Tag: isis

Review of “Covert Action in Irregular Wars: Unraveling the Case of Timber Sycamore in Syria (2012–2017)” by Jonathan Hackett

Introduction
Jonathan Hackett’s article, published in Small Wars Journal, offers a critical examination of the CIA’s Timber Sycamore operation, a covert program aimed at overthrowing Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime through support for rebel forces. Drawing on declassified documents, government records, and interviews, Hackett—a former Marine Corps interrogator and special operations specialist—argues that Timber Sycamore’s failures underscore systemic issues in U.S. covert operations, including oversight gaps, inadequate vetting, and accountability lapses. The article serves as a cautionary tale about the risks of blending Title 50 (covert) and Title 10 (military) authorities in irregular warfare.

Summary
Hackett traces Timber Sycamore’s origins to the Arab Spring, detailing how the CIA and SOCOM collaborated to train and equip Syrian rebels under competing objectives: regime change (CIA) and countering ISIS (SOCOM). The operation, funded by Congress and Gulf states, faced immediate challenges:

  • Weapons Diversion: Bulgarian and Romanian arms intended for “moderate” rebels were funneled to ISIS and Salafi-jihadist groups via black-market networks, including Jordanian intelligence intermediaries.
  • Vetting Failures: Trainees with ties to extremist ideologies, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra), infiltrated the program.
  • Bureaucratic Friction: Parallel State Department efforts and SOCOM’s costly Syria Train and Equip Program (STEP) created redundancies, with STEP spending $500 million to field fewer than five combat-ready fighters.

The operation’s nadir came with Russia’s 2015 intervention, which shifted U.S. focus to counter-ISIS efforts. Timber Sycamore’s legacy was further tarnished by human rights abuses by U.S.-trained forces and the ironic 2024 rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa (a former ISIS-linked figure) to power after Assad’s ouster—a outcome Hackett frames as a pyrrhic victory.

Analysis
Strengths:

  1. Primary Source Rigor: Hackett leverages FOIA disclosures, weapon lot numbers, and congressional records to substantiate claims of diversion and mismanagement. His military background lends credibility to critiques of interagency coordination.
  2. Legal Nuance: The article clarifies the blurred lines between Title 50 and Title 10 authorities, particularly “sheep dipping” (military personnel under CIA direction), and highlights exemptions from Leahy vetting laws that enabled human rights abuses.
  3. Historical Context: Comparisons to past failures (e.g., Phoenix Program, Iran-Contra) contextualize Timber Sycamore within recurring patterns of covert action overreach.

Weaknesses:

  1. Geopolitical Simplification: While Hackett notes Russian and Iranian support for Assad, he underplays their role in thwarting U.S. objectives. A deeper analysis of external actors could enrich the failure narrative.
  2. Bias Potential: The author’s special operations background may skew perspectives on CIA-SOCOM tensions, though he acknowledges both agencies’ missteps.
  3. Outcome Dichotomy: The article frames al-Sharaa’s rise as purely negative, yet briefly notes U.S. engagement with his regime. This paradox warrants further exploration: does pragmatism sometimes override ideological concerns in foreign policy?

Conclusion
Hackett’s article is a timely contribution to debates on U.S. covert operations, emphasizing the perils of lax oversight and short-termism. While dense, its empirical rigor and actionable insights—such as calls for stricter vetting and interagency transparency—make it essential reading for policymakers. However, the analysis would benefit from addressing how global power competition (e.g., U.S.-Russia tensions) shapes covert action efficacy. Ultimately, Timber Sycamore’s legacy—a fractured Syria under jihadist leadership—stands as a stark warning: without accountability, even well-resourced covert campaigns risk backfiring catastrophically.

Rating: ★★★★☆ (4/5)
A compelling, well-sourced case study that balances detail with broader lessons, though slightly constrained by its U.S.-centric lens.

