Month: March 2019
HOW TO SEND AMISOM HOME
https://ismailwarsame.blog/2019/03/30/how-to-send-amisom-home/
( photo: courtesy of AMISOM)
HOW TO SEND AMISOM HOME
(Photo: courtesy of AMISOM)
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PRESIDENT DENI & DAARTA AHMED TAAJIR

Garowe, March 29 – Ahmed TAAJIR, a 19th century local hero, famous trader and king’s Representative symbolizes the complexities of Bendar Qassim (Bosaso), deriving its ancient name from the founder of this coastal town on the shores of the Red Sea in the 14th century.
Article: Wrongfully convicted man’s case sat on Wilson-Raybould’s desk for months
Wrongfully convicted man’s case sat on Wilson-Raybould’s desk for months
PUNTLAND vs THE NETHERLANDS
SOMALIA: CRISIS OF ATTIRE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
SOMALIA: ONE COUNTRY WITH UNLINKED TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SOMALIA’S MOST PRODUCTIVE ARE THE LEAST DEVELOPED SECTORS
SOMALIA’S MOST PRODUCTIVE ARE THE LEAST DEVELOPED SECTORS

(Photo: Foreign illegal fishing gear – alarming)
Garowe, March 27 – Somalia’s Coastal and rural communities are the mainstay and backbone of the national economy, and they are the least developed as if by design. It is a paradox. This under-development in these vital economic sectors is one of the main factors next to bad governance and poor leadership as to why the country is among the least developed nations.
To develop this country in a meaningful way, we need to do the hard work of constructing extensive road network linking up rural, coastal and urban communities as priority in any future economic planning. Any alternative plan is not worth the bits and bytes typed in.
One more thing: if you do not train youth pouring in to urban centres to acquire labor skills they will turn to violence and substance abuses, and become beggers and refugees.
SOMALIA: ONE COUNTRY WITH UNLINKED TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Garowe, March 27, 2019– “Nambarkaan ma wicikartid” (“You can not call this number”)—a phrase every Somali knows all too well. Despite paying for telecom services, customers are locked into provider silos, unable to call friends, family, or businesses on competing networks. Only a few operators, like Golis, Hormud, and TeleSom, have limited interconnectivity, forcing many to juggle multiple phones or dual-SIM devices.
Why does this persist? In a functioning economy, regulators and companies prioritize interoperability, recognizing that communication is a public good—not just a corporate battleground. Yet in Somalia, telecoms still operate with a fragmented, war-era mindset, treating customers as captive revenue streams rather than partners in progress.
There are solutions—if stakeholders choose to act:
Regulatory Intervention – The government must enforce mandatory interconnectivity, as seen in other markets. No telecom should profit from artificially isolating customers.
Revenue-Sharing Agreements – Competing providers can adopt fair pricing models for cross-network calls, ensuring mutual profitability without harming consumers.
Public Pressure – Customers, businesses, and civil society should demand better, voting with their wallets and voices for unified communication.
Nationalist Vision – Somali telecom leaders must rise above zero-sum competition. A connected Somalia benefits everyone—including their long-term bottom line.
The current system is unsustainable. As Somalia rebuilds, its institutions can not afford to replicate the failures of the past. History will judge whether today’s leaders fostered division or laid the groundwork for a truly connected nation.
Ismail H. Warsame
iwarsame@ismailwarsame.blog
@ismailwarsame
SOMALIA: CRISIS OF ATTIRE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
Most Somalis perceive the loose long-sleeved traditional tribal Arab gown, the Khamis, as religious dress and sign of pious relevance. The Abaya with burqa veil hijab of various tribal identification is also widely used now throughout Somalia, whereby a woman in the street without it is perceived as blasphemous and risks all kinds of verbal abuses and ostracism in the society. You wouldn’t know whether the woman walking nearby is your mother-in-law, sister or your own daughter.
HOW TRUTH DIED IN SOMALI DISCOURSES
UNPRODUCTIVE DEBATES WITH LITTLE OR NO POSITIVE ACTIONS
Meet or watch Somalis debating on all kinds of subjects and issues on earth: politics, news, religion etc., while they enjoy their cups of tea lazily at Caffè shops.They all sound experts in debates. You wonder in which colleges and universities they teach or lecture.
No Collusion, No ‘Exoneration’ — NYT > Home Page
A Trump-friendly attorney general’s letter doesn’t do justice to the special counsel’s investigation. Release his whole report.
