Balancing Geopolitics: Addressing Ethiopia’s Drive for Sea Access in a Fragile Region

Somalia’s policy needs to balance firmness on sovereignty with pragmatic engagement to address Ethiopia’s needs, using international and regional partnerships to pressure Ethiopia, while offering viable alternatives that serve both countries’ interests. Also, managing domestic opinion through transparent communication and ensuring any deal is perceived as beneficial to Somalia’s territorial integrity and economic development.

Somalia’s policy towards Ethiopia must navigate historical mistrust, territorial integrity concerns, and regional rivalries while addressing Ethiopia’s quest for sea access. Here’s a structured approach:

1. Diplomatic and Legal Assertiveness

  • Ankara Process Engagement: Prioritize technical committees in Ankara to negotiate Ethiopia’s sea access under Somali sovereignty. Demand Ethiopia formally void its Somaliland MoU as a precondition.
  • International Advocacy: Leverage the African Union and UN to affirm Somaliland as part of Somalia, pressuring Ethiopia to abandon unilateral deals. Highlight violations of territorial integrity under international law.

2. Domestic Unity and Communication

  • Public Diplomacy: Transparently communicate negotiations to Somalis, emphasizing sovereignty safeguards. Address grievances through inclusive dialogue to mitigate protests and build national consensus.

3. Economic and Security Incentives

  • Port Access Proposals: Offer Ethiopia conditional port access via a Somali-government-approved agreement, ensuring oversight and revenue-sharing. Tie access to Ethiopia’s disengagement from Somaliland.
  • Security Collaboration: Strengthen counterterrorism cooperation (e.g., against Al-Shabaab and ISIS) to build trust and mutual dependency.

4. Regional Balancing and Mediation

  • Neutralize Rivalries: Maintain cautious engagement with Egypt in forums like AUSSOM (likely a regional security initiative) without alienating Ethiopia. Use Turkey/Qatar as neutral mediators to ensure balanced outcomes.
  • Tripartite Dialogue: Explore indirect talks with Somaliland, incentivizing reintegration with autonomy guarantees while isolating Ethiopia’s unilateral moves.

5. Contingency Planning

  • Sanctions and Leverage: Prepare multilateral pressure (AU, Arab League) if Ethiopia persists with Somaliland. Highlight economic costs for Ethiopia, such as strained IGAD relations.
  • Alternative Partnerships: Deepen ties with Turkey, Qatar, or others for port investments, reducing Ethiopia’s leverage.

Key Considerations:

  • Sovereignty First: Any agreement must explicitly recognize Somali territorial integrity. Avoid precedents that embolden secessionism.
  • Pragmatism: Acknowledge Ethiopia’s economic needs but frame solutions within Somali-led frameworks.
  • Long-Term Vision: Use negotiations to stabilize bilateral relations, fostering economic interdependence (trade, infrastructure) to dilute historical tensions.

By combining firm legal posturing with pragmatic incentives, Somalia can protect its sovereignty while addressing Ethiopia’s interests, reducing regional volatility, and securing international support.

OPPOSITION PARTIES TO ANKARA DECLARATION IN BOTH SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA ARE FURIOUS

WDM EDITORIAL

Both opposition parties, in Somalia and Ethiopia, to the Ankara Declaration don’t trust their countries’ leaders as the overriding principle. These two leaders, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Abyi Ahmed had lost public trust in their respective countries, and it is unlikely that they will regain that lost credibility ever again in whatever they do in the foreseeable future, let alone this deal. But what we find strange is that the Amharas are accusing Abyi Ahmed of trying to incorporate “Somaliland” into what they call “Oromoma” (Oromo), apparently not into Ethiopia proper.

Analysts of the Ankara Declaration say there were different approaches to the disputes by Somalia and Ethiopia. They found that Somali Side was broad based in addressing their grievances against Ethiopian violations of Somali sovereignty and territorial integrity, while the Ethiopian Side was more specific in their demands, namely the recognition of the role Ethiopian forces played in helping Somalia battle with Al-Shabab as part of ATMIS and their “right” to gain “reliable and secure” access to the Somali sea, terms that were inserted into the Ankara Declaration. While Somalia finally agreed to the Ethiopian demands, they secured Ethiopian recognition of Somali sovereignty and territorial integrity, which means the Ethiopian infamous MoU with Somaliland is now dead. That is the major takeaway for the Somali Side. But, since this wasn’t explicitly stated in the Declaration, it could be subject to different interpretations in the implementation of the deal, specifically by the Ethiopians.

There are also renewed questions on the strategic objectives of Ankara in brokering this deal, given its major role in recent Syrian developments. Time will tell, but precaution applies here. Nations are all after their permanent interests. Make no mistake.

Overall, Ethiopia has secured a major breakthrough in Ankara Talks, an access to the Somali sea, a feat dreamed about but never realised by the past Ethiopian Imperial leaders for two centuries.

In good faith and for mutually beneficial economic cooperation, Ethiopia should be offered commercial facilities in Somali ports as a landlocked neighbourly state. But the historical burden between the two countries is a source of suspicion and mistrust. A lot now depends on Ethiopia to earn Somali public trust and address Somali fears once and for all. Somalis, by nature, are forgiving. They react positively to reciprocity and friendship.