Tag: Somali

ON THE ISSUE OF “SSC”

When we talk about the issue of “Sool, Sanaag and Cayn” (SSC), Sanaag is misplaced here for Warsangelis don’t identify themselves with this political claim of Dhulbahante.

Also note the following facts:
1. When Puntland State was in Sool after its establishment from 1998, the international community (IC) said it was a disputed territory and IC didn’t allow humanitarian and development projects to be implemented either by Puntland or IC independently. Why? It is a disputed territory?

2. When Somaliland happened to be in Sool, Puntland said it was an occupied territory. There is a number of Sool politicians, who are divided along sub-clan allegiances, political opportunism in every Somali factions in Hargeisa and Mogadishu, and betrayal of Dhulbahante cause.
3. Somaliland can implement projects in Laascaanod and IC doesn’t mind that, while IC immediately protests what they called Puntland interference and provocations in a disputed land.
4. As an informed person, I can assert that the issue on the positions of Puntland and Somaliland with regards to Sool and  Dhulbahante territory, in general, could be resolved readily, if Dhulbahante men and women were to understand that they belonged to their Darood/Harti community and avoid identifying themselves with the myths of their Isaxaaq  brothers as a part of “Somaliland” project. Moreover, Dhulbahante alone aren’t assigned to the cause of Somali Unity that they often claim. This is also a myth they have been telling to each other for quite sometime. On Somali unity, they aren’t more important than the Samaroons in Borama.

Another fact: Political leaders, MPs, traditional leaders, civil servants, security forces of  Dhulbahante origin are all here in Puntland State since its inception. They aren’t guests here in the same way they have been treated in Hargeisa. They are equal stakeholders in Puntland State. The noises you heard around against Puntland State are coming from those Dhulbahante individuals that have been deceived or misled by opportunistic politicians of Ali Khalif Galaydh type. Good luck! It makes no sense to claim they had helped the establishment of both Puntland and Somaliland to which they belonged none! Dhulbahante of laascanood City and politicians are powerless in preventing Somali citizens being expelled from the city while they are engaged in empty rhetoric and claim that they stand for Somali unity. Until Dhulbahante politicians and intellectuals accept blame for their contributions to the abysmal state of Dhulbahante affairs, nobody will be able to help them find solution to their situation. Finally, the case of Buhodle (Cayn) is different from the rest of Dhulbahante land because of the fact that it is located at a border point between Somalia and Ethiopia. Ethiopia doesn’t allow escalation of hostilities from Somaliland to spill over her Eastern part, on the top of modest support from Puntland authorities.

Set the record straight

The S.F.G.’s Strategy of Political Conflict

A confrontation over the form of federalism that a future Somali state would adopt is looming, as confidential sources report that the provisional Somali Federal Government (S.F.G.) is in the process of making a concerted push to control the formation of local, regional, and presumptive regional-state administrations in south-central Somalia.

The S.F.G., say the sources, is attempting to resist the early formation of a Jubbaland state in the south that would base itself on a decentralized-federal model, as Puntland has done; head off a similar process to the one in the south in the southwestern Bay and Bakool regions by placing an administration allied to it in charge there; counter the Galmudug authority in the east-central area by backing ex-warlord Abdi Qeybdid against the sitting government; and influence the leadership that will succeed the recently-deceased chair of the Ahlu Sunna wal-Jamaa (A.S.W.J.) movement, Sh. Mohamed Yusuf Hefow, that controls most of the central and east-central regions of Galgadud and Hiiraan. On each of those political fronts, the S.F.G. faces opposition, both locally and nationally by the autonomous state of Puntland, which resists the S.F.G.’s bids for control.

The S.F.G.’s Strategy of Political Conflict

By adopting a strategy of political conflict in south-central Somalia’s regions, the S.F.G.’s president, Hassan Sh. Mohamud, is attempting to solve his most pressing political problem, which is to establish the S.F.G.’s authority – dominance and control – over those regions. In the process of trying to do so, Mohamud is forcing the issue of what the state-form of Somalia will be. The options have narrowed down to two, a centralized federalism favored by the S.F.G. and its allies, and a decentralized federalism advocated by Puntland and its allies. The core political conflict in Somalia is between the S.F.G. and Puntland over state-form; the south-central regions are the arenas in which that conflict is being played out. Both the S.F.G. and Puntland are aware of the high stakes involved in their confrontation; if the S.F.G. prevails in the south-central regions, Puntland will be politically isolated and subject to pressure to abandon its autonomy, which gives it generous control over its natural resources and security policy; if Puntland is able to block the S.F.G., the latter will have had to cede significant authority over nascent regional states. The S.F.G.’s pursuit of a strategy of political conflict has turned a constitutional issue into a political power struggle.

Whether or not the S.F.G.’s strategy succeeds – and its success is highly problematic – that strategy is intelligible and follows from the power position of the S.F.G. The new federal government was to all intents and purposes imposed by the Western “donor”-powers/U.N. under veiled and explicit threats to withdraw financial support. The “donor”-powers wanted a “permanent” government established in Somalia so that they could decrease their commitment to the country and at the same time make agreements favorable to them with it.  In pursuing those aims, they ended up settling for a provisional/interim entity operating under an incomplete constitution that left the fundamental question of state-form open; absent from the constitution was a determination of centralized or decentralized federalism, and there were not yet regional states set up in south-central Somalia.

