Puntland’s Quiet Confederation: While Mogadishu Fights Over A Broken Constitution, Garowe Has Already Moved On – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/28082026-puntlands-quiet-confederation-while-mogadishu-fights-over-a-broken-constitution-garowe-has-already-moved-on-oped/

The Economist
Middle East & Africa | Irro’s gambit
“Somaliland wants to help secure the Red Sea”
Aug 20th 2026 | Nairobi

The Economist’s argument that Somaliland can help secure the Red Sea by trading military access and port facilities for recognition is more aspirational than credible. Somaliland does have strategic geography, an improving port at Berbera, and a leadership eager to leverage both for diplomatic gain. But the article overstates how much security influence a partially recognized entity can actually wield, and it underestimates the legal and political barriers that still define Somaliland’s place in the region.

Geography is not sovereignty

Somaliland’s coastline on the Gulf of Aden is undeniably valuable, and Berbera’s location gives it relevance in any discussion of Red Sea logistics or maritime security. Yet geography alone does not make a polity a dependable security partner in the way a recognized sovereign state can be. The article blurs the line between being strategically located and being politically capable of delivering binding security arrangements.

That distinction matters because Somaliland is still internationally disputed. Israel’s recognition in late 2025 made it the first country to formally recognize Somaliland, but the African Union immediately reaffirmed Somalia’s territorial integrity and called for that recognition to be revoked. In other words, Somaliland’s diplomatic status remains contested, and no amount of strategic self-promotion can erase that fact.

The Djibouti comparison fails

The article suggests Somaliland could become a new Djibouti, but that comparison is misleading. Djibouti hosts foreign military bases from recognized agreements backed by a sovereign government that is accepted by the international system, while Somaliland lacks the same legal standing and diplomatic depth. A base-hosting model depends not only on geography, but on legitimacy, enforceable contracts, and predictable external recognition.

Berbera may be expanding, and it may be attractive to outside powers, but that does not make Somaliland a substitute for Djibouti. Even if foreign governments quietly explore access there, a contested arrangement in Somaliland would remain politically fragile and easy to challenge by Mogadishu, the African Union, and regional rivals. The article treats possible interest as if it were settled capability.

Security leverage is overstated

The piece implies that Somaliland can contribute meaningfully to securing the Red Sea by offering bases to the United States and Israel. But Red Sea security is shaped by larger forces: the Houthi threat, Ethiopian maritime dependence, Gulf rivalries, U.S. strategy, and the Somalia-Ethiopia-Turkey-Israel web of competing interests. Somaliland can be one node in that system, but it cannot control the system.

The article also risks confusing symbolic diplomacy with operational readiness. A willingness to host foreign forces does not automatically translate into effective security provision, especially in a territory whose sovereignty is contested and whose neighbors view military entanglement there with suspicion. The result could be more instability, not less.

Recognition is not guaranteed

The strongest political claim in the article is that security cooperation will help unlock wider recognition. That is speculative at best. Somalia rejects Somaliland’s secession, the African Union rejects unilateral recognition, and broader international practice has so far held firm against endorsing Somaliland’s independence. Even Israel’s recognition did not change the basic reality that most states still treat Somaliland as part of Somalia.

So the article’s logic is inverted: it assumes that if Somaliland offers enough strategic value, recognition will follow. In practice, recognition is driven by international law, regional precedent, and geopolitical calculations that are far bigger than one port, one president, or one transactional security proposal. Somaliland may gain attention, but attention is not the same as statehood.

A more realistic reading

A fairer reading is that Somaliland is trying to convert its location into bargaining power. That is a rational strategy for a government seeking relevance, investment, and diplomatic visibility. But the article goes too far when it frames that strategy as evidence that Somaliland can help secure the Red Sea in a substantive, state-like way.

The better conclusion is simpler: Somaliland can offer geography, not guaranteed security; facilities, not sovereign authority; and political signaling, not recognition. The Economist piece is strongest as a report on ambition, but weak as an assessment of capability. Israeli recognition and Jewish lobbyists in the West cannot fake this reality on the ground.

The Unbalanced Approach Of Djibouti To The Somali Civil War – OpEd https://www.eurasiareview.com/27082026-the-unbalanced-approach-of-djibouti-to-the-somali-civil-war-oped/