56 year old Hussein inherited land southwest of Mogadishu, Somalia. Having been a public servant prior to 1991, when he found himself in a land dispute over that same land, he did what any public servant would do: he took the case to court. Spending nearly 27,000 US dollars in the highly corrupt judicial system, he lost the initial trial and attempted to appeal the case. He still had hope for due process.
Then, the other party attacked his house. The police shot and killed two of his aunts while they tried to save their home. Soon after, his appeal stalled in court. Two years later, with his appeal still unaddressed, Hussein did the unthinkable. He took his case to Al Shabaab, a violent terrorist group that operates a shadow government in the country.
His story is far from unique: Hussein is just one of thousands who has had to turn to Al Shabaab in a country without justice.
The Situation in Somalia
Described as “the most failed state,” Somalia lacks a unified government. Since the collapse of Mohamed Siad’s authoritarian regime in 1991, Somalia has struggled to establish a government. Although nominally run by President Hassan Sheik Mohamud, who served as chief executive from 2012-2017, and was reelected in a much-delayed election in May 2022, much of the country isn’t under government control: Al Shabaab controls nearly 70% of South and Central Somalia. In the areas under its control, Al Shabaab conducts all the basic functions of a normal government: it taxes residents, offers security, and even provides welfare to needy populations. Through taxation, Al Shabaab brings in some 15 million dollars a month–almost as much as the legitimate Somali government. Somalia’s actual government, meanwhile, is consistently rated as one of the most corrupt countries in the world and relies heavily on international assistance to survive. The minister of Hirshabelle put it bluntly: “We have two governments. … They control more and generate more funds than us”.
Despite international efforts to counter its rise, Al Shabaab has thrived in the Horn of Africa. As such, while the Somali government remains corrupt, discriminatory, and otherwise untrusted, more people flock to Al-Shabaab. A 2018 study on recruited members of Al Shabaab found that, increasingly, the group’s messaging towards youth emphasized injustice and power abuse issues. A full two-thirds of recruited members say they joined because of clan discrimination, government corruption, or economic reasons. Given the struggles of the government in Somalia, it is unsurprising that Al Shabaab has gained a foothold in the Somali judicial system.
Al Shabaab’s “Justice”
Utilizing a combination of Xeer, the traditional legal system in Somalia, and Sharia law, a form of Islamic law, Al Shabaab has established a network of courts across the country. These “shadow courts” handle a wide variety of disputes. Somali researcher Hussein Yusuf Ali notes that Al Shabaab responds to a variety of needs for justice, especially arguments over natural resources, commercial disagreements, and accusations of clan discrimination. Land disputes are also frequently handled by Al Shabaab: one resident of Baido estimates that “80% of land disputes are taken to Al Shabaab and perhaps 20% go to formal courts.” Al Shabaab courts even handle issues of extortion, clan discrimination, corruption, and unlawful arrests, meaning Al Shabaab may prosecute government and law enforcement agents as well as civilians.
Even in areas officially controlled by the government, Somalia’s justice system is as dysfunctional as the government itself. Corrupt, fractured, and lacking the power to enforce its decisions, the judicial system rarely provides justice. The US State department described Somalia’s justice system as one where “impunity generally remained the norm,” and decisions are heavily influenced by clan based politics and corruption.
To fill this vacuum, Al Shabaab has become an arbiter of justice–not necessarily because the public actually supports the terrorist group, but because there is no other option. Aweys Sheikh Abdullah, who was a judge in the Banadir regional court from 2016-2018 told reporters that people turn to Al Shabaab because courts involve a “long process which can take years without the case proceeding, backlog resulting from lack of enough judges at the court and costly legal fees.”
Many Somalis see Al Shabaab’s courts as neutral, unbiased institutions which provide a free platform for arbitration. Those from minority clans, who are often wary of being discriminated against by government judges, are enticed by this promise of neutrality to use Al Shabaab. In government courts, one lawyer from Hodan said, “many people fear being killed if they bring their cases before courts. Some people are silenced. Some others receive death threats, which could later force them to withdraw their cases. For minority groups, they might face all those threats and risks with the addition that they have no powerful allies to help them.”
This, among other reasons, is why thousands now turn to Al Shabaab–even those living under government control–to adjudicate their disputes. Residents of Mogadishu, the government controlled capital, travel to nearby Al Shabaab areas to settle disputes. By some anecdotal accounts, even policemen and military officials are known to seek justice from Al Shabaab instead of the government.