PUNTLAND vs THE NETHERLANDS
GAROWE, March 24 -Ample paved roads, highways, parks, ambulances, free health benefits, emergency telephone numbers, shetlters for the needy and social services, among many other public amenities are things that people in the West take for granted.
CHINESE TOURISTS IN MOGADISHU




Chinese business venture hunters and tourists are in Mogadishu amid bomb-blasts.
MISTRUST AMONG SOMALI CLANS IS THE OBSTACLE
MISTRUST AMONG SOMALI CLANS IS THE OBSTACLE
There are four obstacles to Somalia’s progress and modern statecraft:
1. Tariqa wars
2. Politicized clannism
3. Epidemic corruption inbedded in all spheres life of the society
4. Mistrust among clans as a result of the Civil War.
Which one is relatively new to Somalia’s public square?
What is new in the political public square is mistrust among the warring clans that threaten the territorial integrity and sovereignity of Somalia. Mistrust created by Civil War and city-state legacy is the key as why Somalia is taugh to reconstruct. 1, 2 and 3 problems have been in existence in various degrees throughout the history of Somali clans. That is why restoring that missing trust is the fundamental task of all Somali political and clan leaders as well as all other leaders in their all walks of life. Recognition of wrong doing, Reconciliation with material compensation and repentance are critical here for successful conclusion of the process with all elements of adjudication and legal enforcement.
Mistrust is a new obstacle, more dangerous than the current Tariqa wars. If there is no trust, we have nothing in common and we will not be able to have a common country, let alone a unified state. Let us not kid ourselves.
CITY TRAFFIC POLICE IS A SIGN OF LAW & ORDER, DEFINITELY HERE.
CITY TRAFFIC POLICE IS A SIGN OF LAW & ORDER, DEFINITELY HERE.
GAROWE, March 23 – There are a few signs that indicate positive signs of societal freedoms and safety of citizens. Among them are the traffic police to maintain the rules of the road, the existence of an independent judiciary and free press. Go to any big city in any given country. See the existence, behavior and efficiency of traffic police. Pick up some local newspapers to get an idea of how free they are. Enquire about the independence of courts and read the sections and columns on crime and sentencing.
ROADMAP FOR PUNTLAND DENI PRESIDENCY
By now the President should have in place a major reform package for the State’s suffocating and duplicating bureaucracy. By now the President must have shown his vision as to where he would take Puntland State. By now the President must have committed himself and his administration to a democratization process as the old clan POWER-SHARING arrangement had hit the dead-end and should be discontinued. By now the President should have inspired the people of Puntland for renewal of hope and revitalization of socio-economic life in this part of Somalia. By now the President should have cleared the confusion surrounding on how to move forward in terms of cooperation between Puntland and its international partners. By now the President should have studied the dubious P&O and DP WORLD Bosaso contract and clarified Puntland position on whether to revise the infamous contract or discard it all together. Puntlanders had never seen or shown publicly this suspicious Bosaso Port Deal with the UAE ambitious and aggressive firm, the P&O. The President needs to hire a team of highly experienced business and civil contract lawyers to look into this contract with P&O. And by the way, does President Deni have seen that contract? Nobody in Puntland, including the previous members of House of Representatives ( the Parliament), who corruptedly approved the deal, had reported seeing it.
WHY SICK PUNTLANDERS GO TO HARGEISA AND MOGADISHU
Puntlanders seek medical help beyond the State. Why? You would be surprised to find out the main reason behind hundreds of Puntlanders routinely traveling to Mogadishu and Hargeisa for their personal medical care.
Postscript
Reports on theft of donated medicines and equipment from Qardho, Galkayo and Garowe are alarming. No prevention of looting or accountability in place in all public hospitals in the State.
Feature picture: Nurses on strike against return of corrupt official to workplace in Qardho General Hospital.
CONDUCIVE BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT
Would you do business and invest in risk and unstable country even if this is your own land and you are a patriot?
WHY SICK PUNTLANDERS GO TO HARGEISA AND MOGADISHU
Read about it.
Check out @MoveOn’s Tweet: https://twitter.com/MoveOn/status/1108828706984939520?s=09
SOMALI-KENYA MARITIME LOGGERHEAD


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NOTE TO ALL MISSIONS CONVEYING THE POSITION OF KENYA WITH A VIEW TO CORRECTING THE GLARING MISREPRESENTATIONS MADE ..pdf
CUBAN TROOPS IN AFRICA 1960-91 II

BEGINNING OF THE END
By the late 1980s, the world balance of power was changing. The Soviet Union was disintegrating, and along with it, Cuba’s capacity to continue its commitment to the MPLA. Throughout the 1980s, the MPLA grew weaker as the UNITA grew stronger, in large measure due to UNITA’s support from South Africa and increasingly the United States.
