56 year old Hussein inherited land southwest of Mogadishu, Somalia. Having been a public servant prior to 1991, when he found himself in a land dispute over that same land, he did what any public servant would do: he took the case to court. Spending nearly 27,000 US dollars in the highly corrupt judicial system, he lost the initial trial and attempted to appeal the case. He still had hope for due process.
Then, the other party attacked his house. The police shot and killed two of his aunts while they tried to save their home. Soon after, his appeal stalled in court. Two years later, with his appeal still unaddressed, Hussein did the unthinkable. He took his case to Al Shabaab, a violent terrorist group that operates a shadow government in the country.
His story is far from unique: Hussein is just one of thousands who has had to turn to Al Shabaab in a country without justice.
The Situation in Somalia
Described as “the most failed state,” Somalia lacks a unified government. Since the collapse of Mohamed Siad’s authoritarian regime in 1991, Somalia has struggled to establish a government. Although nominally run by President Hassan Sheik Mohamud, who served as chief executive from 2012-2017, and was reelected in a much-delayed election in May 2022, much of the country isn’t under government control: Al Shabaab controls nearly 70% of South and Central Somalia. In the areas under its control, Al Shabaab conducts all the basic functions of a normal government: it taxes residents, offers security, and even provides welfare to needy populations. Through taxation, Al Shabaab brings in some 15 million dollars a month–almost as much as the legitimate Somali government. Somalia’s actual government, meanwhile, is consistently rated as one of the most corrupt countries in the world and relies heavily on international assistance to survive. The minister of Hirshabelle put it bluntly: “We have two governments. … They control more and generate more funds than us”.
Despite international efforts to counter its rise, Al Shabaab has thrived in the Horn of Africa. As such, while the Somali government remains corrupt, discriminatory, and otherwise untrusted, more people flock to Al-Shabaab. A 2018 study on recruited members of Al Shabaab found that, increasingly, the group’s messaging towards youth emphasized injustice and power abuse issues. A full two-thirds of recruited members say they joined because of clan discrimination, government corruption, or economic reasons. Given the struggles of the government in Somalia, it is unsurprising that Al Shabaab has gained a foothold in the Somali judicial system.
Al Shabaab’s “Justice”
Utilizing a combination of Xeer, the traditional legal system in Somalia, and Sharia law, a form of Islamic law, Al Shabaab has established a network of courts across the country. These “shadow courts” handle a wide variety of disputes. Somali researcher Hussein Yusuf Ali notes that Al Shabaab responds to a variety of needs for justice, especially arguments over natural resources, commercial disagreements, and accusations of clan discrimination. Land disputes are also frequently handled by Al Shabaab: one resident of Baido estimates that “80% of land disputes are taken to Al Shabaab and perhaps 20% go to formal courts.” Al Shabaab courts even handle issues of extortion, clan discrimination, corruption, and unlawful arrests, meaning Al Shabaab may prosecute government and law enforcement agents as well as civilians.
Even in areas officially controlled by the government, Somalia’s justice system is as dysfunctional as the government itself. Corrupt, fractured, and lacking the power to enforce its decisions, the judicial system rarely provides justice. The US State department described Somalia’s justice system as one where “impunity generally remained the norm,” and decisions are heavily influenced by clan based politics and corruption.
To fill this vacuum, Al Shabaab has become an arbiter of justice–not necessarily because the public actually supports the terrorist group, but because there is no other option. Aweys Sheikh Abdullah, who was a judge in the Banadir regional court from 2016-2018 told reporters that people turn to Al Shabaab because courts involve a “long process which can take years without the case proceeding, backlog resulting from lack of enough judges at the court and costly legal fees.”
Many Somalis see Al Shabaab’s courts as neutral, unbiased institutions which provide a free platform for arbitration. Those from minority clans, who are often wary of being discriminated against by government judges, are enticed by this promise of neutrality to use Al Shabaab. In government courts, one lawyer from Hodan said, “many people fear being killed if they bring their cases before courts. Some people are silenced. Some others receive death threats, which could later force them to withdraw their cases. For minority groups, they might face all those threats and risks with the addition that they have no powerful allies to help them.”
This, among other reasons, is why thousands now turn to Al Shabaab–even those living under government control–to adjudicate their disputes. Residents of Mogadishu, the government controlled capital, travel to nearby Al Shabaab areas to settle disputes. By some anecdotal accounts, even policemen and military officials are known to seek justice from Al Shabaab instead of the government.
Al Shabaab also has the power to enforce its decisions, while decisions by government courts are largely unenforceable. Al Shabaab’s courts successfully enforce their rulings by using threats of violence to do so. If someone does not comply, they risk the robbery, injury, or death of themselves and their loved ones. Residents of Bariire in Somalia reported that they have been forced to watch public executions, amputations, and more as a means to intimidate residents. While barbaric, this violence ensures respect for the institution–something which the government courts lack.
Al Shabaab’s draconian punishments highlight a frightening truth about the group: despite gaining legitimacy as a pseudo-government, Al Shabaab is just as violent, radical, and dangerous as ever. In the year 2021 alone, the organization killed more than 550 civilians. Al Shabaab has been accused of crimes against humanity, has conscripted child soldiers, and continues to exploit and abuse those under its control. It is no surprise that the people of Somalia, even those who may rely on the court system, want Al Shabaab gone.
