ago.
This is where the case intersects with a history that Somali readers know intimately and American audiences often do not. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled the collapse of the state in 1991 into refugee camps in Kenya and beyond, many without birth certificates, identity documents or any civil registry to consult. Dates of birth were routinely estimated, assigned or rounded by camp officials and caseworkers. Family composition was reconstructed under conditions of displacement, death and separation. Inconsistencies in the paperwork of that generation are not unusual; they are close to universal.
That context does not settle whether any individual committed fraud. Deliberate false statements are a crime, and the law does not excuse them because circumstances were chaotic. But it does mean that discrepancies in 1990s refugee files are weak evidence of intent on their own, and that investigators reading family messages for signs of conscious deception carry a heavy burden of interpretation.

The legal bar for revoking citizenship
Much of the public commentary has leapt to the prospect of stripping Omar of her citizenship, which she obtained in 2000. That leap ignores the law. In Maslenjak v. United States (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held unanimously that the government cannot revoke citizenship over just any false statement in the naturalization process; it must show that the illegal act played a meaningful role in the acquisition of citizenship. Civil denaturalization likewise requires proof that is clear, unequivocal and convincing.
In other words, even if investigators can show that some detail in decades-old paperwork was wrong, they would still have to prove it was material to the grant of citizenship — and, in a criminal case, prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt. A text message, however unflattering, is a long way from either standard.

The questions that matter
The most important issues raised by the Times report are not about Omar’s family but about the government’s conduct.
First, on what basis was Noor’s phone seized earlier this year, and what was the scope of the authority used to search it? Evidence gathered from one person’s device and then deployed against another raises legitimate questions about the reach of the original warrant or subpoena.
Second, did the warrant application for Omar’s home fairly represent the messages to the judge, including any innocent or ambiguous readings? Courts have long held that material omissions or misstatements in warrant affidavits can invalidate a search.
Third, why was an immigration-paperwork inquiry into a member of Congress escalated to an early-morning residential search in the final weeks of an election campaign? The Justice Department’s own long-standing practice counsels caution about overt investigative steps that could affect an election. Whether that practice was followed, waived or abandoned is a matter for congressional oversight.
Fourth, what of the speech or debate protections that shield legislative materials? Seizing a sitting member’s phone and computers inevitably sweeps in privileged congressional communications. How investigators are filtering that material should be disclosed to the appropriate oversight committees.

WDM assessment
The reported use of Sahra Noor’s phone is a meaningful development because it tells us, for the first time, something about the evidentiary route to the Oct. 12 warrant. It is not evidence of immigration fraud, and it is not evidence of a criminal conspiracy. It is evidence that the government has been building this case through Omar’s family for months.
For Somali communities in Minnesota and across the diaspora, the case carries a weight beyond one politician. Many of them carry the same imperfect paper trail from the same camps and the same years. How the government treats Omar’s file will be read, rightly or wrongly, as a signal of how it may treat theirs.
That is why the standard must be the same one that applies to anyone: allegations attributed, not asserted; evidence tested, not leaked; and conclusions drawn in court, not on cable news. WDM will continue to follow the sealed proceedings, congressional oversight and any court filings that bring the underlying evidence into the open.

By Andrew Bobby Tuley

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[Courtesy]

WHY BOTH PARTIES WANT REP. ILHAN OMAR GONE , AND WHY THEY CAN’T BEAT HER FAIRLY

By Andrew Bobby Tuley, Pan African, Philosopher, Theologian, Humanitarian, And Global Health Strategist.

The hatred for Representative Ilhan Omar of Minnesota is the only true bipartisan consensus in Washington. Republicans and Democrats despise her for different reasons, but for the same root cause: she cannot be beaten intellectually or electorally, so she must be eliminated procedurally.

This is not about one statement. It is about what she represents — a Black, Muslim, refugee woman who refused to learn the unspoken rules of the House.

I. WHY THE ESTABLISHMENT HATES HER: SHE BROKE THE CARDINAL RULE

Every freshman in Congress is taught two taboos: Do not question the Pentagon’s budget, and do not question the blank-check military aid to Israel.

Omar broke the second taboo on day one.

Challenging the Foreign Policy Orthodoxy: For 50 years, Congress has treated $3.8 billion a year in military aid to Israel and the automatic U.S. veto at the UN Security Council as untouchable. Omar did what no one had done from inside the chamber — she asked, publicly, why an ally accused by the International Court of Justice of plausible violations of international law should receive unconditional weapons, and why America should veto every resolution holding that ally accountable.

Her supporters argue correctly that her primary offense was not anti-Semitism. It was normalizing a debate that the establishment has spent billions to keep abnormal. Once you allow a sitting member to say “let’s condition aid on human rights compliance” and survive, the entire consensus collapses. The ferocious institutional backlash — censure, removal from the Foreign Affairs Committee — was not about her tone. It was about protecting a foundational consensus from becoming a mainstream debate.

That is why both parties piled on. For Republicans, support for Israel is an evangelical and strategic litmus test. For Democratic leadership, AIPAC and related donor networks are a foundational fundraising pillar. Omar threatened the money and the consensus at the same time. In Washington, that is a capital offense.

II. THE HYPOCRISY THAT EXPOSES THE REAL MOTIVE: THE DOUBLE STANDARD ON LOYALTY

This is where the critical lens reveals the bigotry.

There are 100 members of Congress who openly describe themselves as pro-Israel and who fundraise on that identity. There are members who hold dual citizenships, who attend foreign government rallies, who say “I am an Irish-American first” or “I am a proud Zionist.” No one questions their loyalty. No one demands they be investigated for immigration fraud.

The Double Standard on Identity and Loyalty: When Omar says, “I am an American in Congress but I am a Somali girl, a girl with your lineage, your language, your religion,” she is criminalized for the same diaspora sentiment that every other ethnic politician expresses.

The difference is race, gender, and religion. A white congressman who says “I want to help Ireland prosper” is a statesman. A Black Muslim woman who says “I want Somalia to be stable” is a foreign agent. The accusation that she is anti-American for advocating for international law is only applied to her because her identity makes her an easy target for bad-faith patriotism tests. Her defense of Palestinians is reframed as hatred of America, while defending a foreign government’s bombing campaign is reframed as love of America.

That inversion is the tell. It is not about loyalty. It is about who is allowed to define loyalty.

III. WHY THEY CAN’T BEAT HER AT THE BALLOT BOX — AND WHAT THEY DO INSTEAD

This is the most damning fact for both parties: They have tried to defeat her democratically, and they have failed every time.

Frustration at her Electoral Resilience: In 2020, 2022, and 2024, pro-Israel PACs and party insiders poured over $10 million combined into Minnesota’s 5th District to primary her. Her opponents — Antone Melton-Meaux, Don Samuels — were massively outspent by outside money. She still won by double digits. In her district, which is one of the most progressive, young, and diverse in America, her anti-war, housing-first, student-debt message is not radical. It is popular.

Because she cannot be beaten at the ballot box by her own constituents, her enemies had to change the venue.

The Republican Method: Twist the Law. Unable to beat her in an election they don’t vote in, Republicans weaponized the legal system. They turned a mistranslated Somali homecoming speech into an accusation of divided loyalty, turned a 1991 refugee flight into an accusation of immigration fraud, and turned a father’s alleged military rank into hereditary guilt. The strategy is not to convict her in court — the legal standard for denaturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1451 is almost impossible to meet for a 26-year-old citizenship. The strategy is to keep her under permanent investigation, to force her to spend campaign funds on lawyers instead of organizing, and to feed the “go back to Somalia” narrative for Fox News.

