Federalism, Confederation, Separation, and the Contest over the Somali Federal Compact
By Ismail H. Warsame, MSc, PhD Candidate
Warsame Digital Media (WDM)
Abstract
Puntland State confronts an increasingly consequential constitutional question: whether its long-term political interests remain best protected within the existing Somali federation, through a substantially looser confederal arrangement, or ultimately through political separation should federalism cease to provide meaningful protection for constituent-state autonomy.
This debate did not originate in a traditional Puntland separatist ideology. Puntland was established in 1998 as an autonomous Somali polity whose political project anticipated participation in the reconstruction of Somalia through federalism. Its contemporary estrangement from Mogadishu therefore demands explanation.
This paper argues that Puntland’s dissatisfaction cannot adequately be understood as a bilateral quarrel between Garowe and Mogadishu or as the product of individual political personalities. It forms part of a wider structural contest concerning the meaning of Somali federalism. Comparable disputes have affected Jubaland and South West State and have involved regional elections, constitutional amendments, military deployments, international relations, development finance, and competing claims of governmental legitimacy.
The constitutional situation has become still more complicated by the controversy surrounding the duration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s mandate. On March 5, 2026, Somalia’s Parliament approved constitutional changes that Reuters reported could extend the presidential term from four to five years and postpone elections originally expected in May 2026. The precise application of those provisions to the incumbent remained contested, making it more accurate to describe the matter as a controversial claimed or potential extension arising from the constitutional amendments, rather than as an uncontested legal fact.[1]
The dispute consequently involves five overlapping crises:
- a federal crisis concerning the distribution of authority between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States;
- a constitutional crisis concerning the unilateral or insufficiently consensual alteration of the federal compact;
- a security crisis concerning federal military authority and the political neutrality of national forces;
- a fiscal crisis concerning the distribution and administration of internationally financed development resources; and
- a mandate crisis concerning the authority of incumbent institutions to alter constitutional rules that may prolong their own tenure.
The paper nevertheless rejects an analysis in which every federal action is presumed illegitimate. It reconstructs Mogadishu’s strongest counter-case: Somalia remains one internationally sovereign state; foreign affairs, national defence, citizenship and immigration, and monetary policy are constitutionally federal responsibilities; national forces must possess genuine national reach; international financing imposes fiduciary obligations upon the Federal Government; constitutional reform cannot remain hostage indefinitely to one Federal Member State; and unrestricted regional foreign, security, and financial relationships risk transforming Somalia into a confederation by default.
The resulting conflict is therefore between two potentially destabilizing tendencies: Puntland’s expansive conception of constituent-state autonomy can approach de facto confederalism, while Mogadishu’s expansive conception of national sovereignty can approach administrative centralism.
Using the Ethiopia–Eritrea federation of 1952–1962 as a deliberately limited historical parallel, the paper argues that political unions founded upon protected autonomy become unstable when negotiated authority is progressively replaced by hierarchical authority.
The conclusion is straightforward: Somalia requires neither an impotent Federal Government nor an omnipotent one. It requires a functionally capable but constitutionally constrained centre, meaningful constituent-state autonomy, rule-based fiscal federalism, politically neutral national security institutions, and an authoritative constitutional mechanism for adjudicating centre–state disputes.
If genuine federalism fails, confederation will become increasingly attractive. If both federalism and confederal accommodation are foreclosed, separation may cease to be a marginal Puntland proposition.
Keywords: Puntland; Somalia; federalism; confederation; constitutionalism; mandate extension; Jubaland; South West State; Galkayo; Calmiskaad; fiscal federalism; Eritrea; Ethiopia.
I. Introduction: The Question Somalia Can No Longer Postpone
There is a persistent debate concerning Puntland State’s political future.
One position continues to favour Somali unity under genuine federalism.
Another increasingly considers confederation: a substantially looser Somali union in which Puntland and other constituent states would retain extensive governmental authority while delegating only specifically agreed functions to common institutions.
A third asks whether outright separation must eventually become a legitimate option if federalism becomes incapable of protecting meaningful self-government.
The existence of the third position is particularly significant.
Puntland was not founded as a conventional separatist project. Its institutions developed during the prolonged absence of an effective Somali national government, but the political objective remained participation in a reconstructed Somalia through federal arrangements.
The question therefore should not simply be:
Does Puntland want Somalia?
It should be:
What kind of Somalia did Puntland agree to help reconstruct, and what happens if that constitutional bargain is fundamentally changed without Puntland’s meaningful consent?
That is the question around which the present crisis turns.
II. Puntland and the Bottom-Up Reconstruction of Somalia
Puntland predates Somalia’s contemporary federal architecture.
That chronological fact has constitutional significance.
When Puntland was established in 1998, today’s Federal Government, Federal Parliament, and 2012 Provisional Constitution did not exist. Puntland constructed executive institutions, a legislature, security structures, administrative systems, and conflict-resolution mechanisms while national reconstruction remained incomplete.
Somalia’s federal reconstruction consequently differed from the conventional process in which an established central government devolves powers to provinces.
Political authority had already dispersed following state collapse.
The task was to reconstruct national institutions upward.
This historical experience produced a particularly strong conception of federalism in Puntland: the Federal Government exercises agreed national functions; it does not own the residual political authority of the constituent states.
Mogadishu has increasingly advanced a different conception: Somalia is one internationally sovereign republic, and federal authority must be sufficiently robust to prevent constituent states from evolving into quasi-independent governments.
Neither concern is inherently illegitimate.
Their collision is the constitutional problem.
III. Article 54: The Constitutional Bargain Cuts Both Ways
Somalia’s 2012 Provisional Constitution provides an essential starting point.