Despite the group’s violence, interviews with lawyers, clan elders, and government officials indicate that Al Shabaab’s “reputation for lower levels of corruption,” lack of bias in the court (in that it is seen as not discriminating along clan lines), and ability to enforce court rulings (often through violence) have earned the group respect. Juxtaposed against the government courts, Al Shabaab is now seen as less corrupt and less discriminatory than government courts. In turn, Al Shabaab derives much of their power from a purported moral high ground, which they manage to achieve even in the face of barbaric human rights violations.
Legitimacy and Government
Al Shabaab’s shadow courts are only a case study of their larger strategy to delegitimize the government and take its place. After all, this is not the first time that Al Shabaab has sought to take over the role of the fragile government.
Following the 2017 drought in Somalia, as the government floundered, Al Shabaab began handing out food and water aid to impoverished farmers. More recently, Al Shabaab established COVID-19 healthcare centers in response to the pandemic, and has even established schools and programs to send fighters to universities abroad to receive education.
Doling out these goods and services, Al Shabaab has built its power on the inability of the government to provide for its people. The failures of the Somali government to bring about adequate justice and rule of law created the conditions for Al Shabaab to make its own courts, just as the failure of all governments offers an opportunity for Al Shabaab to rise to power.
Alexus G. Grynkewich, Commander of the US 9th force, describes this type of strategy as “welfare as warfare”, where a terrorist group provides services, humanitarian aid, or security in order to erode the legitimacy of the existing government. This hearts and minds approach helps counteract the violent, oppressive image of Al Shabaab that many Somalis have, thus making the group seem like a more benevolent ruling force.
If this strategy sounds familiar, that’s because it is: the practice of welfare as warfare is a tried and true means for terrorist groups to gain support and legitimacy. The Taliban employed this model for years, running a similar Sharia based court system in Afghanistan. One expert described Al Shabaab as a junior varsity version of the Taliban: like the Taliban, Al Shabaab operates courts, collects taxes, and provides aid to the public. This justice system, which legitimized the Taliban in the eyes of the public and gave the terrorist group valuable experience in running a country, likely helped contribute to the Taliban victory in Afghanistan in August 2021.
Also like the Taliban, Al Shabaab is pairing its legal efforts with a targeted propaganda campaign meant to make the government seem weak and ineffective. In 2021, Al Shabaab released a six part documentary about the failures of the Somali president, advocating for Sharia as a solution. Unlike typical terrorist propaganda, Al Shabaab’s documentary, which it marketed as “objective,” focuses on political problems rather than only radical ideology. Since then, another 12 part documentary about the problems of the Somali constitution has been released.
Without a functioning judicial system, Al Shabaab’s claims that the government is ineffective are more easily accepted across Somalia. The mere existence of a parallel legal system in Somalia, especially one run by a group who explicitly hopes to overthrow the existing government, shows that the Somali state is unable to uphold rule of law.
Al Shabaab courts have become more brazen too. The courts sometimes work directly with clans and elders, and are overturning already decided government cases. Al Shabaab even warns those under its control from stepping foot in government courts, threatening civilians that do so.
Ultimately, Somalia is trapped in a dangerous cycle: an illegitimate government is the but-for cause of Al Shabaab’s courts. Yet Al Shabaab’s courts also contribute to the perception of illegitimacy, while helping to resolve legitimate concerns that the government has not adequately handled.
The Road Ahead
Thankfully, the Somali government has begun paying attention to the issue: President Mohamud has put Al Shabaab’s courts at the center of his counterterrorism strategy in the past few weeks, declaring a war on the system. In September, Somali forces attacked an Al Shabaab-run courtroom in Basra near Mogadishu, the first such operation to specifically target the shadow judicial system.
The federal government has even fomented a clan uprising against Al Shabaab, weaponizing Somalia’s powerful clan militias. In previous administrations, authorities refused to provide government support to the clan militias, allowing Al Shabaab to consolidate control over clan territories. This novel approach to clan militias is already working. Just last week, 40 towns in the Hirab region were liberated from Al Shabaab rule with the help of the Macawisley militia.
This new strategy is vastly superior to a proposed military-only approach to Al Shabaab. A hyper-militarized counterterrorism strategy in Somalia risks killing and radicalizing civilians, shutting down potential negotiations, and will likely result in retaliatory escalation by all parties. While military operations may temporarily clear Al Shabaab out of a town, they do not solve the underlying problem relating to the lack of effective governance in the area. This makes it easy for Al Shabaab to fill the void in services once again.
In fact, using only military force to fight Al Shabaab, now that it operates as a pseudo-state in many areas, may even be counterproductive: because Al Shabaab is the provider of goods and services, attacks on the group risk disrupting vital governance, aid, and public services, leaving vulnerable communities in the lurch. Without a wider political strategy, military escalation will keep Somalia entrenched in conflict.
Additionally, instead of relying on bombing and raids, since Al Shabaab currently has a weakened military, the Somali government should seize this opportunity to build informal channels for peace and demobilization negotiations. The government should start at the local level, leveraging any connections it has to the group. The appointment of Mukhtar Robow, an ex-Al Shabaab leader turned government official, to the ministry of religion last month could give the government the credibility it needs with Al Shabaab to establish locally mediated negotiations. While there is a long-term goal for peace, in the short term negotiations about a ceasefire, halting bombings, and protecting civilians would be a significant step in the right direction.
