July 26, 2025 — Puntland, Somalia

The fight against Daesh (ISIS) in Somalia’s northeastern Puntland State has entered a new and decisive phase, marked by a recent major blow against the group’s internal operations. In a meticulously executed special operation, U.S. Special Forces, working in close coordination with Puntland security services, captured one of the most important financial architects of the terrorist group’s operations in the Horn of Africa — Abdiweli Mohamed Aw-Yusuf, also known as Walalac.

This man was no ordinary foot soldier. As the head of Daesh’s Finance Department, Walalac was responsible for orchestrating the movement of money, laundering funds through illicit networks, and managing the budget for terror cells under the infamous al-Karrar office — Daesh’s administrative hub in Somalia. His arrest, alongside two other senior militants, is not just symbolic; it represents a crippling blow to ISIS’s operational and financial infrastructure in the region.

The Operation: Precision and Secrecy

The raid was reportedly carried out in a rural mountainous hideout in Puntland’s Bari region, an area known for being a sanctuary for extremist groups due to its treacherous terrain and sparse security presence. U.S. Special Forces, utilizing intelligence gathered over weeks — if not months — moved with surgical precision, apprehending the trio without significant resistance or collateral damage.

Puntland security sources confirmed that local forces provided critical logistical and intelligence support, once again highlighting the growing capacity of Puntland’s anti-terrorism apparatus when paired with competent international allies.

The Significance of Walalac’s Capture

Walalac’s arrest is being seen by security analysts as one of the most important counter-terrorism victories in Somalia since the disappearance or possible death of Daesh’s previous leader, Abdulqadir Mumin. Here’s why it matters:

Financial Disruption: As the chief financier, Walalac was the gatekeeper to the group’s lifeline — money. His arrest will likely lead to the freezing and tracking of several funding channels and safe houses.

Network Exposure: Walalac’s capture could lead to the exposure of broader networks — both local and international — that have been silently feeding Daesh’s coffers.

Operational Paralysis: With their funds in limbo and senior leaders apprehended, local Daesh cells will likely go dormant or fragment, buying Puntland and its partners precious time to hunt down remnants.

Al-Karrar Office Under Siege

The al-Karrar office, an administrative and logistical wing of ISIS-Somalia, has been under intense scrutiny for years. Its connections span from illegal charcoal exports to arms smuggling and human trafficking. The capture of Walalac represents the first time that a major figure tied directly to al-Karrar has been detained alive — providing hope that interrogation may yield intelligence on Daesh’s remaining cells, routes, and safe havens.

Puntland: Frontline of the War on Terror

Puntland has long stood as the frontline in Somalia’s multi-front war against violent extremism. While the southern part of the country continues to battle al-Shabaab, Puntland’s remote mountains have become the primary theater in the war against Daesh. The local government’s ability to work with international partners like the United States, while maintaining internal political coherence, has played a key role in holding the line.

But this war is far from over.

A Call for Vigilance and Unity

Despite this success, security analysts caution that Daesh — like a snake — may regrow its head if the region lets its guard down. The arrest of Walalac offers a temporary strategic advantage, but Puntland authorities must now:

Accelerate intelligence sharing with local communities.

Clamp down on financial and recruitment networks in coastal and urban centers.

Prevent the re-emergence of sleeper cells by investing in civic programs and counter-extremism education.

The international community must also recognize that Puntland’s stability is integral to regional and even global security. More investment, more collaboration, and sustained attention are needed to ensure that groups like Daesh do not find new oxygen to breathe.

Conclusion

The fight against Daesh in Puntland has reached a turning point with the capture of Abdiweli Mohamed Aw-Yusuf (Walalac). His arrest is not just a counter-terrorism victory — it’s a testament to what is possible when local governance, global cooperation, and relentless vigilance converge. The people of Puntland, and indeed Somalia as a whole, can take pride in this milestone — but they must also stay wary, stay united, and prepare for the long road ahead.

Terrorism may adapt, but so too must the defenders of peace.

Stay informed. Stay vigilant. Puntland is not just a state — it is a shield against extremism in the Horn of Africa.

External Hands Off! Laas Caanood and Gaalkacayo Must Guard Against the Infiltration of External Agendas

By Warsame Digital Media (WDM)
July 25, 2025

Somalia is no stranger to outside manipulation, proxy politics, and shameless exploitation—whether by foreign powers, religious factions masquerading as saviors, or so-called “federal” agents pushing divisive agendas. But what is happening today in Laas Caanood under the banner of the SSC-Khaatumo Congress is nothing short of a political hijacking engineered by the very enemies of Puntland’s vision, unity, and hard-won stability.

Make no mistake: the ongoing congress in Laas Caanood is not just a community gathering, nor a neutral civil affair. It is being contaminated by the fingerprints of Mogadishu-backed operatives, religious extremists in sheep’s clothing, and foreign-funded agendas aiming to undermine Puntland’s autonomy, fragment its influence, and bleed its border regions into another experiment in clan politics.

The Laas Caanood Congress: From Hope to Hostage

SSC was once a project with merit—a grassroots movement meant to assert identity, recover land from Somaliland occupation, and reclaim dignity. But today, its congress is being commandeered by Mogadishu regime functionaries and shadowy factions from Damul Jadiid and beyond, who care more about turning Sool into a satellite of Villa Somalia than uplifting the suffering people of the region.

Where is the accountability? Where are the discussions on development, reconciliation with Puntland, or service delivery? Instead, we hear whispers of new flags, new borders, and illusory “federal” dreams sponsored by those who never defended a single inch of Sool during its darkest days.

This is betrayal. Plain and simple.

Warning to Mudugh: Keep the Devil Out of the Room

Now, as activists and elders in Mudugh prepare for a long-overdue conference on infrastructure, roads, airports, environmental concerns, and social service delivery, let this article serve as a clear warning:
DO NOT ALLOW your legitimate grievances to be hijacked by the same poisonous outsiders that are currently corrupting the SSC  platform.

The people of Mudugh—noble, resilient, and independent—have every right to question the government’s failures. The delayed road network, the stalled Galkayo airport upgrades, the unaddressed environmental degradation, and the woeful state of health and education services must be confronted head-on, in the open, and with government officials present to be held to account.

But beware: already, certain actors are whispering in the dark, attempting to twist this noble initiative into a political insurrection. They will come with suitcases of money, sweet words of “federal rights,” or pious slogans. They will try to turn civil activism into a weapon against Puntland unity.

Reject them all. This conference must be by Mudugh, for Mudugh, and about Mudugh. Period.

To the People of Laas Caanood: You Have Been Deceived

Your sacrifices were never meant to bring you back into the grip of Villa Somalia’s opportunists.
You didn’t expel Somaliland just to fall prey to the next puppet master.
Wake up!

There can be no sustainable peace or development if your political process is infested by external strategists, manipulating you as pawns in a broader anti-Puntland, anti-regional autonomy campaign.

Do not let Mogadishu’s agents turn you into another failed statelet.

To Civil Society and Elders: Reclaim Control

Civil society, youth, women, and elders—this is your moment. Not the moment for power-hungry charlatans or political middlemen who trade loyalties for contracts.
Speak loudly. Stand firm. Demand clarity from anyone who wants a seat at the table. Ask: who sent you? Who funds you? What is your endgame?

Ask every delegate in Mudugh and Laas Caanood: Are you here for your people, or are you here for another master’s mission?

To Puntland Authorities: Stop Playing Dead

The silence from Puntland’s leadership is unacceptable and dangerous. While external forces are busily redrawing the map of your territories, you issue toothless press releases or retreat into administrative isolation

Send your ministers. Face the public. Explain the delays. Be accountable. Be present. Or else forfeit your moral authority.

Puntland must reassert its role as the legitimate political parent of Sool, Sanaag, Cayn, and Mudugh—not with slogans, but with visibility, action, and bold counter-narratives.

Final Word: Somali Unity Starts with Regional Dignity

What is happening now is not just about SSC or Mudugh.
It is about whether Somali regions can self-organize without being turned into ideological experiments.
It is about whether Puntland can survive not just militarily, but politically.
It is about whether we allow Mogadishu to continue acting like a colonizer disguised as a unifier.

The people of SSC and Mudugh deserve answers, service, dignity—not sabotage and deception.

Let the people rise with clarity. Let the conferences be platforms of progress, not betrayal.
And let every whisper of external interference be met with thunderous rejection.

Down with external manipulation! Long live Puntland’s dignity! And may the people finally speak louder than the plotters ever could.

#SomaliUnity #PuntlandFirst #MudughForMudugh #HandsOffSSC

Context: What exactly happened with Sea World?

On July, 2025, Puntland’s Maritime Police Force (PMPF), under President Said Abdullahi Deni’s administration, intercepted the MV Sea World, a Comoros‑flagged vessel, off Bareeda’s coast   of Puntland State.

The ship was reportedly laden with Turkish-marked armored vehicles, anti‑aircraft guns, ammunition, and MRAPs—apparently en route to Mogadishu for non-state actors.

Puntland claims the ship entered territorial waters without distress signals, violating UNCLOS and posing regional security threats.

Parts of the cargo were off‑loaded, with some weapons reportedly found in civilian hands outside Bosaso Port, prompting an internal probe.

Diverse reactions: Federal Government and external actors respond

The Federal Government of Somalia has condemned Puntland’s actions as “hijacking,” invoking the provisional constitution and UNCLOS to demand immediate release.

Somalia’s defense ministry asserts cargo was legal military equipment under bilateral agreements with Turkey.

Regional analysts have voiced concerns:

A Turkish analyst accused Deni of acting as a proxy for the UAE, claiming the PMPF was UAE-funded and that UAE backed the seizure.

Turkey has a growing defense footprint in Somalia, highlighted by delivery of helicopters and advisory missions.

Egypt too has increased arms shipments to Mogadishu under defense pacts—adding further complexity.

Will President Deni relent under pressure?

Political and Strategic Stakes at Play

1. Puntland’s Legal and Sovereign Position

The administration emphasizes strict adherence to Somalia’s constitution and maritime law sovereignty.

Releasing the ship under federal pressure may be seen as undermining Puntland’s autonomy and authority.

2. Federal Pressure via Diplomatic Channels

Mogadishu is expected to escalate through federal legal routes and international maritime norms to force a release.

Political pressure may ensue via intergovernmental forums and possible UN monitoring teams already engaged in arms embargo enforcement.

3. Regional Backing and Strategic Alliances

UAE support for PMPF and Puntland’s regional security capabilities—possibly emboldening Deni.

Turkey and Egypt may lobby via diplomatic means but face the risk of confrontation with Puntland’s stance.

4. Domestic Pressure from Puntland Citizens

The public in Puntland demands accountability on illegal weapons flows and expects their leadership to act firmly.

Any sign of backing down risks political fallout at home.


