Pip: WAPMEN covers the kind of stories where …

Pip: WAPMEN covers the kind of stories where the phrase "unprecedented in modern history" appears and you realize, reading on, that they actually mean it.

Mara: This episode moves between two theaters of crisis — Somalia's collapsing constitutional order at every level of government, and the strategic fallout from the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran reshaping the Middle East. Let's start with what's happening inside Somalia.

Somalia's Constitutional and Social Breakdown

Pip: The question this segment is really asking is whether Somalia still has a functional political contract — or whether constitutional terms have become purely decorative across every level of government simultaneously.

Mara: The post frames the core problem starkly: "constitutional terms no longer matter. If leaders can remain in office indefinitely, why hold elections? If mandates can be extended through political manoeuvring, why draft constitutions?"

Pip: That's not a rhetorical flourish — it describes a real cascade. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud at the federal level, Said Abdullahi Deni in Puntland, Qoor Qoor in Galmudug, Ali Guudlaawe in Hirshabelle — the mandate disputes run the full vertical stack of Somali governance.

Mara: The companion piece, "Somalia: The Fall of a Society," widens the diagnosis beyond institutions. It argues Somalia faces a crisis of national purpose — that every political actor claims righteousness while none offers a national project capable of reversing decline. The verdict, as it puts it, is not encouraging.

Pip: And the Somaliland-Jerusalem diplomatic engagement gets named as a separate dimension — unprecedented territory for any self-governing Muslim political entity, the post argues, with consequences history will record regardless of how one reads the diplomacy.

Mara: The regional fallout from that kind of fragmentation connects directly to what's happening in the broader Middle East.

U.S.–Iran Conflict and Regional War

Pip: The central question here is whether the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran actually achieved its strategic objectives — or whether it inadvertently validated the very adversary it was meant to neutralize.

Mara: The post's answer is direct: "Deterrence is not about defeating an enemy outright; it is about making aggression costly. By that measure, Iran has already achieved a strategic success."

Pip: So the upshot is that Iran didn't need to win militarily — it needed to survive visibly, and it did. That survival carries its own geopolitical weight.

Mara: The post maps several concrete consequences. The Strait of Hormuz becomes a more potent geopolitical weapon — nearly one-fifth of global oil shipments pass through it. The petrodollar system faces growing pressure as confrontations push oil producers toward non-dollar trade arrangements. Arab monarchies look strategically exposed despite extraordinary wealth.

Pip: And American military bases across Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar — the post calls them "strategic liabilities rather than instruments of uncontested dominance." Every installation is a target now.

Mara: The second piece, "Why Any U.S.-Iran Deal May Only Postpone the Inevitable," extends the argument into diplomacy. It argues that if Washington presents a deal as stability while Iran reads it as proof that decades of sanctions and military pressure failed, the two sides are not actually making peace — they are pausing a structural conflict.

Pip: A deal where one side celebrates survival and the other quietly absorbs a historic loss is not exactly a durable foundation.

Mara: The piece puts it plainly: "when rivals believe that compromise equals surrender, peace becomes temporary, while conflict becomes permanent." The broader transition toward a multipolar order is the frame — the war accelerated it, and no negotiation reverses that direction.


Pip: Both theaters — Somalia's constitutional erosion and the Middle East's shifting order — come down to the same underlying question: what happens when the rules that were supposed to hold things together stop being enforced.

Mara: Next episode, we'll see whether any of the actors involved have started answering that question differently.

Review of “Covert Action in Irregular Wars: Unraveling the Case of Timber Sycamore in Syria (2012–2017)” by Jonathan Hackett

Introduction
Jonathan Hackett’s article, published in Small Wars Journal, offers a critical examination of the CIA’s Timber Sycamore operation, a covert program aimed at overthrowing Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime through support for rebel forces. Drawing on declassified documents, government records, and interviews, Hackett—a former Marine Corps interrogator and special operations specialist—argues that Timber Sycamore’s failures underscore systemic issues in U.S. covert operations, including oversight gaps, inadequate vetting, and accountability lapses. The article serves as a cautionary tale about the risks of blending Title 50 (covert) and Title 10 (military) authorities in irregular warfare.