Al Shabaab also has the power to enforce its decisions, while decisions by government courts are largely unenforceable. Al Shabaab’s courts successfully enforce their rulings by using threats of violence to do so. If someone does not comply, they risk the robbery, injury, or death of themselves and their loved ones. Residents of Bariire in Somalia reported that they have been forced to watch public executions, amputations, and more as a means to intimidate residents. While barbaric, this violence ensures respect for the institution–something which the government courts lack.
Al Shabaab’s draconian punishments highlight a frightening truth about the group: despite gaining legitimacy as a pseudo-government, Al Shabaab is just as violent, radical, and dangerous as ever. In the year 2021 alone, the organization killed more than 550 civilians. Al Shabaab has been accused of crimes against humanity, has conscripted child soldiers, and continues to exploit and abuse those under its control. It is no surprise that the people of Somalia, even those who may rely on the court system, want Al Shabaab gone.
Despite the group’s violence, interviews with lawyers, clan elders, and government officials indicate that Al Shabaab’s “reputation for lower levels of corruption,” lack of bias in the court (in that it is seen as not discriminating along clan lines), and ability to enforce court rulings (often through violence) have earned the group respect. Juxtaposed against the government courts, Al Shabaab is now seen as less corrupt and less discriminatory than government courts. In turn, Al Shabaab derives much of their power from a purported moral high ground, which they manage to achieve even in the face of barbaric human rights violations.
Legitimacy and Government
Al Shabaab’s shadow courts are only a case study of their larger strategy to delegitimize the government and take its place. After all, this is not the first time that Al Shabaab has sought to take over the role of the fragile government.
Following the 2017 drought in Somalia, as the government floundered, Al Shabaab began handing out food and water aid to impoverished farmers. More recently, Al Shabaab established COVID-19 healthcare centers in response to the pandemic, and has even established schools and programs to send fighters to universities abroad to receive education.
Doling out these goods and services, Al Shabaab has built its power on the inability of the government to provide for its people. The failures of the Somali government to bring about adequate justice and rule of law created the conditions for Al Shabaab to make its own courts, just as the failure of all governments offers an opportunity for Al Shabaab to rise to power.
Alexus G. Grynkewich, Commander of the US 9th force, describes this type of strategy as “welfare as warfare”, where a terrorist group provides services, humanitarian aid, or security in order to erode the legitimacy of the existing government. This hearts and minds approach helps counteract the violent, oppressive image of Al Shabaab that many Somalis have, thus making the group seem like a more benevolent ruling force.
If this strategy sounds familiar, that’s because it is: the practice of welfare as warfare is a tried and true means for terrorist groups to gain support and legitimacy. The Taliban employed this model for years, running a similar Sharia based court system in Afghanistan. One expert described Al Shabaab as a junior varsity version of the Taliban: like the Taliban, Al Shabaab operates courts, collects taxes, and provides aid to the public. This justice system, which legitimized the Taliban in the eyes of the public and gave the terrorist group valuable experience in running a country, likely helped contribute to the Taliban victory in Afghanistan in August 2021.
Also like the Taliban, Al Shabaab is pairing its legal efforts with a targeted propaganda campaign meant to make the government seem weak and ineffective. In 2021, Al Shabaab released a six part documentary about the failures of the Somali president, advocating for Sharia as a solution. Unlike typical terrorist propaganda, Al Shabaab’s documentary, which it marketed as “objective,” focuses on political problems rather than only radical ideology. Since then, another 12 part documentary about the problems of the Somali constitution has been released.
Without a functioning judicial system, Al Shabaab’s claims that the government is ineffective are more easily accepted across Somalia. The mere existence of a parallel legal system in Somalia, especially one run by a group who explicitly hopes to overthrow the existing government, shows that the Somali state is unable to uphold rule of law.
Al Shabaab courts have become more brazen too. The courts sometimes work directly with clans and elders, and are overturning already decided government cases. Al Shabaab even warns those under its control from stepping foot in government courts, threatening civilians that do so.
Ultimately, Somalia is trapped in a dangerous cycle: an illegitimate government is the but-for cause of Al Shabaab’s courts. Yet Al Shabaab’s courts also contribute to the perception of illegitimacy, while helping to resolve legitimate concerns that the government has not adequately handled.
