Who Threatens Somali Unity More: The UAE or Hassan Sheikh Mohamud?

Analysis and commentary from the Horn of Africa  ·  Editorial board  ·  19 November 2026

Who Threatens Somali Unity More: The UAE or Hassan Sheikh Mohamud?

A foreign patron outlasts any politician. A president who has lost his mandate and will not go is doing something no foreign country can do.

By the editorial board  ·  Mogadishu  ·  11 min read

THE VERDICT IN ONE PARAGRAPH Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is the greater threat now; the UAE is the greater threat over time. A foreign state pursues its own interest and will still be there whoever governs Somalia. A president whom his own Supreme Court has told he has no mandate, and who removed the judge who said so, breaks something no foreign power can break — the authority of the centre. Once that authority is broken, outsiders deal with the pieces, and the pieces compete. The two threats are one system: the foreign one is easier because of the domestic one.

The mandate question is answered, even if it is not accepted

Parliament amended the constitution in March 2026 to move terms from four years to five, and the government read that as licence for the President to stay until May 2027. On 5 November the Supreme Court’s five-judge panel read it differently: a longer term applies to officeholders already serving only if the amendment says so plainly, and this one did not. Parliament’s and the cabinet’s mandates therefore ended on 14 April 2026 and the President’s on 15 May. Acts taken after those dates under constitutional and legal powers are void, and the cabinet may run routine daily business only. The court ordered the parties to agree an electoral framework within 30 days and to hold elections within 90.

What matters more than the ruling is the answer to it. The President dismissed Chief Justice Bashe Yusuf Ahmed on 4 November, the night before the judgment, and the court declared the dismissal null and void, noting that the presidency’s announcement cited no legal provision and accusing it of obstructing justice. He then attended the swearing-in of Ahmed’s predecessor, Ibrahim Idle Suleiman, on 7 November. The Attorney General declared the ruling to have “no legal effect.” United Nations experts have since called for Ahmed’s reinstatement.

Every other leader in the country must now price in the same risk. That, not the ambition of one man, is the injury.

The dispute has stopped being legal and started being armed

Puntland and Jubaland severed relations with Mogadishu in 2024 and have not restored them. In South West State the national army removed the regional president, Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed (Laftagareen), in March 2026 and installed its own administration; forces loyal to him rebelled in May, took three district capitals in early and mid-October, and have attacked Baidoa at least nine times, most recently on 2 November. By mid-October the opposition held four of Bay region’s five district centres and stood within roughly 35 kilometres of the state capital, which is now close to surrounded and has lost its road link to Mogadishu.

In Hiraan, the Hawadle clan rose in late October because Mogadishu backed a state president from a different clan, against traditional power-sharing. Militiamen took key government buildings in Beledweyne on 30 October; the clan chief issued a call to arms on 6 November; units of the federal security forces defected; and the President’s offer on 8 November to move the Hirshabelle capital into Hiraan was refused by the uprising’s leader, Abdullahi Mohamed Ali Sanbalolshe, who has said the clan intends to form a new Hiraan administration of its own.

The security consequence is already visible. Al-Shabaab took the village of Comaad in Hiraan around 14 November after federal troops withdrew, and the Macawisley clan militia that had held the line against the group since the 2022 offensive pulled out of the Bulo Burde and Matabaan front for Beledweyne. A political split in the region is draining the one local force that had been fighting Al-Shabaab. Meanwhile Uganda has begun withdrawing its roughly 2,000 troops, the counterterrorism mission’s mandate expires at the end of December, and American support for the UN logistics operation ends with it. The ICRC reports more than 18,000 people displaced by recent fighting around Baidoa.

The UAE’s offence is real, and it is a different kind

On 12 January 2026 Mogadishu annulled every agreement with the United Arab Emirates — the ports at Berbera, Bosaso and Kismayo, and all defence and security cooperation — citing evidence that Abu Dhabi was undermining Somalia’s sovereignty and unity. Puntland, Jubaland and Somaliland rejected the cancellation and kept their own arrangements. A Somali minister described the final trigger as the entry of the UAE-backed Yemeni separatist leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi through Somaliland, which followed Israel’s recognition of Somaliland on 26 December 2025.

What the UAE holds on the ground is substantial: a 30-year DP World concession at Berbera with about $442 million invested, a military presence there since 2017, roughly $613 million in commitments inside Somalia including a $336 million port at Bosaso, and $257 million in debt relief in Jubaland. Its personnel were reported to have left the bases at Berbera, Bosaso and Kismayo after the cancellation; DP World insisted its Berbera operations continued.

