A WDM Editorial — Commentary and Critical Analysis
The Leader of SSC-Khatumo, Abdulkadir Ahmed Aw-Ali Firdhiye, has reportedly travelled to Nairobi to meet representatives of the international community.
There is nothing objectionable about that. He should go. He should explain the political aspirations of the communities he represents and seek development assistance, humanitarian support, security cooperation and diplomatic understanding.
But Nairobi may teach Firdhiye something that political enthusiasm in Laascaanood and support from Mogadishu cannot teach quickly enough: the international diplomacy surrounding Sool, Sanaag and Cayn did not begin with SSC-Khaatumo, nor with Firdhiye himself.
He is entering an old diplomatic battlefield—one on which Puntland has operated for nearly three decades.
The files are still there.
Before SSC-Khaatumo
One of the most persistent weaknesses in Somali political debate is the assumption that history begins when the latest political organisation is formed.
It does not.
The dispute over Sool, Sanaag and Cayn predates SSC-Khaatumo by decades. It became particularly visible after Puntland was established in 1998 and asserted a political claim over territories that Somaliland also regarded as falling within its boundaries. Contemporary assessments continue to describe Sool and parts of Sanaag as disputed between Somaliland and Puntland, while also recognising SSC-Khaatumo as a distinct political actor that emerged from the conflict around Laascaanood.
Puntland’s position was not merely that another administration had drawn a competing map. Its deeper argument was that colonial borders could not, by themselves, determine the political future of communities whose inhabitants possessed their own political affiliations, historical relationships and views on Somali unity.
Somaliland, by contrast, has generally grounded its territorial claim in the borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate and in its argument that it restored the sovereignty it possessed at independence in 1960.
That disagreement did not emerge yesterday. It was already present during the earliest years of Puntland’s political formation.
Abdullahi Yusuf and Egal
A 2019 personal reflection by Ismail Haji Warsame, a former chief of staff in the Puntland presidency, describes an important but insufficiently remembered chapter in early Puntland–Somaliland diplomacy.
According to Warsame’s account, during the late 1990s—when southern Somalia lacked an effective central authority—Puntland leaders sought direct discussions with Somaliland. The principal interlocutors were Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Puntland’s founding president, and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, Somaliland’s president and one of Somalia’s most experienced political figure.
Warsame recalls that letters were exchanged and trusted envoys travelled discreetly between Garowe and Hargeisa. The purpose, he maintains, was not to prepare for war but to explore a political settlement.
The reported proposal sought to accommodate Somaliland’s desire for substantial self-government within a reconstructed federal Somalia. That history complicates the claim that Puntland’s relationship with Somaliland was always defined exclusively by territorial confrontation.
Puntland was not only contesting a map. It was also exploring a constitutional and political framework for resolving the Somaliland question.
That initiative ultimately failed. But failure does not erase the attempt.
A Proposed Compromise
Warsame’s account describes the scale of the proposed compromise as remarkable by today’s standards. It states that Puntland considered a rotating presidency between Puntland and Somaliland, with Egal taking the first term.
A second option reportedly involved supporting Egal’s return to Somali national politics while allowing Somaliland to become the first federal state within a renewed Somali constitutional order.
The feasibility of these proposals can reasonably be questioned. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that Puntland was investing political capital in a negotiated settlement before Somalia’s current federal political class had developed a consistent policy on Somaliland.
The account also places the unresolved status of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn at the centre of those discussions.
Let the People Decide
According to Warsame’s recollection, one proposed solution was an internationally observed referendum through which the inhabitants of the disputed territories could determine their political future.
The principle was straightforward: neither Garowe nor Hargeisa should impose a permanent political arrangement on communities that rejected it. The people should decide, and the result should be respected.
This position was not based on conquering Sool or imposing Puntland’s authority over Laascaanood. Nor did it accept Somaliland’s assertion that colonial boundaries alone settled the matter.
It was an argument based on consent.