Analysis: Likely outcomes for President Deni

Scenario Likelihood Implications

1.Stand firm, keep the ship detained.  Reinforces regional autonomy, asserts Puntland’s maritime sovereignty, but sharpens tensions with Mogadishu and external actors.
2. Negotiate conditional release. Release only after transparent joint federal-regional investigation, potentially preserving unity but risking domestic backlash.
3. Immediate release. Politically costly locally; may ease federal relations but embolden Mogadishu to challenge regional autonomy again.

Conclusion: What’s next?

The Sea World standoff highlights the complex tug‑of‑war between Puntland’s self-governance and Somalia’s federal authority—complicated further by Turkey’s defense involvement, Egypt’s arms deliveries, and UAE’s backing of regional security forces.

President Deni is expected to proceed cautiously, prioritizing Puntland’s constitutional rights and public sentiment. A forced release seems unlikely, but a negotiated compromise—perhaps through joint investigations or international mediation—could emerge if diplomatic costs escalate for Puntland.

What People of Puntland Are Saying

Local citizens express deep concern, saying they “need clarity and accountability—illegal arms must be stopped.”

Analysts warn: “How Deni handles this will define Puntland’s autonomy and its role in Somali federal dynamics.”

Final Thoughts

The world is watching. Whether by legal pressure, diplomatic outreach, or regional alliances, Turkey, Egypt, and Mogadishu will seek to reclaim the Sea World and its cargo. Yet Deni’s political calculus—balancing regional pride, domestic sentiment, and external actors—suggests he’s unlikely to capitulate outright. What happens next could redefine federal-state relations in Somalia and influence Horn‑region security ties.

Stay tuned as investigation results emerge, and diplomatic signals shift.

By Ismail Warsame

For over three decades, Somaliland has claimed independence from the rest of Somalia, and yet Britain—its former colonial ruler and one of its strongest foreign patrons—continues to withhold official recognition. This deliberate non-recognition has often been misread by pan-Somali unionists as a moral stance in support of Somali unity, or as Britain’s respect for African Union protocols and international law.

But nothing could be further from the truth.

Britain’s refusal to formally recognize Somaliland’s statehood is not a gesture of goodwill toward Somalia’s unity, nor is it based on any principled commitment to continental or global legal frameworks. Rather, it is a well-orchestrated policy of self-interest, anchored in a desire to preserve influence over the entire Somali geography—fragmented, unstable, and exploitable.

A Strategic Hedge: Playing Both Sides of Somali Politics

Unlike other former colonial powers, the UK has adopted a dual-track approach to Somalia. It engages both the Federal Government in Mogadishu and the administration in Hargeisa. This enables Britain to retain maximum leverage while avoiding formal legal commitments to either side.

By withholding recognition of Somaliland, Britain maintains:

Access to Mogadishu, where UN and African Union missions are based.

Soft power in Hargeisa, where UK-funded NGOs, education programs, and security firms operate freely.

Flexibility in oil and port negotiations, especially concerning Berbera, where UK-friendly interests (like DP World) operate.

This ambiguity is not accidental. It is strategic.

Not About African Unity – Just Global Hypocrisy

Britain frequently cites the African Union’s official stance on Somali territorial integrity to justify its hesitation on recognizing Somaliland. But this argument collapses under global scrutiny.

Britain supported the creation of South Sudan, recognized Kosovo’s independence, and has repeatedly intervened in state fragmentation when it aligns with its own interests. So why is Somaliland different?

Because Somalia—fragmented, weakened, and aid-dependent—is easier to manage, influence, and benefit from.

The moment Britain recognizes Somaliland, it risks:

Losing diplomatic access in Mogadishu.

Triggering regional chain reactions in Puntland and Jubaland.

Empowering nationalists who might resist UK economic and military influence.

So, the status quo—keeping Somaliland in limbo—serves British interests best.

Oil, Ports, and Quiet Power

Much of Britain’s hesitation is economic. Somaliland offers key strategic assets—especially its untapped oil reserves and the Berbera Port, a deep-water port with commercial and military potential.

British companies like Genel Energy have oil exploration interests in Somaliland. However, formal recognition might:

Trigger diplomatic or legal disputes with Mogadishu.

Invite regulatory scrutiny from a more empowered Somali federal government.

Endanger regional power balances that favor Western firms.

Moreover, maintaining soft control over strategic infrastructure without recognition allows the UK to:

Avoid responsibility.

Escape international legal constraints.

Play a long game of influence over multiple Somali actors.

As discussed in the article “The Invisible Hand: How Britain’s Shadow Governance Network Controls Modern Somalia and Seeks its Partition” (wordpress.com/ismailwarsame), the UK’s influence is exerted through a complex network of:

Development NGOs

Security contractors

Political mentorship programs

Education and aid channels

This network allows Britain to play an outsized role in Somali politics without direct intervention. A formal recognition of Somaliland would force London to take sides—thereby disrupting this delicate architecture of indirect influence.

Who Truly Loses in This Game?

The primary victim of Britain’s non-recognition policy is the Somali people—both in Somaliland and in southern Somalia. This ambiguity:

Encourages fragmentation and elite corruption.

Delays genuine reconciliation or reintegration efforts.

Undermines national institutions in favor of parallel structures.

Fuels regional tension and proxy rivalries (e.g., UAE vs. Qatar, Turkey vs. Egypt).

Britain’s calculated silence not only perpetuates division but sabotages the chance for a long-term Somali-led solution—be it reunification, federation, or legal separation.

Conclusion: This Is Not About Unity—It’s About Control

Britain’s refusal to recognize Somaliland is not a principled defense of Somali unity. It is a self-serving strategy to prolong access, leverage influence, and avoid legal entanglements in a volatile yet resource-rich region.

It is time for Somali intellectuals, youth, leaders, and regional allies to confront this duplicity. The future of Somalia—and Somaliland—should not be held hostage to outdated colonial calculations and foreign self-interest masquerading as diplomacy.

Whether one supports recognition or unity, the truth must be clear: Britain’s policy is not based on legality or loyalty—but on pure geopolitical calculus.

Further Reading

“The Invisible Hand: How Britain’s Shadow Governance Network Controls Modern Somalia and Seeks its Partition”

Read here: https://ismailwarsame.blog/2025/07/21/the-invisible-hand-how-britains-shadow-governance-network-controls-modern-somalia-and-seeks-its-partition/

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS (Security First):
* Secure the Ship & Cargo: Place armed guards around the vessel and its cargo holds 24/7. Prevent any unauthorized access. This is non-negotiable.
* Isolate the Crew: Detain the crew for questioning in a secure location. Treat them humanely but restrict communication. They are potential witnesses or participants.
* Freeze Documentation: Seize all ship logs, manifests, communication records, navigation data, and personal crew documents immediately.

2. Confiscation: Not Just an Option, But a NECESSITY (With Caveats):
* LEGAL BASIS FOR CONFISCATION: Confiscation is absolutely an option and highly recommended under international law and Somali domestic law:
* UN Arms Embargo: UNSC Resolutions (e.g., 2662) impose a strict arms embargo on Somalia for non-state actors and require all imports to have explicit Federal Government approval. An unclaimed shipment inherently violates this embargo.
* Violation of Somali Law: Importing arms without proper authorization, end-user certificates, and customs declaration is illegal under Somali law. An unclaimed shipment has none of these.
* National Security Threat: Unclaimed heavy weapons pose an existential threat to Puntland and Somalia’s security. Confiscation is a legitimate act of self-defense and security preservation.
* Port State Authority: As the port state, Puntland has jurisdiction over vessels in its port, especially those suspected of illegal activity.
* HOW TO CONFISCATE LEGALLY:
* Formal Legal Order: Issue an immediate, formal seizure/confiscation order signed by the highest relevant Puntland authority (e.g., President, Security Minister, Port Authority Director), citing the UN embargo violation, violation of Somali law, and threat to national security.
* Document Everything: Meticulously document the ship’s arrival, the lack of claim/paperwork, the security measures taken, the confiscation order, and the inventory process. This is crucial for legal defensibility.
* Notify Federal Government: Inform the Somali Federal Government (SFG) in Mogadishu immediately of the situation and the confiscation action. While Puntland has authority, coordination with the SFG is essential for national unity and international legitimacy. The SFG must formally notify the UN Security Council’s Somalia Sanctions Committee.
* Notify International Partners: Inform key international partners (UNSOM, AU, IGAD, Combined Maritime Forces, INTERPOL) of the confiscation and request urgent technical assistance.

3. CRITICAL NEXT STEPS AFTER SECURING/CONFISCATING:
* Comprehensive Inventory (SAFELY): Conduct a detailed, supervised inventory of the cargo. This is EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. It must be done by trained explosives experts/EOD personnel, ideally with international support (UNODA, INTERPOL). Document types, quantities, serial numbers, markings, and origins of all weapons and ammunition. Use video/photography.
* Thorough Investigation:
* Crew Interviews: Interrogate the crew intensively (with legal counsel/observers present) about the voyage, origin, intended destination, and ownership. Pressure for information.
* Forensic Analysis: Examine the ship, cargo packaging, and any recovered documents forensically for clues (fingerprints, DNA, hidden compartments, digital data).
* Track Ship’s History: Use AIS data, port records, and intelligence to trace the ship’s route, previous ports of call, and ownership history.
* Flag State Inquiry: Demand full cooperation from the ship’s flag state in identifying owners and operators.
* International Assistance is PARAMOUNT:
* Request Expertise: Immediately request technical assistance from the UN (UNSOM, Panel of Experts on Somalia), INTERPOL, the African Union, and relevant states (e.g., for ballistic tracing, EOD, investigative support).
* Request Disposal Support: Securely storing or destroying this volume of arms/ammo is complex and dangerous. Request international support (e.g., UNMAS, donor states) for safe disposal/destruction.
* Transparency (Guarded): Be transparent about the fact of confiscation and the ongoing investigation with the public and international community to build legitimacy. However, do not disclose sensitive operational details, inventory specifics, or investigative leads that could compromise the probe or security.

4. Risks & Considerations:
* External Pressure/Threats: Expect pressure from shadowy actors, potential claimants (via proxies), or even states wanting the cargo suppressed or released. Maintain resolve and security.
* Internal Corruption: Implement strict oversight to prevent leaks, bribery, or theft of the cargo. Use trusted units and international monitors.
* Disposal Challenges: Holding the cargo long-term is risky. Plan for its secure destruction as the ultimate goal, requiring international help.
* Legal Challenges: Be prepared for potential (though unlikely to succeed) legal challenges from shell companies claiming ownership. Your documentation of the embargo violation and lack of initial claim is key.

Conclusion & Recommendation for Puntland:

Confiscation is not only a legal option but a critical security imperative. Puntland must immediately seize the vessel and its cargo based on clear violations of the UN arms embargo and Somali law, citing the grave threat to regional security. Delay risks diversion or attack.