Summary
Hackett traces Timber Sycamore’s origins to the Arab Spring, detailing how the CIA and SOCOM collaborated to train and equip Syrian rebels under competing objectives: regime change (CIA) and countering ISIS (SOCOM). The operation, funded by Congress and Gulf states, faced immediate challenges:

  • Weapons Diversion: Bulgarian and Romanian arms intended for “moderate” rebels were funneled to ISIS and Salafi-jihadist groups via black-market networks, including Jordanian intelligence intermediaries.
  • Vetting Failures: Trainees with ties to extremist ideologies, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra), infiltrated the program.
  • Bureaucratic Friction: Parallel State Department efforts and SOCOM’s costly Syria Train and Equip Program (STEP) created redundancies, with STEP spending $500 million to field fewer than five combat-ready fighters.

The operation’s nadir came with Russia’s 2015 intervention, which shifted U.S. focus to counter-ISIS efforts. Timber Sycamore’s legacy was further tarnished by human rights abuses by U.S.-trained forces and the ironic 2024 rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa (a former ISIS-linked figure) to power after Assad’s ouster—a outcome Hackett frames as a pyrrhic victory.

Analysis
Strengths:

  1. Primary Source Rigor: Hackett leverages FOIA disclosures, weapon lot numbers, and congressional records to substantiate claims of diversion and mismanagement. His military background lends credibility to critiques of interagency coordination.
  2. Legal Nuance: The article clarifies the blurred lines between Title 50 and Title 10 authorities, particularly “sheep dipping” (military personnel under CIA direction), and highlights exemptions from Leahy vetting laws that enabled human rights abuses.
  3. Historical Context: Comparisons to past failures (e.g., Phoenix Program, Iran-Contra) contextualize Timber Sycamore within recurring patterns of covert action overreach.

Weaknesses:

  1. Geopolitical Simplification: While Hackett notes Russian and Iranian support for Assad, he underplays their role in thwarting U.S. objectives. A deeper analysis of external actors could enrich the failure narrative.
  2. Bias Potential: The author’s special operations background may skew perspectives on CIA-SOCOM tensions, though he acknowledges both agencies’ missteps.
  3. Outcome Dichotomy: The article frames al-Sharaa’s rise as purely negative, yet briefly notes U.S. engagement with his regime. This paradox warrants further exploration: does pragmatism sometimes override ideological concerns in foreign policy?

Conclusion
Hackett’s article is a timely contribution to debates on U.S. covert operations, emphasizing the perils of lax oversight and short-termism. While dense, its empirical rigor and actionable insights—such as calls for stricter vetting and interagency transparency—make it essential reading for policymakers. However, the analysis would benefit from addressing how global power competition (e.g., U.S.-Russia tensions) shapes covert action efficacy. Ultimately, Timber Sycamore’s legacy—a fractured Syria under jihadist leadership—stands as a stark warning: without accountability, even well-resourced covert campaigns risk backfiring catastrophically.

Rating: ★★★★☆ (4/5)
A compelling, well-sourced case study that balances detail with broader lessons, though slightly constrained by its U.S.-centric lens.

UNDERSTAND WHY THE ARABS ARE NOW CONDEMNING KING ABDALLAH OF JORDAN

Some Arab political pundits have criticized King Abdullah II of Jordan for meeting with President Donald Trump and endorsing his policy proposal on Gaza and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict for several reasons. These criticisms often stem from political, ideological, and regional perspectives, as well as concerns about the implications of Trump’s policies for the Palestinian cause and Arab unity. Below are the key reasons for such condemnation:


1. Perceived Alignment with U.S. Policies Unfavorable to Palestinians

  • Trump’s Pro-Israel Stance: President Trump’s administration was widely seen as heavily biased in favor of Israel, exemplified by decisions such as recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, and endorsing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. These actions were viewed as undermining Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem and the two-state solution.
  • The “Deal of the Century”: Trump’s Middle East peace plan, often referred to as the “Deal of the Century,” was criticized for favoring Israeli interests at the expense of Palestinian rights. Many Arab pundits saw King Abdullah’s engagement with Trump as tacit approval of a plan that they believe marginalizes Palestinian aspirations for statehood and self-determination.