The Democratic Method: Primary by Proxy. Democrats cannot say “go back to Somalia” because it would alienate their base. So they do it with money. Leadership quietly allows or encourages outside groups like DMFI and AIPAC to spend millions to primary her, while publicly saying “we support all incumbents.” It is a laundering operation: outsource the hit to a Super PAC, keep your hands clean, and if she loses, replace her with a compliant centrist who will never question the $3.8 billion.

Both methods have the same goal: If we cannot beat her ideas in debate, and we cannot beat her votes in her district, we will beat her by making her radioactive and exhausted.

IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT’S COVER STORY — AND WHY IT FAILS

Of course, the official story is different.

The opposing institutional perspective maintains that the hostility is not a conspiracy, but accountability.

The Line Between Policy and Rhetoric: They argue that it was not her defense of Palestinians that triggered backlash, but her rhetoric — “It’s all about the Benjamins,” and her questioning of colleagues’ “allegiance to a foreign country” — which mirrored centuries-old anti-Semitic tropes about Jewish money controlling politics and dual loyalty. From this view, censure was necessary to enforce institutional standards against bigotry.

The Strategic Importance of the Alliance: For the majority in Washington, support for Israel is not just politics. It is seen as a vital geopolitical necessity for Middle East stability and a moral commitment to a democratic ally. In that framework, pushing to cut military aid during a war is not an intellectual critique; it is a dangerous policy that undermines national security.

This cover story collapses under its own logic.

If it was only about rhetoric, why was she removed from committees while members who promoted Great Replacement Theory stayed? If it is about strategic alliances, why is questioning aid to Israel treated as treason, while questioning aid to Ukraine or Egypt is treated as fiscal conservatism?

The answer is simple: The rhetoric argument is the pretext. The alliance argument is the excuse. The real reason is power.

Omar proved that a refugee with no money, no political family, and no permission could win a safe seat, refuse corporate PAC money, and still survive. That model — if replicated — would destroy the fundraising model of both parties.

And that is why, since they cannot beat her intellectually in debate, and since they cannot beat her electorally in Minneapolis, Republicans will keep trying to twist the law to deport her, and Democrats will keep trying to fund her primary opponent to replace her.

They don’t hate her because she is weak. They hate her because she is resilient.

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Healing At Home: What A Garowe Hospital Reveals About Somalia’s Governance Gap – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/18102026-healing-at-home-what-a-garowe-hospital-reveals-about-somalias-governance-gap-oped/

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/ilhan-omar-wdm-investigation-alert-87a?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=5b23go

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/the-cure-was-at-home-all-along?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=5b23go

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/bardaale-wdm-baidoa-security-alert?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=5b23go

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/ilhan-omar-wdm-investigation-alert-b52

Ilhan Omar Investigation Watch — Oct. 14, 2026
Significant new developments have emerged in the federal investigation involving U.S. Congresswoman Ilhan Omar.
According to an Oct. 13 investigation by The Washington Post:
Family members subpoenaed: Federal investigators have reportedly issued grand jury subpoenas to members of Omar’s family.
Investigation’s focus clarified: Authorities are examining allegations involving decades-old immigration documents, including questions about Omar’s recorded birth date and her father’s naturalization. Omar has repeatedly denied wrongdoing.
Potential offenses identified: A person familiar with the search warrant reported that it listed conspiracy, immigration fraud and false statements. These are investigative allegations, not criminal charges or findings of guilt.
Separate financial inquiry: U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro has publicly acknowledged another investigation concerning Omar’s financial disclosures.
The developments follow the Oct. 12 search of Omar’s Washington residence by Homeland Security Investigations agents.

WDM assessment: The reported family subpoenas and disclosure of the investigation’s scope represent a meaningful escalation. However, no criminal charges against Omar or judicial findings establishing misconduct have been verified.
The investigation’s proximity to the Nov. 3 congressional elections continues to raise serious questions about political neutrality and the appropriate use of federal investigative powers.
WDM will continue distinguishing verified legal developments from unproven accusations and political rhetoric.
(washingtonpost.com)

October 13, 2026
Major new development: Somalia’s federal government imposes terrorism-related financial sanctions on former South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and nine others.
Somalia’s National Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Committee announced on Tuesday, October 13, that it had placed 10 individuals on its national financial sanctions list over alleged links to Al-Shabaab.
Those designated include Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen, former Custodial Corps commander Mahad Abdirahman Adan (Shub), and Hassan Abdi Mohamed (Ugaas Hassan).
The decision requires financial institutions to freeze their assets, prohibits transactions benefiting them, and mandates reporting relevant financial activity to Somalia’s Financial Reporting Center.
Shabelle Media
Verification and security implications
Confirmed: The sanctions announcement is independently reported by Anadolu Agency, Shabelle Media Network and Garowe Online.
Not independently established: The underlying allegations of Al-Shabaab involvement. The published decision does not disclose detailed evidence against each individual. The sanctions must therefore not be interpreted as proof of terrorist collaboration.
Shabelle Media +1
Security assessment: This represents a significant escalation in the federal government’s confrontation with Laftagareen’s political and military network following the recent fighting around Baidoa and Qansaxdheere.
The measures could affect the network’s financial operations, but their actual enforcement and military consequences remain uncertain.
I found no independently confirmed reports dated October 13 of renewed major fighting inside Baidoa, additional territorial changes, airport closures or senior-level arrests.

Sources: Shabelle Media Network — October 13; Garowe Online — October 13; Anadolu Agency reporting — October 13.

When Dissent Becomes Evidence: The Search Of Ilhan Omar’s Home – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/12102026-when-dissent-becomes-evidence-the-search-of-ilhan-omars-home-oped/

Homeland Security Must Not Become an Instrument of Political Intimidation

Warsame Digital Media condemns any attempt by the United States Department of Homeland Security to intimidate, threaten or politically target sitting Congresswoman Ilhan Omar.

A democratically elected member of the United States Congress is not an enemy of the state merely because she challenges the administration, criticizes its policies or speaks on behalf of communities whose voices are often marginalized.
Political disagreement is not a security threat. Dissent is not disloyalty. And the machinery of homeland security must never become a weapon against political opponents.
Congresswoman Omar’s constitutional rights, her electoral mandate and her entitlement to equal protection under the law deserve the same respect afforded to every other member of Congress, regardless of political affiliation, religion, ethnicity or national origin.

Congresswoman Omar’s constitutional rights, her electoral mandate and her entitlement to equal protection under the law deserve the same respect afforded to every other member of Congress, regardless of political affiliation, religion, ethnicity or national origin.

WDM calls for congressional scrutiny, full public accountability consistent with the integrity of the investigation, and an unequivocal commitment that federal law enforcement will not be used to punish political dissent.

The United States cannot credibly champion democracy abroad while allowing legitimate concerns about political intimidation at home to go unanswered.
The issue is larger than Ilhan Omar. It concerns whether the world’s most powerful country can protect its own institutions from the temptation to confuse political opposition with criminality.