THE WAR AGAINST ISIS IS NOT OVER YET

The completion of Puntland’s military operation against ISIS in the Cal-Miskaat mountains marks a critical juncture. To consolidate gains, prevent resurgence, and bring remaining leaders like Abdulkadir Mumin to justice, Puntland should adopt the following best practices, informed by counterterrorism strategies globally and regionally:

1. Secure Cleared Territories

  • Maintain a security footprint: Deploy forces to hold recaptured areas (bases, caves, villages) to deter ISIS reinfiltration. Establish checkpoints, patrols, and mobile units to monitor movement.
  • Leverage technology: Use drones, satellite imagery, and motion sensors to surveil remote mountain areas and coastal zones, where fleeing fighters might regroup.
  • Block escape routes: Coordinate with neighboring regions (e.g., Somaliland, Galmudug) and international partners (e.g., EU Naval Force, US AFRICOM) to enforce land, air, and maritime blockades.

2. Intelligence-Driven Manhunt for Leaders

  • Human intelligence (HUMINT): Engage local communities to gather tips on ISIS leaders’ whereabouts. Offer protected anonymity and incentives (e.g., rewards) for credible information.
  • Electronic surveillance: Monitor communication networks (e.g., phones, radios) used by ISIS remnants. Collaborate with international agencies (e.g., INTERPOL, CIA) to track financial flows or encrypted messaging.
  • Targeted raids: Use specialized units (e.g., PDF commandos) for precision strikes based on actionable intelligence to avoid civilian casualties.

3. Community Engagement and Reconciliation

  • Address grievances: Partner with clans, elders, and religious leaders to resolve local disputes (e.g., resource access, land rights) that ISIS exploited for recruitment.
  • Humanitarian aid: Provide immediate relief (food, medicine, shelter) to displaced civilians to build trust and counter ISIS propaganda about government neglect.
  • Counter-radicalization programs: Launch deradicalization initiatives for former ISIS recruits and their families, focusing on education, vocational training, and psychosocial support.

4. Strengthen Governance and Development

  • Restore services: Rebuild infrastructure (schools, hospitals, water sources) in liberated areas to demonstrate tangible benefits of government control.
  • Economic opportunities: Create jobs for youth through public works programs (e.g., road construction, agriculture) to reduce vulnerability to extremist recruitment.
  • Local governance: Appoint credible administrators (preferably locals) to manage recaptured zones, ensuring fair representation and accountability.

5. Regional and International Cooperation

Cross-border collaboration: Share intelligence with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen to disrupt ISIS smuggling routes or safe havens.

International support: Seek funding and training from partners (e.g., UAE, UN) to build capacity in intelligence, logistics, and community policing.

6. Legal and Judicial Frameworks

  • Prosecute captured fighters: Establish transparent, fair trials for ISIS detainees to legitimize counterterrorism efforts and deter future recruitment. Use evidence from seized ISIS materials (documents, videos) to build cases.
  • Sanction facilitators: Work with the UN Security Council to impose travel bans and asset freezes on ISIS-linked individuals and businesses.

7. Counter-Ideological Campaigns

  • Religious outreach: Partner with moderate clerics to challenge ISIS’s extremist interpretations of Islam through mosque sermons, radio programs, and social media.
  • Media strategy: Publicize ISIS’s defeats (e.g., destroyed bases, surrendered fighters) to undermine its image as an invincible “caliphate.”

8. Continuous Assessment and Adaptation

  • Monitor threats: Establish early-warning systems to detect ISIS attempts to regroup, such as small-scale attacks or propaganda resurgence.
  • Evaluate operations: Conduct after-action reviews to identify gaps (e.g., leadership evasion, civilian harm) and adjust tactics.

Key Risks to Mitigate

  • Civilian harm: Avoid heavy-handed tactics that alienate communities. Train PDF forces in international humanitarian law (IHL).
  • Over-reliance on militarization: Pair security operations with governance and development to address root causes of extremism.
  • Leadership vacuums: If Mumin is killed or captured, anticipate ISIS attempts to appoint successors. Preemptively target mid-level commanders.

Conclusion

The “best practice” approach combines security, governance, and community trust to transform short-term military gains into lasting stability. Neutralizing leaders like Mumin requires patience, precision, and partnerships, but Puntland’s success will ultimately depend on its ability to offer civilians a credible alternative to extremism.