In November 1987 the MPLA was in full retreat following a defeat at Mavinga (650 mi SE of Luanda). Cuba’s most successful general, Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, and 15,000 Cuban reinforcements, including frontline pilots, were rushed to Angola. Ochoa remarked, “I have been sent to a lost war so that I will be blamed for the defeat.”
On January 13, 1988, South African-led forces attacked three MPLA brigades east of Cuito Cuanavale (580 mi SE of Luanda). The Cubans wanted these MPLA troops to retreat and then consolidate a new position; they were either unwilling or incapable of doing so. On February 15 the South Africans crashed through the MLPA’s defenses and encircled the 59th MLPA Brigade. Seven Cuban tanks counterattacked; all were destroyed but the 59th Brigade was able to escape. Cuban General Cintra Frias now arrived on the scene to take command of field operations (Ochoa remained the senior Cuban in Angola) and the defenses finally held at Cuito Cuanavale.
Both sides maneuvered on the battlefield to gain advantages at the negotiating table. Should the South Africans attack, Castro instructed Ochoa to “be ready to counter-attack with as many aircraft as possible to completely destroy the Ruacana water reservoirs and transformers [on the border with South African-controlled Namiba].” Apparently, the MLPA knew nothing of these orders; it had a tacit understanding with the South Africans that the Ruacana dam complex was off-limits. Finally, in late 1988 Cuba agreed to withdraw by July 1, 1991, leaving the MPLA to its own fate.
ANGOLAN OBSERVATIONS
During 1975 the Cuban army saved the MPLA from defeat by its internal rivals and external enemies. However, Cuba’s military rescue committed that Caribbean nation to the long term protection of the MPLA regime which required not only military but also economic aid. In the long run, this was unsustainable. The MPLA’s internal rivals were numerically superior, although initially disorganized; but throughout the 1980s the MPLA’s rivals grew stronger as the United States and South Africa became increasingly willing to supply them with aid.
Cuba’s initial military success may be attributed to Castro’s willingness to raise the ante beyond what either the United States or the Union of South Africa was willing to do in 1975. The Cuban commitment probably peaked near 36,000 troops, and possibly 150,000 troops rotated through Angola.
Although Cuba has not released data concerning its casualties, they are estimated to be 3,000 killed (including Gen. Raul Arguello) and 3,000 wounded. These figures do not include the casualties related to disease. Although Cuban logistics were primitive, having to resort to a few aging commercial aircraft, small cargo ships, and large fishing vessels to support a major, long range military operation, nonetheless, these assets got the job done.
Castro’s massive military commitment to Angola revealed inequities within Cuban society. The commanding officer of Cuban air units in Angola during the mid-1970s, Gen. Rafael del Pino, revealed, after defecting to the United States in May 1987,
The people, the officers resist going to Angola. This is not only because … we have converted ourselves into a mercenary army … but it is that our officers see that the problem is that neither the sons of the members of the Politburo [n]or the sons of the principal leaders of the government go to Angola, do not go into military service.
Also, the Cuban economy was adversely affected. To fight on the scale required in Angola forced Cuba to call up its reservists. Many of these individuals were the most technically trained people on the island. As they were removed from their normal jobs, the economy suffered. For example, aircraft required two full crews to make the flight across the Atlantic. These additional crews came from small Cuban airlines, effectively shutting them down. And in spite of attempts to protect the sugar industry, as men were increasingly pulled from the fields, production dropped and, as a consequence, so did Cuban hard currency.
The intervention by the South African army was a political failure for that nation. Although it won battles in 1975, the Union of South Africa, possessing no international support due to its racist policies, could not take political advantage of these victories. During 1975 it committed perhaps 2,000 combat troops to Angola and held a reserve force of some 4,000 men near the border. The subsequent policy of providing support for the UNITA, which at times included employing South African armor and aircraft, was much more successful.
ETHIOPIAN BACKGROUND
In 1974 widespread national strikes crippled Ethiopia as demonstrations and riots spread against the authoritarian regime of Haile Selassie. The military refused to take action against the people. The Dergue (Armed Forces Coordinating Committee) emerged out of the confusion as a powerful political element. By late summer the Dergue arrested the Prime Minister and over one hundred other officials of the government. The Dergue finally seized power on September 12, deposed the Emperor, and established the Ethiopian Provisional Military Government. Fidel Castro was the first foreign head of state to visit Ethiopia following these events.