Warsame Digital Media — Oct. 12, 2026

The World Keeps Misfiling Somalia – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/11102026-the-world-keeps-misfiling-somalia-oped/

Ethiopia Must Not Be Allowed To Burn: The Horn Cannot Survive It – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/10102026-ethiopia-must-not-be-allowed-to-burn-the-horn-cannot-survive-it-oped/

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https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/the-president-who-needs-rescuing?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=5b23go

https://www.eurasiareview.com/05102026-egypts-brotherhood-with-somalia-has-always-served-cairo-first-oped/

By Ismail H. Warsame

Mukhtar Ainashe is right to demand a coherent Somali foreign policy. In his recent essay on Substack, he argues that diplomacy conducted through disconnected visits, conflicting signals and short-term political arrangements cannot substitute for a national strategy. He is correct. But his description of Somalia and Egypt as brotherly nations bound by “unbreakable” ties deserves the same scrutiny he applies to relations with Ethiopia.

The history is real. Its meaning, however, must be tested against conduct, above all when Somalis faced catastrophe. Friendship is easy to proclaim at a presidential reception. Its practical value shows when people fleeing war arrive at a border.

Interests, not sentiment

Egypt’s engagement with Somalia has long been shaped by two concerns: the security of its Nile waters and its rivalry with Ethiopia. Brotherhood belongs to the diplomatic vocabulary. Strategic calculation explains much of the substance.

That pattern has not faded. In August 2024, as Mogadishu protested Ethiopia’s memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, Cairo signed a defense cooperation protocol with Somalia, shipped weapons to Mogadishu and offered troops for the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). A 2024 analysis by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) found that Egypt’s conduct in the Horn can be explained by its long-standing Nile dispute with Ethiopia, and that Cairo began intervening in the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict partly to put pressure on Addis Ababa. Somalia had legitimate reasons to seek partners. But Egypt’s timing reflected its own dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam at least as much as any concern for Somali sovereignty. swp-berlin

The distinction matters. Egypt’s interest in containing Ethiopia does not automatically coincide with Somalia’s interest in peace, institutional recovery and stable relations with its neighbors. A country that becomes the front line of someone else’s rivalry pays costs its patron does not. Cooperation can serve both nations, but Somali leaders must establish where their interests converge and where they diverge.

Mediation with a thumb on the scale

Egypt’s record as a peacemaker in Somalia reflects the same calculation. Ethiopia, mandated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to lead the peace process, hosted negotiations at Sodere in December 1996 and January 1997 that brought 26 factions together in the National Salvation Council. The Sodere group planned a national reconciliation conference in Bosaso for Nov. 1, 1997. Instead, Hussein Aidid and his supporters traveled to Cairo to meet Ali Mahdi and other leaders. The talks there began Nov. 12, and on Dec. 22, 1997, with Aidid and Ali Mahdi as co-chairs, the participants signed the Cairo Declaration. That sequence comes from the U.N. secretary-general’s August 1999 report on Somalia (S/1999/882). refworldun

The Cairo process divided Somalis rather than reconciling them. Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Gen. Aden Abdullahi Nur “Gabyow” refused to sign, and Ethiopia accused Egypt of hijacking the Sodere process. The national reconciliation conference that Cairo scheduled for Baidoa in February 1998 never took place. When it failed, Aidid, Ali Mahdi and Osman “Atto” returned to Mogadishu and set about building an administration for the Benadir region, with the backing of Egypt’s special envoy for Somalia. Cairo’s diplomacy, in other words, revolved around Mogadishu’s faction leaders. The northeast went the other way: in July 1998, a constitutional conference in Garowe elected Abdullahi Yusuf president of the newly declared Puntland State. S 1999 882 ES +2

The regional verdict on such competing initiatives was harsh. In March 1998, IGAD’s Council of Ministers attributed the lack of progress in Somalia partly to the proliferation of parallel initiatives. Djibouti’s then-president, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, called for an end to Somali leaders’ “political tourism,” in which they visited foreign capitals to sign documents they later ignored. un

The pattern continued after Arta. The Transitional National Government formed in Djibouti in 2000 saw its authority challenged by leaders in the south and by the northern administrations in Puntland and Somaliland. Arab capitals nonetheless rallied behind it, and the humanitarian news agency IRIN reported at the time that Libya, Egypt and Yemen were prepared to send forces to support interim president Abdiqassim Salad Hassan. unmissionsthenewhumanitarian

Ethiopia’s mediation was hardly disinterested either. But Cairo’s motive has been stated plainly by outside observers. David Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia, wrote in 2003 that Egypt supports Somali unity and a strong Somali state because such a state can counterbalance Ethiopia, noting that 86% of the water reaching Egypt’s Aswan Dam originates in Ethiopia. A mediator that consistently favors one center of power over the regions is not a neutral broker. Cairo’s preferred outcome has been a strong Mogadishu, not a negotiated settlement among Somalia’s constituent parts. globalsecurity

Refuge as the test

The refugee record demands an honest accounting. Egypt did host Somalis during the civil war; the U.N. refugee agency, UNHCR, counted about 3,500 at the start of 1998. It would be inaccurate to say Egypt admitted none. But a few thousand people across years of state collapse, while neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia absorbed hundreds of thousands, establishes presence, not open access or adequate protection.

Scholarship on Somalis in Cairo bears this out. Egypt is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, but by placing reservations on four of its articles, it withdrew significant rights from refugees on its territory: employment, permanent residence and access to state education. Mulki Al-Sharmani, who has studied Somali refugees in Cairo since the late 1990s, describes Egypt as “a host society that is both closed and open to refugees.” aucegyptaucegypt

I recall that at the height of the civil war, some Western governments advised their citizens of Somali origin against traveling to Egypt unless they held Western passports. I have not yet located the original advisories and offer this as personal recollection rather than established fact. If confirmed, it would expose a painful contradiction: Somali identity, supposedly a bond of brotherhood, offered less assurance at an Egyptian border than a Western passport.

Gaza offers a contemporary test of the gap between declared solidarity and the protection of people. Egypt has mediated ceasefire talks and admitted Palestinians escaping the war. Human Rights Watch reports that about 110,000 people left Gaza for Egypt between October 2023 and May 2024, when Israel seized and closed the Gaza side of the Rafah crossing. Any assessment of Rafah must account for Israeli control; Egypt cannot fairly be portrayed as having admitted nobody or as holding sole power to reopen the crossing.

Yet Cairo’s own conduct remains open to criticism. Amnesty International has documented the arrest of Egyptians who peacefully expressed solidarity with Palestinians, as well as the detention and deportation of foreign activists who tried to join the Global March to Gaza in June 2025. A government that invokes Palestinian brotherhood while suppressing peaceful solidarity invites questions about the substance of that commitment.

Egypt’s rejection of permanent Palestinian displacement rests on defensible ground: expulsion could cost Palestinians their homeland, and Palestinians themselves reject such proposals. Cairo also cites its own national security. But opposing permanent displacement does not settle the separate humanitarian question of voluntary temporary refuge, medical evacuation and enforceable guarantees of return.

Somali interests first

The lesson for Somalia is straightforward. Egypt pursues Egyptian interests. Ethiopia pursues Ethiopian interests. Somali diplomacy must begin with Somali interests, measured by sovereignty, public safety, institutional development and accountability to citizens.

Ainashe’s call for strategic direction is persuasive. His assumption of an unquestionable Egyptian partnership weakens it. Visiting both Cairo and Addis Ababa is not, by itself, evidence of incoherence. The decisive questions are what commitments were made, whether they are compatible and what they will cost Somalia.