Comprehensive Analysis and Expansion of Puntland’s Counter-ISIS Strategy in the Cal-Miskat Mountains

By Jama Haji Warsame, Puntland State, Somalia

Introduction
Puntland’s battle against ISIS in the Cal-Miskat Mountain Range is a pivotal effort to stabilize Somalia and curb regional extremism. While the original reports outline a strategic framework, a deeper dive into specific challenges, stakeholder dynamics, and innovative solutions is essential for a robust policy response.

Short-Term Security Challenges: Context and Data

  1. Tactical Adaptations by ISIS:
    • ISIS has historically employed hit-and-run tactics in Somalia’s rugged terrain. For instance, in 2022, militants used similar strategies in the Golis Mountains, causing prolonged skirmishes. The use of IEDs has surged, with over 50 incidents reported in Puntland in 2023 alone, complicating troop movements and endangering civilians.
    • Humanitarian Impact: The UN estimates 30,000 civilians have been displaced since operations began, straining resources in cities like Bosaso. Organizations like the Somali Red Crescent are providing aid, but funding gaps exceed $15 million.
    • Financial Strain: Puntland’s annual security budget is 25 million dollars, yet counter−ISIS operations consume 4010 million dollars, the stabilization package, remains critical but insufficient.

Long-Term Consequences: Lessons from History

  • Security Vacuum: The 2017 withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from central Somalia led to Al-Shabab’s resurgence. Puntland must avoid this by pre-positioning trained local forces in liberated areas.
  • Economic Stagnation: The fishing and livestock sectors, contributing 60% of Puntland’s GDP, face disruption. Unemployment among youth (over 70%) heightens vulnerability to radicalization.
  • Regional Spillover: ISIS affiliates in Mozambique and the DRC demonstrate the group’s capacity to exploit governance gaps. Cross-border intelligence-sharing with Kenya and Ethiopia is vital.

Stakeholder Roles: Collaboration and Challenges

  • Local Leaders: In Somaliland, clan-led peace councils reduced intercommunal violence by 50% in 2020. Replicating this model could enhance trust in Puntland.
  • Federal Government Tensions: Puntland’s boycott of Somalia’s National Security Council in 2023 over resource-sharing disputes risks fragmenting counterterrorism efforts. Mediation by the AU or IGAD is critical.
  • International Partners: The U.S. AFRICOM provides drone surveillance and occasional airstrikes, while UAE trains PMPF troops. The UAE’s port investments in Bosaso could be further leveraged for more economic-security linkages.

Post-Conflict Engagement: Innovative Solutions

  1. Rehabilitation Programs:
    • Nigeria’s “Operation Safe Corridor” DE radicalized 2,000 Boko Haram fighters via psychosocial support. Puntland could partner with UNICEF to replicate this, focusing on vocational training in agriculture.
  2. Infrastructure Development:
    • Prioritize towns-Cal-Miskat road projects to enhance market access and security mobility. Mobile health clinics piloted in Galmudug, reduced maternal mortality by 30%, and could be expanded.
  3. Gender-Inclusive Strategies:
    • Include women in community policing, as seen in Kenya’s “Nyumba Kumi” initiative, which improved local intelligence by 40%.
  4. Environmental Considerations:
    • Mine-clearance efforts must integrate environmental NGOs to restore grazing lands. The HALO Trust’s work in Somaliland offers a blueprint.

The Way Forward: Integrated Strategies

  • Phased Governance Rollout: Within 6 months of liberation, mobile administration units (MAUs) could be deployed to provide basic services, building on lessons from the Somali Regional State in Ethiopia.
  • Economic Revitalization: Partner with the World Bank’s Somalia Urban Resilience Project to fund youth entrepreneurship in Bosaso, targeting sectors like renewable energy and digital services.
  • International Coordination: Establish a “Cal-Miskat Stabilization Coalition” with the AU, EU, and Gulf states, modeled on the Global Coalition Against Daesh, to pool resources and intelligence.