Over the next few months, the military government systematically destroyed the remaining civil leadership. Executions were common. However, at the same time, Ethiopia was to fight ethnic Somalis who lived in the Ogaden Desert in its northwest corner and wanted to be made part of Somalia. This fighting had profound implications for Ethiopia, since many ethnic groups who desired independence were within its borders.
Somalia had renewed its interest in annexing the Ogaden Province in 1969. Gen. Mohammad Siad Barre, who had come to power in that year through a coup, desired to incorporate those regions outside the nation which had Somali majorities. These included parts of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. In 1974 Siad Barre provided the Soviet Union a naval base at Berbera in exchange for weapons and training, which allowed him to aggressively pursue his ambitions. Some of these weapons and training ultimately reached the “West Somali Liberation Front” (WSLF), which was fighting to separate the Ogaden Desert from Ethiopia and join it to Somalia.
When the deposed Ethiopian Emperor died in August 1975, a number of grass-roots organizations demanded increased civil rights. The military government struck swiftly, openly murdering the opposition. These massacres intimidated those who survived. On February 3, 1977, Brig. Gen. Teferi Bante, head of the highly volatile Dergue, was killed in a coup led by Lt. Gen. Mengistu Haile Mariam—a gunfight literally errupted during a military council meeting. The Cuban news media hailed this as a great victory.
Later in February, Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa, commander of the Cuban troops in Angola, headed a military delegation to Addis Ababa. This was followed by a two-day, unannounced visit by Castro, who tried in vain to resolve the border differences between Ethiopia and Somalia. In April Ethiopia asked the United States to withdraw its personnel from that country.
However, by April the Somali separatists won some clear victories in the northeast, and fighting also erupted in southeastern Ethiopia. In May Mengistu traveled to Moscow seeking military hardware; the request was granted. This infuriated the Somalis, who after all had a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. As a consequence, Somalia increased its aid to the WSLF and on June 17 Somali troops invaded Ogaden forcing the Cubans and Soviets to openly choose sides. Both Cuba and the Soviet Union believed that Ethiopia was more important to their long-term interests than Somalia.
OPPOSING SIDES IN ETHIOPIA
In 1975 the Ethiopian army was composed of almost 41,000 troops. It possessed almost no armor or tracked vehicles, essential for desert fighting. Because of poor leadership, training, and equipment, it had little fighting ability.
The WSLF had about 6,000 fighters. Many had been trained by the Cubans before Castro chose to side with Ethiopia and were supplied from Somalia.
The Somali army was composed of 23,000 men. It possessed 250 tanks and 310 armored personnel carriers, mostly older Soviet equipment. Although its leadership, training, and equipment were poor, they were superior to those of the Ethiopian army.
Prior to December 1977, no Cuban combat troops were in Ethiopia.
OPENING STRATEGIES IN ETHIOPIA
In July 1977 Somalia chose to escalate the fighting from guerrilla actions to open warfare in order to take advantage of its superior army vis-a-vis Ethiopia. Its strategy was to seize the Ogaden Desert and then threaten the heartland of Ethiopia. Initially, Ethiopian strategy was purely defensive.
THE FIRST SOMALI OFFENSIVE
Throughout the summer of 1977, the Ethiopian army lost ground on both the northwest and southwest fronts against the guerrillas while Mengistu carried out bloody purges against those suspected of opposing his rule in Ethiopia. Guerrillas sabotaged the Addis Ababa-to-Djibouti single-track railroad, which carried over half of Ethiopia’s foreign trade, by destroying five bridges. Meanwhile, in July Somalia reacted to Cuban and Soviet assistance to Ethiopia by expelling its Soviet military advisors and accepting military aid from the United States and Great Britain.
On July 17 a Somali force of 250 tanks, twelve mechanized brigades, and thirty war planes invaded the Ogaden Desert. By August the Somali army had seized 112 hamlets and towns and much of the desert. On the eighteenth Ethiopia declared a mass mobilization, and in September Cuban military help to Ethiopia began to increase. These were not enough to reverse the defeats. As a consequence of Cuba’s actions, Somalia expelled the Cuban chargé d’affaires. Late in September the Somali army captured the city of Jijiga (375 mi N of Addis Ababa) and the Kara Marda Pass which was the gateway to central Ethiopia.
