BREAKING

A fee hike, a merchant boycott, and a fight over who really controls Bosaso

If you’ve driven along the Bosaso–Garowe highway in the past couple of weeks, you’ll have seen the traffic jam that tells the whole story: dozens of cargo trucks parked and going nowhere, while out past the breakwater, ships sit at anchor waiting for a green light that hasn’t come. Bosaso Port — Puntland’s main gateway to the rest of the world — has been effectively shut for cargo since around July 1, 2026. And the reason isn’t a storm, a security incident, or a mechanical breakdown. It’s a standoff between the traders who move goods through the port and the authorities who run it.

The port that keeps Puntland running

A little context, if Bosaso isn’t already on your radar: it’s a coastal city in northeastern Somalia’s Puntland region, and its port is the region’s economic lifeline. Nearly everything Puntland imports — food, fuel, medicine, construction materials — comes through Bosaso, and a good chunk of what it exports (livestock, fish) leaves the same way. Some of that cargo even continues overland into central Somalia and Ethiopia.

Since 2017, the port has been managed under a 30-year concession by DP World, the Dubai-based ports and logistics giant. In 2022, DP World and the Puntland government signed off on a roughly $366 million expansion plan: a longer quay, new container yards, better gate infrastructure — the kind of upgrade meant to let Bosaso handle bigger ships and compete seriously as a regional trade hub.

That upgrade needed to be paid for somehow. And that’s where things went sideways.

The spark: a fee hike traders say is way too much

Puntland authorities introduced a new tax and service-fee structure at the port — one that traders say amounts to as much as four times the previous rates. Officials describe the fees as part of the financing package for the port’s modernization. Merchants describe them as unaffordable, badly timed, and a threat to Bosaso’s competitiveness against Somalia’s other major ports, Mogadishu and Berbera.

One Bosaso businessman put it simply: traders aren’t refusing to pay taxes, they’re refusing to absorb additional service charges on top of everything else, at a moment when inflation and drought are already squeezing households and businesses. If importing through Bosaso becomes noticeably pricier than the alternatives, the fear is that shipping lines and importers simply route around it — and a port that loses cargo volume doesn’t get it back easily.

From boycott to street protest

The merchant response was swift: shops closed, cargo handling stopped, and the shutdown just kept going. By the time it hit its 12th consecutive day, reports indicated no commercial cargo had been unloaded at all since the dispute began. Hundreds of residents took to the streets of Bosaso, frustrated not just with the port’s management but with what they saw as a slow, silent response from Puntland’s government.

The knock-on effects were exactly what you’d expect from choking off a region’s main supply line:

• Dozens of trucks stranded outside the port gates
• Ships sitting offshore, unable to unload
• Rising fears of shortages — and price spikes — for food, fuel, and medicine
• Warnings from economists that Puntland’s own government could take a budget hit, since customs revenue from Bosaso is one of its biggest income sources

As if that weren’t enough, a separate dispute over unpaid wages led Puntland security forces to block the Bosaso–Garowe highway around the same time — adding a second chokepoint to a region already struggling to move goods.

There’s a bigger political story underneath this

Here’s where it gets more complicated than “traders vs. fees.” In January 2026, Somalia’s federal government announced it was tearing up its bilateral agreements with the UAE — including the ones covering port management at Bosaso, Berbera, and Kismayo. Puntland pushed back hard, arguing that authority over the Bosaso agreement is a regional matter, not Mogadishu’s to decide, with some officials accusing the federal government of using the dispute to chip away at Puntland’s autonomy. DP World, notably, kept operating both Bosaso and Berbera regardless.

So the local fee fight in Bosaso is playing out inside a much larger, unresolved question: who actually controls Puntland’s ports, and who gets to collect the revenue they generate — Puntland, Mogadishu, or the foreign operator running the docks day to day?

Where things stand

Puntland civil society groups have publicly called on the government, the traders, and the port authority to sit down and end the standoff before it does lasting damage. Talks have reportedly been happening in Bosaso — but as of the latest reporting, there’s no announced breakthrough, and DP World has given no sign it plans to walk back the new charges.