Article 54 states that the allocation of powers and resources between the Federal Government and Federal Member States shall be negotiated and agreed, except in four expressly federal fields:
foreign affairs; national defence; citizenship and immigration; and monetary policy.[2]
Article 53 is equally important. It requires the Federal Government to consult Federal Member States regarding negotiations involving foreign aid, trade, treaties, and other major international agreements. Where negotiations particularly affect state interests, Federal Member State representatives are supposed to participate in the federal negotiating delegation.[3]
The constitutional architecture therefore supports neither extreme.
It does not support the proposition that Puntland may exercise sovereign authority independently in every field.
Nor does it support the proposition that international sovereignty allows Mogadishu to determine every internal question.
The Constitution itself envisages shared government, consultation, negotiation, and divided authority.
That is federalism.
IV. Puntland’s 2013 Rupture: The Early Warning
Puntland’s confrontation with the centre long predates the current presidency.
In August 2013, Puntland suspended cooperation with the Federal Government during Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s first administration, citing disagreements over constitutional federalism, resource sharing, and federal authority.
The historical importance of that rupture is considerable.
It demonstrates that Puntland’s grievances cannot plausibly be reduced to President Said Abdullahi Deni, the 2024 constitutional amendments, or today’s political personalities.
The unresolved questions are structural:
Who controls national resources?
How are revenues shared?
How are international development funds allocated?
Who negotiates agreements affecting Federal Member States?
Which powers belong exclusively to Mogadishu?
Which remain with the states?
And who decides when the two sides disagree?
Somalia still lacks a sufficiently authoritative and trusted mechanism for answering those questions.
That omission has become increasingly dangerous.
V. This Is Not Merely a Puntland Problem
A common response to Puntland’s complaints has been to portray Garowe as uniquely obstructionist.
That argument becomes progressively weaker when similar confrontations repeatedly involve other Federal Member States.
South West has experienced severe disputes involving regional elections and federal security intervention.
Jubaland has experienced electoral, territorial, judicial, and military confrontation with Mogadishu.
Puntland has experienced disputes involving constitutional amendments, security, foreign relations, development finance, and federal authority.
By March 2026, South West State itself had severed relations with the Federal Government.[4]
The cumulative record therefore requires structural analysis.
VI. South West State, 2018: The Robow Precedent
The 2018 South West presidential election provides an important early example.
Mukhtar Robow, a former senior Al-Shabaab figure who had defected from the organization, entered the race.
The Federal Government opposed his candidacy.
Ethiopian forces arrested Robow in Baidoa on December 13, 2018. Protests followed. Human Rights Watch, citing United Nations findings, reported that security forces killed at least fifteen protesters and wounded many others between December 13 and 15.[5]
Robow’s past plainly raised legitimate security questions.
The constitutional concern is different.
A Federal Member State election became entangled with federal political preferences, foreign troops, candidate detention, and lethal security intervention.
That produced a dangerous precedent:
A constituent-state presidency appeared vulnerable to coercive intervention from outside the constituent state.
Whether that perception was entirely fair is less important institutionally than the fact that it became credible.
VII. Jubaland and Gedo: Political Disagreement Becomes Militarized
The dispute surrounding Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe’s 2019 reelection in Jubaland produced an even more serious confrontation.
The Federal Government challenged the electoral process.
Federal forces were subsequently deployed into Gedo, an area claimed politically by the Jubaland administration.
The confrontation became inseparable from Somalia’s broader electoral crisis.
The constitutional problem was no longer theoretical.
National forces were being perceived by one constituent government not as neutral instruments of common defence but as instruments in an internal political struggle.
Once a national military acquires that reputation, federal trust deteriorates rapidly.
VIII. The Federal Security Dilemma
The result is a classic security dilemma.
Mogadishu argues that Somalia requires a national army capable of operating throughout sovereign Somali territory.
Federal Member States fear that those forces can be used against them during political disputes.
They therefore maintain powerful regional forces.
Mogadishu interprets those forces as evidence that regional governments resist national integration.
The centre seeks greater military authority.
The states become still more determined to retain autonomous forces.
Both sides describe themselves as defending constitutional order.
Both become less secure.
Al-Shabaab and Islamic State benefit from the division.
A functioning federation cannot sustain this cycle indefinitely.
IX. The Constitutional Rupture of 2024
The dispute reached another threshold in March 2024 when the Federal Parliament adopted major amendments to the 2012 constitutional framework.
Puntland rejected the amendments and announced that it would cease recognizing federal institutions until a mutually agreed constitutional settlement was restored.
The amendments altered significant elements of Somalia’s political system, including electoral arrangements and executive authority. Critics argued that the changes concentrated power in the presidency. Puntland maintained that it had not consented to a fundamental rewriting of the federal bargain.
The Federal Government defended the process as necessary constitutional completion.
Somalia had remained governed for more than a decade under a constitution explicitly described as provisional.
Mogadishu argued that endless provisionality was itself unsustainable and linked the reforms to movement toward popular elections.
Both arguments contain constitutional force.
A provisional constitution cannot reasonably remain provisional forever.
But constitutional completion is not the same thing as constitutional consensus.
X. The 2026 Amendments and the Presidential Mandate Controversy
The crisis deepened on March 5, 2026.
Somalia’s Parliament approved further constitutional amendments that Reuters reported could increase the presidential term from four to five years and delay elections expected in May 2026.[6]
This development must be described precisely.
The amendments generated a major controversy over whether President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s own mandate had effectively been prolonged. Reuters reported that analysts considered the implications ambiguous: the amendments did not necessarily state expressly that the incumbent’s term was extended, but they created the possibility of an additional year depending upon interpretation and electoral implementation.[7]
The academically responsible formulation is therefore not that an uncontested legal extension unquestionably occurred.