Conclusion
Puntland’s success hinges on transcending military action to embrace holistic governance, economic inclusivity, and regional cooperation. By integrating lessons from global counterinsurgency efforts and addressing gaps in gender and environmental policy, Puntland can transform Cal-Miskat into a beacon of resilience, deterring extremism through sustainable development. The international community must act decisively, recognizing that stability in Puntland is a linchpin for regional security.

PUNTLAND STATE HAS TWO OPTIONS LEFT TO REMAIN IN THE SOMALI UNION

The defense of territorial sovereignty against foreign or extremist threats is a matter of utmost gravity. For years, the Puntland State of Somalia has borne the brunt of countering violent extremist groups, including ISIS and Al-Shabab, in the northeastern regions of Somalia. Despite these efforts, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has yet to provide meaningful support to Puntland’s forces in this critical struggle. This absence of collaboration exacerbates longstanding grievances, including concerns over the FGS’s adherence to the Provisional Federal Constitution, perceived economic marginalization, and policies disproportionately affecting Puntland’s residents.

These tensions unfold against the backdrop of Puntland’s decades-long contributions to stabilizing Somalia and rebuilding governance structures after state collapse. Documented evidence underscores the human and material sacrifices made by Puntland’s people and institutions. Recent developments on the frontlines, however, highlight a troubling pattern of federal disengagement. Many in Puntland perceive the current administration’s failure to fulfill constitutional obligations as a dereliction of duty—a serious charge that merits scrutiny by Somalia’s legislative and judicial bodies.

The cumulative effect of these challenges has reignited debates about Puntland’s future within the Somali Federation, particularly following Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1991. While remaining in the union with Banadir remains a possibility, the lack of reciprocity in governance and security cooperation has led some to consider alternatives. Any decision will require careful analysis of constitutional, political, and socioeconomic implications to ensure stability for all Somali people. Here are possible options, feasibility and how to go about each one:

1. National Congress for Constitutional Reforms

Feasibility and Challenges:

  • Consensus-Building: A National Congress could foster dialogue, but success hinges on Mogadishu’s willingness to engage. Historical precedents (e.g., 2000 Arta Conference) show mixed results due to clan rivalries and centralization tendencies.
  • Legal Framework: The 2012 Provisional Constitution provides a basis for reform, but amendments require broad political buy-in, including from federal states and Mogadishu.
  • International Support: Mediation by regional bodies (AU, IGAD) or the UN could pressure stakeholders to participate. Civil society and traditional leaders might help legitimize the process.

Steps Forward:

  • Coalition-Building: Partner with other federal states (e.g., Jubaland, Galmudug) to form a united front demanding constitutional dialogue.
  • Preconditions: Secure guarantees for equitable representation and international oversight to ensure Mogadishu’s compliance.
  • Phased Approach: Prioritize urgent issues (resource-sharing, security cooperation) while deferring contentious topics (e.g., electoral models) to later stages.

2. Confederation Model

Feasibility and Challenges:

  • Autonomy vs. Unity: A confederation would grant Puntland greater sovereignty (e.g., independent security forces, fiscal control) while maintaining nominal Somali unity. However, Mogadishu is likely to resist ceding power.
  • Regional Dynamics: Neighboring states (Ethiopia, Kenya) might oppose a confederation if it destabilizes Somalia, though some could tacitly support it to counter Al-Shabab.
  • Constitutional Hurdles: Transitioning from federalism to confederalism requires redefining the social contract, potentially through a referendum or inter-state treaty.

Steps Forward:

  • Draft a Framework: Propose a confederal constitution outlining shared competencies (e.g., foreign policy, currency) and state-level powers (e.g., taxation, security).
  • Lobby Internationally: Highlight confederation as a stability measure to donors (EU, UAE) wary of state collapse. Emphasize parallels with decentralized models (e.g., UAE’s federalism).
  • Pilot Cooperation: Initiate cross-state projects (e.g., joint counterterrorism operations, trade agreements) to demonstrate confederal benefits.