The Somali government must beat Al Shabaab at its own game: as long the public sees Somalia’s judicial system as untrustworthy and corrupt, there will always be a demand for Al Shabaab and its courts. Therefore, Somalia must also take steps to address the corruption and costs in its legal system. A study of Somalis found that high costs were the largest access barrier to government courts. On top of this, Al Shabaab’s ability to enforce its court decisions is why the group is so successful in the legal field: the USAID study on Somalia concluded that the ability to enforce decisions swiftly is the largest “pull factor” of Al Shabaab’s courts. As one respondent put it with regards to the government system, “justice depends on your pockets.” Stronger anti-corruption regulations, assistance from the international community in lowering legal fees, and out-of-court arbitration options could go a long way towards lowering costs. However, for a country facing immense turmoil and violent terrorism, reforming the justice system will not be easy.
Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia, could also be a potential model for judiciary reform. Although Somaliland faces corruption, bias, and a lack of resources within its judicial system, it is consistently seen as more effective than the courts in the rest of the nation. Part of an “increasingly capable government,” the justice system in Somaliland still has a long way to go, but is a far better alternative than the current Somali equivalent. Somali leaders might be well served by working with Somaliland officials to reform their courts.
For almost two decades, Somalia has fought Al Shabaab on the battlefield. As the conflict moves to the courtroom, success seems uncertain: The country’s future is precarious, its government and justice system weak, and its people under attack by a violent terrorist group. The world has largely given up on Somalia.
But it is the constant struggle of the Somali people to bring justice, governance, and peace to their country which proves that Somalia is not a lost cause. Growing local resistance against Al Shabaab, demands for improvements to the government, and the peaceful transition of power this summer are all hopeful signs for the country.
It is past time for the government to rise to the goals of its people: President Mohamud has the opportunity now to fight Al Shabaab, build the government, and bring justice to the Somali people. So far, he has risen to the challenge. If he can maintain his momentum, and help the Somali government win the battle for judicial reform and create a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism, the country stands a chance against Al Shabaab. The fight for the future of Somalia has just begun.
To start with, there is weak collective ownership in Somalia among the native people – nobody seems to care about it beyond selfish individual interests. Its leaders seem to practice the king’s motto: “after me the deluge“. Now Somalis have become transnational in their existence – they are split and scattered all over the world, while holding no allegiance to any one country. They are fast becoming the new ever wandering gypsies. State regulations or any societal rules irrite them. Nobody can predict what will become of them. Their Capital City, Mogadishu, hosts foreign troops and none of its residents seem to care or mind. National pride and culture are quickly losing relevance. Their focus is now on social media entertainment and destructive bashing of each other in never ending and fruitless clannish warfare. In the process, they have produced tireless and unscrupulous internet clan warriors determined to secure Google clicks by equally wandering and gullible followers. Fake news and forged documents reign supreme in their malicious and destructive internet sites. Lately, interested and self-centered Somali politicians have been taking advantage of Somalia’s misery, exploited by rumor-mongers and shameless site owners. Terms like CBB (Cayayaan Baraha Bulshada) were specifically coined for these faithless groups of Somali origin sitting behind lethal internet-connected laptops and desktops in Western countries, contributing to their decadence. Depression and loneliness have drive young Somali beauties living in the Western world into nightmares and obscenity in unregulated cyberspace and on the information highway. It is frightening situation.
At home, terrorist groups and religious fanatics believe they have reached the ultimate power of controlling an entire nation, easily reaping protection money and exercising free reign in racketeering.
Somalia’s neighbors are nervous and afraid of the menace happening at their doorsteps. They have run out of other options but to contain Somalia by keeping their troops there. And as long as Western nations are paying the bills, they can tolerate the occasional murders of some of their soldiers by Al-Shabab and ISIS.
Those among the international community who wish Somalia well should act as catalysts for change.
Until Somalis learn to change their attitudes and ways of life by collectively and individually belonging to a country of their own and take care of it, they are likely to be doomed.
With meagre economic resources and limited fighting men, Somaliland is engaged in losing adventures in violence in Sool Region. 1st, it wouldn’t be able to subdue restive population moving forward. 2nd, it has irreversibly damaged its illusionary secessionist attempts. 3rd, it has lost irrevocably any remaining good standing within the international community, harming any working relationships with still remaining international and non-profit organizations operating out of Hargeisa. By its unprovoked violence in SSC regions, Somalilad has decimated its commerce and trade with the rest of Somali regions in Somalia and Ethiopia. That way Somaliland has turned its territories into dystopia.
HOW TO SALVAGE THE SITUATION
Hargheisa should either proceed to immediate arrangement of ceasefire in SSC regions, and hold talks with politicians and leaders in Laascaanod on its speedy forces’ withdrawal, or brave for crushing defeat, humiliation and subsequent unraveling of Somaliland pipe dreams of securing unilateral independence.
CONCLUSION
By mercilessly engaging in war crimes and crimes against humanity in SSC regions, Hargheisa has lost any previously doubtful moral compass to negotiate with its Somalia’s counterparts on the future governance arrangements.