A second possibility was that Puntland and Somaliland could enter the same federal Somali framework, making their territorial competition less politically consequential. Under such an arrangement, both administrations could retain substantial local authority while sharing a broader constitutional structure.
That was the road Puntland attempted to travel. It failed, but the historical record should not be rewritten as though it never existed.
The 2001 Referendum
The diplomatic opening eventually collapsed. A major turning point was Somaliland’s constitutional referendum of 31 May 2001.
The referendum was approved overwhelmingly across Somaliland, but claims about participation in Sool, Sanaag and Cayn—particularly the assertion that large sections of the population boycotted the process—should be presented cautiously and supported with region-specific evidence. The general referendum results alone do not establish the extent or political meaning of non-participation in every district.
From Puntland’s perspective, however, the referendum reinforced Somaliland’s territorial and constitutional claims. It transformed what might have remained a negotiable political position into a claim increasingly presented in Hargeisa as constitutionally settled.
Puntland rejected that conclusion. Over time, so did significant sections of the population in Sool and other disputed areas.
The disagreement moved from diplomatic correspondence to military confrontation, from conference rooms to checkpoints, and from constitutional argument to bloodshed. The conflict around Laascaanood in 2023 was therefore not an isolated event but the latest and most destructive phase of a long-running dispute.
The Diplomatic Burden
This is the part Firdhiye may soon discover.
For years, Puntland confronted an international diplomatic environment that often found Somaliland’s narrative easier to summarise. Somaliland’s argument could be presented in a few sentences: British Somaliland became independent in June 1960, united with the former Italian-administered Somalia, experienced a failed union, and later sought to restore its independence within its former colonial boundaries.
Puntland’s counterargument was more difficult to communicate. It required diplomats to consider several competing principles at once:
- Colonial borders do not automatically settle the political preferences of every community living within them.
- Significant populations in Sool, Sanaag and Cayn have opposed incorporation into Somaliland.
- Clan geography matters politically but should not be confused with the full meaning of citizenship.
- Somali unionism remains an important political force.
- Self-determination is being claimed by more than one movement.
International actors often prefer clear maps to complicated political realities. Puntland spent years trying to explain why the map alone could not resolve the dispute.
It lobbied diplomats, maintained administrations, deployed security forces, challenged Somaliland’s claims and absorbed political and military setbacks. Its efforts were not always successful, and its administration in parts of the SSC territories was often criticised as weak or unresponsive.
Those failures should be acknowledged. Local grievances accumulated, relations with community leaders deteriorated and Garowe did not always govern the region with the political sensitivity required.
But institutional failure in one period does not cancel historical contribution in another.
One may criticise Puntland today without pretending that it was absent yesterday.
Where Is Mogadishu?
This is why Firdhiye’s Nairobi mission deserves attention.
International diplomacy does not move at the speed of Somali political change. Governments retain files. Embassies preserve institutional memory. International organisations use inherited terminology and maps. Diplomats rely on briefing notes prepared by predecessors.
For years, international actors described Sool and related areas as disputed between Somaliland and Puntland. SSC-Khaatumo has had to persuade them to recognise a newer political reality—one shaped by the 2023 conflict, the expulsion of Somaliland forces from Laascaanood and the Federal Government’s subsequent recognition of the administration.
But Firdhiye is not facing the same diplomatic circumstances that confronted Abdullahi Yusuf in the late 1990s. He has, at least formally, a Federal Government that has recognised SSC-Khaatumo and subsequently supported its transition into a federal member state.
That raises the central question: where is Mogadishu?
If the Federal Government recognises the North-East State as part of Somalia’s federal architecture, why should Firdhiye be left to make the case largely alone by himself?
Why should SSC-Khaatumo have to reinvent a diplomatic effort that the Federal Government claims to support?
Make Mogadishu Carry the File
SSC leaders should tell the Federal Government plainly:
You recognised us. Now advocate for us.
That advocacy should extend beyond press conferences in Villa Somalia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should prepare and circulate diplomatic briefs. Somali embassies should explain the constitutional and political case. Somalia’s mission to the United Nations should present the government’s position, while Mogadishu should engage the African Union, IGAD, the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and other international partners.