The Road Ahead
Thankfully, the Somali government has begun paying attention to the issue: President Mohamud has put Al Shabaab’s courts at the center of his counterterrorism strategy in the past few weeks, declaring a war on the system. In September, Somali forces attacked an Al Shabaab-run courtroom in Basra near Mogadishu, the first such operation to specifically target the shadow judicial system.
The federal government has even fomented a clan uprising against Al Shabaab, weaponizing Somalia’s powerful clan militias. In previous administrations, authorities refused to provide government support to the clan militias, allowing Al Shabaab to consolidate control over clan territories. This novel approach to clan militias is already working. Just last week, 40 towns in the Hirab region were liberated from Al Shabaab rule with the help of the Macawisley militia.
This new strategy is vastly superior to a proposed military-only approach to Al Shabaab. A hyper-militarized counterterrorism strategy in Somalia risks killing and radicalizing civilians, shutting down potential negotiations, and will likely result in retaliatory escalation by all parties. While military operations may temporarily clear Al Shabaab out of a town, they do not solve the underlying problem relating to the lack of effective governance in the area. This makes it easy for Al Shabaab to fill the void in services once again.
In fact, using only military force to fight Al Shabaab, now that it operates as a pseudo-state in many areas, may even be counterproductive: because Al Shabaab is the provider of goods and services, attacks on the group risk disrupting vital governance, aid, and public services, leaving vulnerable communities in the lurch. Without a wider political strategy, military escalation will keep Somalia entrenched in conflict.
Additionally, instead of relying on bombing and raids, since Al Shabaab currently has a weakened military, the Somali government should seize this opportunity to build informal channels for peace and demobilization negotiations. The government should start at the local level, leveraging any connections it has to the group. The appointment of Mukhtar Robow, an ex-Al Shabaab leader turned government official, to the ministry of religion last month could give the government the credibility it needs with Al Shabaab to establish locally mediated negotiations. While there is a long-term goal for peace, in the short term negotiations about a ceasefire, halting bombings, and protecting civilians would be a significant step in the right direction.
The Somali government must beat Al Shabaab at its own game: as long the public sees Somalia’s judicial system as untrustworthy and corrupt, there will always be a demand for Al Shabaab and its courts. Therefore, Somalia must also take steps to address the corruption and costs in its legal system. A study of Somalis found that high costs were the largest access barrier to government courts. On top of this, Al Shabaab’s ability to enforce its court decisions is why the group is so successful in the legal field: the USAID study on Somalia concluded that the ability to enforce decisions swiftly is the largest “pull factor” of Al Shabaab’s courts. As one respondent put it with regards to the government system, “justice depends on your pockets.” Stronger anti-corruption regulations, assistance from the international community in lowering legal fees, and out-of-court arbitration options could go a long way towards lowering costs. However, for a country facing immense turmoil and violent terrorism, reforming the justice system will not be easy.
Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia, could also be a potential model for judiciary reform. Although Somaliland faces corruption, bias, and a lack of resources within its judicial system, it is consistently seen as more effective than the courts in the rest of the nation. Part of an “increasingly capable government,” the justice system in Somaliland still has a long way to go, but is a far better alternative than the current Somali equivalent. Somali leaders might be well served by working with Somaliland officials to reform their courts.
For almost two decades, Somalia has fought Al Shabaab on the battlefield. As the conflict moves to the courtroom, success seems uncertain: The country’s future is precarious, its government and justice system weak, and its people under attack by a violent terrorist group. The world has largely given up on Somalia.
But it is the constant struggle of the Somali people to bring justice, governance, and peace to their country which proves that Somalia is not a lost cause. Growing local resistance against Al Shabaab, demands for improvements to the government, and the peaceful transition of power this summer are all hopeful signs for the country.
It is past time for the government to rise to the goals of its people: President Mohamud has the opportunity now to fight Al Shabaab, build the government, and bring justice to the Somali people. So far, he has risen to the challenge. If he can maintain his momentum, and help the Somali government win the battle for judicial reform and create a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism, the country stands a chance against Al Shabaab. The fight for the future of Somalia has just begun.