The bottom line

Nobody in this dispute is really being unreasonable on paper. Puntland and DP World have a legitimate case: modern ports cost real money, and fees are a normal way to fund upgrades. Merchants have an equally legitimate case: a sudden, steep cost increase lands directly on ordinary consumers already dealing with inflation and drought, and a port that prices itself out of the market can lose business it never gets back.

What Bosaso is really showing us is how hard it is to modernize infrastructure in a fragile, trade-dependent economy without bringing the people who actually move the goods along for the ride. However this ends, it’s a pretty clear lesson for next time: raise the price of doing business at your only major port, and you’d better have done the political groundwork first — because the alternative is exactly what’s happening right now.

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This post reflects reporting available as of mid-July 2026. The situation in Bosaso remains fluid; check current Somali and Puntland news sources for the latest developments.

By Ismail Warsame, Warsame Digital Media (WDM)

MOGADISHU, Somalia — Somalia’s constitutional reform is often presented as a legal and technical exercise involving articles, clauses, committees and parliamentary votes. But the central issue is much larger. It concerns the kind of state Somalis want to build after decades of conflict, state collapse, displacement and fragmented authority.

A constitution is more than a legal document. It is a national agreement that defines how power is gained, exercised and limited. It should explain who governs, how leaders are selected, what rights citizens possess, how public resources are managed and how disputes between institutions are settled. Without agreement on these fundamental questions, constitutional reform may become another source of political conflict rather than a foundation for stability.

Somalia has operated under a provisional constitution since 2012. The term “provisional” was intended to reflect a transitional period during which major national questions would be resolved through consultation and compromise. More than a decade later, however, many of those questions remain unsettled.

They include the final shape of federalism, the powers of the Federal Government and Federal Member States, the status of Mogadishu, the electoral system, judicial authority, security arrangements and the distribution of national revenues. These are not minor legal details. They are questions at the core of Somalia’s political future.

The greatest risk is that constitutional change becomes driven by short-term political calculations. If amendments are advanced through narrow agreements among those in power, without broad consultation and meaningful consensus, they may lack public legitimacy. A constitution can be approved by institutions, but it cannot endure if major political and social groups believe it was imposed upon them.

Somalia has experienced many political agreements reached in conference halls that later struggled to gain broad acceptance across the country. The lesson is clear: constitutional reform should not be treated as an elite bargain. It must become a national settlement.

That requires inclusion in substance, not only in appearance. Inclusion does not mean inviting selected political figures to meetings or holding consultations whose outcomes have already been decided. It means creating real opportunities for Federal Member States, opposition parties, civil society organisations, traditional elders, women, youth, business leaders, scholars, minority communities and the Somali diaspora to understand and influence the process.

The public should be able to access proposed constitutional changes in clear Somali language. Citizens should know what is being changed, why it is being changed and how their views can be heard. Constitutional reform should not be confined to legal experts, political insiders and external advisers. The constitution belongs to the Somali people, not merely to those who hold public office at a particular moment.

The federal question deserves especially serious and honest attention. Federalism emerged in Somalia partly as a response to the failures of excessive centralisation in the past. It was intended to prevent the concentration of power in Mogadishu and to give local communities a meaningful role in their affairs.

Yet federalism cannot survive through permanent uncertainty. The country needs a clear and workable division of responsibilities. What powers belong exclusively to the Federal Government? Which functions belong to the Federal Member States? Which powers must be shared? When disagreements arise, which institution has the authority to interpret the constitution and resolve the dispute?

National defence, foreign affairs, citizenship, monetary policy and major national infrastructure require strong federal coordination. At the same time, local governance, basic services and regional development require meaningful local authority. The purpose is not to choose between centralisation and decentralisation as political slogans. It is to build a system that safeguards national unity while respecting local self-government.

The issue of natural resources and public revenue is equally important. Somalia’s economic future may be shaped by its ports, fisheries, trade routes, telecommunications sector and potential natural-resource development. If ownership, management and revenue-sharing arrangements remain unclear, competition for wealth could intensify political tensions.