Prioritize:

1. SECURE the ship and cargo militarily.
2. CONFISCATE formally and legally.
3. INVESTIGATE thoroughly with international help.
4. INFORM the Somali Federal Government and key international partners.
5. DESTROY the cargo safely with international support.

Failure to act decisively risks these weapons fueling catastrophic violence in Puntland, Somalia, and across the region. Confiscation is the essential first responsible step.

https://addisstandard.com/ethiopias-strategic-triple-play-how-assertive-diplomacy-on-gerd-somaliland-mou-brics-membership-reshapes-horn-of-africa-power-dynamics/

“All spoils in the sea belong to the King” , a saying in the ancient Bari Region of Puntland State.

Bosaso, Puntland – In a dramatic and high-stakes intervention, Puntland State Marine Forces have intercepted a vessel carrying a deadly cargo: a significant shipment of heavy armored weapons reportedly destined for non-state factions in Mogadishu, and potentially, the fledgling Federal Government itself or Turkish military base in Mogadishu. This seizure isn’t just a routine bust; it’s a stark and terrifying symptom of a dangerous new phase engulfing Somalia.

For decades, the flow of small arms into South-Central Somalia has been a tragic constant, a relentless undercurrent fueling violence even at the height of the Civil War. Mogadishu’s myriad factions are, as reports rightly state, already “armed to the teeth” with these weapons. But what we are witnessing now is fundamentally different, and far more perilous.

The New, Devastating Reality: Heavy Weapons Enter the Fray

The alarming novelty lies in the extraordinary flow of heavy weaponry– armored vehicles, sophisticated artillery, powerful anti-armor systems – now finding its way to the warring factions. This escalation coincides directly with the premature and controversial lifting of the UN Arms Embargo on Somalia. While ostensibly intended to bolster the Somali National Army in its fight against Al-Shabaab, the reality on the ground paints a far bleaker picture.

Instead of strengthening the central state, this lifting appears to have opened dubious routes exploited by clandestine parties. Powerful external actors, regional players with vested interests, and internal spoilers seem to be leveraging the loosened restrictions to flood the volatile Mogadishu landscape with tools of mass destruction. This isn’t reinforcement; it’s a deliberate act of strategic arson.

Puntland’s Dilemma: A Seized Arsenal and Weighty Choices

The seized vessel now sits in a Puntland port, its lethal contents under guard. Its interception by Puntland forces is a significant act, demonstrating both capability and a clear stance against the uncontrolled proliferation threatening the entire Horn of Africa. But the seizure is only the first act. Puntland society is now embroiled in a crucial and urgent debate: What to do with this arsenal?

The options are fraught with consequence:

1.  Destruction: The most definitive, and perhaps safest, course. Destroying the weapons removes them permanently from the equation, sending the strongest possible message against illicit arms trafficking. However, it requires significant resources and technical capability.
2.  Handover to the Federal Government (FGS): A gesture of federal unity? Or a naive gamble? Given the reported destination included factions within Mogadishu, possibly even elements linked to the FGS itself, and the FGS’s perceived fragility and lack of cohesive control over its own security apparatus, many in Puntland view this option with extreme skepticism. Would these weapons simply fuel the very fires they were meant to extinguish?
3.  Utilization by Puntland Security Forces: Argued by some as necessary for Puntland’s own defense against an increasingly unstable south and the persistent Al-Shabaab threat. However, this risks escalating regional tensions and could be portrayed as Puntland itself becoming a stockpiler, undermining the moral high ground of the seizure.
4.  International Custody/Disposal: Seeking UN or AU assistance to take custody and ensure secure, verifiable disposal. This might be the most transparent option but relies on complex international cooperation and logistics.

Beyond the Seizure: A Nation at the Precipice

The debate in Puntland is more than a local issue; it’s a microcosm of Somalia’s existential crisis. The unchecked flow of heavy weapons, facilitated by the questionable lifting of the embargo and shadowy actors, is catastrophically destabilizing. It empowers warlords, undermines any semblance of state monopoly on force, makes large-scale conventional warfare terrifyingly feasible, and ultimately, drowns out any hope for genuine political dialogue or reconciliation.

The international community must look beyond Mogadishu. Puntland’s action has exposed a critical breach. Urgent questions demand answers:

*   Who is behind these clandestine shipments?
*   How are they bypassing what should be enhanced monitoring post-embargo?
*   Why was the embargo lifted without robust, verifiable mechanisms to prevent exactly this scenario?

The seizure in Bosaso is a warning flare. Ignoring the systemic failure allowing heavy weapons to flood Somalia is not an option. The debate within Puntland is a test – not just for its own leadership, but for the conscience of Somalia and its international partners. The choices made regarding this seized arsenal will send ripples across the region. The path of peace requires not just intercepting the weapons, but decisively dismantling the deadly networks that deliver them and demanding accountability for those who enable this descent into potentially unimaginable violence. The time for decisive action, both in Bosaso and beyond, is now. Somalia cannot afford another descent into the abyss fueled by heavy metal and foreign agendas.

19 July 2025 

The escalating tensions in the Dhahar region of Sanaag represent more than a local border dispute. They are a symptom of a deepening crisis threatening the fragile foundations of Somali federalism, fueled by betrayal, overreach, and the Mogadishu regime’s cynical manipulation. The rift between Puntland and the Khaatumo Movement, once allies in liberating Laas Caanood, now risks plunging the region into renewed conflict, with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s (HSM) government playing a dangerously incendiary role.

The Foundation: Liberation and the Seeds of Discord
There is little dispute over Puntland’s pivotal role in the 2023 liberation of Laas Caanood and surrounding SSC areas from Somaliland forces. Puntland Darawishta provided crucial military leadership, equipment, and fighters, sacrificing blood and treasure alongside local SSC clans. This victory, achieved through a coalition heavily reliant on Puntland’s commitment, was rightly hailed as a triumph of kinship and shared struggle against occupation. The expectation was that this shared sacrifice would forge a strong, cooperative relationship based on mutual respect for historical ties and administrative realities.

The Betrayal: Khaatumo’s Overreach in Sanaag
Instead, a starkly different reality has emerged. Emboldened, sources within Puntland and local observers in Sanaag contend, by overt political and military backing from Mogadishu, the Khaatumo Movement has pursued a policy of territorial aggrandizement. Its deployment of forces into the Dhahar district – an area consistently administered by Puntland for decades and explicitly within its constitutional boundaries – is viewed in Garowe not as an administrative error, but as a deliberate act of aggression and a profound betrayal.

The bitter irony is palpable: forces representing an entity whose very liberation was secured by Puntland’s intervention are now encroaching on territory Puntland considers its sovereign space. Puntland’s offers of dialogue, reportedly based on acknowledging historical context and existing constitutional frameworks, appear to have been rebuffed, deepening the sense of grievance in Garowe.

Mogadishu’s Malign Fingerprints: Orchestrating Instability
The HSM regime’s involvement is the most destabilizing factor. Multiple credible reports indicate Mogadishu is actively fueling this conflict:
1.  Political Legitimization: Granting Khaatumo Movement formal recognition and status far exceeding its administrative control, directly challenging Puntland’s authority in the SSC and Sanaag.
2.  Military Provocation: The reported deployment of Somali National Army (SNA) units, often under the cover of local militia to support Khaatumo operations in Dhahar is a constitutional grenade. It blatantly violates:
    1. Article 48: Federal Member State security jurisdiction within their borders.
    2. Article 49: The mandate for cooperation and mutual respect between levels of government.
    3. The core principle that the FGS cannot militarily intervene against a Federal Member State on its own territory.

Strategic Objective: Analysts widely interpret this as a deliberate HSM strategy to weaken Puntland, the most robust proponent of genuine federalism and a persistent check on Mogadishu’s centralizing ambitions. Destabilizing Puntland’s eastern flank in Sanaag serves this purpose, diverting Puntland’s resources and attention while undermining its territorial claims. The misuse of local militia forces for this internal political maneuvering also gravely risks further fragmentation of the Somali State.

Consequences: A Tinderbox Ignited
The situation is dangerously volatile:
Risk of Open Conflict: The militarization of Dhahar pits former allies against each other. A single skirmish could escalate rapidly.
Federalism Under Siege: Mogadishu’s actions demonstrate a fundamental disregard for the federal compact. If a Federal Member State’s borders can be violated by FGS-backed forces supporting a rival administration, the entire federal project collapses into chaos.
Al-Shabaab’s Opportunity: Internal Somali conflict is manna from heaven for Al-Shabaab, diverting vital resources and attention from counter-terrorism efforts.
Deepening Divisions: The sense of betrayal felt in Puntland and among its supporters in Sanaag risks hardening clan and regional fault lines for a generation.

WDM’s Call: De-escalation, Constitution, and Dialogue

1.  Immediate Withdrawal  Khaatumo militia and all SNA units must withdraw immediately from Dhahar and other disputed areas within Puntland’s historical and constitutional jurisdiction.
2.  Mogadishu Must Cease Fire: President Mohamud’s regime must halt all political, financial, and military support aimed at destabilizing Puntland and provoking conflict between Puntland and Khaatumo Movement. Respecting Federal Member State autonomy is non-negotiable.
3.  ATMIS Command must immediately investigate the deployment of SNA forces to Dhahar, publicly clarify their mandate, and ensure strict adherence to counter-terrorism objectives, avoiding entanglement in FGS political machinations against FMS.
4.  Return to Constitutional Dialogue: Meaningful dialogue between Puntland and Khaatumo representatives is essential, but must be based on:
    *   Recognition of the existing constitutional framework governing FMS boundaries.
    *   Acknowledgement of Puntland’s historical administration and sacrifices in the region.
    *   A commitment to resolving disputes peacefully within the federal structure, without Mogadishu acting as a partisan spoiler.
5.  International Vigilance: The international community must move beyond passive concern. It must publicly condemn the unconstitutional FGS incursions into Puntland territory, pressure Mogadishu to adhere to the Provisional Constitution, and actively support mediation efforts focused on de-escalation and federal principles.

Conclusion
The incident in Dhahar is not an isolated development. It is the calculated result of Khaatumo overreach, enabled and actively encouraged by a Mogadishu regime intent on crippling Puntland and dismantling meaningful federalism. The betrayal of the shared sacrifice at Laas Caanood adds a layer of bitter tragedy. If this dangerous course is not reversed, the consequences will extend far beyond Sanaag, threatening Somalia’s fragile stability and playing directly into the hands of its enemies. Cool heads, constitutional fidelity, and an end to Mogadishu’s destructive meddling are desperately needed before this tinderbox explodes.

In the ever-complex and shifting political landscape of Somalia, few events have reshaped the power dynamics between federal and regional authorities as significantly as the liberation of the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) regions. For Puntland State, once considered the most stable and progressive regional administration in Somalia, its failure to reassert full control over SSC after the withdrawal of Somaliland forces has proven to be a strategic miscalculation with far-reaching consequences. This negligence allowed hostile forces — notably elements aligned with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the central Mogadishu regime — to infiltrate, manipulate, and ultimately redirect the political orientation of the region.

