By Ismail Warsame
For over three decades, Somaliland has claimed independence from the rest of Somalia, and yet Britain—its former colonial ruler and one of its strongest foreign patrons—continues to withhold official recognition. This deliberate non-recognition has often been misread by pan-Somali unionists as a moral stance in support of Somali unity, or as Britain’s respect for African Union protocols and international law.
But nothing could be further from the truth.
Britain’s refusal to formally recognize Somaliland’s statehood is not a gesture of goodwill toward Somalia’s unity, nor is it based on any principled commitment to continental or global legal frameworks. Rather, it is a well-orchestrated policy of self-interest, anchored in a desire to preserve influence over the entire Somali geography—fragmented, unstable, and exploitable.
A Strategic Hedge: Playing Both Sides of Somali Politics
Unlike other former colonial powers, the UK has adopted a dual-track approach to Somalia. It engages both the Federal Government in Mogadishu and the administration in Hargeisa. This enables Britain to retain maximum leverage while avoiding formal legal commitments to either side.
By withholding recognition of Somaliland, Britain maintains:
Access to Mogadishu, where UN and African Union missions are based.
Soft power in Hargeisa, where UK-funded NGOs, education programs, and security firms operate freely.
Flexibility in oil and port negotiations, especially concerning Berbera, where UK-friendly interests (like DP World) operate.
This ambiguity is not accidental. It is strategic.
Not About African Unity – Just Global Hypocrisy
Britain frequently cites the African Union’s official stance on Somali territorial integrity to justify its hesitation on recognizing Somaliland. But this argument collapses under global scrutiny.
Britain supported the creation of South Sudan, recognized Kosovo’s independence, and has repeatedly intervened in state fragmentation when it aligns with its own interests. So why is Somaliland different?
Because Somalia—fragmented, weakened, and aid-dependent—is easier to manage, influence, and benefit from.
The moment Britain recognizes Somaliland, it risks:
Losing diplomatic access in Mogadishu.
Triggering regional chain reactions in Puntland and Jubaland.
Empowering nationalists who might resist UK economic and military influence.
So, the status quo—keeping Somaliland in limbo—serves British interests best.
Oil, Ports, and Quiet Power
Much of Britain’s hesitation is economic. Somaliland offers key strategic assets—especially its untapped oil reserves and the Berbera Port, a deep-water port with commercial and military potential.
British companies like Genel Energy have oil exploration interests in Somaliland. However, formal recognition might:
Trigger diplomatic or legal disputes with Mogadishu.
Invite regulatory scrutiny from a more empowered Somali federal government.
Endanger regional power balances that favor Western firms.
Moreover, maintaining soft control over strategic infrastructure without recognition allows the UK to:
Avoid responsibility.
Escape international legal constraints.
Play a long game of influence over multiple Somali actors.
As discussed in the article “The Invisible Hand: How Britain’s Shadow Governance Network Controls Modern Somalia and Seeks its Partition” (wordpress.com/ismailwarsame), the UK’s influence is exerted through a complex network of:
Development NGOs
Security contractors
Political mentorship programs
Education and aid channels
This network allows Britain to play an outsized role in Somali politics without direct intervention. A formal recognition of Somaliland would force London to take sides—thereby disrupting this delicate architecture of indirect influence.
Who Truly Loses in This Game?
The primary victim of Britain’s non-recognition policy is the Somali people—both in Somaliland and in southern Somalia. This ambiguity:
Encourages fragmentation and elite corruption.
Delays genuine reconciliation or reintegration efforts.
Undermines national institutions in favor of parallel structures.
Fuels regional tension and proxy rivalries (e.g., UAE vs. Qatar, Turkey vs. Egypt).
Britain’s calculated silence not only perpetuates division but sabotages the chance for a long-term Somali-led solution—be it reunification, federation, or legal separation.
Conclusion: This Is Not About Unity—It’s About Control
Britain’s refusal to recognize Somaliland is not a principled defense of Somali unity. It is a self-serving strategy to prolong access, leverage influence, and avoid legal entanglements in a volatile yet resource-rich region.
It is time for Somali intellectuals, youth, leaders, and regional allies to confront this duplicity. The future of Somalia—and Somaliland—should not be held hostage to outdated colonial calculations and foreign self-interest masquerading as diplomacy.
Whether one supports recognition or unity, the truth must be clear: Britain’s policy is not based on legality or loyalty—but on pure geopolitical calculus.
Further Reading
“The Invisible Hand: How Britain’s Shadow Governance Network Controls Modern Somalia and Seeks its Partition”
Warsame Policy & Media Network (WAPMEN) 