It is that:
Somalia entered a serious constitutional dispute over whether amendments adopted by incumbent federal institutions had the effect of prolonging the incumbent political order beyond the four-year cycle under which President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected in May 2022.
That distinction matters.
But it does not make the constitutional problem smaller.
It makes it more serious.
XI. When the Rule-Makers Benefit from Changing the Rules
The mandate controversy introduces a conflict of constitutional interest.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected in May 2022 under a four-year political cycle.
Federal institutions subsequently participated in constitutional amendments capable of altering the duration of that cycle.
Even where amendment procedures are formally lawful, a basic constitutional question arises when incumbent institutions benefit directly from rules they themselves change.
The problem is elementary:
Those temporarily entrusted with political authority should not possess unrestricted power to change the date upon which that authority expires.
This does not mean that every transitional extension is unconstitutional.
Wars, natural disasters, institutional transitions, or genuine electoral impossibility can require temporary arrangements.
But extensions demand exceptionally strong legitimacy precisely because incumbents benefit from them.
The burden of justification should therefore be higher, not lower.
XII. Mogadishu’s Counter-Argument on the Mandate
The Federal Government has a serious response.
It can argue that describing the controversy simply as a presidential self-extension is misleading.
Parliament—not the President acting alone—approved the constitutional amendments.
The changes formed part of a broader attempt to establish a permanent constitutional and electoral framework.
Somalia was attempting to move from indirect elite selection toward broader electoral participation.
Such a transition requires electoral laws, voter registration, constituency arrangements, political-party organization, administrative preparation, security, and funding.
Mogadishu can therefore argue:
Should Somalia abandon constitutional reform merely because implementing a new electoral architecture takes longer than the existing electoral calendar allows?
That argument cannot simply be dismissed.
But neither does parliamentary approval settle the matter.
XIII. Parliament Can Also Possess a Conflict of Interest
A legislature may suffer from precisely the same constitutional conflict when amendments extend the political life of the institutions whose members approve them.
Parliamentary enactment answers:
Who formally changed the rule?
It does not necessarily answer:
Was changing that rule democratically legitimate?
The proper assessment must consider:
the pre-existing constitutional framework;
the amendment procedure;
the degree of political inclusion;
participation by Federal Member States;
the necessity and proportionality of any transitional extension;
the existence of a definite electoral timetable;
and whether incumbents acquire political advantages unavailable under the rules through which they assumed office.
The controversy therefore cannot be resolved by saying simply:
Parliament voted.
Constitutionalism is more demanding than parliamentary arithmetic.
XIV. The Circular Legitimacy Problem
The mandate dispute becomes particularly serious when placed alongside the Puntland dispute.
Puntland rejected the constitutional process.
The Federal Government nevertheless continued the constitutional review.
Those amendments subsequently became part of the legal architecture through which federal institutions claim continuing authority.
Mogadishu then invokes federal authority to demand Puntland’s compliance.
This creates a circular problem:
Puntland disputes the legitimacy of the constitutional process.
Mogadishu invokes the outcome of that process as proof of its authority over Puntland.
The issue is therefore no longer merely the length of one president’s tenure.
It concerns who possesses legitimate authority to alter the constitutional rules governing the duration and scope of federal power itself.
XV. Federalism Requires a Legitimate Federal Centre
Federalism imposes constitutional discipline in both directions.
Puntland cannot invoke autonomy indefinitely while disregarding legitimate federal authority.
But Mogadishu cannot demand unconditional recognition of federal supremacy while the rules governing the tenure and powers of federal institutions are themselves seriously contested.
This produces a fundamental principle:
Federal authority cannot be more legitimate than the constitutional process from which that authority derives.
The mandate controversy therefore intensifies Puntland’s argument.
From Garowe’s perspective, the sequence can be read as follows:
constitutional disagreement;
unilateral or insufficiently consensual amendment;
Puntland’s withdrawal of recognition;
further constitutional amendment;
a disputed change potentially prolonging federal tenure;
and increasing assertion of federal authority against constituent states that reject the amended framework.
Whether one accepts Puntland’s interpretation or not, this is precisely the type of sequence capable of destroying federal trust.
XVI. Jubaland, Ras Kamboni, and the Limits of One-Sided Narratives
The Jubaland confrontation escalated again in late 2024 following another disputed election involving President Madobe.
Competing assertions of legitimacy escalated into judicial and security confrontation and eventually fighting around Ras Kamboni.
A balanced account is necessary.
The episode cannot simply be described as an unprovoked federal attack upon Jubaland.
Later analysis attributed the initial attack in the immediate armed confrontation to Jubaland forces.
That fact does not erase the political confrontation and federal military buildup that preceded the fighting.
But it demonstrates why the Puntland case becomes stronger—not weaker—when evidence contradicting its preferred narrative is acknowledged.
Federalism cannot be studied through propaganda from either side.
XVII. South West State, 2026: The Crisis Reaches a Former Ally
On March 17, 2026, South West State announced that it was severing relations and suspending cooperation with the Federal Government.[8]
This was particularly consequential because South West had generally been politically closer to Mogadishu than Puntland or Jubaland.
Less than two weeks later, federal forces entered Baidoa.
Reuters reported on March 30 that national forces took control of parts of the South West capital following fighting with forces loyal to the regional administration. President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen subsequently resigned. The Federal Government accused his administration of creating political conflict and maintained that federal forces were welcomed, while residents had fled areas of the city fearing wider violence.[9]
Whatever interpretation one prefers, the institutional fact is remarkable:
A constitutional confrontation between the centre and a Federal Member State culminated in federal forces taking control of the member state’s capital.
That cannot be treated as ordinary federal politics.
XVIII. Calmiskaad: Where Was the Federation?
If Baidoa and Gedo raise questions about excessive federal presence, Puntland’s Calmiskaad campaign raises the opposite question:
Where was federal power when Puntland needed national assistance?