Historical friendship deserves recognition. Dependable partnership requires evidence. Somalia cannot afford a foreign policy in which declarations of brotherhood replace scrutiny, or in which another country’s rivalry becomes its national agenda.

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Works cited

Mulki Al-Sharmani, “African Refugees: Ambivalent Status and Diasporic Struggles in Cairo,” in Diane Singerman, ed., Cairo Contested: Governance, Urban Space, and Global Modernity (American University in Cairo Press, 2009).

Mulki Al-Sharmani, “Livelihood and Identity Constructions of Somali Refugees in Cairo,” Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Working Paper No. 2 (American University in Cairo, 2003).

David H. Shinn, “The Horn of Africa: How Does Somaliland Fit?” paper delivered March 2003.

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, “Escalation Risks in the Horn of Africa: Threats from Egypt, Ethiopia, and Somalia Exacerbate Local Conflicts,” SWP Comment 2024/C 50.

United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia,” S/1999/882, Aug. 16, 1999.

From E-Visas To NIRA: Mogadishu’s Bureaucratic War On Ordinary Travelers – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/03102026-from-e-visas-to-nira-mogadishus-bureaucratic-war-on-ordinary-travelers-oped/

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/from-e-visas-to-nira-mogadishus-bureaucratic

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/grievance-is-not-a-mandate-puntland?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=5b23go

  September 29, 2026

Baidoa remains tense but relatively calm following Monday’s heavy fighting. Federal and South West administration forces retain control of the city’s principal government institutions, while forces aligned with former South West State President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen remain active outside Baidoa.
The human cost remains uncertain. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported that Bay Regional Hospital received 69 people affected by the violence, including five children, and recorded three deaths. A healthcare worker was killed, a health facility was severely damaged and an ambulance was looted. Roads leading to hospitals were also blocked during the fighting.
South West authorities have issued substantially higher casualty figures for attacking forces, but those figures remain independently unverified.
The Federal Government and South West authorities also allege that Al-Shabaab participated alongside Laftagareen-aligned forces. Laftagareen’s side denies the allegation, and independent reporting has not established operational cooperation between the two forces.

Brief Political Context
The fighting stems from an unresolved power struggle over South West State following the removal of Laftagareen’s administration and the installation of a new regional leadership backed by the Federal Government. Laftagareen and his supporters rejected the new political order and retained armed forces outside Baidoa. The dispute has consequently evolved from a political confrontation into repeated armed clashes over control and authority in the regional capital.
The immediate battle has subsided, but the underlying political and military confrontation remains unresolved, leaving Baidoa’s security situation fragile and vulnerable to renewed fighting.

WAPMEN/WDM — Monitoring

MSF UK

​

28/09/2026

28 September 2026 – Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors Without Borders (MSF) is deeply alarmed by the impact of the escalating violence in Baidoa, Somalia’s South West State, on civilians and their access to essential healthcare. MSF urgently calls on all parties to the conflict to protect civilians, patients, healthcare workers and medical facilities, and to ensure that people in need of medical care can reach hospitals safely and without obstruction.

On the morning of Monday, 28 September, fighting erupted in and around Baidoa town for the third time since 17 August. A health facility was reportedly severely damaged, and a healthcare worker was killed. An ambulance was looted, while civilian homes were also reportedly attacked. Two medical staff working alongside MSF teams were robbed, and one was injured.

“This is the third time in six weeks that fighting has erupted in Baidoa, with devastating consequences for civilians. It is unacceptable that civilians and healthcare are being caught up in violence. Injured people need immediate medical attention, but many cannot reach hospital. Without timely treatment, many can bleed to death,” says Dr. Elshafie Mohammed, MSF Country Representative in Somalia.

“Health facilities, healthcare workers and patients must never be targeted. We call on all parties to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure and to ensure that patients can reach healthcare facilities safely, without fear, delay or obstruction.”

So far, medical teams working with the Ministry of Health at Bay Regional Hospital have received 69 patients affected by the violence, including five children. Three deaths have been recorded.

Roads leading to hospitals in Baidoa have been blocked since the fighting began, severely restricting access to medical care. Only a small number of wounded patients have managed to reach Bay Regional Hospital. ​

MSF is concerned that many wounded people remain unable to access treatment and expect more patients to arrive at the hospital once access routes reopen. The disruption is affecting not only those wounded in the violence, but also people who need other urgent and essential medical care. ​

Armed clashes also erupted in and around Baidoa town on 17 August, when teams at Bay Regional Hospital received 94 wounded people, including 29 women and 20 children, five of whom were under the age of five. Four deaths were recorded, including that of a young woman. A new wave of clashes began on the morning of 3 September, when teams received 71 wounded people, including 15 women and 12 children. One death was also recorded. ​

At Bay Regional Hospital, MSF works in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, supporting the emergency, maternity, paediatrics, nutrition and outpatient departments. ​

-ENDS-

• media@london.msf.org
• +44 (0) 207 067 4236

Address: Level 5, Artesian, 9 Prescot Street, London E1 8AZ

Contact

www.msf.org.uk

The Tent Before The Palace: What The Warnings About Amman And Riyadh Teach The Horn – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/27092026-the-tent-before-the-palace-what-the-warnings-about-amman-and-riyadh-teach-the-horn-oped/

A WDM Editorial Comment

The proposed letter from Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni to the United Nations should not be read simply as another quarrel between Garowe and Mogadishu. Its significance is larger: one of the principal architects and defenders of Somalia’s federal reconstruction is warning that the political bargain holding the federation together is approaching its limits.

That warning deserves scrutiny rather than automatic acceptance. Puntland makes serious allegations concerning constitutional unilateralism, weapons management, international assistance and the future of UN engagement. Such claims require evidence.

But Mogadishu faces an equally demanding test: answering Puntland’s constitutional argument rather than dismissing it as obstructionism.

At the heart of the dispute is a simple question:

Is Somalia’s federation something the Federal Government administers, or a constitutional compact that the Federal Government and constituent states must govern together?

Hassan Sheikh’s Democratic Promise

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud recently offered an appealing description of Somalia’s political destination:

“Our aim is to become an effective democracy, where differences are resolved through dialogue, law and elections, not violence.”

Puntland can reasonably answer: then apply that principle to the federal dispute.

Dialogue cannot merely mean asking a Federal Member State to accept decisions after they have effectively been made.

Law cannot mean allowing one level of a federation to determine unilaterally the extent of its own powers.

And elections, however desirable, cannot by themselves settle the prior constitutional question of who possesses authority to design the electoral system.

This is where Puntland’s argument is strongest.

The 2012 Provisional Constitution did not envision federalism as administrative decentralization granted by Mogadishu. Article 54 stated that the allocation of powers and resources was to be “negotiated and agreed upon” between the Federal Government and Federal Member States, apart from four specifically reserved federal functions. Article 52 similarly established principles of intergovernmental cooperation.

That language matters.

Puntland can therefore argue that federal consultation is not diplomatic courtesy. It is embedded in the constitutional architecture.

Mogadishu Has a Rebuttal

The Federal Government nevertheless has a substantial answer.

