By Ismail Warsame, Warsame Digital Media (WDM)

Federalism was adopted in Somalia as a political response to state collapse, clan conflict, exclusion, and the fear of renewed centralised authoritarian rule. More than a decade after the adoption of the Provisional Constitution in 2012, however, the country’s federal system remains incomplete, contested, and vulnerable to political manipulation.

The central question is no longer whether Somalia should be federal or unitary. Federalism is already embedded in the country’s constitutional and political reality. The more urgent question is whether Somali leaders can agree on a functional federal arrangement that balances national unity with regional self-government, constitutional order with political compromise, and public interest with elite competition.

Somalia’s federal system emerged from a difficult historical context. The collapse of the central government in 1991 created a vacuum filled by clan-based authorities, local administrations, armed groups, business networks, and civil society. In some regions, local governance structures developed independently of Mogadishu. Puntland, established in 1998, became one of the earliest and most influential advocates of a federal Somalia. Other federal member states were later formed through political negotiations, often under pressure from security crises and international mediation.

Federalism was therefore not simply an academic constitutional choice. It was a survival mechanism. It offered a means of rebuilding the Somali state without demanding that all political power be immediately returned to Mogadishu. It also sought to assure communities that they would retain influence over local affairs, resources, security, and representation.

Yet the system has never been fully settled.

The Provisional Constitution establishes Somalia as a federal republic, but many details of the arrangement remain unresolved. The division of powers between the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states is still unclear in practice. Responsibilities over natural resources, taxation, fisheries, ports, airspace revenues, security forces, education, health, and the administration of justice are frequently disputed.

This ambiguity has created an environment in which constitutional interpretation is often replaced by political negotiation, confrontation, or temporary elite agreements. Such arrangements may prevent an immediate crisis, but they do not create a predictable constitutional order. A functioning federation requires more than regional administrations and federal ministries. It requires agreed rules, accountable institutions, and credible mechanisms for resolving disputes.

Fiscal federalism is among the most important unresolved issues. Fiscal federalism refers to the sharing of revenue, taxes, public spending, and financial responsibilities between different levels of government. Somalia cannot sustain a stable federation if member states remain dependent on uncertain transfers from Mogadishu or external donors, while the federal government lacks an agreed national revenue-sharing framework.

The debate over resources is particularly sensitive. Somalia has a long coastline, fisheries, ports, customs revenues, airspace income, and possible offshore hydrocarbons. Without transparent agreements on ownership, licensing, taxation, and revenue distribution, these resources may become sources of division rather than national development.

Security is another central challenge. Somalia’s security architecture remains fragmented, involving federal forces, regional forces, local militias, intelligence institutions, and externally supported units. The struggle against Al-Shabaab requires cooperation, professional command structures, and a unified national strategy. But relations between Mogadishu and some federal member states have often been affected by mistrust over recruitment, funding, command, and political loyalty.

A federal system does not require the elimination of regional security institutions. It does, however, require clarity on their mandate, accountability, integration, and relationship with national defence priorities. Security institutions must serve the constitution and the public, rather than individual political interests.

Policy Recommendations

First, Somalia should convene an inclusive constitutional settlement conference. It should bring together the Federal Government, federal member states, parliament, political associations, civil society, women’s organisations, youth representatives, traditional elders, business leaders, and constitutional experts. Its purpose should be practical and time-bound: to agree on outstanding questions regarding the division of powers, resource ownership, revenue-sharing, security responsibilities, the status of Mogadishu, and the federal judiciary.

Second, federal and state authorities should establish a permanent Intergovernmental Council through legislation. Rather than meeting only during moments of crisis, this body should hold scheduled meetings and include senior federal and state leaders as well as relevant ministers. Its decisions, minutes, and implementation records should be published. A technical secretariat should monitor agreements and issue quarterly reports.

Third, Somalia needs a national fiscal federalism agreement. It should define which revenues belong to the federal government, which may be collected by member states, and which must be jointly managed or shared. The distribution formula should take account of population, development needs, service-delivery gaps, and regional circumstances. Major revenues—especially customs, ports, airspace, fisheries, and future extractive resources—should be independently audited and subject to parliamentary oversight.

Fourth, Somalia should adopt a natural-resource governance law before major oil and gas production begins. The law should require transparent and competitive licensing, public disclosure of contracts, environmental safeguards, and an independently audited revenue-sharing mechanism. Communities in resource-producing areas should receive fair benefits, while national resources must also serve citizens throughout the country.