Federal officials should explain why the political preferences of SSC communities cannot be overridden by Somaliland’s unilateral claim to the entire territory of the former British Protectorate.
That is what federal recognition should mean.
Otherwise, what has SSC gained by exchanging a difficult relationship with Garowe for political dependence on Mogadishu?
Flags, titles, photographs and delegations are inexpensive. Diplomatic protection is costly.
Puntland carried that diplomatic burden for years. If Mogadishu now claims SSC-Khaatumo as part of its federal political architecture, it should also carry the international file.
Do Not Rewrite the Past
SSC-Khaatumo does not need to deny Puntland’s historical role in order to assert its present political autonomy.
The two positions are compatible:
SSC communities may say that they have chosen a different administrative arrangement, while also acknowledging that Puntland opposed their involuntary incorporation into Somaliland.
One proposition does not cancel the other.
Puntland may no longer administer Laascaanood, but that does not erase its earlier negotiations with Somaliland, its advocacy of a referendum, its rejection of Somaliland’s territorial assumptions or the resources it invested in the dispute.
At the same time, Puntland should not interpret historical involvement as permanent ownership of SSC. Historical contribution does not confer an enduring political title over population that no longer wish to be governed by Garowe.
If Puntland once argued that the people of Sool should determine their political future, it must remain intellectually consistent when those people exercise political agency in ways it dislikes.
That is the price of principle.
Neighbours Outlast Patrons
Firdhiye should also remember that Mogadishu is a political relationship, while Puntland is a neighbour.
Governments change. Presidents leave office. Alliances collapse. Federal coalitions become opposition blocs. In Somali politics, today’s patron can quickly become tomorrow’s adversary.
But Laascaanood will remain where it is, and Garowe will remain where it is. The communities will remain connected by trade, family, geography and shared security concerns. Families will continue to cross administrative boundaries that politicians sometimes treat as though they were natural geological formations.
Responsible leadership in Garowe and Laascaanood should therefore resist turning political disagreement into permanent strategic hostility.
There is too much shared history—and too much shared geography—to make that wise.
Nairobi Has a Long Memory
Firdhiye should go to Nairobi. He should knock on every diplomatic door and make the strongest possible case for the North-East State of Somalia.
But when diplomats consult their files, he should understand what they are likely to find: the competing claims of Somaliland and Puntland, the history of negotiations between Abdullahi Yusuf and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the reported proposals for federal accommodation, the proposed referendum for Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, the 2001 Somaliland constitutional referendum and years of diplomatic and security assessments describing the territories as disputed.
The lesson is unavoidable:
Firdhiye is not beginning the diplomatic struggle over Sool. He is inheriting it.
SSC-Khaatumo—or, in the current constitutional terminology, the North-East State—has every right to pursue its own political future. But political wisdom requires acknowledging those who cleared part of the path before it arrived.
And if Mogadishu now claims the North-East State as part of Somalia’s federal architecture, Firdhiye’s most important diplomatic conversation may not ultimately be with the international community in Nairobi.
It may be with Villa Somalia:
You recognised us.
You supported us.
Now defend us internationally.
Anything less would leave Laascaanood repeating, at enormous cost, a diplomatic struggle that Puntland has already spent decades fighting.
Editorial Note on Sources
This editorial draws particularly on Ismail Haji Warsame’s “Self-governance Options for Somaliland,” published by WardheerNews and subsequently reproduced by Warsame Policy & Media Network on 22 May 2019.
The article presents Warsame’s personal recollections, as a former chief of staff in the Puntland presidency, of late-1990s contacts between Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. It describes exchanges through trusted envoys, a reported proposal for a rotating presidency, an alternative proposal involving Egal’s return to Somali national leadership, and Puntland’s reported advocacy of an internationally observed referendum for Sool, Sanaag and Cayn.
Because these claims are based substantially on a participant’s recollection, they should be treated as an important primary-source political account—not as a substitute for independent archival corroboration.