Mogadishu can argue that Somalia cannot remain indefinitely governed by a provisional constitution adopted in 2012; that Federal Parliament represents the Somali people; that the constitution itself provides an amendment procedure; and that the reforms are intended to replace indirect clan-based political selection with direct universal suffrage and multiparty democracy.

The government can also point out that Puntland itself has sometimes boycotted or declined to endorse National Consultative Council agreements. It can argue that one Federal Member State cannot acquire a permanent veto over national constitutional development simply by refusing to participate.

The Federal Government has maintained that the constitutional process remains open to further amendments and has called upon Puntland to return to the National Consultative Council.

That rebuttal cannot simply be brushed aside.

But neither does it dispose of Puntland’s argument.

The critical distinction is between Parliament’s power to amend a constitution and the political legitimacy of using that power to redefine the federal bargain without agreement from a major constituent state.

Those are not necessarily the same question.

Somalia Public Agenda and its partners have identified precisely this problem: the constitutional and electoral processes remain contested, FGS–FMS relations have been unstable, and Puntland has remained outside important elements of the process. More recent research has proposed either returning to the 2012 framework or renegotiating disputed amendments, together with stronger mechanisms for mediating FGS–FMS disputes.

Puntland Is Not Merely Another Opposition Group

This history strengthens Puntland’s argument.

Puntland existed before today’s Federal Government. It established an administration in 1998 and subsequently participated in the political processes that produced Somalia’s federal institutions.

Its importance to this dispute therefore differs from that of an opposition party seeking advantage over an incumbent president.

Puntland’s argument is institutional:

we helped construct the federal house; the centre cannot now redesign the house and reduce the authority of its constituent units without their agreement.

That claim has historical precedent. Earlier agreements between Puntland and the Federal Government explicitly addressed Puntland’s concerns about constitutional changes and affirmed that completion of the federal constitution should proceed according to the constitutional framework.

The present rupture is therefore the accumulation of an unresolved constitutional argument, not an overnight invention.

In March 2024, Puntland withdrew recognition and confidence from federal institutions pending a mutually agreed constitutional settlement and referendum. The Federal Government responded by urging Puntland back into national consultations. The disagreement has remained fundamentally unresolved.

The Arms Question

This history also explains why Puntland’s concerns about weapons cannot be separated from the constitutional dispute.

Mogadishu has the stronger formal argument in one respect: national defence is expressly among the powers assigned to the Federal Government under the original Article 54.

Puntland therefore should not argue that every federal weapons acquisition requires state permission.

Its stronger argument is about accountability.

Where relations between federal and state governments have deteriorated, there must be credible mechanisms ensuring that internationally supplied weapons remain within authorized national security structures and are not diverted into domestic political conflicts.

The answer should be verification, not accusation.

If Puntland possesses evidence of diversion or misuse, it should submit inventories, serial numbers, transfer records, photographs, procurement documentation and corroborated incident reports to appropriate international mechanisms.

The stronger diplomatic demand is therefore not:

Trust Puntland instead of Mogadishu.

It is:

Trust neither side where independent verification is possible.

That is an argument international partners can evaluate institutionally rather than politically.

UNTMIS: Do Not Confuse a Calendar With a Settlement

The same reasoning applies to the scheduled end of UNTMIS.

Puntland’s strongest case is not that the United Nations should remain indefinitely because Mogadishu cannot be trusted.

It is that an international political transition should reflect political conditions.

If fundamental disagreements remain over the constitution, elections, federal powers and security arrangements, then the international community should ask whether Somalia has achieved the political conditions assumed when the transition timetable was established.

A calendar is not a political settlement.

Puntland should therefore request a conditions-based review of the October 31, 2026 deadline rather than simply demand an indefinite UN presence.

That is narrower, more defensible and harder to dismiss.

Federalism — or Confederation?

There is also a deeper conversation taking place within Puntland political and intellectual circles.

For many years the argument was about making Somali federalism work.

Increasingly, some thinkers have raised another possibility: if the federal compact cannot restrain unilateral centralization, should Somalia consider a confederal relationship instead?

That position is not unanimous Puntland opinion and should not be represented as official state policy.

But its emergence matters.

Under such thinking, Somalia would remain connected through agreed common institutions while constituent states retained substantially greater sovereign authority over their domestic affairs.

Mogadishu’s rebuttal is obvious and serious: such an arrangement could weaken national institutions, produce competing centres of authority and potentially accelerate fragmentation rather than solve it.

That objection deserves consideration.

The Puntland counterargument is equally clear: a federation that repeatedly cannot agree on the division of powers risks becoming federal in name while operating increasingly as a centralized state.

Thus the confederation debate is not merely about constitutional terminology.

It is about trust.

Federalism requires constituent states to trust that powers surrendered to common institutions will remain bounded by the compact.

When that confidence disappears, demands for greater autonomy become predictable.

Independence Is a Different Question

The proposed Deni letter goes further still by warning that Puntland could eventually sever its relationship with Mogadishu.

That should not be conflated with confederation.

Federalism, confederation and independence represent three different constitutional arrangements.

Nor should Puntland claim overwhelming public support for independence without credible evidence. If such a claim is to appear in an official communication to the United Nations, it should be supported by polling or other demonstrable evidence.

But the political warning itself deserves attention.

Puntland was established not as a project to leave Somalia, but as part of an attempt to reconstruct Somalia differently.

That history makes any serious discussion of separation more consequential, not less.

The Strongest Puntland Case

Puntland therefore does not need exaggerated language.

Its strongest case can be expressed in four propositions.

First: Somalia’s federal settlement was founded upon negotiated distribution of authority, not unilateral delegation from Mogadishu.

Second: parliamentary amendment power does not automatically resolve the political requirement for constituent-state agreement when the substance being altered is the federal bargain itself.

Third: national institutions controlling weapons, resources and international agreements require credible safeguards when trust between levels of government has substantially deteriorated.

Fourth: if federal institutions repeatedly prove incapable of producing negotiated settlements, constitutional alternatives — including substantially greater state autonomy or confederal arrangements — will inevitably enter political debate.

Mogadishu has answers to each proposition.

It can invoke parliamentary authority, national sovereignty, universal suffrage, the need for functioning central institutions and Puntland’s own history of withdrawing from national consultations.

Those arguments should be heard.

But Puntland can ask one question in return:

If Hassan Sheikh’s Somalia resolves differences through “dialogue, law and elections,” where is the mutually accepted settlement of the country’s most consequential federal dispute?

That question cannot be answered by a speech at the United Nations.

It requires an agreement in Somalia.

Turn the Letter Into Evidence

President Deni’s proposed communication should therefore become something more substantial than a protest letter.

Turn it into a dossier.

Document the disputed constitutional decisions. Identify the provisions Puntland believes have been breached. Record failed negotiations. Provide evidence supporting allegations concerning security equipment. State precisely what international remedies Puntland seeks. And distinguish demonstrable facts from political conclusions.

Mogadishu should be invited to answer the same record point by point.

That would turn a political confrontation into a testable constitutional case.

The objective should not be to ask the international community to choose Garowe over Mogadishu.

It should be to compel international partners to confront the question Somalia has postponed for too long:

What actually constitutes consent in a federal compact?

Somalia’s crisis is no longer simply about completing a provisional constitution.

It is increasingly about whether the parties still agree on what kind of state that constitution is supposed to create.

President Hassan Sheikh says differences should be resolved through dialogue, law and elections.

Puntland can hold him to those words.