3. Declaration of Independence

Feasibility and Challenges:

  • Legal and Diplomatic Barriers: Under international law, secession is rarely recognized without central government consent. Puntland would face an uphill battle for recognition, akin to Somaliland’s unresolved status.
  • Security Risks: Mogadishu could retaliate militarily, exacerbating conflict. Al-Shabab might exploit the chaos to expand territory.
  • Economic Implications: Loss of access to Somali financial systems and World Bank/IMF aid (via Mogadishu) could cripple Puntland’s economy unless alternative partnerships are secured.

Steps Forward:

  • Preparatory Measures: Strengthen governance institutions, diversify revenue (e.g., port fees, diaspora bonds), and seek bilateral aid (e.g., UAE, Ethiopia).
  • Regional Diplomacy: Court neighbors for recognition, framing independence as a stabilization measure. Leverage Puntland’s anti-extremism role.
  • Gradual Unilateralism: Incrementally assert sovereignty (e.g., issuing visas, signing trade deals) while avoiding overt provocation until international backing is assured.

Recommendations

  1. Prioritize Dialogue: Exhaust all avenues for constitutional reform and confederation before considering independence. A united front with other federal states increases leverage.
  2. Engage International Mediators: Involve IGAD, the AU, potentially Mogadishu allies like Qatar/Turkey (key Somalia donors) to pressure Mogadishu into negotiations.
  3. Contingency Planning: Prepare for independence discreetly (e.g., building foreign alliances, securing revenue streams) while publicly advocating for reform.
  4. Address Security Collaboratively: Propose a federal-state security pact with AU support (AUSSOM) to counter extremists, showcasing Puntland’s commitment to Somali stability.

Ultimately, Puntland’s path must balance pragmatic diplomacy with firm advocacy for autonomy. While independence remains a last resort, incremental steps toward confederalism or constitutional overhaul could preserve Somali unity while addressing governance grievances.

HANDLING THE SURRENDER OF HIGH PROFILE ISIS AND AL-SHABAB LEADERS

Handling the surrender of high-profile extremist leaders like Amir “Lahore” while ensuring justice for the victims is a complex and sensitive issue. Both Puntland and Somali Federal Governments have experienced this dilemma before. Federal Ministers for Religious Affairs Mukhtar Roobow and Defence “TikTok” were high-profile Al-Shabab leaders. The President of Juabaland State Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Ahmed Madoobe) also comes under those politically rehabilitated Al-Shabab leaders. Others included Al-Shabab leader in Galgala mountains of Bari Region  in Puntland State, “Amir Atom,” exiled to Qatar some years back. These former extremist leaders denounced Al-Shabab, while Col. Hassan Dahir Aweys, leader of Al-Shabab and defunct Union of Islamic Courts, refused to abandon extremist ideology and preferred detention instead.

Drawing from historical cases such as Mukhtar Roobow, Ahmed Madoobe, Amir Atom, and Hassan Dahir Aweys, the following framework emerges that the Puntland government could consider to balance amnesty, justice, and long-term stability:

1. Conditional Amnesty

  • The amnesty offered by the Puntland government could be conditional, requiring individuals like Lahore to provide actionable intelligence, disclose the locations of other fighters, and cooperate fully with authorities in dismantling extremist networks.
  • This approach ensures that the surrender contributes to broader security goals while holding individuals accountable for their actions.

2. Transparent Legal Process

  • Even if Lahore has surrendered under an amnesty, he should still face a transparent legal process. This could involve a public trial where evidence of his crimes is presented, and victims or their families are given a platform to share their experiences.
  • A fair trial would demonstrate the government’s commitment to justice and the rule of law, while also addressing the grievances of those affected.

3. Victim-Centered Justice

  • Establish mechanisms for restorative justice, such as truth and reconciliation commissions, where victims and their families can confront perpetrators and seek closure.
  • Compensation or reparations for victims’ families could also be considered as part of the justice process.

4. Public Accountability

  • The government should communicate clearly with the public about the terms of the amnesty and the legal process Lahore will undergo. Transparency is key to maintaining public trust and ensuring that the amnesty is not perceived as a free pass for serious crimes.

5. Rehabilitation and Reintegration

  • For lower-level fighters who surrender, the government could focus on rehabilitation and reintegration programs to help them rejoin society. However, for high-profile leaders like Lahore, rehabilitation should only be considered after they have fully accounted for their actions and served any sentences imposed by the courts.