Beginning in late 2024, Puntland forces launched a major campaign against Islamic State in the mountainous areas of Bari.
By February 2025, Reuters reported that Puntland forces had captured approximately 250 square kilometres and fifty Islamic State bases. Puntland reported substantial militant casualties as well as the deaths of its own soldiers.[10]
This was not merely a local policing operation.
ISIS-Somalia formed part of an international terrorist network, contained foreign fighters, and represented a threat extending beyond Puntland.
Yet Puntland Information Minister Mohammed Aided told Reuters that there was no operational coordination with the Federal Government and appealed for additional international assistance, including counter-drone capabilities, mine-clearing equipment, expertise, and other support.[11]
That statement supplies Puntland with one of its strongest political arguments.
Its forces were performing a function of unmistakable national and international importance.
Yet the principal ground burden remained Puntland’s.
XIX. Mogadishu’s Calmiskaad Response
The Federal Government disputed the broader implication that it was simply absent.
Federal Information Minister Daud Aweis told Reuters that Mogadishu maintained security engagement with stakeholders including Puntland and emphasized the need for stronger federal institutions and a cohesive national counterterrorism strategy.[12]
That response reveals the deeper federal argument.
Puntland says:
We operate independently because Mogadishu cannot reliably perform the common security function.
Mogadishu effectively answers:
The common security function cannot work properly because Puntland and other states operate through fragmented command structures and independent external partnerships.
Both arguments possess internal logic.
The constitutional failure lies in the fact that Somalia still lacks an agreed security architecture capable of resolving the contradiction.
XX. Development Finance: The Puntland Accusation
Another persistent Puntland grievance concerns international development resources.
Puntland political actors have alleged that Mogadishu has withheld, delayed, redirected, or politically conditioned resources intended for Puntland.
These claims must be treated carefully.
Independent research by the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre confirms repeated allegations that the Federal Government has withheld or redirected aid away from Puntland and other territories because of political disputes. U4 also notes reports alleging that millions of dollars allocated to Puntland were redirected toward regions considered politically closer to the Federal Government.[13]
But U4 adds an essential qualification:
the evidence is often unclear, making it difficult to determine whether all such accusations are themselves politically motivated.[14]
That qualification belongs in any serious paper.
Puntland’s allegation is documented.
Every individual allegation is not thereby proven.
XXI. Mogadishu’s Fiscal Defence
The Federal Government possesses a substantial counterargument.
International assistance is often legally provided to the Federal Republic of Somalia rather than directly to each Federal Member State.
Mogadishu therefore carries fiduciary responsibilities involving:
audit;
procurement;
budget reporting;
public financial management;
debt sustainability;
donor compliance;
and national financial governance.
Federal financial records also demonstrate substantial transfers to Federal Member States generally.
Somalia’s Ministry of Finance reported that $117.72 million was disbursed in 2024 under the expenditure category covering transfers to Federal Member States and certain other organizations, including $20.56 million facilitated through donor project funds.[15]
That evidence prevents an academically responsible paper from claiming that Mogadishu simply confiscates all state resources.
The problem is subtler.
Federal control creates legitimate administrative responsibility.
It also creates potential political leverage.
XXII. Fiscal Federalism Must Be Rule-Based
The answer is institutional rather than rhetorical.
State allocations should be formula-based.
Conditions should be published.
Disbursements should be traceable.
Audits should be independent.
Technical non-compliance should be documented.
Political disagreements should be irrelevant.
Hospitals are not political opponents.
Road projects do not boycott constitutional conferences.
Water systems do not dispute presidential mandates.
Citizens should not lose development because two governments disagree.
A rule-based system would protect Puntland from genuine discrimination while simultaneously protecting Mogadishu from unfounded accusations of discrimination.
XXIII. Galkayo, August 2026: The Latest Warning
The constitutional confrontation has now reached one of Somalia’s most politically sensitive cities.
In early August 2026, fighting erupted in Galkayo involving Puntland forces and an armed formation based near the airport in northern Galkayo whose commanders had aligned themselves with Mogadishu.
Puntland forces seized the camp following heavy fighting.
Puntland characterized the operation as necessary to remove a security threat and accused Mogadishu of supporting destabilizing armed formations.
The episode is particularly dangerous because Galkayo has historically been divided between Puntland administration in the north and Galmudug administration in the south and has experienced recurrent clan and political violence.
Armed federal-state competition in such an environment is therefore potentially explosive.
XXIV. Galkayo: Allegation Is Not Yet Proof of Intent
A scholarly paper must distinguish three propositions.
First, armed confrontation occurred.
Second, Puntland regarded the forces involved as federally aligned.
Third, Puntland alleges that Mogadishu deliberately supported those forces in order to destabilize Puntland.
The first two propositions are much easier to establish publicly than the third.
Evidence of federal alignment does not automatically establish a federal plan to destabilize Puntland.
Mogadishu’s strongest counterargument is consequently straightforward:
Federal security relationships and national forces operating inside internationally recognized Somali territory cannot automatically be characterized as foreign aggression against Puntland.
That argument has constitutional weight.
But it does not eliminate federal responsibility.
Where armed formations associated with the national government operate in a Federal Member State during an acute political confrontation, Mogadishu should be able to identify clearly:
their legal status;
their command;
their mission;
their financing;
their relationship with the national security structure;
and the constitutional basis for their presence.
Without that transparency, federal security activity becomes indistinguishable politically from intervention.
XXV. The Calmiskaad–Galkayo Paradox
For Puntland, the political contrast is devastating.
In Calmiskaad, Puntland says it fought an international terrorist organization without operational coordination with Mogadishu.