Dialogue requires negotiating with those who disagree.

Law requires limits on the authority of every level of government.

Elections require agreed rules before ballots can confer legitimacy.

And federalism requires consent — because without meaningful consent, decentralization becomes permission granted by the centre rather than power protected by the constitution.

That is the argument Puntland should take to the United Nations.

And that is the argument Mogadishu should be required to answer.

Warsame Digital Media (WDM)
Commentary and Critical Analysis

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/puntlands-warning-and-the-crisis

A President Without A Mandate Addresses The World – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/23092026-a-president-without-a-mandate-addresses-the-world-oped/

PRESS RELEASE
Operation Puntland Stability
Ismail H. Warsame — Garowe
May 6, 2002
Archival Record
SomaliaWatch records the following item in its historical news archive:
“(Ismail H. Warsame – Garowe) PRESS RELEASE – Operation Puntland Stability”
Posted: May 6, 2002
The press release concerned the Puntland political and military crisis of 2001–2002 and the operation undertaken by forces loyal to President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.
Independent contemporary reporting provides important corroboration. On May 7, 2002, the humanitarian news service IRIN reported renewed fighting near Qardho between forces loyal to Abdullahi Yusuf and forces loyal to Jama Ali Jama. IRIN stated that Yusuf was conducting an operation code-named “Puntland Stability First,” which was described as an effort to restore law and order. Crucially, IRIN attributed this information to a press release issued on Monday by Abdullahi Yusuf’s Chief of Cabinet, Isma’il Warsame.
The date corresponds to Monday, May 6, 2002, the same date recorded by SomaliaWatch.
Related Communication — May 7, 2002
A surviving follow-up communication issued under Warsame’s name the following day was headed:
BREAKING NEWS ON PUNTLAND STABILITY FIRST
Galkayo, May 7, 2002
It reported fighting in Qardho and the subsequent movement of Abdullahi Yusuf’s forces toward Bosaso. The communication was signed:
Ismail H. Warsame
Chief of Cabinet
Historical Significance
The May 6 press release and May 7 follow-up communication form part of the contemporary documentary record of the 2001–2002 Puntland constitutional and political crisis. They also provide contemporaneous evidence of Ismail H. Warsame’s position as Chief of Cabinet and his role in communicating the Puntland administration’s position during the crisis.
Archival source: SomaliaWatch historical news archive.
Contemporary corroboration: IRIN, “Renewed fighting in Puntland,” May 7, 2002.

From Federation To Confederation By Default: The Cost Of Mogadishu’s Unilateralism – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/22092026-from-federation-to-confederation-by-default-the-cost-of-mogadishus-unilateralism-oped/

Mohamed Dhabancad, a key member of the Technical Committee for the Future Council, hailing from the Puntland Government, describes Somalia’s federal negotiations as deeply troubled or stalled. The talks, between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Somali Future Council, remain stalled over elections, constitutional legitimacy, security and whether any eventual settlement will be implemented. The Future Council is an opposition coalition that includes major national political figures and the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland.
His account is best read in two layers: what independent reporting confirms, and what remains his political interpretation. On the first, the record is clear. Somali Magazine and other outlets have reported that repeated rounds of talks have failed to resolve disputes over the electoral model, constitutional amendments and election-management arrangements. On the second, Dhabancad goes further, arguing that the deadlock stems chiefly from the federal side.
Concessions without reciprocity
Dhabancad’s central charge is that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has been intransigent and unwilling to accommodate opposing positions. This is his political assessment, not an established fact. There is, however, evidence of persistent disagreement. WardheerNews reported that during the February talks Hassan Sheikh held firm on the amended constitution and his preferred electoral model, while the Future Council accused the government of inflexibility.
According to Dhabancad, the opposition has already made significant concessions, retreating from some earlier positions to reach a negotiated electoral arrangement. The problem, he says, is that the federal side has not reciprocated. As a result, the dispute is no longer only about what kind of election Somalia should hold. It is increasingly about whether the parties can trust one another to honor whatever they agree with.
The Doolow drone incident and security guarantees
That question of trust is sharpest on security. Dhabancad placed particular weight on the reported drone attack on the Doolow residence of Gen. Mahad Abdirahman Shub, former commander of the Somali Custodial Corps, which came as negotiations approached a potentially decisive stage.
The Future Council condemned the incident and called for an independent investigation, alleging that a drone struck Shub’s home and injured him and members of his family, Shabelle Media Network reported. The federal government reportedly denied responsibility and offered a different preliminary explanation for the explosion. Available reporting does not establish federal responsibility.
The timing nonetheless deepened opposition concerns. Mohamed Abdirizak Mohamud, another opposition figure, told Hiiraan Online that the incident occurred as negotiators were close to agreeing on a Democratic Transition Task Force.
For Dhabancad, security guarantees are therefore inseparable from the political agreement itself. Opposition leaders need assurances covering their personal security, meeting venues, hotels, airport movements and other arrangements tied to negotiations and elections. That, he said, is why the Future Council wants the international community involved not merely as a facilitator but as a credible guarantor.
Hirshabelle and parallel elections
Dhabancad also tied the national talks to elections in Hirshabelle. The issue matters because the Future Council is seeking a national electoral framework while federal authorities press ahead with electoral arrangements in the federal member states.
Earlier in 2026, Dawan Africa reported that Hassan Sheikh and Hirshabelle President Ali Abdullahi Hussein Guudlaawe had agreed that Guudlaawe would contest the forthcoming state election on the ruling party’s ticket. The negotiations later became entangled in whether regional elections should proceed before a national settlement. According to Somalia Today, opposition representatives sought to suspend member-state elections until a national agreement was reached, while federal negotiators refused to bring those elections into the talks.
Dhabancad’s objection is that an election cannot be agreed as part of a negotiated framework and then implemented unilaterally in ways that alter the substance of the deal. His concern, in other words, is as much about compliance as about the electoral formula.
A “manufactured opposition”
Dhabancad further alleged that Hassan Sheikh is mobilizing supporters and government-aligned figures to present themselves as an alternative opposition, diluting the Future Council’s negotiating weight. “Staying in Villa Somalia nightly, and visiting Foreign embassies daily, doesn’t make one an opposition“, Dhabancad says.
In his view, this creates a false equivalence between the organized opposition and actors close to the incumbent. It allows the government to claim it is consulting a broad spectrum of political forces rather than negotiating principally with the coalition challenging its electoral program. This characterization remains Dhabancad’s and should stay attributed to him unless further evidence establishes coordination between the presidency and specific nominal opposition groups.
International guarantees: the remaining obstacle
These concerns converge on the role of international partners, now among the most sensitive questions in the talks. Dhabancad said the Future Council wants international actors to guarantee both security and implementation. The Fikir Institute has reported a related dispute over terminology: Hassan Sheikh reportedly prefers that international actors be called “facilitators” rather than “mediators,” while the opposition seeks a stronger role for them in ensuring implementation.
Dhabancad also referred to ongoing negotiations over the wording of a joint statement and the creation of an electoral or transitional mechanism. Outstanding issues include the 4.5 clan power-sharing formula, women’s representation, election-management bodies, security arrangements and the timetable for elections.
Conclusion
Dhabancad’s message is that the negotiations have not collapsed, but the remaining disagreements go well beyond electoral technicalities. They now concern political trust, constitutional legitimacy, security and enforceability. In his telling, the Doolow incident, the Hirshabelle process and the cultivation of a government-friendly opposition all show that verbal commitments are no longer enough.
His core demand is straightforward: a negotiated electoral settlement, credible security arrangements, international guarantees and a mechanism ensuring that whatever the federal government and the Future Council sign is implemented as agreed rather than later changed by either side.

