Federalism, Confederation, and the Risks of Somalia’s Centralizing Drift
By Ismail H. Warsame, MSc, PhD Candidate
Warsame Digital Media (WDM)
Executive Summary
Puntland’s constitutional relationship with Somalia has entered a critical phase.
The debate is no longer confined to whether Puntland should remain within a federal Somalia. Three possible futures are increasingly visible: renewed and enforceable federalism, a looser confederal arrangement, or eventual separation if the federal compact becomes permanently incapable of protecting constituent-state autonomy.
Puntland was not established in 1998 as a conventional separatist project. Its political architecture anticipated participation in a reconstructed Somali state based upon federalism. The present estrangement therefore reflects accumulated distrust rather than an original rejection of Somali unity.
That distrust has been reinforced by repeated centre–state confrontations involving not only Puntland but also Jubaland and South West State. These include Puntland’s break with Mogadishu in 2013; the South West election and Mukhtar Robow crisis in 2018; federal military deployment in Gedo during the Jubaland dispute; the 2024 constitutional rupture; Jubaland’s 2024 electoral crisis and armed confrontation at Ras Kamboni; Puntland’s largely self-directed Calmiskaad campaign against Islamic State; South West State’s 2026 rupture with Mogadishu and subsequent federal military intervention in Baidoa; allegations concerning the withholding or redirection of Puntland development funds; and the August 2026 Galkayo confrontation.
The situation has been further complicated by controversy over the March 2026 constitutional amendments, which Reuters reported could extend the presidential term from four to five years and delay elections. The precise application to the incumbent remains contested, but the issue raises a wider legitimacy problem: incumbent institutions appear to have participated in changing constitutional rules that may prolong their own tenure.
The Federal Government nevertheless has legitimate counterarguments. Somalia is one internationally recognized sovereign state. Foreign affairs, national defence, citizenship and immigration, and monetary policy are constitutionally federal responsibilities. Mogadishu must also manage international debt, donor accountability, national security coordination, and constitutional reform. Puntland cannot invoke federalism selectively while disregarding genuine federal powers.
The central policy challenge is therefore not to choose between a powerless centre and an all-powerful one.
Somalia requires a functionally strong but constitutionally limited Federal Government, matched by meaningful and protected Federal Member State autonomy.
Without such a settlement, the political logic is likely to move progressively from federalism toward confederation and, eventually, separation.
The Policy Problem
Somalia has never fully resolved whether its federation is a negotiated partnership among constitutionally protected constituent states or a centrally led state in which regional governments exercise delegated authority.
The 2012 Provisional Constitution attempted to bridge this contradiction.
Article 54 reserves foreign affairs, national defence, citizenship and immigration, and monetary policy to the Federal Government, while requiring the remaining allocation of powers and resources to be negotiated and agreed upon between the centre and the Federal Member States.[1]
Article 53 further requires federal consultation with Member States in major international negotiations affecting their interests.[2]
The constitutional principle is therefore clear:
Somalia is neither a unitary state with decentralized provinces nor a confederation of sovereign republics.
Its stability depends upon maintaining the middle ground.
That middle ground is weakening.
Why Puntland Matters
Puntland predates Somalia’s current federal architecture.
It established functioning political and security institutions in 1998 while Somalia still lacked an effective national government. Its founding project was based on regional self-government combined with participation in a future federal Somalia.[3]
Puntland therefore does not view its autonomy as a privilege granted by Mogadishu.
It regards it as part of the constitutional bargain upon which national reconstruction was built.
This historical understanding helps explain why Puntland reacts strongly when federal authorities appear to expand powers that Garowe believes were never constitutionally transferred to the centre.
Evidence of a Wider Federal Crisis
The problem extends beyond Puntland.
