A WDM Editorial
As fighting unfolds between the Puntland Defence Forces (PDF) and rebellious elements of the Puntland Security Force (PSF), one dangerous temptation must be resisted above all others: do not reduce this confrontation to a sub-clan grievance.
That would not merely be intellectually lazy; it would be politically reckless.
The bullets flying around Bosaso are not the inevitable consequence of ancient clan rivalries. They are the predictable result of years of institutional neglect, constitutional ambiguity, weak political leadership, and repeated failures to build a unified state security system. Personalising the conflict or attaching it to sub-clan identity only obscures the real disease while inflaming the symptoms.
This crisis did not begin yesterday. Nor did it begin with the current exchange of fire. It has been developing for well over a decade.
The Original Sin
The PSF was created as an elite counter-terrorism force outside the normal constitutional security architecture of Puntland. Professionally trained and externally supported, it became an effective fighting force against terrorism. Yet its institutional design contained a fatal flaw.
It evolved as a parallel security institution rather than an integrated component of Puntland’s constitutional chain of command.
That distinction matters enormously.
Every functioning state has one fundamental principle: there can be only one legitimate chain of command for the use of force.
The moment a military or security unit develops operational autonomy beyond civilian authority, the seeds of future confrontation have already been planted.
For years, successive Puntland administrations postponed confronting this contradiction. Instead of resolving it through legislation, institutional reform, political dialogue, and constitutional clarity, leaders preferred temporary political accommodations.
Temporary solutions eventually produce permanent crises.
Parallel Security Structures Never Remain Neutral
History offers countless examples.
Whether in Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, parallel armed organisations eventually become political actors. Once an armed institution acquires its own command, funding, external relationships, and internal identity, it naturally begins to defend its organisational interests.
This is not unique to Puntland.
It is the predictable behaviour of institutions operating without clear constitutional boundaries.
The longer such ambiguity persists, the greater the risk that competing political centres begin to seek influence over those forces.
That is precisely where Puntland now finds itself.
Loyalty Cannot Be Switched Without Consequences
Reports and accusations that elements of the PSF have aligned themselves with the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud represent more than an ordinary political disagreement.
If armed personnel established to serve Puntland decide—without constitutional authorization—to transfer their operational loyalty elsewhere, the issue immediately ceases to be an internal personnel dispute.
It becomes a constitutional challenge to Puntland’s authority.
No government anywhere in the world can tolerate armed units independently choosing which political authority they will obey.
Civilian governments may change.
Political parties may change.
Presidents certainly change.
The chain of command cannot.
If security personnel become free agents, the state itself begins to dissolve.
Puntland Also Bears Responsibility
Acknowledging this does not absolve Puntland’s own leadership.
Quite the opposite.
This confrontation reflects years of failure by successive Puntland governments to solve the PSF question before it reached today’s dangerous stage.
Instead of creating a comprehensive legal framework governing elite forces, governments repeatedly postponed difficult decisions.
Instead of integrating all armed units under one constitutional structure, exceptions multiplied.
Instead of strengthening parliamentary oversight and civilian accountability, security policy increasingly revolved around executive decisions.
Instead of building institutions, politics often focused on personalities.
The result is today’s crisis.
Governments cannot indefinitely postpone institutional reform and then express surprise when institutional contradictions eventually explode.
This Is Not About General Diano
Nor is it about any individual commander.
Nor should it become a referendum on President Said Abdullahi Deni.
Nor should it become a political campaign for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
The issue is much larger.
Tomorrow another president will occupy Garowe.
Another president will occupy Villa Somalia.
Another generation of commanders will emerge.
If the constitutional questions remain unresolved, the same confrontation will simply return under different names.
Somalia has already wasted too many decades replacing personalities while preserving dysfunctional institutions.
Stop Weaponising Clan Identity
Perhaps the greatest danger now is the attempt to mobilise public opinion through sub-clan narratives.
Every Somali political crisis eventually attracts voices eager to transform institutional disputes into collective clan grievances.
That temptation must be rejected.
A soldier who violates constitutional authority does not represent his clan.
A government enforcing lawful authority is not fighting a clan.
The law deals with individuals, commands, and institutions—not bloodlines.
Once communities begin interpreting constitutional disputes through the lens of genealogy, rational politics becomes impossible.
Justice gives way to revenge.
Citizenship gives way to tribal mobilisation.
The state slowly disappears.
One State Cannot Sustain Multiple Armies
This principle is universal.
Puntland cannot function indefinitely while maintaining multiple armed organisations operating under uncertain legal arrangements.
The answer is not revenge.
Nor humiliation.
Nor collective punishment.
Nor endless military confrontation.
The answer is institutional reform.
That means establishing the PSF’s legal status beyond dispute, clarifying its chain of command, ensuring transparent budgeting and civilian oversight, integrating or restructuring parallel forces where necessary, and creating a negotiated framework with the Federal Government to prevent overlapping mandates and competing loyalties.
Anything less merely postpones the next crisis.
The Moment for Political Courage
Military victories can restore temporary order.
They cannot resolve constitutional contradictions.
Only politics can do that.
Only institutions can do that.
Only leadership willing to place the interests of Puntland above temporary political calculations can do that.
The fighting around Bosaso should therefore serve as a national warning.
States are not destroyed only by external enemies.
Sometimes they slowly weaken because governments postpone difficult reforms, tolerate institutional ambiguity, and allow parallel centres of armed authority to emerge until confrontation becomes inevitable.
Puntland still has an opportunity to correct that mistake.
But only if it understands one fundamental truth:
This is not a war between sub-clans. It is a struggle over the constitutional monopoly of legitimate force.
The sooner Puntland resolves that question through law rather than gunfire, the stronger both its democracy and its security will become. The longer it delays, the more likely today’s confrontation will become tomorrow’s recurring tragedy.