With meagre economic resources and limited fighting men, Somaliland is engaged in losing adventures in violence in Sool Region. 1st, it wouldn’t be able to subdue restive population moving forward. 2nd, it has irreversibly damaged its illusionary secessionist attempts. 3rd, it has lost irrevocably any remaining good standing within the international community, harming any working relationships with still remaining international and non-profit organizations operating out of Hargeisa. By its unprovoked violence in SSC regions, Somalilad has decimated its commerce and trade with the rest of Somali regions in Somalia and Ethiopia. That way Somaliland has turned its territories into dystopia.
HOW TO SALVAGE THE SITUATION
Hargheisa should either proceed to immediate arrangement of ceasefire in SSC regions, and hold talks with politicians and leaders in Laascaanod on its speedy forces’ withdrawal, or brave for crushing defeat, humiliation and subsequent unraveling of Somaliland pipe dreams of securing unilateral independence.
CONCLUSION
By mercilessly engaging in war crimes and crimes against humanity in SSC regions, Hargheisa has lost any previously doubtful moral compass to negotiate with its Somalia’s counterparts on the future governance arrangements.
The Provisional Federal Constitution of Somalia adopted a democratic system of government with checks and balance of power between three branches of government. Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has three levels of governance: 1. Shared level (dawladda dhexe) 2. A Federal Member State (Dawladd-Gobolleed) or FMS. 3. Local District Council (Gole deegaan). Like any other similar federal system, the first two levels have their own separate constitutions and three branches of government. Sovereignity remains with the Central Government of the Somali Republic. The system is still evolving and needs further work in harmonizing the constitutions. Formation of FMS must satisfy the requirement of unification of two regions or more to be constitutionally legitimate. A FMS has powers expanding into regions and districts within the state.
Contrary to the behavior of the Somalia’s current President, the Executive Powers of the Government rest on the Cabinet and powers of the President and Prime Minister are clearly spelled out in the Federal Constitution. The President appoints the Prime Minister, but he cannot fire him. Only the Parliament has power to fire both the President and Prime Minister.
In summary, Somali Federal Constitution is similar to that of USA. The President of a FMS is the same as the Governor of a US state, who is elected to a fixed term in Office. Similarly, in Somalia the Federal Authorities cannot fire or appoint a FMS President, in the same way US President cannot do. Political agreements between FGS and FMS are by consensus similar to the case of Canadian Federalism. In many ways, Federal Constitution has similarities with that of UK and Northern Ireland system of government with strong devolution of power to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Economic resources and fiscal responsibilities are shared by special arrangements, agreements between Central Government and Federal Member States by consensus. Unlike ethnic federalism of Ethiopia, the central authorities in Somalia have no much sway in internal affairs of FMS.
Finally, Somali Federal Constitution came about as a de facto (not de jure), following the civil war and the re-instatement of Central Somali Government accepted that reality on the ground into the Federal Constitution. It was the only way to try to restore lost trust between warring clans.
Still, some portions of Somali people believe that a form of federalism called “Confederalism” is the best option. They say Somali clans by nature are confederal entities like Darood, Hawiye, Dir etc. What suits them most is the confederalism of Swiss type, where Cantons has most powers and an elected Prime Minister (Cabinet) has the Executive Powers of the Government, while the Presidency is a rotating ceremonial role between Cantons.
Ongoing controversy on the Somali Constitution, if not resolved soon, may lead to the breakup of Somalia. It is a dangerous crossroad for Somalia’s survival as a state. Warning. Let us act now.
WHY SOMALILAND FORCEFUL OCCUPATION OF LAASCAANOOD IS NOT IN ITS BEST INTEREST
The main reason Somaliland Administration stays in Sool Region is its pursuit of unilateral secession from Somalia. That attempt has now hit the rocks, and it is unlikely that will ever happen as long as people of Somalia don’t allow it. Now the meager economy of Somaliland cannot sustain prolonged forceful occupation of Sool Region with its residents struggling for peace and freedom for the long haul. firstly, the ongoing uprising in Laaska (Laascaanood) has clearly demonstrated to Somalis, and the world at large, that Somaliland is an occupying entity against the will of the residents there.
Secondly, by suppressing the uprising in Laascaanood, Somaliland has irreversibly lost its territorial claim to Sool Region based on lame excuse of long-gone British Protectorate colonial border. After all, this is Dhulbahante/Harti land. No one within the international community would entertain Somaliland quest for secession after what has happened in Laascaanood recently, unless the world is suddenly ready to recognize every tribe or clan in Africa to form own sovereign state.