South West State, 2018
The arrest of Mukhtar Robow during the South West presidential contest and the lethal unrest that followed created a lasting perception that federal power could influence regional electoral outcomes. Human Rights Watch, citing UN findings, reported that at least fifteen protesters were killed following Robow’s arrest.[4]
Jubaland and Gedo
The dispute over Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe’s 2019 reelection developed into a confrontation over Gedo involving federal troop deployments. International Crisis Group later described the federal approach as overreach and linked troop withdrawal to efforts to restore political confidence.[5]
Puntland, 2024
After Parliament approved major constitutional amendments in March 2024, Puntland announced that it would no longer recognize federal institutions until an agreed constitutional settlement was restored.[6]
Jubaland and Ras Kamboni, 2024
The dispute over Jubaland’s 2024 election escalated into competing claims of legitimacy and armed confrontation. Later analysis attributed the immediate opening attack at Ras Kamboni to Jubaland forces, illustrating that federal-state conflict cannot credibly be reduced to a simple narrative of one-sided aggression.[7]
South West State, 2026
South West severed relations with the Federal Government in March 2026. Less than two weeks later, federal troops entered Baidoa and the regional president resigned.[8]
Taken together, these incidents indicate a recurring structural problem rather than a uniquely Puntland grievance.
The Calmiskaad Test
Puntland’s campaign against Islamic State in the Calmiskaad mountains has become an important test of the federal compact.
Reuters reported in February 2025 that Puntland forces had recaptured approximately 250 square kilometres and fifty ISIS positions.[9]
Puntland Information Minister Mohammed Aided stated that there was no operational coordination with the Federal Government and appealed for additional international support.[10]
The Federal Government rejected the implication that it was disengaged. Federal Information Minister Daud Aweis said Mogadishu maintained security engagement with Puntland and emphasized the need for a unified national counterterrorism strategy.[11]
The competing claims expose the core problem.
Puntland argues:
It was forced to act independently because the centre failed to provide meaningful operational support.
Mogadishu argues:
Independent regional military structures themselves prevent coherent national security coordination.
Both arguments point toward the same policy conclusion:
Somalia urgently needs an agreed federal security architecture.
The Galkayo Warning
The August 2026 confrontation in Galkayo added another layer of mistrust.
Puntland forces seized a camp held by federally aligned forces following fighting in the divided city. Puntland accused Mogadishu of supporting armed formations intended to destabilize Puntland.
Public reporting confirms the fighting and the existence of federal-aligned forces, but the precise intent attributed to Mogadishu remains contested.
This distinction matters.
A policy analysis should not present allegation as established fact.
But the episode still exposes a serious institutional weakness.
Where federal-aligned armed formations operate inside a Federal Member State during an acute political dispute, their legal mandate, chain of command, financing, and mission should be transparent.
Without such clarity, legitimate federal security activity becomes politically indistinguishable from intervention.
Development Finance and Fiscal Distrust
Puntland has repeatedly alleged that international development funds intended for the State have been delayed, withheld, or redirected because of political disagreement with Mogadishu.
Independent U4 research records repeated allegations of politically motivated diversion or withholding of aid involving Puntland, while also cautioning that available evidence does not conclusively establish every claim.[12]
The Federal Government has a legitimate counter-case.
International finance is often provided to the Federal Republic of Somalia, and Mogadishu bears fiduciary responsibilities involving auditing, procurement, donor compliance, debt sustainability, and financial reporting.
Federal records also show substantial transfers to Federal Member States generally.[13]
The policy problem is therefore not simply whether Mogadishu should have a role.
It should.
The problem is whether the system is sufficiently rule-based to prevent both actual political discrimination and persistent suspicion of political discrimination.
The Mandate Controversy
The March 2026 constitutional amendments further complicated the crisis.
Reuters reported that the changes could extend the presidential term from four to five years and delay elections originally expected in May 2026.[14]
The legal application to the incumbent remained contested.
This qualification is important.
The issue should not be described simplistically as an uncontested personal term extension.
But the constitutional concern is substantial.
Incumbent institutions participated in adopting rules that may prolong their own tenure.
This raises a basic democratic principle:
Political institutions should not possess unrestricted power to alter the expiry of the mandate from which their authority derives.
Mogadishu can reasonably argue that an electoral transition requires time for voter registration, electoral legislation, constituency design, political-party organization, security, and administration.
But parliamentary approval alone does not remove the conflict of interest where legislators and executives benefit directly from the new timetable.
For Puntland, the issue deepens an existing legitimacy dispute.
Garowe already rejected the constitutional process.
The same amended order is now being invoked to sustain federal authority over Member States that dispute its legitimacy.
Mogadishu’s Strongest Counter-Case
Puntland’s critique must be balanced against legitimate federal concerns.