As a result of the “donor”-powers’ actions, the S.F.G. was left with the challenge of establishing its authority in the south-central regions without a constitutional basis, scant resources to buy allies in the regions, and military forces that did not extend beyond the capital Mogadishu. Under those constraints, the S.F.G. had few options; it could renounce the attempt to control the south-central regions and allow those regions substantial autonomy, which would weaken whatever (potential) power it might have; or it could do what it has chosen to do, which is to contest the forces for decentralized federalism region by region by allying with factions in each region that felt marginalized by nascent autonomous administrations with power bases independent of the S.F.G. The new federal government opted for the latter, which set up the conditions for political conflict. A source reports that the strategy of political conflict was urged upon Hassan by his inner circle of advisers from his Damul Jadid movement.

The consequences of the conflict strategy carry severe risks to stability. The divide between the forces of centralized and decentralized federalism has become confused with sub-clan rivalries within the regions, exacerbating animosities that already existed. Those rivalries have also given the revolutionary Islamist movement, Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.), which had been pushed out of control over its most lucrative territories, an opportunity to recruit from disaffected sub-clans, and it has drawn Puntland into the fray.

The conflict strategy shows the power deficit of the S.F.G. and its efforts to rectify it. None of what the S.F.G. feels that it has had to do would have been necessary had an effective process of state-building been instituted, which would have involved a process of social-political reconciliation among Somali factions leading to a constitutional agreement to which the major factions would have signed on. That possibility was eliminated by the “donor”-powers’ actions, and that constitutes their most egregious political failure.

As a result of the “donor”-powers’ actions, the domestic Somali actors have been left to pick up the pieces. Absent political reconciliation and the trust that comes with it, the Somali domestic actors are constrained to pursue their perceived interests and attempt to make them prevail. There is no reconciliation process in place; the stage is set for sub-clan-impelled constitutional confrontation abetted by ex-warlords and revolutionary Islamists. Interpreted through the dramaturgical model in political science, a tragedy is unfolding in which the protagonists-antagonists can see nothing to do but play a zero-sum game.

The Status of the Conflict

It is too early in the conflict over the state-form that Somalia will/might take to make a grounded prediction about its outcomes. The S.F.G. has only attempted to implement its strategy of political conflict in earnest since the return of Hassan to Mogadishu in mid-February from his round of visits to the external actors with interests in Somalia. Having touched base and gotten promises of support, Hassan had to try to “deliver” on his end of the bargain, showing that he led a (potentially) effective government.

Hassan’s most important political front, which demands his immediate attention, is the south, where a convention is slated to be held on February 23 to form a Jubbaland state comprising the Lower and Middle Jubba regions and the Gedo region. Approximately 500 delegates, including elders from the three regions are expected to attend, with the S.F.G. and regional states (Ethiopia and Kenya) as observers. Up until the present, it has appeared that the Jubbaland process would issue in a regional state modeled on Puntland. The S.F.G. will try to reverse that outcome.

According to one source, Hassan’s strategy has found willing supporters among sub-clans in the south that feel disadvantaged by the dominance of Ahmed Madobe, the interim governor in Kismayo, and his Ras Kamboni militia, which is allied with Kenyan forces in the south and is mainly composed of members of the Mohamed Suber sub-clan of the Ogaden-Darod. That leaves other Ogaden sub-clans, the Majertein-Darod (with ties to Puntland), and the Marehan-Darod more or less disposed to thwart any attempt by Madobe to dominate the Jubbaland state.

Another source confirms open-source reports that ex-warlord and Marehan leader, Barre Hirale, has met with Hassan and is “on good terms with the S.F.G.”  The source says that the Marehan will “listen to Hirale if he is empowered.” Meanwhile, on February 13, Garoweonline reported that a delegation whose members are involved in forming a Jubbaland state met with Puntland’s president, Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, to discuss how “Puntland’s efforts to establish [the] Jubbalnad state could be improved.” On February 15, Garoweonline reported that Hassan and the S.F.G.’s prime minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, who is Marehan, had split on the Jubbaland issue, with Shirdon supporting the ongoing process and Hassan attempting to undermine it.

The reports from closed and open sources present a picture in which fations in the south have not (yet) fully aligned, crystallized, and polarized around the issue of state-form, and around the S.F.G. and Puntland, with the S.F.G. itself split. The S.F.G.’s presence at the slated convention represents a concession by Hassan by virtue of his acknowledging the Jubbaland process, but it also is an opportunity for him to influence its outcome. Puntland will not be present at the convention, but it will attempt to work through its allies. How the local factions will align, insofar as they do, and how big a role the regional external actors decide to play, and on which of the sides, will determine the outcome, in addition to the efforts of Hassan and Farole.

The second front opened by Hassan in implementing his strategy of political conflict is the southwestern Bay region, dominated by the Rahanweyne clan, where an attempt to form a regional state composed of the Bay and Bakool regions was underway but had not advanced as far as it has in the southern regions. In the south, Hassan has been constrained to try to turn an ongoing process that was going against him to his favor or to subvert it, whereas in the southwest he has attempted to head off such a process before it began to function independently of the S.F.G.