A Missed Moment of Strategic Opportunity

The battle for SSC was never just a local uprising against Somaliland’s occupation. It was a continuation of a decades-long resistance movement with deep historical ties to Puntland. The people of SSC, particularly from the Dhulbahante clan, have always maintained cultural, kinship, and political affiliations with Puntland. This was reaffirmed when Puntland sacrificed blood and treasure to support resistance movements over the years — notably during the Las Anod uprisings.

However, after the expulsion of Somaliland from Las Anod in 2023, Puntland inexplicably failed to seize the strategic moment to re-establish its authority and governance structures. This was not merely a symbolic error; it left a vacuum — one that would soon be filled by actors with ulterior motives.

Khatumo’s Rise — and Puntland’s Passive Abdication

Into this vacuum stepped the resurrected Khatumo movement, a faction historically known for political inconsistency and a revolving door of alliances, having at various points aligned with Somaliland and then later with federal actors in Mogadishu. The Puntland leadership mistakenly assumed that SSC’s liberation would naturally evolve into reintegration with the State. Instead, Puntland took a backseat, letting Khatumo activists pursue their own narrow political projects, unmonitored and unaccountable.

This passivity emboldened Khatumo leaders who quickly aligned themselves with Villa Somalia. What emerged was not a grassroots-led administration but a proxy project coordinated by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s presidency — a regime known for its centralist tendencies and hostility toward federalism as practiced in Puntland.

By refusing to proactively assert moral, political, and security leadership over SSC, Puntland not only lost the upper hand in one of the most geopolitically critical regions of Somalia, it also betrayed the trust of those in SSC who had sacrificed for a Puntland-oriented liberation. The void was filled by opportunists whose allegiances lay not with the region’s long-term interests, but with Mogadishu’s short-term political calculus.

Infiltration by Mogadishu: The Slow Occupation

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration has wasted no time exploiting Puntland’s strategic silence. Through appointments, visits, and selective aid disbursement, Villa Somalia has systematically installed agents, operatives, and anti-Puntland ideologues in SSC. Under the guise of state-building, this central regime is working to dislodge Puntland’s influence from the region altogether.

In fact, the Khatumo leadership’s decision to embrace Villa Somalia has shown itself to be a strategic overreach. Many in SSC have begun to view these moves as nothing more than Mogadishu’s encroachment by proxy — using Khatumo as a convenient façade. Local frustrations are growing. The belief that Mogadishu would bring stability and investment is beginning to fade in the face of increasing central interference, clan fragmentation, and unkept promises.

Strategic Miscalculations of Khatumo Leaders

The Khatumo leadership’s alignment with Mogadishu might have appeared advantageous in the short term, but it is already backfiring. By choosing to provoke Puntland territorially — and alienate one of the few entities that supported SSC militarily and politically for years — Khatumo has committed political suicide.

Not only has this alliance undermined the local legitimacy of Khatumo among SSC residents, but it has also exposed the movement as a puppet of centralist forces that do not respect SSC’s autonomy or its federalist aspirations. The alliance with Villa Somalia has also drawn the ire of traditional elders and prominent figures who now see the movement as compromising the very essence of SSC’s struggle — self-determination without domination from either Hargeisa or Mogadishu.

The Road Ahead: Reclaiming Strategic Ground

Puntland must learn from its strategic error and reassess its posture toward SSC. The region remains central to the geopolitical and security calculus of northern Somalia. Without Puntland’s presence, the SSC region risks descending into another contested zone, fought over by distant federal authorities and political opportunists.

The way forward must include:

1. Re-engagement with SSC communities — not through imposition, but through meaningful consultation and power-sharing arrangements that recognize local aspirations within the Puntland federal framework.

2. Political containment of Khatumo’s overreach, while extending an olive branch to reasonable actors within the movement who understand the perils of Mogadishu’s overreach.

3. Mobilization of traditional elders and grassroots support, to counter the Villa Somalia narrative and reinforce Puntland’s historical support for SSC autonomy.

4. Clear communication to the federal government that Puntland will not tolerate strategic encirclement or federal manipulation through proxy movements like Khatumo.

Conclusion: Puntland Must Act — Now

What Puntland faces today is not simply a loss of territory or influence, but a threat to the very federal balance of Somalia. SSC’s struggle was born out of the aspiration for dignity, self-rule, and resistance against marginalization — ideals that closely align with Puntland’s own founding principles. For Puntland to abdicate its responsibility in SSC is not only a strategic blunder; it is a betrayal of its federalist legacy.

The time to correct this course is now. Puntland must reassert its rightful place in SSC — not with force, but with legitimacy, partnerships, and a vision that transcends narrow politics. Otherwise, it risks becoming a sidelined spectator in a game where it once held all the cards.

By Ismail Warsame
Regional Affairs Analyst and Contributor
July 18, 2025

1. Background: The Puntland–SSC‑Khaatumo schism

In October 2023, Somalia’s Federal Government recognized SSC‑Khaatumo as an interim federal member state (administration covering Sool, Sanaag, Cayn regions) with its capital in Las Anod  . That move sharply conflicted with Puntland’s constitutional claim: Puntland insists SSC regions are legally part of its territory, rejecting separation without inclusive clan consensus or referendum  .

Tensions escalated in mid‑2025, particularly over Sanaag, where SSC‑Khaatumo-affiliated leaders organized conferences backing federal recognition. Puntland responded by banning unapproved gatherings and vehicles (including those with SSC‑Khaatumo or Somaliland plates) in the region, and deploying elite forces to disrupt political activity  .

2. Puntland ends recognition of SSC‑Khaatumo

According to local reporting, Puntland no longer recognizes SSC‑Khaatumo, viewing it as a federal-provoked entity destabilizing governance in Sanaag. Officials allege coordination between Mogadishu and SSC‑Khaatumo leadership in orchestrating “security provocations” within Puntland’s territory. The move forms part of Puntland’s broader assertion of sovereignty in SSC, rejecting any federal-backed entity that bypasses Puntland’s constitutional framework.

3. ISIS threat in Cal‑Miskaad and Puntland’s counterterror response

Separately, Puntland continues intensive operations against ISIS-Somalia cells entrenched in the Cal‑Miskaad mountains:

Operation Hilaac launched in December 2024 and extended into 2025, targeting IS hideouts across the Golis/Cal‑Miskaad ranges. Security forces collaborated with US and UAE air strikes, seizing over 250 km² of territory, destroying 50+ bases, eliminating dozens of militants and eliminating senior ISIS facilitators like Ahmed Muse Said  .

As late as May–June 2025, operations continued—neutralizing logistic hubs, repelling large-scale attacks, and consolidating control over critical terrain  .

Puntland leadership insists ISIS aimed to establish Cal‑Miskaad as a global command center, a plot thwarted by “heroic forces” in parliamentary remarks by President Deni on June 15, 2025  .

4. Will Puntland impose taxes or regulatory restrictions on SSC‑Khaatumo?

While Puntland has not publicly announced new taxation plans targeting SSC‑Khaatumo, the available measures indicate a tightening of administrative controls:

The ban on unauthorized meetings and vehicle plate prohibitions in Sanaag signal an escalation in regulatory pressure  .

Puntland may enforce existing tax schemes and regulatory requirements (e.g. licensing, checkpoints) more strictly in SSC-aligned areas, especially those hosting SSC‑Khaatumo political activity.

Considering Puntland’s broader posture of rejecting SSC‑Khaatumo’s legitimacy, economic sanctions or heightened enforcement are plausible: entry checkpoints, confiscation of non‑Puntland plates, duties on trade, or restrictions on formal services to SSC‑run institutions may be imposed or intensified.

Given the institutional standoff, SSC‑Khaatumo territories may find Puntland withholding administrative approvals, business licenses, or local tax exemptions as leverage. While no explicit new tax law has been quoted publicly yet, increasing regulatory friction is clearly underway.

5. Broader implications: security, politics, and governance

Federal–regional feud: Puntland’s refusal to recognise SSC‑Khaatumo and its operational bans are part of a broader confrontation with Mogadishu, whom it accuses of unconstitutional interference  .

Security connections: Puntland faces a dual-front threat—SSC‑Khaatumo’s politicization in Sanaag and rolling operations against ISIS in Cal‑Miskaad. Each front intersects, as instability in one region can undermine counterterrorism gains elsewhere.

Clan politics and local legitimacy: Puntland cites traditional clan elders in Sanaag who reaffirm Puntland’s territorial rights and reject SSC‑Khaatumo affiliation as destabilizing  .

Issue and Current Status

Recognition: Puntland no longer recognises SSC‑Khaatumo; federal recognition viewed as unconstitutional.
Security measures Bans on meetings and non‑Puntland plate vehicles in Sanaag; deployment of Puntland security forces.
ISIS threat Ongoing. large‑scale counterterror operations across Cal‑Miskaad — major gains under Operation Hilaac.
Tax/regulatory crackdown. No formal new taxes yet, but increased enforcement of permits, licensing, and vehicle regulations in SSC‑aligned areas.
Outlook Likely more regulatory and administrative pressure, potentially economic restrictions, as Puntland asserts control over its claimed territory.

✅ Conclusion

Puntland has taken a firm stance: ceasing recognition of SSC‑Khaatumo, banning its affiliated activities in Sanaag, and positioning itself as the sole authority in SSC regions. Parallel to escalating security operations against ISIS in Cal‑Miskaad, these moves suggest a dual strategy of political consolidation and territorial control. Although no formal new taxes have been announced explicitly targeting SSC‑Khaatumo, the existing bans on meetings, vehicle movements, and likely administrative restrictions count as de facto pressure. As federal–regional tensions deepen, look for further institutional measures—economic or regulatory—to limit SSC‑Khaatumo’s operation within Puntland’s claimed zones.

Once a proud land of nomadic warriors and pastoral wisdom, Somalia today lies fractured, besieged, and preyed upon by regional and global actors who treat it as a chessboard for influence and resource extraction. The struggle for Somalia’s future is no longer an internal matter; it has become a scramble — a ruthless, self-interested competition between foreign powers, aided and abetted by opportunistic local elites who barter national sovereignty for clan leverage and personal gain.

Historical Pride, Present Humiliation

Somalia’s collapse began with internal fissures — dictatorship, warlordism, and endless transitional governments. But now the decay is fed and prolonged by a wider geopolitical contest involving countries such as Turkey, UAE, Qatar, Egypt, Ethiopia, and even Israel — each maneuvering for a slice of Somalia’s land, coast, ports, influence, and strategic location on the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean.

This new scramble for Somalia eerily mirrors the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, where European colonial powers carved Africa into spheres of influence. Today, this is happening again — not with maps and rulers, but with military bases, corrupt deals, infrastructure projects, drone bases, arms shipments, political endorsements, and proxy leaders.