Preface by Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, Prime Minister (January 1962)
SINCE the Somali Republic became an independent State on the first of July, 1960, the Government has become increasingly aware of the need for the publication of an authoritative guide to its border problems and their origins, in view of the friendly interest, particularly among other African nations, which these problems have aroused. We Somalis occupy the eastern ‘horn’ of Africa, the largest, single homogeneous area in the continent. The country consists, for the most part, of scant pastures and two rivers, and has been the playground of international politics for many years. Our country was divided and sub-divided by Euro-Abyssinian colonialism in the last two decades of the 19th Century. The value of our land was not the motive for annexation because the complexities of our pastoral life offered no inducement to the intruders who were more favoured in this respect than ourselves, for they already possessed an abundance of rich and fertile land in temperate zones. The aims of annexation, which are analysed in succeeding pages, were dictated by selfish policies which the colonial powers concerned found it expedient to pursue without regard to the interests of the Somali people. Our misfortunes do not stem from the unproductiveness of our soil, nor from a lack of mineral wealth. These limitations on our material well-being were accepted and compensated for by our forefathers from whom we inherited, among other things, a spiritual and cultural prosperity of inestimable value: the teaching of Islam on the one hand and lyric poetry on the other. Moreover, our forebears developed techniques of animal husbandry which have not been easy to improve upon and applied their ingenuity to the total utilization of the few natural resources available to them. By their skills we live today, and, with the generous assistance of wealthier nations, we shall lay new foundations, in accordance with our liberal and democratic Constitution, for the spiritual and material enrichment of future Somali generations. No! Our misfortune is that our neighbouring countries with whom, like the rest of Africa, we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations, are not our neighbours. Our neighbours are our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary ‘arrangements’. They have to move across artificial frontiers to their pasture lands. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same pastoral economy as ourselves. We speak the same language. We share the same creed, the same culture and the same traditions. How can we regard our brothers as foreigners? Of course we all have a strong and very natural desire to be united. The first step in this direction was taken in 1960 when the Somaliland Protectorate was united with Somalia. This act was not an act of ‘colonialism’ or ‘expansionism’ or ‘annexation’. It was a positive contribution to peace and unity in Africa and was made possible by the application of the principle of the right to self-determination. We adhere most rigidly to this principle which is linked to our pledge in Article VI of our Constitution that we shall promote ‘by legal and peaceful means the union of Somali territories’.
It started with the name of the Somali State in 1970s. The government was then anything but democratic. Nevertheless it was called the Somali democratic Republic. Now it is Federal Republic of Somalia more by de facto than de jure. Successive Mogadishu Federal Administrations were trying to behave in the same way as the dictatorship of Somali Democratic Republic, albeit they had no capacity and institutions to implement their centralist policies by force of repression, fortunately or unfortunately, based on your perspective.
The latest governance system agreed upon by all Somalis is federal, however, it is sad that it is being misinterpreted by many as weakening Somalia’s state, even to the extent of dismembering the country. That is extremely dangerous propaganda. It neither reflects on the political realities in Somalia nor on experiences in many federal countries in the world. On the contrary, Somalia is much stronger with different levels of democratic government.
Another lethal propaganda by anti-federalist forces is the question they pose as to how many presidents Somalia could have at the same time. This an attempt to discredit and ridicule the heads of Federal Member States, some even suggesting that they should be called regional governors. They ignore the fact that each FMS had come into existence as a result of a union of two or more regions – a political situation quite different from the era when a regional governor was appointed by the central government for a particular region. They also dismiss the fact that federalism entails doing away with old political cliches and habits of past bad rulers of Somalia. Anti-federalist forces are advocating for the repeat of the same mistakes and abuses of power that led Somalia’s state failure in the first place. That is unacceptable to many Somalis.
Federalisn and its variety of confederalism finds relevance in Somalia’s traditional clan society where most clans are more bonded by federation than by blood lineages. Dir, Hawiye, Digil & Mirifle etc are confederate clans. Most clans in Somalia are social constructs for strengthening them numerically for common protection. Somali Clan confederates are lately used for securing political edge in power-sharing rivalry.
Still others shamelessly propagate that Somalia’s Federalism was derived or adopted from ethnic Ethiopian federalism. Knowing historical facts about national efforts of re-instating Somali State after its failure in January 1991, and having participated in most national reconciliation process, Ethiopian involvement in the drafting of Somalia’s governance holds no water. It is a fallacy. It is just another anti-federalist tactics to unravel the modest gains of the Federal System and discredit its supporters. Unfortunately, many gullible Somali citizens bought this dangerous falsehood.
I am afraid the struggle between pros and cons of federalism will go on until one side wins the game. Keep fighting.
Now that Puntland Technical Committee for Federal Negotiations (TCFN) is back in Garowe, there are a few events that have made an impact on our assessment of the journey to Bosaso and will be reflected on our experience.
1. An event of Bosaso Development Vision 2030 held by Puntland Presidency on March 6 2023 about non-involvement of Puntland Government in the aggressive war waged by Somaliland against civilian population of Laascaanood. That was a major political statement by President Said Abullahi Deni on Somaliland Administration’s violence in Sool Region.
2. Guided tour of Bosaso Seaport under expansion – an important construction project underway that would make a big difference in Puntland infrastructure capacity and economic expansion.
3. A meeting TCFN held with Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni at his Residence in Bosaso in which important topics related to both Puntland State and Federal Affairs were deliberated and a meeting of minds were attained.