By October Ethiopia had received large quantities of military hardware from the Soviet Union, but the Ethiopian army was totally unprepared to employ these. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister traveled to Cuba to seek Cuban training and combat troops as a last resort. However, by October 31 the Somali advance had been halted.
THE SECOND SOMALI OFFENSIVE
On November 13 Somalia expelled all Soviets, took back its base concessions, and aborted its 1974 friendship treaty. It also broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. On the twenty-second Somalia launched a second offensive; the objective was the city of Harar (250 mi E of Addis Ababa). On December 22 Cuba began a secret, massive airlift by Soviet aircraft of its combat troops from Angola, the People’s Republic of the Congo, and the Caribbean to Ethiopia. The Cuban combat force grew from 400 men in December 1977 to 16,000 men in April 1978.
ETHIOPIA-CUBAN TROOPS IN COMBAT
In January 1978 Raúl Castro flew to Addis Ababa and then on to Moscow. On January 24, the Ethiopian and Cuban troops counterattacked from Harar. The Somalis sustained 3,000 casualties and began to retreat. In February Cuban troops launched a major offensive and recaptured much of the lost desert. On March 5 the Kara Marda Pass was recaptured and by the eighth the Somali army had been driven back into its own territory and was in a state of shambles. The fighting was over.
In 1981 Ethiopia, supported by Cuban and Russian advisors (but not combat troops) invaded Somalia, attempting to drive Siad Barre from power. This failed in part because the United States provided Somalia $50 million in military aid. By 1984 the Ethiopian army was fighting six separatist guerrilla movements and the country was in chaos. Peace between Ethiopia and Somalia was agreed to on April 6, 1988, and the last Cuban left Ethiopia on September 9, 1989.
ETHIOPIAN OBSERVATIONS
In 1977 Cuban combat troops were able to snatch victory from defeat because of the introduction of an overwhelming force (16,000 men) against Somalia in a little more than seven weeks. Although farther from Cuba, logistics were easier than the Angolan operation because many Cuban troops were pulled from Angola and the Republic of the Congo, and more importantly, the Soviet Union provided most of the air transportation. Cuban casualties are cited as being high, although no numbers are offered.
As in Angola, Fidel Castro attempted to direct combat operations from Cuba. Division Gen. Leopoldo Cintra Frías stated:
We maintained permanent contact with the Commander in Chief; daily he was sent cables with information. He replied to everything and gave pertinent instructions. … He would order you to place a cannon in a place, how to do it, with how many men, etc. He had it all at his fingertips.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Foremost, Cuba’s fighting in Africa was at its own intiative and not that of the Soviet Union. General Cintra Frías, who served in both Angola and Ethiopia, stated, “The Soviets were never able to control us although I think that was their intention on more than one occasion.” José Raúl Alfonso, a former member of the Cuban intelligence community, stated, “the opinion [of those going to Angola in 1975] was that the Soviets did not know what we were going to do, so much so that Fidel told us that if things went wrong, we should not expect aid from them, not even from the Socialist camp.”
In some respects, the Cuban experience in Africa paralleled that of the United States in Vietnam. The Cuban army could win battles, but because Cuba did not understand the nature of the struggle, these victories did not lead to political success. In Angola particularly, Cuba saw this as a struggle against colonialism and capitalism where, in fact, it was primarily an internal feud between competing tribes. And, like Lyndon Johnson for Vietnam, Fidel Castro for Africa attempted to fight the war from his command post at home.
In the context of the cold war, Cuba’s efforts in Africa were a waste of resources. Cuba’s interventions were costly in men and treasure, contributing to a sharp downturn in its domestic economy. Additionally, Cuba’s military actions in Africa cost Cuba any possible rapprochement with the United States. Far less significant, these military actions did win Castro the good will of some black Africans who perceived neocolonialism as their greatest threat.
By late 1977 Cuba and the Soviet Union more clearly agreed upon foreign policy, as was demonstrated by their cooperation in Ethiopia, which had been somewhat lacking in Angola. One consequence of Cuba’s troops fighting in Africa was that Soviet pilots and technicians replaced Cubans in the defenses of the Caribbean island so that the Cubans could serve in Africa. Also, from 1970 to 1979 Soviet troops in Cuba increased from 1,000 men to some 5,000 men, and in 1979 Cuba acknowledged that a Soviet combat brigade was stationed on the island. Sarcastically, the People’s Daily of Peking wrote:
Question: What’s the largest country in the world?
Answer: Cuba. Its heart is in Havana; its government is in Moscow; its graveyards are in Angola and Ethiopia; and its people are in Miami.