Hassan moved by issuing an S.F.G. decree replacing the longtime Bay political leader and sitting governor, Abdifatah Gesey, who had been backed by Ethiopia and had forces in the region, with Abdi Hasow. Gesey resisted the S.F.G.’s action, declaring that he remained governor. According to a closed source, Ethiopia turned against Gesey and used its forces to oust him. On February 15, Garoweonline reported that Gesey had mobilized his militia and was still in the Bay region’s capital, Baidoa, whereas Hasow was out of public view. According to Garoweonline’s sources, the confrontation between Gesey and Hasow had caused the Bay administration to grind to a halt. Efforts to mediate the dispute were initiated and a delegation was sent to the region by the S.F.G.

On February 21, Garoweonline reported that Gesey was taken by S.F.G. security forces to Mogadishu after mediation efforts had failed. Sources in Mogadishu told Garoweonline that Gesey was “promised another title” in the regional government.
An indication of why Ethiopia switched sides and altered the distribution of power in favor of the S.F.G. is given in an Ethiopian government statement on February 16 concerning talks between the Somali Federal Parliament’s speaker, Mohamed Osman Jawari, and Ethiopia’s foreign minister, Tedros Adhomam, in which Jawari is reported to have urged the formulation of a “common position” between the S.F.G. and Ethiopia on the London conference on Somalia that will be held later in 2013. In return, Ethiopia promised to “work with Somalia on pushing donors to keep their promises.” Jawari then traveled to the ethnic Somali Ogaden region (Somali Regional State) of Ethiopia, where he met with regional officials and visited schools. Reports did not mention any hint that Jawari had taken up alleged human rights violations committed by Ethiopia and Ethiopian-backed militias in the Ogaden.

Just as in the south, the outcome of the face-off in Bay cannot be predicted. The S.F.G. has gained a foothold and has leverage, but it has yet to achieve the traction to push back its adversaries decisively.

A similar stand-off characterizes the situation in the Galmudug authority in east-central Somalia, where two governments dominated respectively by different sub-clans of the Hawiye claim claim the right to rule. According to a source, the S.F.G. has recognized one of the contenders – the faction led by ex-warlord Abdi Qeybdid – as the “legitimate” authority. During the past month there have been outbreaks of politically-inspired sub-clan violence in Galmudug with open sources claiming that Qeybdid’s militia is responsible for initiating the clashes. Again, as in the south and southwest, the S.F.G.’s strategy of political conflict is being implemented in Galmudug, and its outcome is uncertain.

In the central region of Galgadud and part of the Hiiraan region, the dominant A.S.W.J. movement is in the process of naming a leader to replace Sh. Mohamed Yusuf Hefow, who died in mid-February. Hefow had been in discussions with the S.F.G. to merge A.S.W.J. with it. A.S.W.J., which has several factions that support or oppose collaboration with the S.F.G. in various degrees, has now become subject, according to a source, to pressure from the S.F.G. to integrate with it on the S.F.G.’s terms. Again, the outcome is uncertain, but the S.F.G.’s push is underway. The source reports that a delegation from the federal parliament is in Galgadud, claiming that they are “consulting with local communities on extending government rule” to the region. The source says that the presence of the delegation has led to a dispute between some of the A.S.W.J.’s leadership and the S.F.G.

Assessment

One of the sources contributing to this analysis has put the S.F.G.’s/Hassan’s strategy of political conflict succinctly and precisely: Hassan is attempting to isolate some leaders and factions in each region and to empower others favorable to him. In doing so, Hassan is splitting each region politically, intervening in local conflicts and exacerbating them, and working with whoever will ally with him for whatever reason, whether it be ex-warlords, dissident clans, or factions within a movement. That is the familiar strategy of divide-and-rule, which is used by actors who cannot (Hassan) or do not want to expend the military and/or financial resources required to control the outcome of a conflict.

Hassan is playing the divide-and-rule game to extend the authority of the S.F.G. into the south-central regions, but in doing so he is carrying with him the program of centralized federalism. Puntland has yet to play its hand overtly, but it can be expected to do so if it appears that the centralized-federalist project is gaining traction and momentum. Since Hassan’s strategy necessitates opposition to its implementation by the forces that he is attempting to isolate, as it has done in each case, the path is open not only to confrontation at the local level and the re-activation of H.S.M., but to counter-moves by Puntland.

It is too early to predict whether or not Hassan will be successful, but it can be said that a political battle is looming that will overshadow all other political issues in the territories of post-independence Somalia.

Hassan’s strategy is obviously high risk and high stakes. In his best-case scenario, Hassan prevails in each south-central region and Puntland is faced with the option of compromising its autonomy or separating from south-central Somalia. Short of the best case for Hassan, “Somalia” becomes irretrievably fragmented and balkanized, or its territories become a mixture of uncoordinated regional and local forms of administration.

It is unclear whether or not the “donor”-powers understand what is happening in Somali domestic politics and, if they do, whether they are prepared to intervene and in what way. That the “donor”-powers will act decisively to try to prevent political breakdown is unlikely. The United States, for example, was prepared to support the S.F.G.’s request to have the United Nations arms embargo on it lifted, but then backtracked after European opposition and stated that it would wait for the completion of a U.N. “review”  of the desirability of taking such action. The U.S. backtrack was a blow to the S.F.G., which had expected more robust support when the U.S. recognized it.