4. A meeting of TCFN and some cabinet members of Puntland Government to exchange views on current issues of Somalia’s political landscape and state of affairs were conducted and brainstormed. Consensus of views on existing political realities in Somalia emerged in this important get-together with Puntland key cabinet members.
Stay tuned for further deliberations from Puntland Technical Committee for Federal Negotiations (TCFN).
The Technical Committee For Federal Negotiations has had an important and constructive meeting with President Said Abdullahi Deni and his team of key ministers last night at his Residence in the Puntland Red Sea Port City of Bosaso. Great ideas on moving the State forward has been explored. It was focused deliberation of issues and Puntland immense potential for development, a politically mature and candid debate ensued in the discussion. A review of TCFN operational performance and potential contribution to state-building and Somalia’s governance in general were among the topics covered. President Deni was shining in his open tackling with the issues of Puntland State and Federal Government.
Earlier in the day, TCFN with the Minister of Finance had toured Bosaso Port and saw first hand commendable Port expansion in progress. It is huge understanding and already the construction company had made noticeable portions of the project. TCFN found satisfaction in talking to the project managers and site engineers. Real work is underway here for all to see.
My understanding was that President Deni did not sign document/s that were contrary to article 54 (the 4 powers) of the Federal Provisional Constitution or Article 4 of the PL Constitution. If any, documents signed by Deni and the administration before him are ad-hoc agreements allowing the process of governing the country to continue while completing the Provisional Federal Constitution. And that is/ was the wrong thing to do or to go about.
The Federal Government has been utilising its own centralist policies by grabbing and assuming State powers, particularly during HSM and Farmaajo’s period. Both men disregarded Articles 54 and 142 of the Federal Provisional Constitution. Article 54 limits the Federal powers to 4 only. While Article 142 allows the FMS, existing before the establishment of the Federal Provisional Constitution, to adhere and use thier own existing constitutions as well. That means the Federal Provisional Constitution recognises powers within the FMS of Puntland and Gulmudug. These two States had transferred these 4 powers while retaining the rest of their state powers. Remember, in June 2012, there were two FMS only, namely Puntland and Gulmudug.
As I have mentioned above mistakes were made by Deni and Gaas. They signed documents that are contrary to Puntland’s Constitution and Federal Provisional Constitution. At least they should’ve legal expertise and advisers, particularly during the discussion drafting agreements or finalising the document. Nevertheless, their failure doesn’t make the signed documents legal.
For Gaas, one very important document concerns natural resources, particularly fishing, oil and gas sectors. These two agreements were not submitted to the Puntland Parliament for ratification. In addition, oil and gas documents have articles stating co-operation and co-governance on the sectors. In other words, the laws would be drafted jointly. Under these articles the sectors would be managed and governed jointly by FMS and the Federal Governments. Neither the States nor the Federal Government have sole power over these sectors. But Farmaajo Administration drafted Petroleum Law without the consent and the support of the PL Government. In fact, PL Government made it very clear the illegality of the process and its final product, the Petroleum Law.
Thus, both agreements undermine Articles 54 and 4 of PL’s Constitution, the Article 54 of the Federal Provisional Constitution and the Oil and Gas Sector Management Agreement.
Hassan Sheekh Maxamud doesn’t care about the Somalia’s Provisional Constitution nor what Puntland thinks. He wants to govern the country the way he wants. It is his way or the highway for PL. That is why people like me have called for confederal political system for Somalia.
Deni needs to talk about this regularly and continuously. Politics is about expressing your views with certainty and determination.
At United Nations Security Council. Latest Report by UNSG
“The recent agreement on the delineation of powers between the Federal Government and federal member states, albeit at this time without the support of Puntland, is encouraging progress. I urge leaders to continue inclusive discussions towards reaching a political agreement on power-sharing and other outstanding issues of federalism, within the context of the constitutional review process. It is vital that National Consultative Council discussions and the constitutional review process be informed by broad public consultations, in order to reflect the views of all stakeholders, including women, young people and marginalized groups. I am concerned by the recent announcement made by Puntland that it would limit cooperation with the Federal Government, and I call on the leaders of Somalia to resolve disputes through dialogue and compromise.”
Subsequently, on 9 January 2023, Puntland issued a statement asserting its constitutional right to act as an independent government until the Federal Constitution was finalized, while reiterating its role in building the federal system of Somalia. Puntland further outlined its readiness to negotiate separately with the Federal Government towards reaching agreements on the completion of the constitution, security matters and power-sharing, among other matters. On 14 January, Puntland appointed a 22-member technical committee to engage with the Federal Government in this regard”.
According to a research paper issued by Constitutional INSIGHTS published by Melbourne Forum in 2018 on constitutional issues, the world has multiple countries having various constitutional arrangements for different parts of their respective jurisdictions. There are many factors cited for reasons behind devising asymmetrical constitutional arrangements such as culture, religion, geography, wealth, historical grievances etc. Canada has asymmetrical federal arrangement with its French speaking Province of Quebec, allowing it to keep its Napoleon Civil Law, and for Native Territories within Provinces. Puntland, Somaliland and BanadirRegion could qualify for asymmetrical arrangement to be enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia.
But, what is asymmetrical constitutional arrangement? This is how it has been depicted by Constitutional INSIGHTS.