Thirdly, repression against residents of Laascaanood will entail gross human rights violations for which the leaders of Somaliland Regime will be held accountable in a court of law inside, and possibly, outside Somalia.
Somaliland is, therefore, better advised to vacate Sool Region peacefully in an exercise for damage control for crimes against humanity in abusing unarmed population.
BINDING AGREEMENT BETWEEN TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE SOMALI REPUBLIC AND PUNTLAND STATE OF SOMALIA ON RESOURCES AND POWER-SHARING, INSTITUTIONAL AND CAPACITY- BUILDING
This Agreement is as valid and binding between parties today as it was in 2007. Puntland State entered into this Agreement with the Federal Government, on behalf of then existing and future FMS. There is no legal venue for FGS today to ignore this solemn undertaking. Puntland State and every FMS has the legal right to demand for implementation of this official document.
Somalia has changed culturally – forget the old days of national celebrations, flag waving and song of national anthem. No talk of significance of national independence. Historical songs of patriotism are suppressed and celebrated singers are things of the past, only to be remembered by 70-year olds. The entire history of Somalia is being erased or has disappeared from national discourse and school curriculum.
Any signs of globalization and Western influence are being discouraged or eroded. Women can’t walk along the streets in towns without complete Xijab – any woman seen in public without heavy veil is automatically assumed blasphemous by the majority of population. Girls as old as five years are subjected to the strict rules of their mothers in dressing up. Fathers are bashed or looked down whenever they escort their daughters in public without following strict religious culture of today’s Somali society. The very name of Somali identity is fasting losing relevance in the country. The whole country appears to look different and disconnected from its past profile of liberal culture and religious tolerance. Time-tested traditional customs are looked down as pagan and un-Islamic. Somali society is fundamentally changing to a status of big X and cultural uncertainty.
It appears that academic descriptions by many foreign scholars and travelers of Somalis and Somalia have no relevance today. New studies in anthropology and sociology are required to reflect on the rapidly changing nature of the new people being created in Somalia. Years of Wahabists’ indoctrination is almost done and successful. This has been made possible by repression of the Military Dictatorship of Siyad Barre before its final collapse in 1991, whereby the oppressed people of Somalia sought salvation in religion during his reign. Saudi Arabian Wahabism teachings, its institutions of charity organizations bent on spread of Wahabism to counter-act Iranian Shia influence in Sunny nations and opportunistic nature of Somali nomadic character had been a deadly combination of sort to transform Somalia into a nation in identity crisis, now in every aspect of life.
Deterioration of environment, livestock and fish habitat is in a state of alarm and emergency. Religious groups dismiss this man-made disaster as curse from Allah. This is another area of grave concern for the survival of life in Somalia. Public awareness and action are required to reverse the dangerous trend.
Piracy, Civil War, Terrorism, Refugees, Genocide, Al-Shabaab, ISIS, Warlords, Famine, Drought, Relief Aid, United Nations, UNHCR, Doctors Without Borders, Action Aid, World Bank, IMF, UNDP, NGOs, AMISOM, AU, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Debt, Suicide Attacks, Money Laundering, Hawala System, Human Trafficking, Illegal Charcoal Trade, Early Childhood Mortality Rates, Mother and Infant Mortality, Open Borders, Khat Trade, No Currency Control, Zero Central Bank, No Drugs Control, Expired Food and Medicine, Heinous Business Practices, Rape, Murder, Kidnappings, No National Archive, Militias, Tribalism, Clannish, Religious Sects, High Divorce Rates, Corruption, No Accountability, lowest literacy rate in the world, illegal unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, foreign troops presence, bio-piracy, corruption, nepotism, capital flight, consumismerism…..
Does hearing and reading these horror attributes of Somalia as a country stimulate any chemical reactions in the minds of Somali Political elites? We doubt.