As it stands, no actor, external or domestic, is working to avoid the impending confrontation. There is no formal process of reconciliation underway. The discourse of Somali political actors and intellectuals is not addressing the issue directly or, in some cases, at all. The external actors are silent about it. At the point at which the conflict intensifies to the degree that it is impossible for actors to ignore it, it is likely that it will be too late to resolve; this analysis is simply an early warning.

Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago  weinstem@purdue.edu

Source: media

 

On the Political Stagnation of Puntland

The latest political announcements (press statements) by Puntland political parties and their petition to Puntland State President, the Electoral Commission and to some members of the international community under the heading: Resolving Local Municipality Elections Stalemate, issued in Garowe, March 21, 25, 2013, indicate either the non-existence of mutual dialogue or break-down of political discourse within the State on the best way forward for holding local government elections. A number of political parties including UDAD, Midnimo, PDP and Wadajir seem to have forged an association to challenge the Government on its latest reform proposals and planned changes in Voter IDs registration. Among other things, these new political parties demand the immediate delay of Municipal Elections in Puntland until adequate preparations are done to insure fair public participation and a new independent Electoral commission installed.

As a neutral person on the current disagreements, “stalemate” as they put it, I think it is not appropriate for me to comment on these specific documents and respective political statements surrounding these issues, despite repeated requests by members of the Puntland public to do so.

Discussing democratization process in Puntland State, however, gives me a great deal of pleasure. But, it is long overdue. It is unfortunate that Puntland State has not come out of age yet and still in the woods. In other words, Puntland has been heavily suffering far too long from political stagnation since its foundation in August 1998. Democratization in the State has never been in the good books of its successive leaders as it was never contemplated as political imperative or priority for the continued survival and sustainability of the regional administration against all imaginable upheavals of Somali clan politics and rocky relationships with the rest of Somalia.
It is extremely important to note here that rushing things of such importance and magnitude is not wise for it creates more problems and serious fatal errors in hasty fashion to feel and look good in the eyes of foreign donor community. The fate of the State hangs on it and nobody has the right to gamble at the expense of nation’s existence, public safety and regional political stability. It requires tremendous efforts, resources, thorough preparatory work and ample time to build political consensus and legal framework for the final implementation of the electoral process in fair and transparent manners.
They said commonly, “A thousand-step journey starts with first one”. Leaders of Puntland State (authority and opposition) task and obligation to their people is to make sure that ‘One First Step” towards democratization must be moved straight forward towards the right direction. The alternative spells danger and political suicide for all concerned.

Somalia: A Government Failing at its own Peril

BY FAISAL A. ROBLE  03/23/2013 

Preface

Somalis could aptly capture the disappointment with Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s administration in the following proverb: “Dha’do roob noqonwaayday!” and a fittingly comparable Indian saying goes “Clouds come floating into my life, no longer to carry rain or usher storm….,”

One must wonder why conditions in Mogadishu and adjoining southwestern regions of Somalia are descending back to anarchy and to a renewed conflict.  One may also wonder why all the fanfare orchestrated in the month of February when Somalia’s new leader, Hassan Sheikh Mohamed, visited the US and Europe so quickly dissipated.  Yet, most Somalis suspect that policy makers in WashingtonD.C. and its proxy country in the Middle East – the kingdom of Qatar – were hasty to declare “mission accomplished” in the long conflict of Somalia.

If indeed true, that would have been good news to be welcomed by Somalis – a population so hungry for peace, development and security in their own backyard.  But it was not meant to be so.  As matter of fact, the month of February, 2013 could go into the annals of the history of this troubled country as the month when hope for lasting reconciliation and a new history making among the country’s disparate clans was thrown into oblivion.  As such, there is a credible fear the adage of “clouds floating into our life, but no longer carrying rain”could be the true fate of the nation in the lurking. 

The government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, who has been eroding whatever little is left of Somalia’s cohesion and coexistence, is responsible for, in the words of Dr. Weinstein, the production of a “renewed conflict” between the center and the regions.

A novice in politics who enjoys deep roots in religious radicalism (Africa Confidential, October 2012), Hassan Sheikh took power in September of 2012.  At the outset, his lack of experience worked in his favor, because, as often noted by those who elected him in September of 2012, he was perceived as the lesser of two evils (between him and the former President Sheikh Sharif).  In a sense he is a man without history and without paper trail.

Alas, a Somali scholar who spent with Hassan Sheikh (almost three days of a grueling session in Djibouti in 2010) said this:  “for three hard working days of deliberations and discourse, Hassan said nothing.  All that was feasible in his face was that he came across as a man of tremendous anger and partisanship.”

Despite some cosmetic gains, most often orchestrated by donors who are anxious to hand over Somalia’s affairs and make her leaders responsible for their citizens’ protection and management, Hassan Sheikh’s policies so far bear truth to this cogent observation by one of Somalia’s prominent academics.

Let us skin off the layers of the ongoing dismantling of the tangible gains Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s predecessors so far made and the rapid dissention to the abyss of conflict.

Jubbaland:  The residents of Jubbaland had seen enough terror, occupation and wanton bloodshed in the hands of militia commanded by the late Aidid Farah, who is alleged to have introduced into Somali political culture what Dr. Lidwein calls “clan cleansing.”