Fifth, the federal government and member states should agree on a security-sector compact. This agreement should clearly define the roles of the Somali National Army, police, intelligence services, regional security forces, and local community forces. Recruitment, salaries, training, weapons registration, and command arrangements should be standardised. National defence and counterterrorism operations must function under a unified strategy with civilian oversight.

Finally, Somalia needs an independent Constitutional Court, or an agreed equivalent mechanism, capable of resolving federal-state disputes. Political disagreements are inevitable in every federation. The objective is not to eliminate disagreement, but to ensure that it is resolved through law rather than boycotts, armed pressure, or informal bargaining.

Implementation Timeline

First six months: Consensus on the electoral process

The immediate priority should be a broad political consensus on the electoral process. The Federal Government, federal member states, parliament, political stakeholders, civil society, women’s groups, youth representatives, and traditional elders should agree on an inclusive electoral framework that is credible, peaceful, and constitutionally grounded.

Somalia cannot complete its federal settlement while political actors remain divided over the rules of representation, elections, and constitutional legitimacy. Agreement on an electoral process should therefore be treated as the foundation for the wider federal agenda, not as a separate political dispute.

During the same period, federal and state authorities should adopt a joint roadmap for constitutional completion and establish technical committees on fiscal federalism, natural-resource governance, security coordination, and judicial reform.

Six to 12 months: Institutional agreements

Following electoral consensus, the Intergovernmental Council should be formally established. Federal and state representatives should negotiate draft agreements on the division of powers, revenue collection, resource management, and security coordination. Public consultations should be held in Mogadishu and across all federal member states, ensuring that constitutional reform is not limited to political elites.

12 to 18 months: Legislation and implementation

Parliament should debate and adopt legislation on fiscal federalism, natural-resource governance, intergovernmental relations, and security coordination. An interim revenue-sharing formula should begin, supported by independent audits and public reporting. An agreed independent mechanism should also monitor the implementation of electoral commitments.

18 to 24 months: Constitutional completion

Outstanding constitutional amendments should be finalised through the legally required approval process. A Constitutional Court or constitutional dispute-resolution body should become operational. The government should publish an annual federalism implementation report, allowing citizens, parliament, and the media to assess whether commitments are being honoured.

The danger facing Somalia is not federalism itself. The greater danger is an incomplete federation governed through mistrust, personality-based politics, and recurring constitutional disputes. Federalism can deepen fragmentation or provide a framework for unity, depending on how it is implemented.

Somalia needs a federal compact that is clear, fair, and enforceable. That requires consensus on the electoral process, completion of the constitution, fair revenue-sharing, accountable resource governance, professional security institutions, and an independent judiciary. The country’s future cannot depend on repeated emergency settlements. It requires institutions capable of managing disagreement peacefully, lawfully, and in the public interest.

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By Ismail H. Warsame

Ports do not fall silent by accident.
When the cranes stop moving, containers remain stranded, merchants close their shops, and an entire commercial city shuts its doors, the problem is rarely about taxes alone. Taxes are merely the spark. The real fire has usually been burning inside government institutions for years.
That is precisely what Bosaso is witnessing today.
The silence that has descended upon Somalia’s busiest northern commercial gateway is not simply an economic dispute between traders and port authorities. It is an indictment of governance itself.
For years, Bosaso Port has been Puntland’s economic heartbeat, connecting the Horn of Africa with the Gulf States and beyond. Every container unloaded, every truck dispatched, every customs receipt collected represented confidence in Puntland’s economy. Today that confidence has been shaken.
The immediate dispute concerns increased port charges and taxation. But reducing this crisis to a disagreement over fees completely misses the point.
This is a crisis of leadership.
Good governments anticipate economic shocks before they explode into political crises. Weak governments wait until markets close, transport stops, public anger boils over, and only then begin searching for solutions.
That is governing by reaction rather than by strategy.
A government that cannot maintain confidence among its own business community is quietly undermining the very foundation upon which its revenue depends.
The closure of Bosaso Port is therefore far more than a commercial interruption. It is a warning that institutional trust is beginning to erode. And once trust disappears, rebuilding it becomes far more expensive than any disputed tax.
The lesson extends beyond Puntland. Across Somalia, political leaders too often confuse authority with administration. They assume issuing directives is the same as governing. It is not. Governments exist to balance revenue collection with economic growth, state authority with public confidence, and regulation with prosperity.
When that balance collapses, ports fall silent—not because the sea has disappeared, but because confidence has.
History repeatedly teaches one harsh lesson: economies rarely collapse overnight. They decline gradually through a series of ignored warnings until one day everyone notices the silence.
Bosaso may be experiencing one of those moments.
The question is no longer why the port went silent.
The real question is whether Puntland’s leadership understands what that silence is trying to say.