By Ismail H. Warsame
Somalia did not adopt federalism because politicians suddenly embraced decentralization. It adopted federalism because centralized rule destroyed the Somali state. The Provisional Constitution was meant to ensure that no government in Mogadishu could again dominate the rest of the country through patronage, coercion, or clan politics.
Yet that is precisely what many Somalis now fear is happening.
The growing accusation against President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is not simply one of political interference. It is the allegation that he is governing through what many call the “Goofka doctrine”—a politics that elevates clan loyalty above constitutional federalism and seeks to extend Mogadishu’s influence by cultivating loyalists inside the Federal Member States.
South West State is widely seen by critics as politically subdued. Jubaland has resisted repeated attempts at federal pressure. Puntland now believes it has become the next target, with fears that Mogadishu is searching for local proxies to divide the state from within rather than confront it openly.
Whether every allegation is true is almost secondary.
The real danger is that Somalia’s unfinished Constitution makes such accusations entirely believable.
Where constitutional powers remain undefined, patronage replaces law. Where institutions are weak, political clients become more valuable than constitutional partners. Every federal vacuum eventually becomes an opportunity for political capture.
Puntland must therefore remain vigilant. Garowe and Bosaso should pay close attention to attempts at candidate engineering, security manipulation, financial dependency, and narrative warfare disguised as “national unity.” Federal cooperation must never become federal subordination.
But Puntland must also avoid a familiar trap. Not every governance failure can be blamed on Mogadishu. Corruption, weak administration, and political complacency cannot be excused by invoking external conspiracies.
Both Villa Somalia and the Federal Member States have constitutional obligations.
The centre must stop treating federal states as political territories to be conquered.
The regions must stop treating federalism as a shield against accountability.
Somalia’s future depends on neither central domination nor perpetual regional confrontation. It depends on completing the federal project: clarifying constitutional powers, strengthening independent institutions, respecting regional autonomy, and ending the politics of clan patronage.
The greatest threat to Somalia today is not one politician.
It is the belief that constitutions can be replaced by loyalists.
Once that becomes the accepted rule of politics, federalism survives only on paper—and Somalia risks repeating the very mistakes that caused the collapse of the state.