They have also suffered multiple invasions by the allied forces of Jubbland valley (Dooxada Juba) encouraged and funded by the first transitional government, headed by Abdi Qasim (Qasim is now a close advisor to Hassan Sheikh).  The longest occupation of the region has been under the forces of Al-Shabab.

In 2008, a new chapter ushered in Jubbaland where a grass roots effort was launched to establish a local administration that would tackle invading outsiders and possibly put security matters in the hands of locals (this effort was based on an earlier effort carried out by the United Nations in 1993). The objective was to empower local folks not only to govern themselves, but to also protect and provide for their security.  This was advised by a theory that combines the tools of local governance and grass roots approach to neighborhood protection.

Instead of joining and promoting this noble effort, the government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud made its number one national policy to fight and dismantle the gains so far registered in this region.  By doing so, he deliberately violated key Sections of the provisional Federal Constitution of Somalia, including but not limited to Sections of Articles 48, 49, and 47. Worse, he used divisive languages and politics of wedge that eroded the prestige of his own office.

The very perception that the President of Somalia is painted with such an ugly picture as “tribalist,” or “vendetta carrying USC cadre,” makes him an irrelevant of a leader with no national appeal.  Unless he shows some significant and immediate mending of relations with all sections of the Somali communities, his administration is looking for a rocky future ahead.

For a potential amelioration of the situation and perhaps the only way to save his presidency, a must–study lesson to him in this respect would be the recent agreement  reached between Puntland and his own Prime Minister, Saacid Farah, a more calm and conciliatory figure.

Somaliland:  Somaliland had declared a unilateral secession from the rest of Somalia in 1991 on the ashes of Somalia’s failed state.  It is recalled that Barre’s regime exacted an unforgettable massacre against the Issaq population in the region.

The hope for meaningful talks on the nagging question of Somaliland’s unilateral secession, and the resolution to the conflict in Khatumo, was dashed first by mismanaging the talks, and finally by the immature request by this government to lift the 20 year-old arms embargo.

A lasting reconciliation between Somaliland with Mogadishu requires trust-building and Mogadishu recognizing the limits to its power.  It would also require finding reputable ways to give Khatumo leaders a prominent role in the talks for they are major stakeholders in the outcome.

The search for more arms and weapons for Mogadishu-commanded militia army, the so-called “Somali National Army (SNA)” is in total contradiction to the spirit of fostering genuine and productive talks with Somaliland and the resolution to the question of secession.  The conflict in Somalia is not due to lack of arms, but more arms in the wrong hands in southern Somalia at a time of heightened insecurity and tangible suspicion of Mogadishu by the regions.

On March 17, 20013, only weeks after the UN’s lifting of arms embargo on Somalia, massive amounts of ammunitions, rifles (AK47s) and other weapons  were “stolen” from the presidential palace of Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud.  Whether or not the loss of such a huge amount of weapons was the design of an inside job is beside the point.  The lesson here is that Somalia is still awash with weapons, particularly Mogadishu, and most of it is in the wrong hands.

Moreover, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s government does not have the right infrastructure and legal capacity to keep weapons from falling into the wrong hands.  Thus, peaceful communities in Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubbaland are not comfortable with weapons flying all over.

Return of Terror/Anarchy to Mogadishu: On March 19, 2013, the New York Times  carried a front-page story about Al-Ahabab resuming its aggressive acts of terrorizing the residents of Mogadishu. This is one of a series of troubling signs of the deterioration of Hassan Sheikh’s administration.  Despite his premature and uninitiated over-pledging pronouncement to the nation that his three top priorities are “security, security, security,” the nation is less secure now than six months.  Security is slipping out of hand; dead bodies continue to turn up in Mogadishu’s dark alleys as if we were experiencing a de javu of the days of extreme anarchy.

About ten days ago, the corpses of six civilians with their hand and legs cuffed together were dumped by government soldiers in to the city’s allies.  Rape cases are not abated, despite the international attention received by the rape of a Somali woman, only because of a human rights advocate from Europe who refused to let the issue get buried under the rhetoric of the President as a “friend of women.”

Moreover, Somalia’s equal opportunity critic and cartoonist, Amin Amir, had recently posted at aminarts, a serious of cartoons reflecting the Somali sentiment; the disposition of Mogadishu becoming a “one-clan city;” pressure for the immediate return of “stolen or looted properties” is building up; prisoners freed out of government jails in a freak way, and massive amounts of weapons stolen from the government’s depot located at the presidential campus.  If the worsening conditions are not arrested, the euphoric welcome extended to this President is soon to be replaced with despair and a potential demise to the modicum of gains so far registered.

Baydhabo region:  Who thought that millions of Somalis would worry at the very news of Ethiopia’s leaving Bydhabo region?  Local and international news media is awash with concrete information that as soon as Ethiopians pulled out of Xudur, a prominent town within the Bydhabo region, Al-Shabab easily overran the ragtag militia soldiers reporting to Mogadishu.

It is also reported that, if reinforcement is not given to the AMISOM troops stations in Baydhabo, Al-Shabab is poised to recapture the regional seat of the Digil Mirigle coalition.

Is the comeback of the Al-Shabab, therefore, simply a military question, or an indication that Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s government is losing the faith of the Somali people at-large?

