A WDM Editorial
A government’s priorities are revealed not by its speeches, but by where it commits its soldiers, its money, and its political energy. Today, Somalia faces an uncomfortable question: why does a Federal Government whose constitutional mandate expired months ago appear more determined to escalate tensions in Galkayo than to liberate Somali territory still occupied by al-Shabaab?
Galkayo has suffered enough.
It is a city burdened by divided administration, decades of unresolved clan grievances, contested jurisdiction, recurring insecurity, and the pressures of displacement. It should be a place where federal institutions cooperate to preserve stability—not another arena for political confrontation.
Yet allegations continue to emerge that federal-aligned actors are encouraging militia mobilization around Galkayo instead of concentrating national efforts against the insurgency that continues to occupy Somali soil.
The contrast could hardly be sharper.
Adan Yabaal, barely 200 kilometres from Mogadishu, was celebrated as one of the Somali National Army’s major victories in 2022. Yet al-Shabaab recaptured the strategic town in April 2025, and it remains outside government control. That is not a peripheral setback. It is a reminder that Somalia’s principal battlefield remains unfinished.
Then there is Jilib—al-Shabaab’s long-standing operational headquarters and self-declared capital since 2014. Despite years of military campaigns, international support, airstrikes, and repeated offensives, the movement’s political and military nerve centre remains intact. More than a decade later, the federal government has still not reclaimed the insurgency’s capital.
Instead, an altogether different pattern appears to be emerging.
South West State has experienced sustained federal intervention following disputes over regional authority. Galmudug now finds itself in open political tension with Villa Somalia. And Galkayo, sitting on the sensitive boundary between Puntland and Galmudug, increasingly risks becoming the next flashpoint.
Whether every allegation proves accurate or not, the perception itself is deeply damaging. Federalism cannot survive if Federal Member States come to believe that political independence invites pressure while constitutional cooperation receives intimidation.
The irony is particularly striking because the Federal Government itself operates under a constitutional cloud. Its constitutional mandate expired months ago, yet instead of prioritizing constitutional consensus, national reconciliation, and the recovery of territory held by terrorists, it appears increasingly preoccupied with political confrontation against Federal Member States. A government whose own constitutional legitimacy is disputed should exercise restraint—not open new political and military fronts.
Former Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke recently warned that a conflict in Galkayo would divert precious military resources from the fight against al-Shabaab and ISIS. On that point, he is entirely correct. Somalia cannot afford another internal front while terrorists continue to occupy strategic territory.
But his warning leaves unanswered the most important question: who is creating the conditions for such a conflict?
Warning against war while remaining silent on those whom critics accuse of orchestrating the political and military tensions around Galkayo is an incomplete analysis. If federal-aligned actors are contributing to militia mobilization and political destabilization, then condemning the consequences without confronting their alleged role treats the symptoms while ignoring the disease.
The Provisional Constitution did not establish federalism so that Mogadishu could politically discipline Federal Member States. It established federalism to disperse power, reduce conflict, and unite Somali institutions against common national enemies.
That enemy is not Puntland.
That enemy is not Galkayo.
That enemy is al-Shabaab.
If a Federal Government whose constitutional mandate expired months ago still possesses the troops, resources, and political determination to project force, those assets should first be directed toward liberating Adan Yabaal, reclaiming Jilib, and dismantling al-Shabaab’s remaining territorial sanctuary. Those are the battles that matter. Those are the victories the Somali people have waited for.
Manufacturing political crises in areas outside the Federal Government’s effective administration does not strengthen the Somali state. It weakens federalism, diverts scarce security resources, and risks opening another front in a country already fighting for its survival. More paradoxically, it undermines the very federal system that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has repeatedly presented as a cornerstone of his government’s political agenda. A strategy that erodes the constitutional autonomy, mutual trust, and institutional integrity of the Federal Member States ultimately weakens the Union it claims to defend.
History will not judge leaders by how effectively they confronted fellow Somalis. It will judge them by whether they defended the Constitution, respected the limits of their mandate, and liberated the territory still occupied by terrorists.
Somalia does not need another constitutional crisis.
It does not need another federal confrontation.
It needs Adan Yabaal back.
It needs Jilib back.
It needs a government that fights al-Shabaab—not federalism.