Somalia wouldn’t be expected to become a rule-based modern state in the foreseeable future – it needs many generations of statecraft experience to outgrow persistent socio-economic realities. Clans and groups of religious infighting will always be there as long as society remains primative and unenlightened. Predominantly, opinions advocate for eradication of tribalism in Somali society. Daraawiish Movement of Sayyid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan in the 1880s1900s tried to address the issue of tribalism through religious indoctrination. It became a hard nut to crack and the problem had emancipated into a more vicious cycle of inter-clan conflict, revenge and counter-revenge. Areas he reigned and built his power-base are still reeling from historic tribal mayhem with no visible path to peaceful reconciliation -Dhulbahante, Isaak and Ogaadeen are examples of Daraawiish’s legacy permanently prone to interclan warfare. SYL (Somali Youth League), the National Political Party for independence, tried to bury “HAYB” (clan identification), only to be re-ignited and exploited by European neocolonialists of Italy, Britain and French. Emperial Ethiopia took advantage of this Somalia’s weakness. The regime of General Siyaad Barre had pretended or attempted to do away these centuries-old clan ways of nomadic life and allegiance. They failed abysmally with devastating result of vicious civil war that destroyed Somali state in the end. It is our observation and assessment that Clan Power-sharing Formula of 4.5 would stay here for a long time, even after direct popular elections. Why? It would be the only guarantee for minority political representation. We know many would disagree with our assumptions, however, time will tell.
So the best solution to the chronic tribal problem of Somalia is the policy of eliminating clan relationships once and forever. However, that has been proven unimplementable and fundamentally a mission impossible as it is also misguided and impractical.
The alternative policy to best solution to clan problems in Somalia is to work out a state policy that treats tribalism as co-existing with modern chronic diseases like diabetes, hypertension etc by devising regulations and laws to deal with it- accept the existence of the illness and treat it by medicine and diet (in this case, legislations). For instance, any person holding public office must be subjected to severe sanctions against abuses and acts of tribalism, nepotism and corruption. There must be laws as well in the private sector regulating and addressing crimes committed in the name of clan allegiances.
All what we are saying here is, let us learn managing our clan system in better ways, humanely and fairly until we grow out of it.
This book by a veteran Somali political writer Ismail Haji Warsame can be bought from Amazon of different countries, Barnes & Noble, Apple, Scribd, Smashwords and many other large bookstores of the world and digital libraries. It is in two volumes, each costing $11.99. The books are excellent sources of information on contemporary Somali political history. It could be used as a learning tool in essay and English composition writing for students in high schools, colleges and universities. This book could be useful for Somali politicians and foreign diplomats as well as researchers on Somalia.
In 1999, interacting with late premier of Ethiopia, Melez Zenawi, on the economic and security importance of still to be built Gara’ad Port was an eye-opener for him. The late Puntland President and I came to his office at Arati-Killo in Addis Ababa one day on appointment. At his campound gate, there were only two security guards. The campound seemed deserted with no visible security detail, unlike presidential buildings of most Somali leaders in Villa Somalia and capital cities of the Federal Member States. At door we were met by a sole office worker. We went through a narrow passage with a number of closed doors on each side, presumably offices, until we reached a sitting place where the premier was waiting for us. Melez was chain-smoking his cigarette brand of Rothmans, I noticed, while Yusuf was unusually nervous as he indicated that by his constant scratching on the edge of the sofa. I put my hand over his to stop him scratching persistently.
During a little chit-chat, Melez asked Mr Yusuf, “tell me about your cousins”. Yusuf responded, “you know Generals Gabyoy and Morgan better than I do, for you interacted with them when TPLF was a rebel organization based in Mogadishu during Siyad Barre regime, and you and I know how General Omar Haji Masale misbehaved during Somali Talks in Cairo in 1997”.
We started talking business. Melez was a good listener and habitually never interrupts someone, based on my earlier encounters with him. Among our priorities for discussion included our plan to construct Gara’ad Port on the shores of the Indian Ocean in Mudugh Region of Puntland. Somehow, Melez sounded that he heard about our desire to have a seaport there, but he seemed not to have paid any attention before. He looked concerned about Eritrean issue and frictions with Isaiah Afewerke.
Abullahi Yusuf explained to Melez how would-be Gara’ad Port could become a game-changer in terms of Ethiopian economy and marine transport needs, especially for Eastern Ethiopia. Mr Yusuf briefed him that in the event Ethiopia wanted to pump Shilabo gas through pipes to tankers at sea, there are three routes, the shortest and most secure of which would be Gara’ad Port. The route to Gara’ad Port passes through Darood sub-clans while the routes to Berbera and Obbiyo pass through multiple Somali sub-clans, who were traditionally antagonistic to each other. The operation of gas pumps have to consider safety as a priority. Melez had warmed up to the idea of Ethiopia having an alternative and safer sea-route to the Indian Ocean. Ethiopia should now take advantage of the newly built Gara’ad Port. They should invest in the construction of well-built highways to Gara’ad Port.