There is some truth to the argument that his imprudent conflict with the leadership of IGAD, with his neighbors who through unfortunate circumstances hold sway on Somalia, particularly in the area of security, and with the officers of the United Nations Office for Somalia (UNOS) is partially a cause to the faltering security conditions in the southwestern regions of the country.

Unfortunately, the main reason why security is deteriorating in Mogadishu and in Southwestern regions is a function of bad internal politics.  Since assuming power, the government’s domain has been narrowing and it lost faith with Puntland, Somalialnd, Jubbaland, and to some extent the Digil Mirifle coalition.  The recent brouhaha over the rights of Galmudug to form its state, which could have been discussed in private chambers and the clashes in Marka, also further eroded this government’s grip on the nation’s affairs.

Whereas his government was supposed to reach out to all section of the Somali society, Hassan Sheikh arrogantly narrowed his power base to a coalition representing some members of his clan and that of his religious group, Dumjadid.

While writing this piece I reached out to my good friend, Said Samatar, a prominent historian and an authority on Somali political culture and asked him what good could Hassan Sheikh have done at the outset to get this time right?

This is what he said:

“Hassan Mohamed should have put on his Maawis (Somali garb), wrap his Shaaland, and carry his Bakoorad (cane); with that take a tour consisting of a coalition of Hawiye elders to Puntland, Jubbaland, Bay, Bakol, and Somaliland; meet and great those elders, give a peace and justice overtures; let the Hawiye elders convey the message that their son is ready to respect Somali Xeer and mutual respect to each other.”

In one of his speeches to the Somali Diasporas  Hassan Mohamoud prematurely and triumphantly announced that the role of the elders is finished.  Considering how deeply he sinking in so many fronts, particularly with security slipping out of his hands, one is tempted to give a try to Said Samatar’s traditionalist approach to interject a dose of optimism and hope to the faltering search for peace in Somalia.  After all, the government and the land belong to the people of Somalia and it is their responsibility to fix it.

Source: Wardheernews.com

Correspondence Corner

Dear Fernandez,

To answer your questions, inquiries on personal background are relevant because in the Somalia of today, and as a result of the most vicious civil war in its history, objectivity in political analysis becomes an issue. Emotions usually play out into Somali authors’ essays and descriptions of events in the country. Although Somalis are patriarchal in their lineages, my mother is Northerner while father is from Central Somalia regions. I was born in Northern Somalia and raised in Mudugh Region ( Galkayo) of Central Somalia and Banadir Region (Mogadishu) of Southern Somalia. I finished formal education (High School) in Mogadishu. I went overseas for higher learning and trained as Mechanical Engineer with Masters Degree in thermal power engineering. Since then, I have been acquiring other skills as well, including public administration and political science.

Since I was raised mostly in Mogadishu, I am deeply connected to Southern Somalia too. My political constituency is PuntlandState of Somalia in the North Eastern Somalia though. I therefore consider myself as someone having broad multi-clan background. I am not sure whether that makes sense to you.

I travel a lot in Europe, North America and East Africa and therefore I cannot say I am stationed in one place. My e-mail address, ismailwarsame@gmail.com, however, is permanent if someone wants to reach out to me. Right now, I am in Garowe, Puntland, Somalia.

With regards to your question on whether Somalia can become a Federal state, I attach my relevant views on the subject expressed in these articles found both in; http://Wardheernews.com and http://imailwarsame.com

The Way Forward for Somalia

Kismayo Solution: The South-West State of Somalia

The Current Status, Goals and Vision of the Transitional Federal Government

Public Trust Deficit in Somalia

Federalism, a Guarantor of Peace among Somali Clans

Self-Governance Options for Somaliland

Hope and Lessons in Somalia

Outside View: Building a Secure Somalia

TFG Top Priorities as Expressed by the President

Somalia, Foreign and International Conspiracy

AYA Response to Riyale’s Provocations

AYA Memo on Escalating Conflict in Somalia’s Northern Regions

Letter to Prime Minister Berlusconi

Other articles of interests are

NATTCO Mandate

EU and Africa Guiding principles for Cooperation

ICG London Meeting

UN 2006 Security and Humanitarian Report on Somalia

Ambassador’s Report Back

UN Arms Embargo Monitoring Group Report

TFG and ICU

Presidential Briefing at ICG Meeting

Diplomatic Briefing

European Union Policies on Multilateral issues

SACB Secretariat

Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) Guiding Principles

Basis for European Union-Somalia Relationship

SACB Addis Declaration on Somalia

Declassified briefing to the European Union member states by the Author

Safarkii Dheeraa ee Wiilka Reer Miyiga

The Long Journey of the Nomadic Boy

Don’t get high on Khat (aka Kat, Qat, Chat); It is not worth it

In addition, there is a Provisional Federal Constitution to be adhered to by Somalia’s leadership as well as the basis for governance for new Somalia. Respecting that Constitution by all is the basis for restoring trust among people of Somalia.

I am not so sure if I understood well your question regarding the role of religion in Somalia. However, I must say that there are two permanent factors in the country.

