By Ismail Warsame, Warsame Digital Media (WDM)
MOGADISHU, Somalia — Somalia’s constitutional reform is often presented as a legal and technical exercise involving articles, clauses, committees and parliamentary votes. But the central issue is much larger. It concerns the kind of state Somalis want to build after decades of conflict, state collapse, displacement and fragmented authority.
A constitution is more than a legal document. It is a national agreement that defines how power is gained, exercised and limited. It should explain who governs, how leaders are selected, what rights citizens possess, how public resources are managed and how disputes between institutions are settled. Without agreement on these fundamental questions, constitutional reform may become another source of political conflict rather than a foundation for stability.
Somalia has operated under a provisional constitution since 2012. The term “provisional” was intended to reflect a transitional period during which major national questions would be resolved through consultation and compromise. More than a decade later, however, many of those questions remain unsettled.
They include the final shape of federalism, the powers of the Federal Government and Federal Member States, the status of Mogadishu, the electoral system, judicial authority, security arrangements and the distribution of national revenues. These are not minor legal details. They are questions at the core of Somalia’s political future.
The greatest risk is that constitutional change becomes driven by short-term political calculations. If amendments are advanced through narrow agreements among those in power, without broad consultation and meaningful consensus, they may lack public legitimacy. A constitution can be approved by institutions, but it cannot endure if major political and social groups believe it was imposed upon them.
Somalia has experienced many political agreements reached in conference halls that later struggled to gain broad acceptance across the country. The lesson is clear: constitutional reform should not be treated as an elite bargain. It must become a national settlement.
That requires inclusion in substance, not only in appearance. Inclusion does not mean inviting selected political figures to meetings or holding consultations whose outcomes have already been decided. It means creating real opportunities for Federal Member States, opposition parties, civil society organisations, traditional elders, women, youth, business leaders, scholars, minority communities and the Somali diaspora to understand and influence the process.
The public should be able to access proposed constitutional changes in clear Somali language. Citizens should know what is being changed, why it is being changed and how their views can be heard. Constitutional reform should not be confined to legal experts, political insiders and external advisers. The constitution belongs to the Somali people, not merely to those who hold public office at a particular moment.
The federal question deserves especially serious and honest attention. Federalism emerged in Somalia partly as a response to the failures of excessive centralisation in the past. It was intended to prevent the concentration of power in Mogadishu and to give local communities a meaningful role in their affairs.
Yet federalism cannot survive through permanent uncertainty. The country needs a clear and workable division of responsibilities. What powers belong exclusively to the Federal Government? Which functions belong to the Federal Member States? Which powers must be shared? When disagreements arise, which institution has the authority to interpret the constitution and resolve the dispute?
National defence, foreign affairs, citizenship, monetary policy and major national infrastructure require strong federal coordination. At the same time, local governance, basic services and regional development require meaningful local authority. The purpose is not to choose between centralisation and decentralisation as political slogans. It is to build a system that safeguards national unity while respecting local self-government.
The issue of natural resources and public revenue is equally important. Somalia’s economic future may be shaped by its ports, fisheries, trade routes, telecommunications sector and potential natural-resource development. If ownership, management and revenue-sharing arrangements remain unclear, competition for wealth could intensify political tensions.
A credible constitutional arrangement should ensure that national resources benefit all Somalis while recognising the legitimate concerns of communities in areas where resources are located. Revenue-sharing rules should be transparent, predictable and subject to independent public oversight. No region should feel that the centre is exploiting it, while no region should use resources as a tool for permanent political separation from the rest of the country.
Constitutional reform must also strengthen the rule of law. Somalia cannot establish lasting stability if public institutions rely on personalities, informal arrangements or the political strength of individual leaders. A credible constitution should establish an independent judiciary that can interpret the law and resolve disputes between federal institutions, member states and citizens.
This is particularly important during electoral disputes and constitutional crises. Where trusted legal mechanisms are absent, political actors may rely on pressure, armed mobilisation or informal negotiation. That is not a sustainable substitute for law. Courts must be independent not only in name, but in their appointments, resources, jurisdiction and ability to enforce decisions.
The electoral system also requires careful national dialogue. Somalia’s present arrangements developed under extraordinary conditions of insecurity and institutional weakness. But a permanent constitutional order must answer a basic democratic question: how should citizens choose those who govern them?
The aspiration for one-person-one-vote elections is legitimate. However, it must be supported by practical preparation, including security, voter registration, constituency boundaries, electoral administration and public confidence. Direct elections cannot be reduced to a political slogan or used to justify rushed institutional change. Somalia should move toward universal suffrage through realistic, transparent and agreed milestones.
There is also a moral obligation at the centre of constitutional reform. The constitution must protect the rights and dignity of all citizens, including women, minorities, internally displaced persons, journalists, political opponents and communities affected by insecurity. Freedom of expression, due process, equal citizenship and protection from arbitrary power are essential safeguards against the abuses that have damaged Somali society in the past.
Equally, constitutional reform must avoid creating winners and losers by design. A constitution is strongest when political actors accept its rules even when they lose an election, a parliamentary vote or a legal dispute. That acceptance depends on confidence that the rules were made fairly, applied consistently and cannot be changed casually to benefit those in office.
International partners can offer technical expertise and financial support. They can share lessons from other countries and assist Somali institutions. But they cannot create Somalia’s political settlement. Constitutional reform should not be rushed merely to satisfy donor schedules or external expectations. Its legitimacy must come from Somali ownership, open debate and respect for disagreement.
Somalia does not require a perfect constitution. No country has one. But it needs a constitution that citizens understand, institutions respect and political actors accept as the shared rulebook of the nation. Achieving that will require patience, compromise and leaders willing to place the country’s long-term stability above immediate political advantage.
Constitutional reform is an opportunity to rebuild trust between citizens and the state, between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States, and between Somalia’s difficult past and its future possibilities. If reduced to a contest for power, it will deepen division. If pursued as a genuine national settlement, it can help establish the stable, lawful and accountable state that Somalis have long deserved.
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