Somalia cannot function if each Federal Member State independently determines national foreign policy, military relationships, citizenship, currency, and external diplomatic relations.
Article 54 expressly assigns several of these areas to Mogadishu.
The Federal Government is also correct that:
- national forces must possess real operational capacity;
- international creditors require one sovereign counterpart;
- foreign governments should not be able to construct competing state-level diplomatic systems inside Somalia;
- Puntland cannot possess an automatic veto over every constitutional reform;
- and the federation cannot gradually become a confederation simply because individual states choose to behave as sovereign entities.
These concerns are not merely excuses for centralization.
They are genuine problems of national statehood.
Where the Federal Case Stops
Legitimate federal authority nevertheless has constitutional limits.
Foreign affairs cannot become a pretext for ignoring Article 53 consultation requirements.
National defence cannot become a universal justification for military intervention during regional political disputes.
Fiscal oversight cannot become political punishment.
Constitutional reform cannot allow the centre alone to redefine the powers of the constituent states.
Universal suffrage cannot substitute for federal agreement.
And parliamentary majorities cannot be permitted to vote federalism itself out of existence.
The challenge is therefore to distinguish federal capacity from federal domination.
Strategic Options for Puntland
Puntland now faces three broad constitutional paths.
1. Reconstructed Federalism
This remains the least disruptive and potentially most viable option.
It would require:
clear allocation of powers;
rule-based fiscal federalism;
constitutional protection of state autonomy;
agreed security arrangements;
limits on unilateral federal troop deployments;
transparent resource-sharing;
and an independent constitutional mechanism capable of binding both Mogadishu and Federal Member States.
2. Confederation
If trust in conventional federalism has deteriorated beyond repair, a confederal arrangement could preserve Somali political unity while shifting more authority to constituent states.
Common institutions could retain narrowly agreed functions such as:
external defence;
currency;
citizenship;
selected foreign affairs;
interstate commerce;
international debt;
and maritime coordination.
Most domestic authority would remain with the states.
3. Separation
Separation remains the most consequential option and should not be romanticized.
It would raise difficult questions involving:
international recognition;
citizenship;
borders;
public debt;
currency;
trade;
security;
airspace;
maritime jurisdiction;
and succession to federal assets and obligations.
But its political appeal will grow if both genuine federalism and confederal accommodation are foreclosed.
Policy Recommendations
1. Establish a Binding Federal Dispute Mechanism
Somalia urgently requires an independent constitutional court or equivalent institution capable of adjudicating centre–state disputes.
Neither Puntland nor Mogadishu should be judge in its own cause.
2. Negotiate a Federal Security Compact
The Federal Government and Member States should agree rules governing:
federal troop deployment;
state consultation;
regional forces;
joint command;
counterterrorism operations;
weapons transfers;
and political neutrality of security institutions.
3. Insulate Development Finance from Political Conflict
Federal-state transfers should be formula-based, transparent, audited, and technically conditioned.
Citizens should not lose development projects because political relations collapse.
4. Establish Special Amendment Rules for Federal Questions
Constitutional provisions affecting Member State powers should require a higher threshold than an ordinary parliamentary majority.
The system must balance national decision-making with meaningful constituent-state consent.
5. Resolve the Mandate Controversy Transparently
Federal authorities should provide a clear, authoritative, and independently reviewable legal explanation of:
the current presidential term;
the applicability of the March 2026 amendments to the incumbent;
the precise election timetable;
and the transitional legal basis for any continuation beyond the original four-year cycle.
Ambiguity over the expiry of national political authority is itself constitutionally destabilizing.
6. Create a Puntland Constitutional Futures Commission
Puntland should establish an independent commission to examine federalism, confederation, and separation.
Its purpose should be analysis, not predetermined advocacy.
7. Strengthen Puntland’s Own Constitutional Governance
Puntland’s case for autonomy will remain strongest when it demonstrates rule of law, judicial independence, accountable security institutions, transparent finance, political pluralism, and effective local government.
Autonomy must produce better governance, not simply more localized power.
Historical Warning: Ethiopia and Eritrea
The Ethiopia–Eritrea federation of 1952–1962 offers a limited but relevant institutional warning.