In Galkayo, it encountered forces aligned with Mogadishu during a domestic political confrontation.
The resulting perception is:
Mogadishu appears weak where Puntland needs federal assistance and strong where Puntland fears federal interference.
The Federal Government disputes that characterization.
But legitimacy depends partly upon what institutions visibly do.
A national government cannot afford to become perceived as less operationally relevant against ISIS in Puntland than it is during political confrontations inside Puntland.
XXVI. Mogadishu’s Strongest Case Against Puntland
The Federal Government’s broader argument must nevertheless be stated at full strength.
If every Federal Member State independently claims the right to:
conduct foreign relations;
enter strategic military agreements;
determine whether national forces may operate within its territory;
reject national constitutional decisions;
maintain largely independent armed forces;
negotiate directly with foreign powers over strategic infrastructure;
ignore federal diplomatic decisions;
and decide which national institutions it recognizes,
then Somalia eventually ceases to function as a federation.
It becomes a confederation without admitting that it has become one.
Mogadishu is entitled to regard that prospect as a threat to national statehood.
XXVII. Foreign Affairs: Where Mogadishu Has a Strong Case
Article 54 explicitly places foreign affairs within federal competence.
This became particularly visible in January 2026 when the Federal Government severed diplomatic and security relations with the United Arab Emirates.
Puntland and Jubaland rejected Mogadishu’s decision. Puntland maintained that its relationship with the UAE, including the long-term DP World arrangement concerning Bosaso port, would continue.[16]
From Puntland’s perspective, the UAE relationship concerns longstanding security, investment, port development, and counterterrorism interests.
From Mogadishu’s perspective, the constitutional problem is obvious:
How can Somalia possess one foreign policy if constituent states independently maintain relationships that the national government has formally terminated?
On this issue, Mogadishu possesses substantial constitutional grounds.
But Article 53 provides the necessary counterweight: the Federal Government must consult states where international agreements significantly affect their interests.
National competence does not mean national indifference to constituent-state interests.
XXVIII. National Sovereignty Is Real—but Not Unlimited Internally
Somalia is the internationally recognized sovereign state.
It represents the country before international institutions.
It carries international debt obligations.
It conducts treaty relations.
It defends Somalia’s territorial integrity.
These are genuine federal functions.
But international sovereignty does not automatically confer unlimited internal jurisdiction.
Canada is sovereign.
Germany is sovereign.
Switzerland is sovereign.
The United States is sovereign.
Their constituent units nevertheless possess constitutionally protected powers.
Thus the phrase “Somalia is one country” cannot answer every internal jurisdictional dispute.
If it could, federalism would be merely decorative.
XXIX. Puntland Cannot Have a Permanent Veto
Mogadishu also has a legitimate objection to an excessively rigid conception of state consent.
If every constitutional amendment requires unanimous approval by every Federal Member State, a single government may acquire permanent power to block constitutional development.
Consultation cannot necessarily mean unanimity.
Negotiation cannot necessarily mean veto.
Somalia requires institutions capable of making decisions.
Otherwise federalism becomes paralysis.
Puntland has a right to participate.
It has a right to object.
It has a right to demand constitutional protection.
But it does not follow automatically that Puntland must possess a unilateral veto over every national reform.
XXX. But Mogadishu Cannot Vote Federalism Away
The opposite danger is equally serious.
If an ordinary national majority can alter the powers of constituent states without meaningful state consent, the centre can effectively determine the limits of its own authority.
That is structurally dangerous.
Established federations generally impose special amendment requirements when the federal balance itself is altered.
Somalia needs a mechanism combining national democratic legitimacy with constituent-state consent.
Neither absolute state veto nor unlimited federal majoritarianism is adequate.
XXXI. Universal Suffrage Does Not Answer the Federal Question
Mogadishu’s desire to replace indirect political selection with broader popular elections is democratically defensible.
But democracy and federalism answer different questions.
Democracy asks:
Who governs?
Federalism asks:
Which government possesses which powers?
A directly elected president can still violate federalism.
A directly elected state president can still violate state constitutionalism.
Votes establish democratic legitimacy.
They do not create unlimited jurisdiction.
Somalia requires both democratic elections and constitutional federalism.
Neither substitutes for the other.
XXXII. National Defence: Mogadishu Is Right About Something Fundamental
Somalia cannot possess a meaningful national army if every Federal Member State treats federal forces as foreign troops.
The country confronts Al-Shabaab, Islamic State, piracy, transnational crime, and external security threats.
National defence is explicitly federal under Article 54.
A national military therefore requires genuine national reach.
Puntland must acknowledge this.
But Mogadishu must acknowledge the corresponding limitation.
XXXIII. National Defence Cannot Become a Universal Intervention Clause
There is a constitutional difference between deploying federal troops:
against Al-Shabaab;
against Islamic State;
to an international frontier;
or against external aggression,
and deploying forces during a contested Federal Member State election or political confrontation.
Without clear rules, “national security” can swallow federal autonomy.
Somalia therefore needs binding protocols governing:
federal deployment;
state consultation;
joint command;
regional forces;
counterterrorism coordination;
political neutrality;
and dispute resolution.
Until then, Mogadishu will call the same troop movement national authority that Garowe or Kismayo calls political intervention.
XXXIV. The Mandate Problem Changes the Balance
The controversy over President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s tenure adds another dimension to all of these federal claims.
The Federal Government can legitimately insist upon its constitutional competencies.
But the authority of institutions asserting those competencies depends upon the legitimacy of the constitutional order under which they continue governing.
If the centre changes the rules governing federalism and simultaneously changes rules capable of extending the duration of the federal institutions making those changes, constituent-state distrust becomes almost inevitable.
The constitutional danger is therefore not merely an extra year.
It is the precedent of constitutional self-preservation.