One essential psychological, and therefore also political, factor in the Cuban involvement was the fact that many Cuban soldiers were either black or of mixed race.
One source states that over 300,000 Cuban military personnel and civilian experts served in Africa. It also states that of the 50,000 Cubans sent to Angola, half caught AIDS and that 10,000 Cubans died as a consequence of Cuban activity in Africa, although these numbers seem high. All Cubans had left Africa by May 1991.
NEW SOMALIA’S MARRIAGE REQUEST. READ IT HERE BELOW.
SOMALIA: MARRIAGE BY PROXY.
Garowe, Puntland, March 21 – The banquet Hall is comfortable and fully air-conditioned in the hot and burning wheather of the Horn of Africa. It might be of interest to note that neither the bridegroom nor the bride was present in the ceremony, but their respective representatives. This family arrangement is known as marriage by proxy.
The new episode in today’s marriage procedure was a condition or a request I heard for the first time that, and perhaps new to Somalia’s marriage tradition, upon a request to give her hand, the girl’s representative demanded that the bridegroom should take the bride to the Hajj in Mecca. The representative of the bridegroom had to accept this request without much fuzz.
Based on my enquiry, both the bridegroom and the bride were happily married with this novel arrangement.
I also noticed that there was no need for women to be present in a marriage ceremony by proxy. It was only men’s business.
https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=10218719120357168&id=1473969186
SOMALIA: A SLOW RESTORATION OF TRUST AMONG SOMALIS
SOMALIA: A SLOW RESTORATION OF TRUST AMONG SOMALIS
Relationships between different parts of Somalia, now and then.
One would appreciate that despite the unnecessarry political tension between Puntland and “Northwest State of Somalia” (Somaliland), the bulk of the new daily visitors of Garowe are coming from urban centres such as Hargeisa, Burco and Berbera. Many among them are looking for business and professional job opportunities in Puntland. Education and hospitality sectors benefit tremendously from the influx of job seekers from the Northwest.
Puntlanders go to Hargeisa and Mogadishu for medical care due to the fact that the leaders of Puntland had abysmally failed to address the acute health needs of the people of Puntland during the entire course of twenty years of state’s existence. Shame and dereliction of national responsibility! Trade and commerce never stopped between Puntland and Somaliland and Northeast and Southern Somalia even in the height of the War.
Garowe: The Glass Houses of Puntland
Garowe: The Glass Houses of Puntland
The quote that people in “glass houses don’t throw stones” is certainly true for the local residents of Garowe, State of Puntland, Somalia. Instead, they are busy in cutting business deals with NGOs and government agencies and constructing more hotels and villas to rent out to the highest bidder, oblivious to the fact that their City is facing military seige and badly needs campaigns for mobilizing situation awareness, re-enforcement, internal state security and intelligence capabilities.
SOMALIA TO DISCARD ITS HISTORY & NATIONAL HERITAGE
“If we historians fail to provide a nationally defined history, others less critical and less informed will take over the job for us.” Prof. Degler
THE ANCIENT ORIGINS OF PUNTLAND RE-DISCOVERED
SOMALIA: EASY ACCESS TO PUBLIC SERVICES
Why does one living in Cape Gardaffui (Ras Casair) on the tipmost of the Horn of Africa has to travel two thousand Kms away on dangerous rough roads over inaccessible mountains, ancient Puntland caves and Maidi-infested territories to the Capital Mogadishu to get his/her passport or driving licence?
“That is not the best way to re-construct the New Somalia”, I finally told him to rebuff his hardline attitude.
Worth reading also this:
SHAMELESS ABUSE OF AUTHORITY BY MINISTER GODAX

Federal Education Minister, Godax, has just again added insult to an injury by trying to bend the Federal Constitution to his whims and wishes of the “Daladaha Waxbarashada Muqdisha” ( Mogadishu Private Education umbrellas). By attempting this, he is dismissing outright all the provisions of the Federal Constitution that the Federal states are responsible for education and other social services in their respective states. He now turns against Puntland State Education Ministry for refusing to play ball with him in his abusive game
PUNTLAND ACHELLES HEELS
PROBLEM SOLVING
via PROBLEM SOLVING
PROBLEM SOLVING
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To whine and complain about the existence of a problem, leading to doing nothing about it.
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To think positive and look for solutions leading to taking concrete action.
But, please take note that when debating on issues and trying to solve problems, there will be always conflicts of ideas. Management of these conflicts is key here.



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