UN General Assembly Resolution 390(V) established Eritrea as an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia.[15]
Over the following decade, Eritrean autonomy was progressively weakened, and Ethiopia dissolved the federation in 1962.
The legal and historical circumstances differ profoundly from Puntland.
The lesson is not that Puntland is destined to follow Eritrea.
The lesson is institutional:
When a political union depends upon protected autonomy, dismantling that autonomy can radicalize rather than extinguish demands for self-government.
The centre may centralize in order to prevent fragmentation.
The periphery interprets centralization as proof that autonomy cannot be trusted.
Federalists become confederalists.
Confederalists may become separatists.
That is the danger Somalia should avoid.
Conclusion
Puntland’s constitutional debate now reflects five interconnected crises:
federal authority, constitutional amendment, security relations, fiscal federalism, and democratic mandate.
Mogadishu possesses legitimate national powers.
Puntland possesses legitimate constitutional autonomy.
The failure lies in Somalia’s inability to establish trusted institutions defining the boundary between them.
The policy objective should therefore not be victory for Garowe over Mogadishu or Mogadishu over Garowe.
It should be a federal settlement in which neither can constitutionally dominate the other.
The central proposition is simple:
Somalia requires a real Federal Government—and real Federal Member States.
If genuine federalism is restored, Puntland has powerful reasons to remain committed to Somali unity.
If federalism becomes merely nominal, confederation becomes rational.
If both federalism and confederal accommodation fail, separation will inevitably become more politically attractive.
The greatest danger to Somali unity may therefore not come from those demanding autonomy.
It may come from political institutions that, in the name of strengthening the state, progressively destroy the constitutional bargain that makes the state worth belonging to.
Notes
1. Reuters, “Somali Parliament Backs Constitutional Changes That Could Extend President’s Term,” March 5, 2026.
2. Federal Republic of Somalia, Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia (Mogadishu, 2012), art. 54.
3. Ibid., art. 53.
4. Reuters, “Somalia’s South West State Says It Has Severed Ties with the Federal Government,” March 17, 2026.
5. Human Rights Watch, “Somalia,” World Report 2020 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2020).
6. Reuters, “Somalia’s Puntland Refuses to Recognise Federal Government after Disputed Constitutional Changes,” March 31, 2024.
7. International Crisis Group, Electoral Showdown in Somalia: Averting Another Round of Turmoil, Africa Briefing no. 208, 2025.
8. Reuters, “Somali Army Takes Control of Strategic City, Regional Leader Resigns,” March 30, 2026.
9. Reuters, “Puntland Offensive Deals Blow to Islamic State in Somalia,” February 7, 2025.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Aid Diversion and Corruption in Somalia (Bergen: U4, 2026).
13. Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Finance, 2024 End Year Budget Performance Report (Mogadishu, 2025).
14. Reuters, “Somali Parliament Backs Constitutional Changes That Could Extend President’s Term,” March 5, 2026.
15. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 390 A (V), “Eritrea,” December 2, 1950.
Selected Bibliography
Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Finance. 2024 End Year Budget Performance Report. Mogadishu, 2025.
Federal Republic of Somalia. Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Mogadishu, 2012.
Human Rights Watch. “Somalia.” World Report 2020. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2020.
International Crisis Group. Electoral Showdown in Somalia: Averting Another Round of Turmoil. Africa Briefing No. 208. Brussels, 2025.
Puntland Development Research Centre and Interpeace. A Bottom-Up Approach to Peace and Statebuilding: Lessons from the Somali Experience. Garowe, 2008.
Reuters. “Puntland Offensive Deals Blow to Islamic State in Somalia.” February 7, 2025.
———. “Somalia’s Puntland Refuses to Recognise Federal Government after Disputed Constitutional Changes.” March 31, 2024.
———. “Somali Parliament Backs Constitutional Changes That Could Extend President’s Term.” March 5, 2026.
———. “Somalia’s South West State Says It Has Severed Ties with the Federal Government.” March 17, 2026.
———. “Somali Army Takes Control of Strategic City, Regional Leader Resigns.” March 30, 2026.
U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. Aid Diversion and Corruption in Somalia. Bergen, 2026.
United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 390 A (V), “Eritrea.” December 2, 1950.
You must be logged in to post a comment.