A credible constitutional arrangement should ensure that national resources benefit all Somalis while recognising the legitimate concerns of communities in areas where resources are located. Revenue-sharing rules should be transparent, predictable and subject to independent public oversight. No region should feel that the centre is exploiting it, while no region should use resources as a tool for permanent political separation from the rest of the country.

Constitutional reform must also strengthen the rule of law. Somalia cannot establish lasting stability if public institutions rely on personalities, informal arrangements or the political strength of individual leaders. A credible constitution should establish an independent judiciary that can interpret the law and resolve disputes between federal institutions, member states and citizens.

This is particularly important during electoral disputes and constitutional crises. Where trusted legal mechanisms are absent, political actors may rely on pressure, armed mobilisation or informal negotiation. That is not a sustainable substitute for law. Courts must be independent not only in name, but in their appointments, resources, jurisdiction and ability to enforce decisions.

The electoral system also requires careful national dialogue. Somalia’s present arrangements developed under extraordinary conditions of insecurity and institutional weakness. But a permanent constitutional order must answer a basic democratic question: how should citizens choose those who govern them?

The aspiration for one-person-one-vote elections is legitimate. However, it must be supported by practical preparation, including security, voter registration, constituency boundaries, electoral administration and public confidence. Direct elections cannot be reduced to a political slogan or used to justify rushed institutional change. Somalia should move toward universal suffrage through realistic, transparent and agreed milestones.

There is also a moral obligation at the centre of constitutional reform. The constitution must protect the rights and dignity of all citizens, including women, minorities, internally displaced persons, journalists, political opponents and communities affected by insecurity. Freedom of expression, due process, equal citizenship and protection from arbitrary power are essential safeguards against the abuses that have damaged Somali society in the past.

Equally, constitutional reform must avoid creating winners and losers by design. A constitution is strongest when political actors accept its rules even when they lose an election, a parliamentary vote or a legal dispute. That acceptance depends on confidence that the rules were made fairly, applied consistently and cannot be changed casually to benefit those in office.

International partners can offer technical expertise and financial support. They can share lessons from other countries and assist Somali institutions. But they cannot create Somalia’s political settlement. Constitutional reform should not be rushed merely to satisfy donor schedules or external expectations. Its legitimacy must come from Somali ownership, open debate and respect for disagreement.

Somalia does not require a perfect constitution. No country has one. But it needs a constitution that citizens understand, institutions respect and political actors accept as the shared rulebook of the nation. Achieving that will require patience, compromise and leaders willing to place the country’s long-term stability above immediate political advantage.

Constitutional reform is an opportunity to rebuild trust between citizens and the state, between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States, and between Somalia’s difficult past and its future possibilities. If reduced to a contest for power, it will deepen division. If pursued as a genuine national settlement, it can help establish the stable, lawful and accountable state that Somalis have long deserved.

Support WDM for its independence coverage of issues that matter in Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and beyond.

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Warsame Policy & Media Network (WAPMEN) — Critical analysis, news and commentaries
Talking truth to power in an undemocratic and tribal context

Veteran Somali political writer Ismail Haji Warsame has released a new two-volume book on contemporary Somali political history. The books are now available through major international retailers and digital libraries, including Amazon (in multiple country stores), Barnes & Noble, Apple Books, Scribd, and Smashwords, among other large booksellers and digital libraries worldwide. Each volume is priced at $11.99, or less.

What the Book Offers

Warsame’s work provides a detailed account of Somalia’s recent political history, making it a valuable reference for anyone seeking to understand the forces that have shaped the country’s political landscape.

Because of its depth and clarity, the book also lends itself well to educational use. Teachers could draw on it as a learning tool for essay writing and English composition at the high school, college, and university levels, helping students engage with real-world political content while developing their writing skills.

Who Should Read It

The book’s relevance extends beyond the classroom. It is a useful resource for:

• Somali politicians, who can draw on it for historical context and perspective
• Foreign diplomats, seeking a deeper understanding of Somalia’s political dynamics
• Researchers, looking for a well-informed source on Somali affairs

Where to Find It

Both volumes are widely available and can be purchased from most major online bookstores and digital libraries, making the book accessible to readers around the world.

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Source: Warsame Policy & Media Network (WAPMEN)

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