A rule defended because one trusts today’s president must also be safe if exercised tomorrow by a president one distrusts.
That is the correct constitutional test.
XXXV. The Missing Institution: Who Judges the Federation?
The deepest structural weakness is now obvious.
When Puntland and Mogadishu disagree over constitutional powers, who decides?
Puntland cannot be the final judge of its own jurisdiction.
But neither can the Federal Government.
Mogadishu is simultaneously:
the national executive;
the international representative of Somalia;
a participant in constitutional amendment;
the principal national security authority;
an important gatekeeper for international finance;
and one of the parties to the federal dispute.
A functioning federation requires an independent constitutional arbiter capable of binding both sides.
Without one, disputes migrate from law to bargaining, bargaining to financial pressure, and financial pressure to armed confrontation.
XXXVI. The Ethiopia–Eritrea Parallel: A Warning, Not a Prediction
The Ethiopia–Eritrea federation provides a useful but limited historical parallel.
Puntland is not Eritrea.
Eritrea had a separate colonial history and entered federation with Ethiopia through an internationally sponsored arrangement.
The legal histories are different.
The comparison concerns institutional dynamics.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 390 A (V), adopted on December 2, 1950, provided for Eritrea to become an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia.[17]
The federation came into effect in 1952.
Over the following decade, Eritrean autonomy was progressively eroded.
In 1962, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea and terminated the federal arrangement.
The intended result was integration.
The historical result was radicalization of the Eritrean political question, prolonged armed struggle, and ultimately independence.
The lesson is not that Puntland should imitate Eritrea.
The lesson is:
Destroying constitutional autonomy does not necessarily destroy the political demand for autonomy. It may radicalize it.
XXXVII. The Centralization Paradox
This produces what may be called the centralization paradox.
The centre fears fragmentation.
It therefore accumulates authority.
Constituent states interpret increased central authority as proof that existing autonomy guarantees cannot be trusted.
They demand stronger guarantees.
The centre interprets those demands as separatism.
It centralizes further.
Federalists become confederalists.
Confederalists may eventually become separatists.
The policy intended to preserve national unity thereby manufactures the political constituency for exit.
XXXVIII. The Autonomy Escalation Ladder
The process can be conceptualized as:
decentralization → federalism → enhanced federalism → confederation → sovereignty
Movement along this ladder is not inevitable.
Political communities move upward when weaker constitutional guarantees repeatedly fail.
Puntland historically occupied the federal position.
Somalia’s strategic objective should be to make that position sufficiently secure that Puntland has no compelling reason to move further.
XXXIX. Confederation Should Be Studied, Not Feared
Confederation should therefore enter serious Somali constitutional debate.
A confederal Somali arrangement might delegate to common institutions agreed responsibility for:
external defence;
currency;
citizenship;
selected foreign affairs;
interstate trade;
maritime security;
international debt;
and agreed national infrastructure.
Most domestic governmental authority would remain with the constituent states.
Confederation has disadvantages.
It may weaken coordinated security.
It may complicate redistribution.
Foreign powers could exploit internal differences.
National infrastructure could become harder to manage.
But constitutional alternatives must be compared with reality, not perfection.
A looser union commanding genuine consent may ultimately be stronger than an ambitious federation continuously resisted by its constituent parts.
XL. Separation: The Option Centralization Could Create
Puntland’s historical commitment to Somali reconstruction makes the emergence of separatist sentiment especially significant.
If Puntland had always been separatist, contemporary demands for separation would tell us little.
But Puntland was founded within a Somali political framework.
The relevant future question would therefore be:
What caused a historically federalist polity to conclude that federalism could no longer protect it?
If Mogadishu wishes never to confront that question, it must make the existing constitutional bargain credible.
XLI. Puntland Must Also Look in the Mirror
Puntland cannot defend constitutionalism nationally while neglecting constitutionalism internally.
Its strongest argument against central domination is not historical entitlement.
It is governmental performance.
Puntland must strengthen:
independent courts;
legislative accountability;
professional policing;
civilian control of security institutions;
transparent public finance;
competitive politics;
local government;
human-rights protection;
constitutional succession;
and accountability for political violence.
Clan militias and private armed formations cannot coexist indefinitely with serious statehood.
Self-government without the rule of law merely decentralizes arbitrary power.
XLII. A Constitutional Futures Commission
Puntland should establish an independent Constitutional Futures Commission.
It should examine three scenarios without predetermined conclusions.
Option I — Reconstructed Federalism
What constitutional guarantees would make Puntland’s continued participation sustainable?
The Commission should address:
allocation of powers;
fiscal federalism;
natural resources;
international agreements;
security command;
federal troop deployment;
constitutional amendment;
and independent adjudication.
Option II — Somali Confederation
The Commission should examine:
citizenship;
currency;
defence;
foreign relations;
airspace;
ports;
maritime jurisdiction;
international borrowing;
treaties;
and interstate commerce.
Option III — Separation
Even if separation remains undesirable, responsible government should understand its implications:
recognition;
borders;
citizenship;
assets and liabilities;
public debt;
currency;
trade;
defence;
airspace;
maritime boundaries;
and relations with the remainder of Somalia.
The purpose would not be to manufacture separation.
It would be to replace emotional speculation with constitutional analysis.
XLIII. The Five-Dimensional Crisis
The Puntland question should therefore now be understood through five overlapping constitutional crises.
1. Federalism
Who possesses which powers?
2. Constitutional Amendment
Who may change those powers and through what procedure?
3. Security
When may federal forces operate inside constituent states, and under whose command?
4. Fiscal Federalism
How are national and international resources distributed without political discrimination?
5. Democratic Mandate
Can incumbent federal institutions alter constitutional rules that may prolong their own tenure, particularly when major constituent states dispute the legitimacy of the amendment process?