Asymmetric Territorial Arrangements in Decentralized Systems
Introduction This issue of Constitutional INSIGHTS deals with the questions presented by constitutional or legal arrangements that treat one region of a state differently from others. Differential treatment of this kind is sometimes described as ‘asymmetry’. It can be a useful tool in constitutional design. It may be particularly important in constitution building after conflict. For obvious reasons, however, it also may create envy or resentment on the part of other regions. Accommodating asymmetry in an existing constitution may, in some contexts, present other challenges as well. Asymmetry is a feature of constitutional arrangements in all parts of the world. This issue of Constitutional INSIGHTS explores when, how and with what consequences it has been used in Asia and the Pacific. Practice in the region is integral to an understanding of global constitutional experience. The use of asymmetry in Asia and the Pacific offers insights for constitution building in states and regions elsewhere. Examples of asymmetry on which this issue of Constitutional INSIGHTS draws include: Jammu and Kashmir in India; Aceh in Indonesia; the Bangsamoro region in the Philippines; the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea (PNG); Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia; and the Oecusse in Timor-Leste. As these examples show, asymmetry can be used in a range of different systems: federations, devolved systems of government and more centralized unitary states. States in the region in which asymmetry could be a useful tool in the future include Myanmar and Sri Lanka. This issue of Constitutional INSIGHTS addresses four key questions:
What does asymmetry involve?
In what circumstances is it useful?
What legal framework is needed for asymmetry?
What issues arise in the course of implementing asymmetry? Read more here by downloading the file below:
We don’t know where everybody of you is on earth, and that is relevant point if you want to gauge the real perspectives of persons in the debate. From our perspectives as persons on the ground in Somalia, federal system is already a reality in the country. Yes, public institutions in both the Centre and most FMS are either non-existent or still rumentary. In the past only Puntland State was advocating for it, but now most FMS wouldn’t accept the return to One City-state Rule from the Centre. True, most FMS depend on the hand-outs from the Centre via international donor community. That is why the Centre has much sway in their respective internal affairs and security as they experience Alshabab onslaught, humanitarian crisis, non-existent infrastructure and a lot more problems. This is where Puntland is far better off and can stand up to unduly influence from the Centre. But, they all feel sense of pride for having made it. Another benefit they got from setting up a regional state is their newly acquired abilities to mitigate clan warfare as all clans feel belonging to a common state. Federalism in Somalia is now stronger than it was when Puntland alone was fighting for it. Puntland leadership may have political differences with the Central and some FMS leaders, but that doesn’t mean that they have abandoned the concept in practice. It is important to understand the situation on the ground.
Also note that the federal system with its different forms is a complex democratic governance with overlaying public institutions. Because most Somali clans are confederal by nature rather than blood lineages (Hawiye, Isaaq, Dir, Raxanweyn etc), federalism would have come easy and suitable to them. But the problem was its implementation because most leaders so elected before were undermining the system. They couldn’t grow out of the old central mentality they had experienced before. The question is, who would then make federalism work in Somalia? It is extremely important to be aware of this fact.
Advocates of a strong Somali Government argue that federalism weakens the Somali central administration, and the system Somalis agreed upon, following a vicious civil conflict in the country, is not working for Somalia and bound to fail. The proponents of this argument just shy away from declaring their intentions of directly promoting a unitary government, repeating the notion of installing the same mal-administration and tyranny that led to state failure as a result of city-state repression and violation of basic human rights. Many don’t acknowledge the fact that Somalia is still a federal state by name only, and even that is de facto rather than de jure as citizens fled to seek safe havens in their original places of ancestry, following the Civil War. They also seem not to be aware of the fact that leaders of the Central Government, who were elected on the platform of the Federal Constitution, paradoxically were undermining the very system they are elected to protect and uphold. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud 1 & 2, and Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo were undeniably committed to doing away with Somalia’s fragile federalism. However, by attempting to unravel the system, they did more harm to the people’s trust in public institutions. Any argument for and against decentralization of Somalia’s governance which do not take into account the fact that federalism doesn’t take care by itself without concerted national efforts and intellectual power behind it, doesn’t deserve recognition in this debate.
Many Southern Somalia think tanks, media houses and prominent personalities are leading relentless campaigns to promote a centralist approach to Somali governance. At the forefront of these efforts are Mogadishu-based Heritage Institute for Policy Studies and Hiiraan Online, just to mention a few. Another major impediment to federalism is a secessionist attempt in Northwest Regions of Somalia, with many now promoting the idea that the Provisional Federal Constitution can’t be completed without Somaliland joining in. Others use these fresh political trends as excuses to prolong the status quo and freeze the democratic aspirations of the Somali people. Secessionists in Northern Somalia are now resorting to military violence against resisting residents in Sool Region as they see diminishing returns for their unilateral attempt to break up Somalia.
The Provisional Federal Constitution of Somalia adopted a democratic system of government with checks and balance of power between three branches of government. Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has three levels of governance: 1. Shared level (dawladda dhexe) 2. A Federal Member State (Dawladd-Gobolleed) or FMS. 3. Local District Council (Gole deegaan). Like any other similar federal system, the first two levels have their own separate constitutions and three branches of government. Sovereignity remains with the Central Government of the Somali Republic. The system is still evolving and needs further work in harmonizing the constitutions. Formation of FMS must satisfy the requirement of unification of two regions or more to be constitutionally legitimate. A FMS has powers expanding into regions and districts within the state.