Warsame Digital Media WDM has conducted a survey through the Facebook to test interest in politics among the demographics in all regions of Somalia. Methodology: Release of a video clip directed at Somalia’s constituencies only. It was a Youtube video clip broadcasted through the social media. The clip wasn’t framed as normal survey, but a podcast reminding population to support political associations and parties in order to insure the independence of these organizations to survive, compete in the political arena and make government authorities accountable.
We believe that the result of watching rate to this video reflects upon participation and interest in Somali politics, on the top of many other factors of interest to researchers .
Based on the number, age and gender, residents of Banadir, Waqooyi Galbeed (Sonaliland) and Bari (Puntland) came out respectively first. The lowest rate came from Gedo, Bay, Bakool and Hiiraan. The rest of the regions are in-between. Read here the result of test:
Anti-democratic extensions of mandate is becoming fashionable in most Federal Member State (FMS) in Somalia. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is reticent about the new political shenanigans by the heads of FMS. Silence on the illegal power grab could be interpreted as conniving with the power abuses in the FMS. Somaliland, which had never re-elected its Upper House in more than three decades and only twice in the Lower House, constitutes the most undemocratic entity and leads the pack of power grabbers in Somalia, followed by Jubaland, Galmudugh, Southwest and Hirshabelle. In the case of Somaliland, the Upper House (Guurti) has just extended its legislative mandate to yet another five-year term, thus becoming a parliament for life, and Somaliland, the mother of all mandate extensions. The President has extracted two-year term extension for himself by creating artificial constitutional crisis in Somaliland. Other FMS have opted for constitutional manipulations to prolong their stints and lives of misrule.
In Puntland State, public debates are raging in towns between supporters and opponents of democratic transition. Here at least the government isn’t talking about mandate extension. There are people among the debaters, though, who say cynically or in good faith that the idea behind One Person One Vote planned in Puntland State, is to seek extension of current administration’s term to finish up the process. They say the taste of pudding is in the eating. Until that happens, let us keep the faith to see these elections through.
Ununiform development needs in Somalia is a reality on the ground, and those regions still in humanitarian or recovery stages couldn’t be allowed to hold back those which are in development stage, when considering aid distribution and technical assistance programs. Peace and stability must be the criteria to gauge development needs.
حافظ على السلام لتعيش بسلام. يدفع. عندما أنشأنا دولة بونتلاند في الصومال في أغسطس 1998 ، على الرغم من أن المناطق الشمالية الشرقية كانت مستقرة نسبيًا باستثناء مودوغ ، كانت هناك إقطاعيات فرعية من العشائر ومقاتلين عشائريين مهددين والعديد من نقاط التفتيش غير القانونية على طول الطرق والطرق السريعة الرئيسية ، على رأس العناصر الدينية المتطرفة مثل آل. – اتحاد الاسلامى. قامت ولاية بونتلاند ، من خلال السلطة الأخلاقية والتشريعية ، بإزالة هذه العناصر من الفوضى المجتمعية في غضون فترة زمنية قصيرة. عاد السلام الكامل والممتع إلى المناطق الشمالية الشرقية من الصومال. من الحالة الإنسانية إلى الانتعاش والتنمية ، انتقلت بونتلاند إلى وضع الحكم الذاتي وتقديم الخدمات العامة ، بغض النظر عن مدى شعور الناس بعدم الرضا ، بناءً على توقعاتهم من حكومة مراوغة ، في أعقاب حرب أهلية شرسة في تاريخ هذه الأمة المضطربة. قارن سيناريو بونتلاند بتلك المناطق الصومالية التي لا تزال تعاني من العنف والأزمات الإنسانية. هناك ، لا أحد يتحدث عن مرحلة التعافي من الحرب الأهلية. لا يزالون بحاجة إلى تدخل إنساني. خلال تقييم الاحتياجات المشتركة لفرقنا (JNA) مع الأمم المتحدة والبنك الدولي في 2005-2006 ، اكتشفنا أن أجزاء مختلفة من الصومال تحتاج إلى مناهج إنمائية مختلفة. كان استنتاجنا أن بونتلاند وأرض الصومال قد انتقلتا إلى مرحلة التنمية بينما كانت بقية الصومال في الغالب في مرحلة إنسانية. لا تزال احتياجات التنمية غير المعلوماتية في الصومال حقيقة واقعة على الأرض ، ولا يمكن السماح لتلك المناطق التي تمر بمرحلة إنسانية أو مرحلة التعافي بعرقلة تلك التي هي في مرحلة التنمية ، عند النظر في توزيع المساعدات وبرامج المساعدة الفنية. يجب أن يكون السلام والاستقرار معيارين لقياس احتياجات التنمية
Keep the peace to live in peace. It pays. When we established Puntland State of Somalia in August 1998, although Northeast Regions were comparatively stable save Mudugh, there were sub-clan fiefdoms and menancing clan militiamen and numerous illegal checkpoints all along the roads and main highway, on top of religious extremist elements like Al-Itihad Al-islaami. Puntland State, through moral and legislative authority, had cleared up these elements of societal anarchy within a short period of time. Full and enjoyable peace returned to Northeastern Regions of Somalia. From humanitarian situation to recovery and development, Puntland had moved forward to the status of self-government and delivery of public services, no matter how unsatisfied people felt, based on their expectations from an elusive government, following a vicious civil war in the history of this troubled nation.