These crises reinforce one another.
That is why Somalia’s present predicament cannot be solved through another political communiqué.
It requires constitutional settlement.
XLIV. What Mogadishu Is Right About
Mogadishu is right that Somalia requires meaningful national institutions.
It is right that foreign affairs cannot be completely fragmented.
It is right that national defence requires coordination.
It is right that citizenship and monetary policy require national institutions.
It is right that international creditors require a sovereign counterpart.
It is right that Puntland cannot automatically veto every national decision.
It is right that Federal Member States cannot selectively invoke only those constitutional provisions that restrain Mogadishu.
And it is right that a system in which every Federal Member State behaves as an independent sovereign would cease meaningfully to be a federation.
These are not trivial arguments.
They are part of statehood.
XLV. What Puntland Is Right About
Puntland is right that federalism cannot survive if the centre alone determines what federalism means.
It is right that constitutional changes affecting constituent-state powers require meaningful state participation.
It is right that national security institutions must not become instruments of regional political competition.
It is right that international development resources require safeguards against political manipulation.
It is right to ask why operational federal assistance appeared so limited during its major campaign against ISIS.
It is right to demand clarity about federally aligned armed formations operating within Puntland territory.
And it is right to question constitutional arrangements capable of extending the tenure of the very federal institutions adopting those arrangements.
These are not inherently separatist arguments.
They are constitutional arguments.
XLVI. The Central Finding
Once both cases are stated seriously, Somalia’s problem becomes clearer.
Puntland sometimes advances an interpretation of autonomy approaching confederal sovereignty.
Mogadishu sometimes advances an interpretation of national sovereignty approaching unitary centralism.
Neither extreme offers a stable federal settlement.
Somalia requires:
a functionally strong but constitutionally limited Federal Government.
The centre must be powerful where the Constitution makes it powerful.
It must be restrained where the Constitution makes the states autonomous.
The same principle applies to Puntland.
That is the essence of federalism.
XLVII. Conclusion: The Federation Must Earn the Union
Puntland’s constitutional debate is no longer theoretical.
It is the cumulative product of political experience.
That experience includes Puntland’s 2013 rupture with Mogadishu; South West’s 2018 election crisis and the Robow arrest; the Jubaland-Gedo confrontation; the disputed constitutional amendments beginning in 2024; the Ras Kamboni confrontation; Puntland’s largely self-directed Calmiskaad campaign against Islamic State; allegations concerning development resources; South West State’s 2026 rupture and federal intervention in Baidoa; the disputed presidential mandate arising from the March 2026 constitutional changes; and the August 2026 Galkayo confrontation.
Not every Puntland accusation has been proven.
Not every federal action is unconstitutional.
That is precisely why the cumulative pattern is so important.
The central problem is not that every action by Mogadishu can be demonstrated to constitute hostile interference.
The deeper problem is that Somalia’s constitutional architecture is insufficiently trusted to distinguish legitimate federal authority from political federal intervention.
The mandate controversy makes this problem substantially more serious.
The question is no longer only:
What powers does Mogadishu possess over Puntland?
It is also:
Under what constitutional authority do the federal institutions claiming those powers continue to govern?
Reuters reported that the March 2026 amendments could extend the presidential term by a year, although the application to the incumbent remained legally and politically ambiguous.[18]
That ambiguity itself is damaging.
The expiration of political authority should not be mysterious.
Citizens should know when a president’s mandate begins.
They should know when it ends.
Opponents should know when elections occur.
Security institutions should know that their loyalty belongs to constitutional government rather than indefinite incumbency.
Constitutional predictability is not administrative decoration.
It is one of the foundations of peaceful politics.
Puntland was founded not to destroy Somalia but to survive Somalia’s collapse and participate in its reconstruction.
Federalism supplied the compromise:
self-government without separation; Somali unity without renewed central domination.
That bargain remains possible.
But it must work both ways.
Puntland cannot demand constitutional restraint from Mogadishu while ignoring legitimate federal powers.
Mogadishu cannot demand obedience from Puntland while claiming the unilateral authority to determine the extent of those powers.
And neither Parliament nor the Presidency should casually establish precedents allowing incumbent institutions to rewrite constitutional clocks from which they themselves benefit.
Somalia requires a real Federal Government.
Somalia also requires real Federal Member States.
Destroy the first and the republic fragments through weakness.
Destroy the second and the federation fragments through resistance.
The Ethiopia–Eritrea historical parallel is therefore not prophecy.
It is warning.
Political unions rarely disintegrate because of one disagreement.
They deteriorate when exceptions become precedents, precedents become practices, and practices gradually replace the original constitutional compact.
If genuine federalism works, Puntland has powerful reasons to remain within Somalia.
If federalism becomes nominal, confederation becomes increasingly rational.
If both meaningful federalism and confederal accommodation become impossible, separation will inevitably move closer to mainstream Puntland political debate.
That is not a declaration of independence.
It is the logic of failed constitutional guarantees.
The responsibility therefore lies equally—but differently—with Garowe and Mogadishu.
Puntland must demonstrate that self-government produces constitutional government.
Mogadishu must demonstrate that national government does not mean central domination.
And Somalia as a whole must establish one principle beyond political manipulation:
The constitutional rules governing the federation cannot belong to whichever political faction temporarily occupies Villa Somalia.
Mogadishu is the seat of the Federal Government.
It is not the proprietor of the federation.
Puntland is a constituent state.
It is not an independent sovereign under the existing constitutional compact.
Between those propositions lies Somalia’s possible future.
The federation will survive only if both are respected.
A federation survives not because one side wins the struggle for power, but because neither side can constitutionally dominate the other.