2. Erosion of Jordan’s Historical Role as a Defender of Palestinian Rights

  • Jordan’s Unique Position: Jordan has historically positioned itself as a key advocate for Palestinian rights, partly due to its large Palestinian population and its custodianship of Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. Critics argue that meeting with Trump and appearing to support his policies undermines Jordan’s moral and political standing as a defender of the Palestinian cause.
  • Perceived Betrayal: Some pundits view King Abdullah’s engagement with Trump as a betrayal of Jordan’s historical commitment to the Palestinian struggle, particularly at a time when the Palestinian leadership rejected Trump’s proposals outright.

3. Regional and Domestic Political Pressures

  • Arab Public Opinion: Across the Arab world, there is widespread sympathy for the Palestinian cause, and Trump’s policies are deeply unpopular. By meeting with Trump, King Abdullah risks alienating not only Palestinians but also broader Arab public opinion, which sees the U.S. approach as unjust and one-sided.
  • Domestic Concerns: Jordan has a significant Palestinian population, and any perceived shift away from supporting Palestinian rights could provoke domestic unrest or criticism from political factions within Jordan.

4. Concerns About Normalization with Israel

  • Normalization of Israeli Occupation: Trump’s policies, particularly those related to Gaza and the West Bank, are seen as attempts to normalize Israeli occupation and annexation of Palestinian territories. Critics argue that King Abdullah’s engagement with Trump could be interpreted as endorsing this normalization, which contradicts the Arab consensus on the need for a just and comprehensive solution to the conflict.
  • Impact on Arab Unity: Some pundits fear that Jordan’s actions could encourage other Arab states to follow suit, further fragmenting the Arab position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and weakening collective bargaining power.

5. Lack of Palestinian Inclusion in the Process

  • Marginalization of Palestinian Voices: Trump’s policies were crafted without meaningful consultation with Palestinian leaders, leading to accusations that the U.S. was imposing a solution rather than facilitating a negotiated settlement. Critics argue that King Abdullah’s engagement with Trump legitimizes a process that excludes and disempowers Palestinians.
  • Undermining the Palestinian Authority: By engaging with Trump, King Abdullah risks undermining the Palestinian Authority’s position and weakening its ability to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people.

6. Geopolitical Implications for Jordan

  • Balancing Act: Jordan walks a fine line between maintaining its strategic relationship with the U.S. and upholding its commitment to the Palestinian cause. Critics argue that King Abdullah’s meeting with Trump prioritizes U.S. ties over regional solidarity, potentially isolating Jordan within the Arab world.
  • Regional Rivalries: Some pundits suggest that Jordan’s actions could be seen as aligning with U.S. and Israeli interests at the expense of broader Arab and Islamic solidarity, particularly in the context of regional rivalries involving countries like Iran and Turkey.

Conclusion

The condemnation of King Abdullah II by some Arab political pundits reflects broader concerns about the direction of U.S. policy under President Trump and its implications for the Palestinian cause. Critics view Jordan’s engagement with Trump as undermining its historical role as a defender of Palestinian rights, legitimizing a one-sided peace process, and risking regional and domestic backlash. While Jordan may have sought to balance its strategic interests with its commitment to the Palestinian cause, the perception of alignment with unpopular U.S. policies has fueled criticism and skepticism among Arab commentators.

Ultimately, the controversy highlights the complex geopolitical dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the challenges faced by Arab leaders in navigating competing pressures from domestic, regional, and international actors.