6. International Cooperation

  • Given the transnational nature of groups like ISIS and Al-Shabab, Puntland could seek assistance from international partners, such as the African Union, the United Nations, the US and EU, to ensure that the legal process meets international standards and to provide additional resources for justice and reconciliation efforts.

7. Long-Term Security Measures

  • While addressing individual cases like Lahore’s, the government should also focus on long-term strategies to prevent the resurgence of extremism. This includes addressing root causes such as poverty, lack of education, and political marginalization.

8. Balancing Amnesty and Justice

  • The government must strike a delicate balance between offering amnesty to encourage defections and ensuring that serious crimes are not overlooked. Amnesty should not equate to impunity, especially for those responsible for mass atrocities.

By taking a multifaceted approach that prioritizes justice, transparency, and reconciliation, the Puntland government can address the immediate challenge of dealing with surrendered extremists while laying the groundwork for long-term peace and stability.

CAN PUNTLAND STATE OF SOMALIA FIGHT AND DEFEAT ISIS AND AL-SHABAB ALONE WITHOUT HELP FROM VILLA SOMALIA?

Certainly, she can. Here is why. Historically, any support of Puntland State to Somalia has always been one-sided or one-way street. Whether it was a fight for national independence, defence of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, or re-institution of the failed state. Puntland State has pioneered the current Somali governance system and country’s re-engagement with the international community. There was nothing worth talking about that came from Southern Somalia in the way of re-building this country. All that Mogadishu has offered to this country were sectarian violence, warlordism, corruption, and mismanagement of public affairs. Tribal agenda, sectarian violence, and divisions within will never help Somalia. Instead, Puntland has embarked upon self-government, self-reliance and self-defence, an experience that will enhance not only Puntland’s security, but will aid Somalia in particular, and the Horn of Africa in general to meet the challenges of extremism in the sub-region. Defeating ISIS and Al-Shabab is almost half done in Puntland State, and it is predicted that the fight shall be over before Ramadan. Next, after this campaign against extremists in the eastern mountains of Puntland State is to re-think a new military strategy to get rid of extremists throughout Somalia. Puntland State doesn’t need any permission from anybody to take the fight to extremists anywhere in the Somalia.

Apart from above assessment, let us tune now to various independent security analyses:

1. Puntland’s Capabilities and Challenges

  • Security Capacity: Puntland has its own security forces, including the Puntland Dervish Force and the Puntland Security Forces (PSF, PMPF, Darawiish), which have demonstrated resilience in combating extremist groups. They have successfully conducted operations against Al-Shabab and ISIS-Somalia in remote areas like the Galgala Mountains.
  • Territorial Knowledge: Puntland’s familiarity with its terrain and local clan networks gives it an advantage in counterinsurgency efforts.
  • Resource Constraints: Despite these strengths, Puntland lacks the advanced weaponry, intelligence infrastructure, and sustained funding required for a prolonged, large-scale campaign. Without external support (including from Somalia’s federal government or international partners), its capacity to maintain momentum could diminish.

2. Federal vs. Regional Dynamics

  • Political Tensions: Historical friction between Puntland and Mogadishu over resource-sharing, political representation, and security coordination complicates joint efforts. Puntland has often criticized the federal government for corruption and inefficiency.
  • Fragmented Counterterrorism: Al-Shabab and ISIS exploit gaps in coordination between federal and regional forces. A unilateral Puntland campaign could leave vulnerabilities elsewhere in Somalia, as militants often regroup across regional boundaries.

3. The Role of Al-Shabab and ISIS

  • Al-Shabab’s Resilience: Al-Shabab remains a potent force with revenue streams ($100+ million annually from extortion and smuggling), territorial control in south-central Somalia, and the ability to launch attacks nationwide. ISIS-Somalia, though smaller, has entrenched itself in Puntland’s mountains.
  • Transnational Threats: Both groups have regional and international linkages, meaning localized victories in Puntland would not eliminate the broader threat without a Somalia-wide strategy.