The Geopolitical Perils And Diplomatic Realities Of Recognizing Somaliland – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/21092026-the-geopolitical-perils-and-diplomatic-realities-of-recognizing-somaliland-oped/

Mogadishu’s Dysfunction Is Somaliland’s Best Argument In Washington – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/21092026-mogadishus-dysfunction-is-somalilands-best-argument-in-washington-oped/

Salah Mohamed Ali’s Huddur & the History of Southern Somalia is a 2005 English-language history of Huddur—also spelled Hudur or Xudur—and the wider political, social and administrative development of southern Somalia. The first edition was published in Cairo by Nahda Bookshop Publisher and runs to 540 pages, according to the book’s Google Books record and WorldCat catalog entry.

The book’s importance lies in its decision to place Huddur at the center of a broader national history. Rather than treating the town as a remote provincial settlement, Ali presents it as a point from which to examine the history of Bakool, the inter-riverine regions and southern Somalia’s contribution to the making of the Somali state. Because the complete text is not readily available online, the discussion below is a thematic assessment based on bibliographic records, searchable catalog information and corroborating historical sources—not a chapter-by-chapter summary.

Huddur in southern Somali history

Huddur is the administrative capital of Bakool Region and an important town in southwestern Somalia. A United Nations–Habitat urban profile describes it as a historic trade center and records a sequence of political affiliations linking the area to the Ajuran Empire, the Geledi Sultanate and, eventually, Italian Somaliland. The same profile states that Huddur became the center of Bakool Region and Huddur District after Somali independence in 1960.

Some details in this traditional chronology should be treated cautiously. The UN-Habitat profile states that the area was incorporated into Italian Somaliland in 1910 following the death of Sultan Osman Ahmed. That date is useful as a reference point, but it should not be presented as an uncontested account of the precise process by which Italian authority expanded over the region. Colonial incorporation was generally gradual and involved treaties, military pressure, administrative extension and changing relations with local authorities.

The broader historical point, however, is well supported: European colonialism did not enter a political vacuum. Huddur and the surrounding inter-riverine regions already contained established communities, religious networks, commercial routes and systems of authority. Local political life was shaped by traditional leaders, religious figures, elders and community institutions long before the creation of modern colonial districts.

Authority before colonialism

The history of Huddur challenges the assumption that political organization in southern Somalia began with colonial administration. Local authorities exercised influence over land, migration, security, dispute settlement, religious life and relations between communities. Their authority did not necessarily take the form of a centralized state, but it was nevertheless politically meaningful.

Malaaqs, sultans, religious scholars and elders operated through different sources of legitimacy. Some relied on lineage and customary authority; others drew influence from religious learning, control of trade routes, mediation or the ability to mobilize followers. These institutions continued to operate alongside colonial officials after the establishment of Italian rule.

Colonial governments therefore did not simply replace existing authority with a modern bureaucracy. They classified communities, drew administrative boundaries, appointed intermediaries and introduced new security structures. In doing so, they changed the balance among local leaders and altered relations between rural communities and emerging towns.

Italian and British rule

Huddur’s modern history was shaped first by Italian expansion and later by the British Military Administration during and after the Second World War. Italian rule brought new forms of administration, taxation, policing and military control. It also connected inland towns more closely to wider colonial systems centered on Mogadishu and other administrative and commercial centers.

The transition from Italian rule to British military administration represented a major political change, but it did not end foreign control. British officials inherited and reorganized parts of the colonial system while operating within the wartime and postwar politics of the region. The changing administrations affected local officials, security arrangements and the political opportunities available to Somali communities.

These developments are important because colonial rule was not experienced uniformly across Somalia. The experience of Huddur differed from that of Mogadishu, the coastal towns and the northern territories. Inland communities encountered colonialism through district officials, military stations, local intermediaries, taxation, trade and disputes over authority.

International trusteeship and independence

The political future of southern Somalia was also shaped by international decisions after the Second World War. The former Italian colony became a United Nations Trust Territory under Italian administration, creating a transitional framework that was intended to prepare the territory for self-government and independence.

The trusteeship period encouraged the growth of schools, administrative institutions and political organizations, although its objectives and implementation remained contested. It also created a setting in which Somali nationalists could organize, debate constitutional questions and demand independence.

Huddur was connected to these developments through administrative networks and political parties. The town’s history illustrates that the transition to independence was not simply a process directed from Mogadishu. Political change reached inland districts, where local leaders, activists, religious figures and communities interpreted nationalism through their own political and social experiences.

Southern participation in nationalism

The struggle for Somali independence involved political movements from across the territory. The Somali Youth League was the most prominent nationalist organization, but it was not the only party active in the southern regions.

The Hizbia Dighil Mirifle, commonly known as HDM, was established in 1947 and represented many communities in the inter-riverine regions. Scholarly sources describe it as a counterweight to the politically dominant Somali Youth League and note that its support was concentrated particularly among Digil and Mirifle communities. In 1956, the organization changed its name to Hizbia Dastur Mustaqil al-Somal, or HDMS.

The party’s history is especially relevant to Huddur and Bakool because it demonstrates that southern communities were active participants in the political struggles of the late colonial period. HDM was not merely a local association. It had national objectives and participated in debates about representation, constitutional arrangements and the future organization of the Somali state. At the same time, its regional social base reflected the political importance of the inter-riverine communities.

This history complicates accounts that portray Somali nationalism as the achievement of a single city, party or region. Nationalist politics developed through interaction between national organizations and local political structures. Traditional leaders, merchants, religious authorities, educated activists and community representatives all contributed to that process.

Regional diversity and national unity

The history of Huddur also demonstrates the diversity of southern Somalia. The region included pastoral communities, agricultural populations, riverine settlements, trading centers and towns that became colonial administrative headquarters. These communities differed in language, livelihood, political organization and historical experience.

The inter-riverine regions were particularly important because of their agricultural production, settled communities and distinctive social institutions. Huddur’s history cannot be understood solely through the political experience of Mogadishu or the coastal ports. Nor can it be reduced to a single clan or administrative category. Its development involved overlapping identities, economic relationships, religious networks and political authorities.

Recognizing this diversity does not weaken the idea of Somali nationhood. It explains how national identity was constructed. Somalia emerged through the interaction of many local histories rather than from one uniform political experience.

Correcting historical marginalization

One of the book’s principal contributions is its effort to correct the marginalization of southern local histories. When places such as Huddur, Baidoa, Luuq and Bardhere appear only as peripheral locations, their contributions to political mobilization and state formation are overlooked.

A town-centered history can restore that missing agency. It can show how colonial policies were experienced locally, how political parties organized beyond the capital, how traditional authority interacted with modern administration and how national ideas were adapted to local conditions.

This perspective remains relevant to contemporary debates about federalism, representation and institutional reform. Many political disputes in Somalia are also disputes about historical recognition: whose leaders mattered, whose communities participated in independence and whose experiences shaped the state. A fuller national history cannot resolve those disputes by itself, but it can provide a more accurate foundation for discussing them.