Turkey: Imperial Revivalism Draped in Islamic Brotherhood

Among the most aggressive actors is Turkey, which disguises its neo-Ottoman ambitions under the rhetoric of Islamic solidarity. Ankara has established its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, trained thousands of Somali troops, and embedded itself in government operations under the banner of development and security. But behind this veneer lies a deeper agenda: domination through dependency.

Turkish companies now manage Mogadishu Port and Airport, while Turkish-trained soldiers form the inner circle of elite military units answerable to Villa Somalia. These are not acts of brotherhood — they are steps toward colonial-style leverage, with Somalia providing cheap loyalty and strategic access in exchange for superficial development.

Case in Point: Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
President Hassan Sheikh, hailed as a democrat in some Western circles, is widely viewed within Somalia as a divisive figure whose loyalty lies more with Turkish interests and his own personal gain than with national unity. Hassan Sheikh has:

1. Alienated the Darood clans by strategically supporting clan fragmentation in Jubaland, Puntland.

2. Undermined federalism while falsely claiming to champion reconciliation.

3. Used Turkish support to entrench a military apparatus loyal to him, not to the Somali state.

This is not leadership — this is the weaponization of foreign alliances to crush domestic dissent and suppress rival clans.

UAE: Commercial Empire by Proxy

If Turkey brings guns wrapped in religious language, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) comes with cash, ports, and backroom deals. Using financial leverage and political manipulation, the UAE has positioned itself as a commercial hegemon in northern Somalia, particularly through its deep involvement in Berbera Port (Somaliland) and Bosaso Port (Puntland).

The UAE’s strategy is clear:

Exploit federal fragmentation by signing independent port and military agreements with regional states, bypassing the federal government.

Support leaders such as Said Deni in Puntland or figures in Somaliland who will toe the Emirati line in return for funds, equipment, or political endorsement.

Control Red Sea trade routes, undermining Somalia’s chance to ever centralize maritime revenue.

In many ways, the UAE has replicated colonial divide-and-rule tactics, using cash and contracts instead of rifles.

Qatar, Egypt, and the Broader Proxy War

Qatar, a close Turkish ally, has often been accused of financing Islamist networks in Somalia and influencing media and politics through shadow channels. Its rivalry with UAE spills onto Somali soil, turning the country into a battlefield of Gulf enmities.

Egypt, obsessed with Ethiopia’s Nile dam project, sees Somalia as a possible southern flank to pressure Addis Ababa. Egyptian intelligence involvement in Mogadishu is rising, sometimes in competition with Ethiopia and sometimes coordinated with UAE-backed figures.

Meanwhile, Israel’s low-profile involvement through security intelligence and partnerships with Ethiopia and UAE, adds another layer of complexity.

Ethiopia: Historical Hostility in Strategic Garb

Ethiopia — with dreams of sea access — has long played a destabilizing role in Somalia, from invading in 2006 to meddling in regional states. Under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia has pivoted to a port diplomacy strategy, pushing for naval access through Somalia, Djibouti, or Eritrea. This has resurrected fears of territorial ambition masked as economic need.

The Ethiopian-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) over sea access — supported by some UAE channels — directly threatens Somalia’s territorial integrity. Yet Villa Somalia’s response under Hassan Sheikh has been weak, reactive, and uncoordinated, showing a leadership vacuum in Mogadishu.

Internal Betrayal: Local Elites as Gatekeepers to Foreign Control

None of this foreign interference could happen without local collaborators. Somalia’s elites — especially in Mogadishu — have traded national interest for clan supremacy or financial gain. President Hassan Sheikh’s government has become emblematic of this betrayal, presiding over:

1. The politicization of the military and security forces.

2. The weakening of federalism through manipulative appointments and budgetary blackmail.

3. Tactical alliances with foreign actors who prefer a fragmented Somalia — easier to manipulate and less likely to stand up for itself.

On the other hand, regional leaders like Said Deni in Puntland have played the UAE card for their own survival, equally compromising Somalia’s cohesion in the process.

The Cost: Somalia as a Puppet Theater

The result of this multilayered scramble is clear:

1. National institutions are hollow.

2. Foreign actors pull the strings of key politicians.

3. Somalia’s future is determined in Ankara, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Addis Ababa — not in Mogadishu or Garowe.

Rather than forging unity, Somali leaders have become intermediaries of foreign interests, deepening the crisis of statehood.

A Path Forward: Resisting the Scramble

The tragedy is not irreversible. But it requires:

1. A genuine national dialogue across clans and regions — without foreign meddling — to agree on a new political contract.

2. Reclaiming sovereignty over key institutions, including ports, airports, and the military.

3. Ending the proxy games, by banning foreign bases and mercenary training programs that answer to foreign capitals.

4. New leadership from within the Somali people, especially among the younger generation, who see beyond clanism and are weary of being pawns in foreign conflicts.

Conclusion

Somalia’s greatest danger today is not just poverty or terrorism. It is the death of national will — the loss of collective identity amid a sea of foreign agendas and internal betrayals. The scramble for Somalia is real, but it can be resisted. Pride, history, and the legacy of those who once united the Somali nation must guide the next generation.

To reclaim Somalia, Somalis must first reclaim Somalia from themselves — and from those who have sold it piece by piece.

The WDM: The Voices of the People. The Mirror of the Nation.

Puntland State of Somalia, once regarded as a beacon of stability and comparative governance in an otherwise volatile region, is now facing one of the worst crises in its history—both politically and economically. The situation unfolding today is not the result of external aggression or unforeseen disaster, but rather a direct consequence of internal mismanagement, political exclusion, and a leadership style that has effectively shut down the engines of government.

The One-Man Show Presidency: A Recipe for Collapse

At the heart of Puntland’s current woes lies an increasingly isolated and opaque presidency that has refused to open itself to the voices of its people, civil institutions, and political actors. President Said Abdullahi Deni’s administration has gradually morphed into a one-man show — closed to ideas, allergic to criticism, and resistant to any form of inclusive dialogue. This autocratic style of leadership has paralyzed institutions and crippled the public administration from the inside out, behaving like absolute monarch no accountability.

Deni’s presidency is widely viewed as inactive and disengaged. Reports and insiders frequently note that the President rarely reports to his place of work, has no visible daily governing schedule, and fails to convene meaningful cabinet or security meetings. In any functional state, especially one surrounded by both domestic and regional threats, such absentee leadership is catastrophic.

Dysfunctional Governance: Ministers in Name Only

Under this administration, ministries exist more in title than in function. Ministers are often appointed not on merit or experience, but through clan favoritism, nepotism, or cronyism. As a result, Puntland’s bureaucracy has been stuffed with incompetent and untrained officials who lack the expertise or authority to implement any meaningful policy.

Government offices are routinely described as ghost institutions. Ministries are devoid of operational budgets, technical staff, and policy direction. There is rampant duplication of duties, and many departments are essentially dead weight. Civil servants are unpaid, projects are frozen, and key state infrastructure has deteriorated beyond recognition. From health and education to justice and internal security, the system is simply not functioning.

Security Meltdown and Lawlessness

The policy of political isolation has extended into Puntland’s security domain. By alienating former allies, refusing meaningful cooperation with traditional community leaders, and undermining coordination with federal or neighboring regional authorities, Puntland’s leadership has allowed security to deteriorate dramatically.

Recent months have witnessed an alarming rise of inter-clan conflicts, ISIS, and organized political groups tearing Puntland State apart. Armed groups are regaining influence in previously pacified areas, and traditional elders — once integral to local dispute resolution — have been sidelined and disrespected. Even in urban centers like Garowe, Bosaso, and Galkayo confidence in security forces has eroded, with many units underfunded, demoralized, and factionalized.

Economic Paralysis and Poverty

Puntland’s economy is in a downward spiral. Once bustling ports like Bosaso, Galkayo’s central markets, and regional trade corridors are now stagnating due to poor infrastructure investment, rampant corruption, and the absence of any economic recovery strategy.

Small businesses are suffocating under rising costs and unpredictable regulations. Foreign investment has dried up. Infrastructure projects funded by donors or multilateral partners have been either hijacked for political gain or deliberately frozen to punish political adversaries. Civil servant salaries are months in arrears. The private sector, once a reliable engine for growth, is shrinking under pressure, forcing many youth into unemployment or out-migration.

This economic collapse is not just a matter of policy failure—it is the natural result of a leadership vacuum and absence of strategic planning.

Political Isolation and Eroding Legitimacy

President Deni’s decision to isolate Puntland politically — both internally and from the broader federal framework — has severely backfired. Where Puntland once played the role of a wise and steady elder in Somali politics, today it has no clear allies. Even regions and factions that historically aligned with Puntland’s interests have now distanced themselves, criticizing its political rigidity and lack of outreach.

The attempt to extend his powers without consensus has only deepened this legitimacy crisis. Civil society, traditional elders, opposition groups, and even sections of the diaspora have turned their backs on the administration, viewing it as illegitimate and out of touch. The public now sees the government not as a custodian of the state but as a personal enterprise led by a man who views public service as private entitlement.

Crossroads: To Be or Not To Be?

What’s happening in Puntland is not merely a governance failure — it is an existential threat to the state’s future. The once-proud region, known for pioneering Somali federalism, drafting the first post-civil war constitution, and creating relatively stable institutions, now teeters on the brink of disintegration.

Puntland is at a critical crossroads — to either reclaim its founding principles of participatory governance, rule of law, and decentralized democracy, or continue down this dangerous path toward autocracy, division, and collapse.

The people of Puntland — intellectuals, elders, youth, business leaders, and women — must now choose whether to remain silent in the face of growing dysfunction or to rise in defense of their future. Puntland’s survival depends not on one man but on a collective course correction. Without accountability, inclusivity, and strategic leadership, the Puntland model will become just another tragic chapter in Somalia’s long struggle for statehood.

Conclusion:

Puntland’s future is still salvageable — but not without immediate action. The time for cosmetic changes and hollow rhetoric has passed. Reform, renewal, and responsible leadership are now the only options. The cost of inaction is clear: political irrelevance, economic collapse, and security breakdown. The people of Puntland must act — and act now — before the window of opportunity closes permanently.

The WDM: The Voices of the People. The Mirror of the Nation.

Recently, I had the distinct pleasure of being an esteemed guest of a dear Mandarin speaking friend in Nairobi, Kenya, who generously hosted me for lunch at several fine Chinese restaurants. What began as a simple invitation quickly turned into an eye-opening cultural experience—one that left a lasting impression on my palate and spirit.

Falling in Love with Chinese Cuisine

To say I’ve fallen in love with Chinese cuisine would be an understatement. The richness, diversity, and presentation of the dishes captivated me from the very first bite. Each meal was a colorful orchestra of flavors—sweet, sour, salty, spicy—expertly balanced and served with artistry. The variety was remarkable: from steamed dumplings to sizzling, to silky soups to aromatic teas, every dish told a story of centuries-old culinary heritage.