And the final historical lesson is perhaps the simplest:
If Somalia wants Puntland to remain federalist, Somalia must make federalism worth defending.
Notes
1. Reuters, “Somali Parliament Backs Constitutional Changes That Could Extend President’s Term,” March 5, 2026. Reuters reported that the amendments could extend the presidential term by one year and delay elections, while analysts noted ambiguity concerning their precise application to the incumbent.
2. Federal Republic of Somalia, Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia (Mogadishu, 2012), art. 54. Article 54 reserves foreign affairs, national defence, citizenship and immigration, and monetary policy to the Federal Government while requiring other allocations of powers and resources to be negotiated and agreed.
3. Federal Republic of Somalia, Provisional Constitution, art. 53. The article requires consultation with Federal Member States regarding foreign aid, trade, treaties, and other major international agreements and provides for state participation where their interests are particularly affected.
4. Reuters, “Somalia’s South West State Says It Has Severed Ties with the Federal Government,” March 17, 2026.
5. Human Rights Watch, “Somalia,” World Report 2020 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2020). Human Rights Watch, citing the United Nations, reported that at least fifteen protesters were killed following Mukhtar Robow’s December 2018 arrest.
6. Reuters, “Somali Parliament Backs Constitutional Changes That Could Extend President’s Term,” March 5, 2026.
7. Ibid. Reuters reported analysis indicating that the constitutional implications remained ambiguous and that the changes did not necessarily expressly prolong the incumbent’s term, although they could produce that effect.
8. Reuters, “Somalia’s South West State Says It Has Severed Ties with the Federal Government,” March 17, 2026.
9. Reuters, “Somali Army Takes Control of Strategic City, Regional Leader Resigns,” March 30, 2026. Reuters reported fighting between national forces and troops loyal to South West State, federal control of parts of Baidoa, civilian flight, and the subsequent resignation of the regional president.
10. Reuters, “Puntland Offensive Deals Blow to Islamic State in Somalia,” February 7, 2025. Reuters reported Puntland’s claim that its forces had recovered approximately 250 square kilometres and fifty Islamic State bases.
11. Ibid. Puntland Information Minister Mohammed Aided stated that there was no operational coordination with the Federal Government and appealed for additional international assistance.
12. Ibid. Federal Information Minister Daud Aweis maintained that Mogadishu had continuing security engagement with stakeholders including Puntland and called for stronger federal institutions and a cohesive national counterterrorism strategy.
13. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Aid Diversion and Corruption in Somalia (Bergen: U4, February 9, 2026), section “Politicised Allocation.” The report records repeated allegations of federal withholding or redirection of aid from Puntland and other territories and cites reports of international aid allocated to Puntland allegedly being redirected toward politically aligned regions.
14. Ibid. U4 explicitly cautions that evidence concerning the political motivation of such alleged diversions is often unclear.
15. Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Finance, 2024 End Year Budget Performance Report (Mogadishu: Budget Department, March 26, 2025), paras. 44–45. The report states that $117.72 million was disbursed under the category covering transfers to Federal Member States and other organizations during 2024, including $20.56 million through donor project funds.
16. Reuters, “Somali Regions Reject Mogadishu’s Move to Cut Ties with UAE,” January 13, 2026. Puntland and Jubaland rejected the Federal Government’s termination of relations with the UAE; Puntland maintained that its existing UAE relationship and DP World Bosaso concession remained valid.
17. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 390 A (V), “Eritrea,” December 2, 1950, UN Doc. A/RES/390(V). The resolution established the framework under which Eritrea would constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia.
18. Reuters, “Somali Parliament Backs Constitutional Changes That Could Extend President’s Term,” March 5, 2026.
Bibliography
Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Finance. 2024 End Year Budget Performance Report. Mogadishu: Budget Department, March 26, 2025.
Federal Republic of Somalia. Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Mogadishu, 2012.
Human Rights Watch. “Somalia.” World Report 2020. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2020.
International Crisis Group. Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia. Africa Briefing. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020.
———. Staving off Violence around Somalia’s Elections. Africa Briefing. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2020.
———. “Stabilising Somalia for Elections and What Comes After.” Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021.
Puntland Development Research Centre and Interpeace. A Bottom-Up Approach to Peace and Statebuilding: Lessons from the Somali Experience. Garowe: PDRC/Interpeace, 2008.
Puntland State of Somalia. Constitution of the Puntland State of Somalia.
Reuters. “Puntland Offensive Deals Blow to Islamic State in Somalia.” February 7, 2025.
———. “Somali Regions Reject Mogadishu’s Move to Cut Ties with UAE.” January 13, 2026.
———. “Somali Parliament Backs Constitutional Changes That Could Extend President’s Term.” March 5, 2026.
———. “Somalia’s South West State Says It Has Severed Ties with the Federal Government.” March 17, 2026.
———. “Somali Army Takes Control of Strategic City, Regional Leader Resigns.” March 30, 2026.
U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. Aid Diversion and Corruption in Somalia. Bergen: U4, February 9, 2026.
United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 390 A (V), “Eritrea.” UN Doc. A/RES/390(V). December 2, 1950.
WDM Editorial Proposition
The evidence does not require the intellectually convenient fiction that Mogadishu is always wrong.
Nor does Somali sovereignty support the equally dangerous fiction that whatever Mogadishu does in the name of the Federal Republic is automatically constitutional.
Puntland must respect legitimate federal authority.
Mogadishu must accept that legitimate federal authority has constitutional limits.
And incumbent federal institutions must recognize that constitutional legitimacy becomes particularly vulnerable when they alter rules capable of extending their own tenure.
Federalism is not obedience to Mogadishu.
Federalism is not independence from Mogadishu.
It is constitutionally divided government.
That distinction is now the difference between preserving the Somali federation and slowly dismantling it.
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