The distinction that matters is method. Turkey deals with Mogadishu, and by doing so accepts that Somalia is one country. The UAE deals with Hargeisa, Garowe and Kismayo, going around the capital, and each of those deals is a rehearsal for the proposition that Mogadishu’s signature is not needed. On the narrow question of what damages Somali unity, that is the graver conduct.

In a televised address the President accused the UAE of signing port deals without consulting him, running armed forces outside the national chain of command, funding regional administrations against him, and helping bring about Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. The port deals, the base and the direct regional relationships are documented. The claim about Emirati authorship of the recognition, while widely believed and described by analysts as the backdrop to the rupture, has not been proven, and Abu Dhabi denies undermining Somali sovereignty.

Is the country being sold? The charge has substance

The President’s government signs one-sided agreements while accusing others of the same. On oil, the March 2024 agreement with Turkey — published in Turkey’s own parliamentary records — lets the contractor recover up to 90 percent of production as cost petroleum before any profit is shared, caps Somalia’s royalty at 5 percent, waives signing, development, production and surface fees, and requires Somalia to compensate the contractor within a year if it changes its law in a way that costs money. Three offshore blocks of about 5,000 square kilometres each went to the Turkish state oil company without competitive bidding.

The figure that Turkey keeps 95 percent of revenue comes from leaked documents and should be treated as a claim, not a fact; it also cannot describe the same money as a 5 percent royalty. On fish, a Turkish armed forces pension fund signed a deal with the fisheries ministry in December 2025 creating SOMTURK, a joint venture with exclusive authority to license, register, monitor and police fishing across Somali waters and the entire exclusive economic zone. SOMTURK was six days old when it received that authority; the revenue split has never been published; Puntland refused it permission to work in its waters.

Turkish firms run Mogadishu’s airport and seaport. For 2025 the airport operator reported about $29.7 million in gross revenue against a contract giving the government 25 percent, which should have sent roughly $7.4 million to the treasury; about $4.15 million arrived, a gap of some $3.3 million that led the Auditor General to conclude the concession revenue could not be independently verified as fairly determined. Neither the airport nor the port contract was ever put to a parliamentary vote, and Somali law requires open tenders and a procurement board the government never established. The 2012 charter reserves foreign affairs and defence to the federal government and requires it to consult the states on major international agreements. These deals were signed with Mogadishu alone — which is precisely why the states now claim the right to make their own.

The real problem is not one auction. It is many sellers.

“For sale to the highest bidder” assumes one owner who can deliver what is sold. Somalia does not have one. Every seller claims to own what it is selling; every buyer backs the claim that suits it. The more credible sellers there are, the cheaper a Somali signature becomes — which is worse than an auction, because an auction has one owner who can be held to a price.

ASSETSOLD BYBOUGHT BY
Berbera port and baseSomalilandUAE
Bosaso portPuntlandUAE
Kismayo portJubalandUAE
Hobyo port (80-year concession)GalmudugTurkey
Mogadishu port, airport, EEZ, oilFederal governmentTurkey

Concession terms as published by the Turkish parliament and the Office of the Auditor General.

The President’s critics are right on the documented points: that his term ended on 15 May 2026 by his own court’s ruling, that he replaced the judge who said so, and that he signs one-sided deals while blaming others for doing the same. What is not proven is the treason charge. His Defence Minister said Somali politicians meeting in Abu Dhabi were learning from Sudan’s RSF how to raise militias, and warned that “every traitor to the nation would be given his due”; he named no one and produced no evidence. Reporting placed former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Puntland’s Said Abdullahi Deni, Jubaland’s Ahmed Madobe and a former intelligence chief in Abu Dhabi for election talks; that former intelligence chief has confirmed he discussed an alliance to remove the President. Sharif Sheikh Ahmed says he lived in the Emirates for about a decade and took no money or political backing from its government. No evidence of Emirati funding for the opposition, or of a militia plot, has been published.

The President’s strongest argument is that Turkey deals only with Mogadishu, and so accepts that Somalia is one country, while the UAE’s base at Berbera and its role around Somaliland’s recognition do not. On the narrow question, that argument holds. But it asks the reader to accept that dealing with Mogadishu rather than around it is what separates a partner from a predator — and the oil and fisheries terms make that line very thin indeed.

One fact the government underuses is harder than anything in its rhetoric: Sanbalolshe, the former national intelligence chief, is now a leader of the Hiraan uprising and says the clan will form its own regional administration. An armed secession from federal authority, run by a man who once ran the federal intelligence service, is a more serious charge than anything the Defence Minister has said aloud.

Warsame Digital Media  ·  Editorial  ·  19 November 2026

Foundational Asymmetry And The Federal Consolidation Problem: Somalia In Comparative Perspective – Analysis

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