Beyond the food itself, I was fascinated by the etiquette and tools used in Chinese dining. The graceful use of chopsticks, the traditional serving ware, and the emphasis on sharing and harmony at the table all reflected a deep-rooted culture of respect, refinement, and mindfulness. It was more than a meal—it was a ritual of community and appreciation.

Meeting the Faces Behind the Flavors

Even more enriching was the opportunity to meet my friend’s Chinese colleagues and acquaintances—professionals and workers who were both cultivated and cordial. This was my first real interaction with Chinese individuals in a social setting, and I was deeply impressed by their warmth, humility, and intellect.

Despite language and cultural differences, there was a genuine spirit of friendship and curiosity in our conversations. I learned about their work in Nairobi, their impressions of Kenya, and their personal journeys. They, in turn, were interested in my background and perspectives as far as body could convey. It was a reminder of how shared meals can bridge cultures and create meaningful human connections.

Gratitude to a Generous Friend

None of this would have been possible without the generosity of my friend, who thoughtfully extended these invitations and made sure I felt welcome in every setting. It was not just about food—it was about hospitality, sharing, and opening doors to new experiences. I am sincerely grateful for the time, effort, and kindness that went into making me feel like a valued guest.

A New Chapter of Curiosity

This experience has opened a new chapter in my appreciation for Chinese culture and hospitality. I look forward to exploring more about their traditions, cuisine, and community here in Nairobi and beyond. It is often said that food is a universal language—and now I know this to be true.

To my friend: thank you for the marvelous entertainment and for introducing me to a world I am eager to know more about.

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/06/hitler-public-order/683098/

https://epc.ae/en/details/featured/expansion-of-the-islamic-state-in-puntland-a-new-round-of-jihadist-infighting-in-somalia

Introduction

Since the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012, the nation has grappled with persistent opposition stemming from federal member states (FMS), political alliances, civil society, and armed groups. This opposition reflects deep-rooted tensions over governance structures, resource allocation, and national identity. Understanding the dynamics of this opposition is crucial for Somalia’s path toward stability and unity.

1. Historical Context and Evolution of the Opposition

The roots of opposition to the FGS trace back to the collapse of the central government in 1991, leading to the emergence of clan-based administrations and regional entities. The 2012 provisional constitution introduced a federal system intended to balance power between Mogadishu and the regions. However, the implementation of federalism has been fraught with challenges, leading to friction between the central government and FMS over issues like resource sharing, security, and political representation.

2. Main Forms of Opposition

A. Federal Member States (FMS) as Opposition

FMS have often acted as de facto opposition to the FGS, asserting their autonomy and challenging central authority:

Puntland: Established in 1998, Puntland has been a vocal critic of the FGS, especially concerning constitutional reforms perceived to centralize power. In March 2024, Puntland announced its withdrawal from the federal system, citing unilateral constitutional amendments by the FGS  .

Jubbaland: Under President Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe), Jubbaland has clashed with the FGS over electoral processes and autonomy. In November 2024, Jubbaland suspended ties with the FGS following disputes over regional elections and constitutional amendments  .

B. Political Alliances and Movements

Political figures and former leaders have formed alliances to challenge the FGS:

Forum for National Parties (FNP): Founded in 2019 by former Presidents Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the FNP advocates for political reforms and has been critical of the FGS’s approach to federalism and elections  .

Council of Presidential Candidates (CPC): Formed during the 2021 electoral crisis, the CPC opposed term extensions and called for transparent elections, highlighting the need for consensus between the FGS and FMS  .

C. Civil Society and Media

Journalists, scholars, and civil society organizations have played a role in opposing the FGS by advocating for transparency, accountability, and inclusive governance. However, they often face challenges such as censorship and limited freedom of expression.

D. Armed Opposition: Al-Shabaab

While not part of the political opposition, Al-Shabaab remains a significant threat to the Somali state, exploiting governance vacuums and conflicts between the FGS and FMS to expand its influence.

3. Strengths of the Opposition

Regional Autonomy: FMS like Puntland and Jubbaland have established functioning administrations, providing them with leverage in negotiations with the FGS.

Territorial Control: Control over strategic regions allows FMS to assert authority and resist centralization efforts.

Public Support: In some regions, local populations support FMS leaders who they perceive as better representing their interests compared to the FGS.

International Engagement: FMS have engaged with international actors independently, seeking support and investment, which enhances their political standing.

4. Weaknesses of the Opposition

Fragmentation: The opposition lacks a unified agenda, with differing priorities among FMS and political alliances, leading to inconsistent strategies.

Clan-Based Politics: Reliance on clan affiliations can undermine national cohesion and limit the appeal of opposition movements beyond specific groups.

Limited Institutional Capacity: Some FMS struggle with governance challenges, including limited administrative capacity and financial resources.

Susceptibility to External Influence: Engagements with foreign actors can lead to perceptions of external interference, potentially undermining legitimacy.

5. Key Actors in the Somali Opposition

Said Abdullahi Deni (Puntland President): A prominent critic of the FGS’s centralization efforts, advocating for greater regional autonomy.

Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe) (Jubbaland President): Opposes FGS interventions in regional affairs, emphasizing the importance of respecting FMS autonomy.

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Former President): Leader of the FNP, advocating for political reforms and inclusive governance.

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (Current President): Previously part of the opposition during Farmaajo’s tenure, now leading efforts to reconcile with FMS while facing criticism over constitutional reforms.

6. International Dimensions

International actors have influenced Somalia’s political landscape:

United States: Has engaged with both the FGS and FMS, including military cooperation with Puntland in counterterrorism efforts  .

Gulf States: Countries like the UAE and Qatar have supported different Somali factions, contributing to regional rivalries and political alignments  .

African Union and United Nations: Have facilitated dialogues and supported peacekeeping missions, aiming to stabilize the country and promote governance reforms.

7. Conclusion and Outlook

The opposition to Somalia’s Federal Government is multifaceted, encompassing regional administrations, political alliances, and civil society actors. While the opposition has strengths in regional autonomy and public support, challenges such as fragmentation and clan-based politics persist. Moving forward, fostering inclusive dialogue, respecting the autonomy of FMS, and implementing constitutional reforms through consensus are essential steps toward national unity and stability.

In a small teashop in Garowe, the capital of Puntland, an intense debate reflects the broader currents of international politics playing out in Somalia. The topic? Turkey’s deepening presence in Somalia and the strategic rivalries involving the UAE, Qatar, the United States, and the specter of rising threats from geopolitical instability in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Somalia, a nation long beset by internal conflict, is now an epicenter of great power competition in the Horn of Africa.

I. Turkey’s Strategic Entry into Somalia

Turkey’s modern engagement with Somalia began in earnest in 2011, when then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Mogadishu at the height of a famine crisis. His visit was the first by a non-African leader in over two decades and marked a significant shift in Turkey’s foreign policy — a blend of humanitarian outreach, religious solidarity, and strategic ambition. Ankara launched a range of humanitarian and development initiatives, from building hospitals and roads to opening its largest embassy in Mogadishu.

But what started as humanitarian support quickly evolved into a robust, long-term strategic presence:

Military cooperation: In 2017, Turkey opened Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, one of its largest overseas military bases. The facility trains Somali National Army (SNA) units, helping shape a Turkish-aligned military core within Somalia.

Economic investment: Turkish companies control key infrastructure, including Mogadishu’s main port and airport. They have also been active in construction, energy, and education sectors.

Diplomatic leverage: Turkey has positioned itself as a key external actor in Somalia’s politics, often bypassing traditional Western donors and institutions.

II. Centralization vs Federalism: The Critique of Turkey’s Policy

One of the central critiques emerging from within Somalia — echoed in the Garowe debate — is Turkey’s over-reliance on Mogadishu’s central government. This approach, critics argue, ignores the realities of Somalia’s federal structure, where semi-autonomous member states like Puntland, Jubaland, and Galmudug wield significant power and territorial control.

Turkey’s preference for working exclusively with the federal government has created friction with federal member states. These entities often view Ankara’s approach as undermining Somalia’s federal model and centralizing power in Mogadishu, a city with tenuous control beyond its immediate surroundings. Turkey’s alignment with weak or embattled central governments, as seen during the Farmaajo administration, has further exacerbated distrust in regions like Puntland, where political independence and territorial autonomy are zealously guarded.

III. Turkey’s Enduring Footprint and Realpolitik

Despite critiques, another view — espoused in the same debate — argues that Turkey has already cemented a near-permanent presence in Somalia. Its deep institutional ties, military base, and control over revenue-generating infrastructure mean that even if the federal government collapses or is replaced by another force, including Al-Shabaab, Turkey is likely to retain its foothold.

This perspective reflects a realist understanding of foreign policy: Turkey is in Somalia not merely as a humanitarian actor but as a geopolitical competitor seeking influence in a strategic maritime corridor. Somalia offers Turkey a base on the western flank of the Indian Ocean, adjacent to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most critical shipping chokepoints.

IV. The Gulf Rivalry: UAE, Qatar, and the Shadow of Proxy Politics

Turkey’s position in Somalia cannot be understood without examining the fierce geopolitical rivalry playing out between Turkey-Qatar on one side and the UAE-Saudi Arabia on the other.

UAE’s strategy: The UAE has pursued a “federal-first” strategy, cultivating ties with Puntland and Somaliland, where it has built the Berbera port and military facilities. Abu Dhabi views Turkish and Qatari influence in Mogadishu as a threat to its broader Red Sea and Indian Ocean strategy.

Qatar’s alignment: Doha, often aligned with Turkey, has funded political actors in Mogadishu and has supported Islamist-leaning political movements such as Damul Jadiid — a factor that aligns poorly with UAE’s secular authoritarian model.

The result is a complex web of local and regional alliances, with Somali factions often serving as proxies for competing Gulf powers. The rivalry spills into domestic politics, clan dynamics, and even armed conflicts.

V. The United States and the Resource Factor

Adding another layer is the role of the United States. Although historically supportive of Somalia’s federal government, Washington has become increasingly wary of foreign actors such as Turkey, China, and the Gulf states entrenching themselves in Somalia’s institutions and infrastructure. Of particular concern is the potential exploitation of untapped offshore hydrocarbons — believed to exist in Somalia’s Indian Ocean waters.

U.S. officials are especially cautious of Turkey gaining exclusive energy rights in Somalia, particularly in light of Ankara’s assertive energy policies in the Eastern Mediterranean. American interests also include counterterrorism, maritime security, and preventing Chinese or Russian encroachment in this strategic corridor.

VI. The Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Bigger Chessboard

Beyond Somalia itself, the Horn of Africa is embedded in a larger geopolitical theater. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are now areas of intense interest due to:

Increased naval traffic and global trade routes.

The militarization of strategic ports (Djibouti, Berbera, Assab).

Rising Houthi-Iranian influence in Yemen, directly across the water from Somalia.