Contrary to the behavior of the Somalia’s current President, the Executive Powers of the Government rest on the Cabinet and powers of the President and Prime Minister are clearly spelled out in the Federal Constitution. The President appoints the Prime Minister, but he cannot fire him. Only the Parliament has power to fire both the President and Prime Minister.
In summary, Somali Federal Constitution is similar to that of USA. The President of a FMS is the same as the Governor of a US state, who is elected to a fixed term in Office. Similarly, in Somalia the Federal Authorities cannot fire or appoint a FMS President, in the same way US President cannot do. Political agreements between FGS and FMS are by consensus similar to the case of Canadian Federalism. In many ways, Federal Constitution has similarities with that of UK and Northern Ireland system of government with strong devolution of power to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Economic resources and fiscal responsibilities are shared by special arrangements, agreements between Central Government and Federal Member States by consensus. Unlike ethnic federalism of Ethiopia, the central authorities in Somalia have no much sway in internal affairs of FMS.
Finally, Somali Federal Constitution came about as a de facto (not de jure), following the civil war and the re-instatement of Central Somali Government accepted that reality on the ground into the Federal Constitution. It was the only way to try to restore lost trust between warring clans.
Still, some portions of Somali people believe that a form of federalism called “Confederalism” is the best option. They say Somali clans by nature are confederal entities like Darood, Hawiye, Dir etc. What suits them most is the confederalism of Swiss type, where Cantons has most powers and an elected Prime Minister (Cabinet) has the Executive Powers of the Government, while the Presidency is a rotating ceremonial role between Cantons.
Ongoing controversy on the Somali Constitution, if not resolved soon, may lead to the breakup of Somalia. It is a dangerous crossroad for Somalia’s survival as a state. Warning. Let us act now.
Yesterday it was Jubaland Administration to confront and withstand the tribal agenda of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM). Today it is Puntland Federal member to stop him carrying out Mogadishu power grab, proving to all that his political slogan “Somalia in peace within itself and with the rest of the world” was an empty phrase and deception designed to buy time before he unleashes his despotic and destructive demons against peaceful development of Somalia, its institution-building and collective approaches to Somalia’s governance. HSM’s confrontational style of governance is unraveling the hard-won gains of Somalia’s devolution of power. Already he dismantled the Executive Powers of the Cabinet and turned the Parliament into either disabled or rubber-stamp to have any say in important national affairs, while in the process he has been exercising maximum levels of nepotism, cronyism and marginalization. To know more, please read this recent article below:
Yesterday it was Jubaland Administration to confront and withstand the tribal agenda of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM). Today it is Puntland Federal member to stop him carrying out Mogadishu power grab, proving to all that his political slogan “Somalia in peace within itself and with the rest of the world” was an empty phrase and deception designed to buy time before he unleashes his despotic and destructive demons against peaceful development of Somalia, its institution-building and collective approaches to Somalia’s governance. HSM’s confrontational style of governance is unraveling the hard-won gains of Somalia’s devolution of power. Already he dismantled the Executive Powers of the Cabinet and turned the Parliament into either disabled or rubber-stamp to have any say in important national affairs, while in the process he has been exercising maximum levels of nepotism, cronyism and marginalization. To know more, please read this recent article below:
It feels nostalgic to older men and women remembering good old days, and it causes a feeling of reverence and respect from younger generations to think about the noble deeds of older men, who are often regarded as heroes, founders and pioneers. There are numerous dead men and women that permanently command respect and gratitude. I, sometimes, stop to think why?
I think the reason they were what they were is, among other things, that they had better human values than we do today. For sure, they were hard working as life was tougher then. They earned every penny through the hard way. They were innovators and knew how to compromise in solving problems and make life better for everyone. They were also brutal in pursuit of their dreams for success, including exploitation of man. They are remembered for their exploits on earth, including enslaving others. They were good men as well as evil human being. But, they stand out from the crowd of their time. They made history and left their footprints on earth. Evil or good, they are role models for different crowds of people in every nation. They still live within each of us. They are still shaping up our world -they are still in-charge.
Here in Somalia, boys are constantly reminded that they will never catch up with the characters and qualities of their forefathers. We reluctantly accept this popular notion of underestimating today’s younger generations. But today’s life challenges are different in nature from those of older generations. Today’s world is global, interconnected and interdependent, demanding collective approaches to solving common problems of diseases, ignorance and poverty. COVID-19 is the shining example that an outbreak of virus in Wuhan, China, is life-threatening danger in New York City, USA. Life is, somehow, easier living today than the time of our forefathers. Still, we are obsessed and seized by their spirit, and sometimes, haunted by their ghosts.
WHY SOMALILAND FORCEFUL OCCUPATION OF LAASCAANOOD IS NOT IN ITS BEST INTEREST
The main reason Somaliland Administration stays in Sool Region is its pursuit of unilateral secession from Somalia. That attempt has now hit the rocks, and it is unlikely that will ever happen as long as people of Somalia don’t allow it. Now the meager economy of Somaliland cannot sustain prolonged forceful occupation of Sool Region with its residents struggling for peace and freedom for the long haul. firstly, the ongoing uprising in Laaska (Laascaanood) has clearly demonstrated to Somalis, and the world at large, that Somaliland is an occupying entity against the will of the residents there.