Conclusion

Salah Mohamed Ali’s Huddur & the History of Southern Somalia is best understood as a regional history with national implications. Its subject is Huddur, but its historical concerns extend to Bakool, the inter-riverine south, colonial administration, political organization and the emergence of Somali nationalism.

The book’s central significance is its insistence that southern Somalia was not a passive or peripheral space. Huddur had its own political authorities, religious institutions, economic networks and historical experiences. Its communities encountered colonial rule, participated in political movements and contributed to the transition toward independence.

The available evidence supports the book’s broad historical importance, but some specific claims require careful qualification. The 2005 publication, Cairo imprint, English-language first edition and 540-page length are confirmed by bibliographic records. Huddur’s association with the Ajuran and Geledi political traditions and its later incorporation into Italian Somaliland are reported by UN-Habitat, although the exact chronology and mechanisms of incorporation should be distinguished from established fact. The formation of HDM in 1947 and its later transformation into HDMS are corroborated by scholarly and reference sources.

The strongest conclusion is therefore a measured one: Somalia was built through many local histories, and Huddur provides an important example of how one inland town can illuminate the political formation of an entire country.

US and European experts on the region warn recognition of breakaway Somaliland

Synthesizing Ground Analysis by Markus Virgil Hoehne & Diplomatic Perspectives from Ambassador David Shinn

Author Context: Markus Virgil Hoehne is a social anthropologist at the University of Göttingen who has researched Somali issues for 25 years. Ambassador David Shinn is a former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia (1996–1999) and Adjunct Professor at George Washington University.

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Introduction: The Case Against Recognition

Washington’s own record of intervention in the Horn of Africa—rather than arguments originating from Mogadishu—provides the strongest case against recognizing Somaliland. While proponents frame recognition around American strategic imperatives, an examination of regional conflict dynamics, historic foreign policy missteps, and diplomatic precedents demonstrates that legal recognition would destabilize the Somali Peninsula and trigger active warfare.

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The Flaws in Geostrategic Justifications

Arguments in favor of recognition, such as those advanced by Steven A. Cook, base their position on geostrategic objectives—specifically confronting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Houthis, as well as securing freedom of navigation through the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Hormuz.

However, advocates rely on the naïve assumption that internal opposition in eastern Somaliland can be resolved through peaceful dialogue.

• Long-Standing Opposition: Opposition from eastern clans is deep-rooted; Somaliland never maintained effective control over eastern territories, with the exception of Lasanod between 2007 and 2022.
• Armed Defeat & The North East State: Armed rebellion emerged in the east as early as 2009, and in 2023, local clan militias defeated the Somaliland army in Lasanod, leaving parts of the city destroyed by shelling. Following this defeat, eastern clans formed a new administration—the North East State (NES) of Somalia—headquartered in Lasanod and recognized by Mogadishu.
• Somali National Army Presence: In August 2026, the Somali prime minister visited Lasanod to discuss establishing a Somali National Army (SNA) base.
• Limits of Legitimacy: Members of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans in the east are predominantly Somali unionists, whereas the Isaaq clan generally supports Somaliland. Consequently, Somaliland President Irro’s authority effectively ends around Oog, an Isaaq town 85 kilometers west of Lasanod.

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Diplomatic & Policy Realities: Ambassador David Shinn’s Assessment

Complementing Hoehne’s ground-level analysis, veteran U.S. diplomat Ambassador David Shinn provides critical context regarding Washington’s executive policy and international diplomatic norms:

• Deferral to the African Union: Amb. Shinn emphasizes that the United States and Western powers consistently defer to the African Union (AU) on matters concerning African boundary changes and state sovereignty. Unilateral U.S. recognition remains highly unlikely without prior AU consensus or movement from key African nations.
• Risks to U.S.–Somalia Relations: Shinn warns that formal recognition of Somaliland would throw a severe wrench into Washington’s diplomatic and security relationship with the Federal Government of Somalia, endangering vital counterterrorism coordination in Mogadishu.
• Understanding the “Dual-Track” Policy: While the U.S. engages practically with Hargeisa on trade, development, and civil society, Shinn clarifies that this engagement is designed to foster stability within a Somali federal framework, not serve as an endorsement of formal independence.

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The Destabilizing History of U.S. Interventions

Concerns that Somalia is inherently a “fount of terrorism, piracy, and extremism” rely on quasi-colonial logic that portrays Somalis as incapable of maintaining political order. In reality, many of Somalia’s crises since 1991 have been co-produced by the United States and its regional allies.

1. Operation “Restore Hope” (1992–1994): U.S. intervention fueled markets of violence by elevating certain warlords into political partners while designating others as villains. Attempting to arrest Mohamed Farah Aideed led to the 1993 “Black Hawk Down” battle in Mogadishu, leaving 18 U.S. Marines dead and foreclosing direct U.S. military engagements abroad for years.
2. Indirect Interventions & Warlord Financing: Washington subsequently turned to indirect actions, financing local warlords under the premise of counterterrorism.
3. The 2006 Ethiopian Invasion: In December 2006, the U.S. strongly supported a brutal Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths in Mogadishu.
4. The Expansion of al-Shabaab: The carnage caused by U.S.-backed Ethiopian and African Union forces led Somalis across the Horn—including volunteers from Hargeysa in Somaliland—to view al-Shabaab as a legitimate defender of the Somali nation. Before late 2006, al-Shabaab numbered only a few hundred fighters; counterterrorism operations expanded the group into thousands.

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Comparative State Formation: Somalia vs. Rwanda

The contrasting outcomes of foreign intervention in Somalia and non-intervention in Rwanda highlight how external military operations disrupt organic state formation:

• Rwanda (1994): During the 1994 genocide, the UN and U.S. refused to intervene, leading to the loss of at least 800,000 lives. Ex-post, non-intervention allowed Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to end the genocide and establish a stable state. Despite authoritarian practices and human rights concerns, Rwanda became a primary U.S. partner, demonstrating that geopolitical interests routinely supersede human rights considerations in Washington’s strategic alignments.
• Somalia: Repeated external interventions perpetuated conflict, fractured local governance, and prevented organic post-conflict stabilization.

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Conclusion: Why External Recognition Threatens Regional Peace

Any attempt by Washington to legally recognize Somaliland against the resistance of the Somali federal government and unionist eastern clans constitutes another destabilizing external intervention. As both Hoehne’s ground analysis and Shinn’s diplomatic assessment demonstrate, unilateral recognition would fail to secure regional peace, strain key partnerships in Mogadishu, and risk sparking a major new war across the Somali Peninsula.

Baidoa, Sept. 18, 2006: The Day Suicide Terror Came To Somalia – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/18092026-baidoa-sept-18-2006-the-day-suicide-terror-came-to-somalia-oped/

Irro’s Washington Charm Offensive Couldn’t Paper Over Somaliland’s Empty Hands – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/17092026-irros-washington-charm-offensive-couldnt-paper-over-somalilands-empty-hands-oped/

Mogadishu, The Eternal Nain: A Chronicle Of A Capital That Never Learns – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/16092026-mogadishu-the-eternal-nain-a-chronicle-of-a-capital-that-never-learns-oped/

Somalia’s Wasted Reunification Opportunities: Blame Mogadishu, Not Hargeisa – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/15092026-somalias-wasted-reunification-opportunities-blame-mogadishu-not-hargeisa-oped/