New military alliances, such as the Red Sea Council (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.), seeking to control maritime routes and exclude rival powers like Turkey and Iran.

Somalia’s long coastline — the longest in mainland Africa — makes it a pivotal node in this maritime network. Any power with influence in Somalia has a say in broader Indian Ocean geopolitics.

VII. Conclusion: Somalia as a Geopolitical Battleground

The debate in the Garowe teashop captures a microcosm of a larger truth: Somalia, once seen solely through the lens of state failure and humanitarian crisis, is now a stage for global strategic competition. Turkey’s presence is deep and likely enduring, but it is also challenged by Emirati pragmatism, Qatari alliances, American caution, and Somali federal complexity.

In the years to come, the key questions will be:

Can Somalia navigate these external rivalries without becoming a client state of any particular axis?

Will Turkey broaden its engagement beyond Mogadishu to federal states like Puntland, or continue to alienate regional power centers?

How will hydrocarbons, port politics, and military rivalries reshape Somali sovereignty?

Somalia’s future lies not just in peace-building and governance reform but in managing its geography — a blessing and a curse in the current world order.

By WDM
May 18, 2025

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In the bustling port city of Bosaso on the Gulf of Aden, Puntland’s economic heartbeat, a quiet storm is brewing. Along its sun-scorched coastline, foreign flags fly over a sprawling military facility—a base reportedly hosting U.S. intelligence operatives, Emirati naval and military assets, and drone launchpads targeting ISIS militants in nearby Calmiskaad. While officials tout it as a critical tool for regional security, whispers of backroom deals, civilian risks, and shadowy missions beyond Puntland’s borders demand a closer look. Is this base a lifeline for stability or a ticking time bomb for Somali sovereignty? Let’s unpack the debate.

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Whose Agenda Rules in Bosaso?

Foreign military bases are rarely just about “security.” In Bosaso, two global heavyweights—the U.S. and UAE—are playing very different games.

• The U.S. Counterterrorism Playbook: Washington’s focus is laser-sharp: degrade ISIS-Somalia, a faction that’s carved out hideouts in Puntland’s mountains. Drone strikes from Bosaso have reportedly pummeled insurgent positions, but as we’ve seen in Yemen and Afghanistan, such tactics can backfire. Civilian casualties breed resentment, and “surgical” strikes often leave political wounds that fester.
• The UAE’s Grand Chessboard: For the Emirates, Bosaso is a strategic jewel in its crown of Horn of Africa investments. With ports in Eritrea and Yemen already under its belt, the UAE seems intent on dominating trade routes and countering rivals like Turkey and Qatar. But at what cost? Leaked reports suggest murky agreements with Puntland’s leadership, including sweetheart deals for port access and presidential security. Critics argue this isn’t aid—it’s a transaction.

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The Tightrope Walk: Security vs. Somali Sovereignty

Puntland’s government, which operates semi-independently from Mogadishu, faces a brutal calculus. Partnering with foreign powers brings cash, weapons, and intelligence to fight groups like ISIS and Al-Shabaab. But reliance on outsiders risks turning Puntland into a pawn in someone else’s war.

• The Presidential Bubble: The fact that Puntland’s president now resides in the military base speaks volumes. While his safety may be guaranteed, what about the people? Locals have little say in deals struck behind closed doors, and rumours of U.S.-led strikes spilling into neighbouring regions could spark backlash.
• Mission Creep: A Slippery Slope: Media reports hint at operations stretching beyond Puntland’s borders. If true, this risks inflaming tensions with Somalia’s federal government and neighbouring states in the sub-region. Without clear rules or oversight, the base could become a hub for proxy wars, not peace.

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Risks of Foreign Presence: More Than Just Bombs?

Foreign bases often come with unintended consequences:

1. Blowback: Concentrating foreign troops and drones in Bosaso makes it a prime target for insurgent attacks. Civilians, not soldiers, often pay the heaviest price.
2. Proxy Wars: The UAE’s rivalry with Turkey (which backs Mogadishu) could turn Puntland into a battleground for regional power plays.
3. Eroding Trust: Secrecy fuels distrust. If locals view the base as a tool of foreign exploitation—not protection—it could fuel the very extremism it aims to crush.

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A Better Path Forward?

Security is vital, but it can not come at the cost of Somali sovereignty. Here’s what’s missing from the Bosaso equation:

• Transparency: Puntland’s government must disclose the terms of its foreign partnerships. Who’s funding the base? What’s the scope of operations?
• Accountability: Civilian harm from drone strikes must be investigated and compensated. No more “oops” apologies.
• Invest in People, Not Just Drones: Jobs, schools, and hospitals do more to counter extremism than any drone. Why is 90% of foreign aid still military-focused?

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Final Thoughts: Who Wins, Who Loses?

The Bosaso base is a double-edged sword. For now, it may keep ISIS at bay and line the pockets of a few elites. But if history teaches us anything, it’s that foreign military interventions in Somalia rarely end well. Without transparency, equity, and local buy-in, Bosaso’s base risks becoming another chapter in Somalia’s long story of external exploitation—dressed up as a “security partnership.”

What do you think? Is foreign military presence a necessary evil in fragile states like Somalia or a recipe for disaster? Drop your thoughts in the comments.

Background information

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has maintained a notable presence in Bosaso, the commercial hub of Somalia’s Puntland State, since 2017.  This involvement encompasses both maritime security initiatives and infrastructure development.

UAE Presence in Bosaso

The UAE has been instrumental in supporting the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), a regional security entity established in 2010 to combat piracy.  This support includes training, equipment provision, and operational assistance. 

In addition to security collaborations, the UAE, through its subsidiary P&O Ports, secured a 30-year concession in 2017 to manage and develop the Port of Bosaso.  The development plans involve constructing a 450-meter quay, dredging to a depth of 12 meters, and enhancing port infrastructure to accommodate larger vessels. 

Reports of Radar Installation

In April 2025, open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts reported the presence of a structure near Bosaso’s UAE-operated airbase that resembles an Israeli-manufactured ELM-2084 Multi-Mission Radar system.  This radar is known for its capabilities in tracking drones, missiles, and aircraft over distances up to 470 kilometres.  The installation, if confirmed, could enhance surveillance and air defence in the region. 

Official Denials and Regional Dynamics

The Puntland government has officially denied the existence of any UAE military base or radar installations in Bosaso.  Minister of Information, Mahmoud Aydid Dirir, labelled the reports as “fabricated propaganda” aimed at undermining Puntland’s stability and progress in counter-terrorism efforts. 

These developments occur amid complex regional dynamics, with various international actors seeking strategic footholds in the Horn of Africa.  The UAE’s activities in Bosaso reflect its broader strategy to secure maritime routes and expand its influence in East Africa.

⚠️ Conclusion

While the UAE’s involvement in Bosaso is evident through its support for the PMPF and port development projects, reports of advanced military installations like the ELM-2084 radar remain unconfirmed and are officially denied by Puntland authorities.  The situation underscores the intricate interplay of local governance, foreign interests, and regional security concerns in Somalia’s northeastern corridor.

The suggestion that Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo could serve as a political blueprint for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is not merely misguided—it risks erasing the lessons of Somalia’s recent history. While both leaders have occupied the presidency, their approaches to governance, constitutional integrity, and national cohesion diverge sharply. To position Farmaajo as a model for Mohamud is to endorse a legacy of authoritarianism, foreign policy recklessness, and clan-based division—a path incompatible with Somalia’s fragile democratic aspirations.

1. Authoritarian Centralization vs. Sectarian Fragmentation

Farmaajo’s tenure was defined by a systematic erosion of democratic norms. His administration weaponized state institutions to silence critics, imprison journalists, and stifle opposition through tactics like the 2018 electoral meddling in Galmudug and Jubbaland. By centralizing power in Mogadishu, he destabilized Somalia’s federal framework, undermining hard-won progress toward inclusive governance.

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, while navigating Somalia’s complex clan dynamics, has faced accusations of favoring his Hawiye lineage, particularly in appointments and resource allocation. However, unlike Farmaajo’s overt power grabs, Mohamud’s challenges stem from the perennial tension between clan loyalty and national unity—a struggle inherent to Somalia’s political landscape. Emulating Farmaajo’s autocratic playbook would only exacerbate these divisions rather than resolve them.

2. Foreign Policy Gambles vs. Diplomatic Pragmatism

Farmaajo’s alignment with Qatar and Turkey alienated traditional partners like the UAE and Western donors, polarizing Somalia’s foreign relations during a critical period of state-building. His 2018 agreement ceding Somali airspace management to Ethiopia—crafted in secrecy without parliamentary oversight—exposed a blatant disregard for sovereignty. This deal, framed as “regional cooperation,” set a perilous precedent for external interference.

Mohamud, by contrast, has pursued a more balanced diplomatic strategy, reaffirming ties with multilateral institutions like the African Union while cautiously engaging Gulf partners. His administration’s support for the Somali National Army’s offensive against al-Shabaab, backed by international allies, reflects a pragmatic approach to security—one that avoids Farmaajo’s reliance on foreign patronage.

3. Clan Populism vs. Incremental Reconciliation

Farmaajo’s rhetoric of “Somali nationalism” often served as a veil for sub-clan favoritism, deepening societal fractures. His manipulation of clan loyalties, exemplified by the politicization of security forces and federal agencies, prioritized short-term control over long-term reconciliation.

Mohamud’s efforts, though imperfect, have leaned toward dialogue. His handling of the SSC-Khatumo crisis—a breakaway region challenging Puntland’s authority—illustrates this contrast. Where Farmaajo ignored the 2019 Las Anod protests, enabling violent crackdowns, Mohamud has cautiously supported SSC-Khatumo’s quest for representation, framing it as a constitutional rather than partisan issue. This shift, while contentious, acknowledges local agency—a marked departure from Farmaajo’s top-down coercion.

4. Constitutional Sabotage vs. Institutional Reform

Farmaajo’s most damaging legacy lies in his assault on electoral norms. His 2021 bid to illegally extend his term via a rubber-stamp parliament ignited street battles in Mogadishu, threatening a return to civil war. Such brinkmanship exposed a willingness to trade stability for personal power.

Mohamud, meanwhile, has cautiously advanced constitutional reforms, including controversial amendments to Somalia’s electoral model. While critics argue these changes centralize power, they also aim to universalize suffrage—a step toward one-person, one-vote elections absent since 1969. The difference? Farmaajo sought to bend institutions; Mohamud, however haltingly, seeks to rebuild them.

Conclusion: Charting a New Path Beyond Populism

Somalia’s next chapter demands leaders who transcend the zero-sum politics of the past. Farmaajo’s tenure—a case study in the perils of populism—offers no roadmap for progress. His foreign gambles, clan patronage, and disdain for federalism exacerbated the very crises he vowed to solve.