Secondly, by suppressing the uprising in Laascaanood, Somaliland has irreversibly lost its territorial claim to Sool Region based on lame excuse of long-gone British Protectorate colonial border. After all, this is Dhulbahante/Harti land. No one within the international community would entertain Somaliland quest for secession after what has happened in Laascaanood recently, unless the world is suddenly ready to recognize every tribe or clan in Africa to form own sovereign state.
Thirdly, repression against residents of Laascaanood will entail gross human rights violations for which the leaders of Somaliland Regime will be held accountable in a court of law inside, and possibly, outside Somalia.
Somaliland is, therefore, better advised to vacate Sool Region peacefully in an exercise for damage control for crimes against humanity in abusing unarmed population.
BINDING AGREEMENT BETWEEN TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE SOMALI REPUBLIC AND PUNTLAND STATE OF SOMALIA ON RESOURCES AND POWER-SHARING, INSTITUTIONAL AND CAPACITY- BUILDING
This Agreement is as valid and binding between parties today as it was in 2007. Puntland State entered into this Agreement with the Federal Government, on behalf of then existing and future FMS. There is no legal venue for FGS today to ignore this solemn undertaking. Puntland State and every FMS has the legal right to demand for implementation of this official document.
Fake news flies faster than not only supersonic speed, but it also has more staying powers than the truth. Only yesterday at least two grown-up college graduates I knew well bought the fake news that Puntland State was planning to seceed from rest of Somalia, and that it was issuing its own passport.
As alarming as that may sound, I also had a chance to strike a conversation with 25-year old girl from Buhoodle. She not only seemed to know little to nothing about Puntland history, but surprisingly she has a well rehearsed version of Dr Ali Khalif Galaydh’s sinophobic notion about Puntland and Majeertaine. She also didn’t know that Khatumo was a failed administration whose leaders had finally sold their souls to the Hargeisa Administration. I, as well, know that most Dhulbahante men and women think that Khatumo and Dhulbahante are synonymous, despite the fact that many “Dholos” were opposed to the idea of “Khatumo”.
Cayn Region or Buhoodle isn’t equal to a half of Togdheer Region. Puntland State designated Buhoodle as “Region” because the “Village” of Buhoodle” doesn’t sound well to the “Establishment”. The “SSC” (Sool, Sanaag, Cayn) do not tell the whole truth. Here Sool Region, a part of Nugaal Valley, is correct. But the inclusion of Sanaag Region here is controversial at least, as Warsengeli of Erigavo area is either excluded or inserted here without their consent.
Dhulbahante, therefore, is advised to discontinue the use of the words “Khatumo and SSC” for their struggle against Somaliland occupation. You don’t run the names of failed rebel groups over and over again to achieve better or different results. Continued use of these names could further divide Dhulbahante along sub-clan lines and settling of old scores within “Khatumo and SSC” malpractice.
Farmaajo wanted to destroy Federalism by puting puppet regional governors in FMS and conduct sham direct elections to install himself into a dictatorship once again in Somali politics. He didn’t learn from the Civil War. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud wants to use Somalia’s Federalism cleaverly as a weapon to disable it through the so-called “Madasha Qaranka” (National Consultative Forum) composed of the leaders of Federal Government, FMS and, paradoxically, the Governor of Banadir Region. Madasha is an unconstitutional entity whose relevance doesn’t go beyond consultations (it has no legal authority whatsoever in all Federal and State Constitutions). Recent Mogadishu Session of the “Madasha” in which HSM had attempted to weaponize the powers of the FMS against themselves to disable regional judiciary is still fresh in our minds. Only Puntland President, Said Abdullahi Deni, refused to succumb to HSM’s political shenanigans. Nothing will come out of HSM’s sinnister plans to undermine Federalism.
For your information, there is an existing Agreement between FGS and FMS signed in 2007 by the leaders of the Transitional Federal Government, and Puntland State of Somalia, on behalf of existing and future FMS. This was signed by the leaders of TFG, President Abdullahi Yusuf, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Geedi, on behalf of the Federal Government, and President Mohamud Muse Hersi (Adde Muse) for Puntland.
This Agreement stipulated that the transfer of public institutions, state agencies and infrastructures that come under the jurisdictions of FGS in accordance with the Provisional Federal Constitution, shall wait until the FGS develops institutional capacities and legal framework, including completion of Federal Constitution.
These FMS institutions or agencies included paramilitary forces (Daraawiish), border entry points like airports and seaports, customs, among others. Workers of these agencies of FMS must be paid by the FGS, and until that happens, a FMS shall continue to pay the salaries of these state workers, on behalf of the FGS.
No transfer of tax revenues from a FMS to FGS shall occur until FGS shall assume full responsibilities for running these state agencies that may come under its jurisdictions based on fully agreed Federal Constitution.
This Agreement is valid today as it was in 2007, and the situation of the FGS remains exactly the same.
Until the requirements of this AGREEMENT are met, the Federal Government can’t demand for the transfer or acquisition of airports, seaports, customs from a FMS. Moreover, most FMS public institutions like education, Judiciary etc, are independent from the Federal Government, and unless special arrangements to be agreed upon are enacted, both Federal and state constitutions guarantee that separation of powers.
Warsame Policy & Media Network (WAPMEN) 
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