Compare Puntland scenario with those Somali regions which are still experiencing violence and humanitarian crisis. There, nobody is talking about recovery stage from the Civil War. They still need humanitarian intervention.
During our Teams’ Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) of Somalia with the United Nations and World Bank in 2005-2006, we had discovered that different parts of Somalia needed different development approaches. Our conclusion was that Puntland and Somaliland had moved to development stage while the rest of Somalia was mostly in humanitarian stage. Ununiform development needs in Somalia is still a reality on the ground, and those regions in humanitarian or recovery stages couldn’t be allowed to hold back those which are in development stage, when considering aid distribution and technical assistance programs. Peace and stability must be the criteria to gauge development needs.
Aren’t you still tired and fed up of being told that your member of Parliament would be picked up by your clan elder? How would you allow your Puntland State President to continue to be selected by a group of unrepresentative 66 persons in your so-called parliament? By continuing to accept this kind of unaccountable and unrepresentative government, you risk losing the hope and future of your kids, existing generation, or even Puntland self-government. If you don’t change, you will have no rights to blame others for your misfortunes because of failure in your civic responsibilities. Once you skip the opportunity to vote and make a difference in your life and others’, you abandon all your rights as a full citizen.
In my opinion, after many trials and errors, Puntland State is now posed to make history in introducing One Person One Vote to the State and Somalia, starting with elections of District Councils. Make sure you contribute to the process and play your important role as responsible resident of Puntland State of Somalia. Good luck!
The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources of Puntland Government expresses its deep concern regarding the minutes from the meeting on 21/9/2022 between the Federal Minister of Fisheries & Marine Resources and foreign ambassadors, in which the Minister of Fisheries stated that he “does not recognize any license that is not issued by the Federal Ministry of Fisheries”, and threatened, “whoever is engaged in fishing activities with a license granted by the Federal Member States will be on the list of those who are accused of illegal fishing”.
Puntland Government wishes to highlight that the above statement contradicts the constitution and the following political agreements:
1.Article 44 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia stipulates that the distribution of natural resources shall be negotiated by the Federal Government of Somalia and its member states through a constitutional framework.
2. The Baidoa Convention held on February 2nd 2018, Article 2; Paragraph B, confirms that the Federal Member States (FMS) have the authority over anything below 24 nautical miles.
3. The Addis Ababa Agreement held on March 22nd 2019, Article 3, states that the revenue generated from below 24 nautical miles will be managed by the Federal Member States.
4. The Constitution of Puntland State, Article 3; Section 3 states that foreigners who are granted a permit from Puntland Government are allowed to fish between 12-24 nautical miles.
Therefore, such reckless statement from the Minister of Fisheries & Marine Resources of the Federal Government could incite political instability, plunge the country into further division and jeopardize the economic future of the fishing sector as a whole.
In conclusion, we call on the officials of the Federal Ministry of Fisheries of Somalia to retract for his unsubstantiated statement, and honor the previous agreements and consultations between the Federal Government of Somalia and Puntland Government.
You must be logged in to post a comment.