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud need not replicate these failures. Instead, his administration must prioritize inclusive dialogue, strengthen judicial independence, and depoliticize security forces. The SSC-Khatumo question, for instance, should be resolved through constitutional mechanisms, not backroom clan deals.

Somalia’s future hinges on rejecting the false choice between strongman rule and sectarian fragmentation. Leaders must embrace compromise over coercion, transparency over secrecy, and nationhood over clanhood. Farmaajo’s legacy is a warning, not a model—and Mohamud’s success depends on learning from it, not reviving it.

Somalia deserves leaders who build bridges, not walls. The stakes are too high for anything less

Prepared for Somali Policymakers, Constitutional Experts, and Academic Stakeholders
May 2025

Executive Summary
Three decades after the collapse of central authority, Somalia remains trapped in a cyclical crisis of political fragmentation, weak institutions, and contested sovereignty. The federal model, formally adopted to distribute power and promote reconciliation, has not delivered the intended outcomes. The persistent gap between constitutional theory and governance practice has produced a stalemate, enabling extremist actors to exploit the resulting vacuum.

This paper proposes that Somali leaders consider a transition from federalism to confederation as a pragmatic response to political paralysis. A confederal framework could provide the necessary flexibility for self-governance while preserving a shared national identity, laying the groundwork for long-term stabilization.

1. Background: Post-Conflict Governance in Somalia
The post-1991 Somali political agenda prioritized five critical goals:

National reconciliation among fragmented communities and regions.

Conflict resolution and peace-making to end violence.

Equitable power-sharing across clans and territories.

Anti-corruption and public accountability.

Reconstruction of national institutions

While some progress has been made, especially with external support, foundational challenges persist due to unresolved political structure.

2. The Federal Project: Ambitions and Breakdown
Somalia’s Provisional Constitution (2012) institutionalized federalism as a compromise mechanism. In practice, implementation has stalled due to:

Ambiguity in constitutional powers between federal and member states.

Mogadishu-centric centralism, often undermining local autonomy.

Irregular recognition of federal member states (e.g., SSC-Khatumo, Somaliland).

Interference in regional elections and internal affairs by the federal government.

Incomplete constitutional review process and absence of judicial enforcement mechanisms.

These systemic weaknesses have led to growing disillusionment among stakeholders.

3. Political Paralysis and National Security Risks

Electoral gridlocks have become normative rather than exceptional.

Security coordination failures have emboldened extremist groups like Al-Shabaab and ISIS.

State capture and clientelism are widely reported in both federal and regional institutions.

Citizens increasingly view both the federal and state authorities as illegitimate.

Without a structural reset, the federation may continue to unravel from within.

4. The Confederation Option: Conceptual Foundations
Confederation offers a flexible model based on voluntary association of sovereign entities, with minimal central authority. This could entail:

Shared responsibilities in foreign policy, national defense, and currency

Full autonomy for member states in domestic governance, taxation, security

Coordinated rather than hierarchical policymaking

Structured opt-in mechanisms for policy harmonization

Comparative Lessons: Historical precedents (e.g., early Swiss Confederation, Senegambia, the United Arab Emirates to some extent) suggest that confederations can serve as transitional frameworks in post-conflict or diverse societies.

5. Policy Rationale for Somali Confederation

Current Challenges of Federalism:

Incomplete and contested autonomy for member states

Centralized implementation bottlenecks

Weak national ownership and political legitimacy

Zero-sum competition among political elites

High potential for conflict due to power centralization

Potential Advantages of Confederation:

Guaranteed and formalized regional autonomy

Decentralized flexibility in governance

Stronger local accountability and legitimacy

Incentives for negotiated cooperation over competition

Reduced conflict through clearly defined and shared sovereignty

6. Risks and Mitigation Strategies

Potential Risks:

Fragmentation into mini-states

Diplomatic isolation of the central authority

Resource inequalities among regions

Misuse of confederation as a step toward secession.

7. Recommendations for Policymakers and Researchers

1. Launch a National Commission on State Architecture Reform, including confederalism as a legitimate option.

2. Fund academic studies and policy dialogues across universities and think tanks to analyze comparative confederation models.

3. Revise the constitutional review agenda to include confederation as a transitional or permanent framework.

4. Engage in inclusive consultations with unrecognized or marginalized regions.

5. Negotiate a compact on shared sovereignty, drawing from international mediation support if needed.

8. Conclusion:

The Strategic Imperative of Rethinking Unity
Somalia’s struggle is not with federalism alone but with the assumptions underpinning its governance model. Confederation does not signify disintegration—it offers an opportunity to rebuild legitimacy from the ground up, turning imposed unity into negotiated coexistence.

Inaction risks entrenching the current deadlock and empowering non-state actors further. Policymakers and scholars must now lead a proactive, evidence-driven exploration of Somalia’s next constitutional chapter.

Prepared by:
Ismail Warsame/ Warsame Digital Media
iwarsame@ismailwarsame.blog
For distribution to Somali Federal Government, Federal Member States, Constitutional Review Committee, Somali Research Community.

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Author: WDM
May 2025
Publisher: Warsame Digital Media

Executive Summary

This report examines the recent political direction of SSC-Khatumo, a regional administration representing Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn, which has chosen to distance itself from Puntland in favor of asserting independent governance. While hailed by some as a bold move toward self-determination, this analysis argues that SSC-Khatumo’s leadership has adopted a misguided path shaped by political naivety and manipulation from Mogadishu-based factions. By falling into the orbit of groups like Damul Jadiid and Aaran Jaan, SSC-Khatumo risks political isolation, strategic vulnerability, and internal disillusionment. The report urges a reassessment of current trajectories and advocates for renewed regional cooperation.

1. Introduction

The political experiment currently underway in SSC-Khatumo has been hailed by some as a long-overdue assertion of self-governance. However, a closer examination reveals a trajectory marked by shortsighted strategy, external manipulation, and a weakening of foundational alliances. At the heart of this transformation is a leadership that, while buoyed by grassroots support, has increasingly distanced itself from long-standing partners like Puntland and aligned itself with factions in Mogadishu known more for political subterfuge than regional empowerment.

This report critically examines SSC-Khatumo’s separation from Puntland and its alignment with opportunistic factions in Mogadishu. Drawing on historical alliances, political patterns, and stakeholder dynamics, the report argues that SSC-Khatumo is being lured into a political trap that threatens the long-term viability of its autonomy and governance.

2. Historical Context and Strategic Foundations

SSC-Khatumo originated from a defensive movement aimed at countering Somaliland’s territorial claims over Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn. These territories are demographically aligned with the Darod-Harti clan family, which also forms the backbone of Puntland. The mutual interest in resisting Somaliland created a strong alignment between SSC forces and Puntland.

Puntland provided critical support—military, financial, and diplomatic—allowing SSC to establish a foothold. The relationship, while uneven at times, was based on shared identity and strategic necessity. SSC also benefited from Puntland’s decentralized governance model and international partnerships.

However, internal dissatisfaction grew within SSC ranks, especially over perceptions of marginalization and limited autonomy within Puntland’s structure. These grievances were gradually politicized, setting the stage for SSC’s reassertion of independence in 2023–2024. This period also saw increasing overtures from Mogadishu-based actors, who viewed the SSC-Puntland rift as a means to weaken Puntland’s defiance of Mogadishu centralization policies.

3. The Fall into the Damul Jadiid–Aaran Jaan Orbit

Damul Jadiid and Aaran Jaan are networks within Somali federal politics, often associated with centralized authority, behind-the-scenes influence, and a history of political manipulation. These factions have long viewed Puntland’s assertiveness as a threat to Mogadishu’s control and have sought to undercut it using proxy actors.

SSC-Khatumo’s leadership, either out of political naivety or personal ambition, appears to have welcomed this overture. The Damul Jadiid-Aaran Jaan axis offered rhetorical support, minimal funding, and vague promises of recognition, which appealed to a leadership eager to escape Puntland’s association. In doing so, SSC-Khatumo opened itself up to exploitation by a political faction with no history of supporting genuine regional autonomy.

4. The Rift with Puntland

SSC-Khatumo’s unnegotiated departure from Puntland is framed by its leaders as a move toward full self-determination. However, this move has come at the cost of severing ties with the only regional partner that consistently supported SSC’s struggle against Somaliland occupation of SSC territories.

Instead of negotiating for greater autonomy or formal separation within Puntland, SSC-Khatumo chose a confrontational approach, driven by mistrust and encouraged by external actors. This rift could weaken both entities in the face of growing threats from Mogadishu and Hargeisa.

5. The Federal Government’s Calculated Silence

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has maintained an ambiguous stance toward SSC-Khatumo, apart from legally unbinding statement by prime minister Hamse Abdi Barre through media channels and behind-the-scenes diplomacy, it has avoided formal recognition or material backing. This silence is strategic.

Mogadishu avoids antagonizing Somaliland while encouraging SSC to drift further from Puntland. SSC is effectively being used as a pawn in a broader political game—its struggle romanticized publicly but unsupported in practice. This calculated neglect may eventually leave SSC stranded.

6. Stakeholder Analysis

Internal:

SSC Elders and Youth: Increasingly divided; many support autonomy but question isolation.

Diaspora: Financially supportive but growingly skeptical about long-term strategy.

Regional:

Puntland ally may now feel betrayed and could pivot to a more assertive stance.

Somaliland: Watching SSC’s instability with interest; could exploit divisions.

National:

FGS: Seeks to weaken Puntland using SSC as leverage; offers minimal commitment.

External:

International Partners: Hesitant to engage SSC directly without federal recognition.

ATMIS/AUSSOM: Focused elsewhere; not equipped to mediate SSC’s crisis.

7. Consequences of Isolation

SSC-Khatumo’s current trajectory risks several negative outcomes:

Economic Weakness: No institutional or financial base to sustain governance.

Military Vulnerability: Limited capacity to defend against Somaliland or internal insurgency.

Political Fragmentation: Leadership lacks cohesion; multiple factions emerging.

Loss of Public Trust: Community expectations are high; delivery is low.

8. Possible Future Scenarios

1. Reconciliation with Puntland: A negotiated reentry or partnership based on autonomy guarantees.

2. Federal Recognition Gambit: Unlikely to succeed due to FGS’s weak credibility and Somaliland sensitivities.

3. Long-Term Isolation: SSC becomes a de facto isolated entity, vulnerable to infiltration and collapse.

9. Conclusion

SSC-Khatumo’s leadership has made a critical strategic error by alienating Puntland and aligning with self-interested factions in Mogadishu. While the desire for autonomy is legitimate, the path chosen is fraught with risk, driven by short-term pride rather than long-term viability. Without recalibration, SSC-Khatumo may find itself isolated, under-resourced, and politically adrift. The region’s future lies not in emotional separation but in strategic cooperation with like-minded regional partners.

Timeline of Key Events

2012–2017: Original Khatumo movement

2022: Las Anod protests escalate

2023: Re-declaration of SSC-Khatumo

2024: Unilateral break with Puntland

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