4. International and Regional Context

  • Foreign Support: The Somali National Army (SNA) and African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, AUSSOM) rely heavily on international funding and training. Puntland’s isolation from these channels could limit its operational reach.
  • Regional Stability: The Horn of Africa’s interconnected security landscape (e.g., Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia, Kenya’s counterterrorism efforts) means Puntland’s success depends partly on regional alliances.

5. The Claim of Victory “Before Ramadan”

  • While Puntland has made gains in recent operations, declaring imminent victory is optimistic. Insurgencies are rarely eradicated quickly; they often adapt through guerrilla tactics, recruitment, and exploiting governance gaps. Sustainable success requires not just military action but also reconciliation, development, and governance reforms.

6. Legal and Political Authority

  • Puntland’s authority to operate beyond its borders is legally contentious. The Somali Constitution designates security as a shared federal and state responsibility, but unilateral cross-regional operations could escalate tensions with Mogadishu and other federal member states.

Conclusion

Puntland has demonstrated significant resolve and capability in combating extremism, but complete victory without collaboration is unlikely. A cohesive, national strategy—backed by international partners—is critical to address the root causes of radicalization, such as governance failures and economic marginalization. While Puntland’s self-reliance is commendable, long-term stability in Somalia demands unity, resource-sharing, and trust-building between federal and regional entities.

SECURITY STATUS QUO IN MOGADISHU IS UNSUSTAINABLE

WDM EDITORIAL

Residents of Mogadishu and fledgling Federal Government of Somalia have been coexisting with extremist groups and various religious Tariqas for decades now. You can’t fight back against these extremists when the society itself is split along religious lines, when the government is headed by one of those religious sects (Damul-Jadid), the rank-and-file of the security forces are infiltrated by terrorists or recruited mainly from a few subclans from the vicinity of Banadir Region, with mistrust caused by Civil War still fresh in the minds of people, and Federal officials and administrators are being intimidated by Al-Shabab and ISIS on daily basis.

Unless there is a serious commitment on the part of impowered Judiciary (judges, police, secret services) with sound public policy behind them to address the epidemic of Al-Shabab and underlining problems of government security apparatus, Mogadishu and rest of the country will coexist with another government by the extremists, who are bent to take over the country and beyond in the same way Taliban have been projecting, and eventually succeeded.

Alshabab, Alqaeda and ISIS are no different from other historical Mafia groups. They coexist with corrupt societies and compromised security personnel. Since they thrive in intimidating members of the general public, they extort money and new recruits..

World community can’t help out Somalia in this fight in the absence of Somali authorities ready to get rid of the menace of terrorism from their own land.

IN THE END YOU HARVEST WHAT YOU SOW

MAFIA, AL-SHABAB AND SIMILAR TERROR GROUPS ARE NOTORIOUS IN REVENGE AND RETALIATION

By Ismail Warsame
Opinion Columnist

The recent cleanup operations against Al-Shabab will certainly attract the ire and angry responses from the Satans in Galkayo and elsewhere in Somalia. Residents and authorities shouldn’t put their guard down after initial operational and legal successes.

According to news sources, some residents in urban towns of Puntland State were receiving typical Al-Shabab phone calls to intimidate and terrorize people. This is the traditional modi operandi of the Evil Group in Somalia.

On receiving such cowardly warnings, residents are advised to contact authorities immediately, while taking extra security precautions and safety measures. Collect and document all messages and evidences of intimidation as much as you can to be used in a court of law against the perpetrators.

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Puntland authorities shouldn’t lose the momentum to uproot the menace of Al-Shabab and ISIS in their areas of jurisdiction, and help other regions in Somalia in eliminating these terror groups. Operations against the terror groups require discreet networking and cooperation between trustworthy organizations and reliable state agents. These also need the voluntary cooperation of citizens with the authorities. Concentrate on exposing financial and intelligence networks of the terrorists.

Intelligence and news resources are indicating that the leadership, financiers and intelligence networks of Al-Shabab Terror Group are still intact in Galkayo and other towns of Puntland. Some residents among the terrorist networks could be unsuspecting high profile persons in the community. They should be exposed and rounded up without fear or favors. Good luck!

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