1. Clan

2. Islam (in the form of Somali traditional Sunni sect).

Islamic religion in Somalia is now experiencing deep crisis as the new adherents of Saudi Wahabism make their presence felt and forcefully imposed upon the population, hence extremism and radicalism resulted in the creation of Al-Shabab, Al-Itihad, Al-Takfir, Al-Islah, among others of fundamentalist Islam. Wahabism now is a political and religious force to be reckoned with. You may be aware that Saudi Arabia has been extending religious scholarships to a huge number of Somali youths for decades. When these graduates came back to Somalia, the resulting effect is devastating for the stability of the country and religious harmony. That is the main source of the current religious intolerance never recorded in the history of religion in Somalia.

I hope this will give you a brief introduction to the “state of the union” in Somalia.

Regards,

Ismail

Dear Ismail

It is a pleasure to contact you and I appreciate your qick answer.

I found your blog through a Somali news site, named Wardheer News. An article signed by you and look up in the web who you are, and I found your blog. That`s all. It has been my first contact with the blog but it will not be, for sure, the last one.

I guess you are living in America (US or Canada), Aren’t you? Sorry for asking some personal questions. Are you a national Somali?, if so where are you or your family coming from in Somalia?, and, finally, which is your family clan?

My tow first (non personal) questions is basics and difficult. It is about the future of Somalia.

– Will Somalia be a real Federal state?

– Is Islam more than the nationalistic idea what is going to unify Somalia?

I have watched out about this three aspects of (name of the city omitted for privacy reasons). I am leaving the country before Summer what is a wise decission I took…

Thnaks in advance. Best regards.

Fernandez (name of the sender modified for privacy protection)

Updated

The Way Forward For Somalia

The Way Forward For Somalia
By Ismail Haji Warsame
Sept. 21, 2012

Now that the positions of the President and Speaker of the Federal Parliament have been secured with the election of enlightened politicians and with great expectation to appoint, in turn, a smart, positive, unifying, representative and competent Prime Minister as the Chief Executive Head of a cabinet worthy to meet the tasks and challenges before them, the first huge step forward would be complete. That alone would be a great achievement by itself.

What happens historically often in the context of Somali administrations though are administrative, legal and political gridlocks based on the following issues:

  1. Leaders not limiting themselves to their respective constitutional mandates, leading to constant bickering and in-house fighting.
  2. Absence of consultation, conflict-resolution and constructive dialogue among leaders.
  3. Abuse of power and public resources-lack of accountability wiping out public trust.
  4. Disregard for public opinion and aspirations of the masses.
  5. Absence of delegation of power and duties to their competent bureaucratic personnel and departments.
  6. Disrespect for the national institutions and lack of strengthening them on everlasting and permanent foundation.
  7. Disregard of the supremacy of the law and fine traditions of the Somali people.
  8. Inherent ignorance of human rights, civic and personal freedoms.
  9. Awkward relationship with the international community.

These man-made obstacles, among others, were the factors tremendously contributing to a situation where we could not hold on to the status of a nation-state, develop and adhere to the art and culture of statecraft.

The new leadership is compelled to learn from our tragic modern history of self-government in a radical approach for change of the status quo. Leaders must have national vision beyond their own Goofka (clan enclave), learn to enhance their cultural-cross abilities and travel throughout the country to be honorary house guests of families around the nation. They have to develop tolerance for different opinions and opposition. They have to try to win the hearts and minds of all their citizens. In other words, they must be fit to govern. If they could not hold to those standards, they have to admit failure, and before it is too late, return power to the people. That way a nation survives and peaceful continuity of history, government and people’s achievement are secured.

It is not as easy as it sounds though. The litmus test of leaders worthy of people’s trust is their express willingness to insure and respect that the mechanism of checks and balance of power are in place with all three branches of government playing their constitutional mandates practically and effectively. In addition, smooth operations of public services delivery and building fundamental institutions of government are the bench-mark for the first requirements of government. Public order, personal safety and protection of private properties are keys to stability and prosperity. A nation with secure borders, faithful to its creator and enjoying economic prosperity and peace with itself first is the only acceptable future for NEW SOMALIA. There is no point in keeping a leader if he or she is not up to the job. We have to fire them. To fire them, citizens must have mechanism to do so. Not having the institutions to expose leaders’ abuses and incompetency like freedom of expression, assembly and independent system of justice (judiciary) would end up in the tragic consequences we been living through for decades. We must not allow that to happen again, for if we do we would not be worthy to be the sole owners of that rich and strategic land, space and seas of Somalia.

To start with, let us count as of today what fundamental everlastings public institutions the new leaders of Somalia would like to leave behind after they are gone and how strong these institutions and instruments of government are to withstand the passage of time and turmoil. And above all, let us ask ourselves how would people of Somalia can get rid of bad leadership or even good leadership if the people so desire for a change without the country falling apart again?

While shared, the responsibilities to create and maintain good governance fall mainly on the citizens as their civic duties to bring their leaders to accountability and replace them immediately as warranted. No politician should be trusted blindly even if he or she belonged to one’s house-hold or Goofka.

Another thing worth mentioning, it is now time to rebuild a broken nation and country. Nobody is going to do hard the work for us. It is only us. Others can only help us along the way if we are equally careful and tactful.

Deficit of Public Trust in Somalia

Public Trust Deficit in
Somalia
By Ismail Haji Warsame
Oct. 02, 2012
The Presidency of the Republic does not give the expected trappings of power, the magic of the highest leadership position in the land or the glory of the Office amid distrust and absence of loyalty within the population and regions of the country. That institutional empowerment must be earned nation-wide in the hard way, and in the case of Somalia, require hard work over many years to come for the future generations of Somalia to enjoy it. If successful, the new leaders can only pave the way for restoring that missing public trust. To accept any Somali President, Prime Minister or the Speaker of the House as a leader of all the people is a long shot, given the depth of distrust developed within the communities for the past 30 odd years towards government officials, or rather any institutions of governance unfortunately. In Somalia’s today the Presidency or any position of leadership is unenviable role for a decent person to play for it requires heavy personal sacrifices few are willing to commit to.

The very idea of bottom-up approach in rebuilding Somalia is primarily based on the restoration of that missing trust before the country has central institutions. Quite a number of Somali intellectual circles and many politicians inside and outside the country, particularly in Mogadishu, do not still appreciate how important the “Building-Blocks’ concept is, as we coined the term more than a decade ago in Puntland State of Somalia, as the shortest way to heal the deep wounds caused by the civil war and abuses of the Military Government, in addition to nepotism and rigging of elections by previous civilian governments. Creation of Federal Institutions starting with the TFG Charter and current Provisional Constitution is a hard fought negotiated outcome towards rebuilding that public trust. Anybody who believes that we can have a highly centralized system of government again in Mogadishu or elsewhere in the country is either of out of touch with reality in today’s Somalia or must have his/her sanity re-examined as this dream cannot be realized in the present political conditions of Somalia. The sooner we all embrace whatever type of federalism we accept as result of a negotiated settlement, the better off we are to re-construct our country. I may add, under the current political atmosphere, having a Federal President and Prime Minister hailing from South-Central Somalia is a recipe for failure and does not meet the necessary power-sharing legitimacy to move the country forward. If proven true (I hope not), the rumors flying around these days in Mogadishu and beyond on the selection of a Prime Minister do not give me sense of optimism for Somalia to be on the mend.

 Practical intellectual thinking and bold political leadership are required to brainstorm on why Somaliland and Puntland were created in the first place. While the First went to the extreme of outright unilateral declaration of seccession, the Second did not lose hope that Somalia can be rebuilt from the ashes of the Civil War and the deficit of public trust. For the benefit of those who were not closely following major political developments in the country during the past 15 years or so, or limited/exposed to only superficial sideline debates on Somalia, Puntland State spent considerable resources including brain power to see Somalia re-instituted. This is a major political capital investment that cannot be written off without paying a heavy national price.

A simple political instinct is lacking among the intellectuals and politicians in Southern Somalia, i.e. they could not figure out that if Mogadishu is to remain the Capital City and enhance its status as attractive to the residents of Northwest and Northeast Somalia among other parts of the country, it should be subject to power-sharing. Someone cannot be expected to have both ways or as they say, “have their cake and eat it”, given what happened in that City during the vicious Civil War. Mogadishu leaders instead, for the sake of national unity, would have been smart enough to encourage others get elected to the presidency. That did not happen unfortunately despite the great expectation from the new President to deliver, and a lot of people are worried about the direction and the future of the country.

While it is not so popular to be an early pessimistic person, they say, a pessimist is a well informed optimist. Nevertheless, I have strong conviction that the best days of Somalia are still to come.

 

Somalia, Foreign Aid and International Conspiracy

The story of Somalia’s tragedy is too complex to summarize in a few pages. What I learned though in the course of the past two decades is the fact that when a country breaks up in the way the Somali State failed, it is too hard, if not impossible, to reconstruct it and put it back together again. That is because such a failure creates thousands of well-paid jobs and other beneficial opportunities for a huge number of expatriates or international aid workers and foreign diplomats. It does not take rocket science to figure out that those international employees and their decision-makers would not be acting against their own self-interests in order to see Somalia back on its feet again with all their goodwill intentions and humanitarian intervention. There is no incentive for this to happen. This is the first and most serious obstacle Somalis has to deal with to get Somalia back on track. The second biggest problem is Somalis themselves in abysmally failing to put their acts together by understanding that they are in peril and fatal danger of losing not only their sovereignty but also their country. This is the core of Somalia’s problem today.

Some, including these foreign expatriates and governments, would argue that the second problem is the crux of the issue as to why Somalis can not have their country back. That is true too as long as our people do not take responsibility for their own failure and are always quick to blame others for their misfortune and misery they have created onto themselves. Listen with purpose to Somali group debates, the so-called Fadhi-Ku-Dirirka (lazy losers’ shouting clan/personal debates), in coffee and teashops and amateur Radio and TV panel discussions and ever multiplying clan fox-hole websites. You notice that nobody is talking about the big picture of “Somalia first” and putting any political differences or clannish self-interests aside at the moment to save the nation as priority number one. After all that has been happening in Somalia for the last few decades, isn’t that a double tragedy? Some may conclude that Somalis are a punch of feuding clans that can not agree to have a nation-state, and therefore, under such circumstances, two scenarios are plausible:
Let neighbour states take over the country by dismembering it and dividing it among themselves.
Allow foreign re-occupation of the country until Somalis are ready and fit to govern themselves.
We should never give a chance that to happen at any cost. At moment, fieriest diplomatic lobby, intrigues and direct military intervention under the disguise of flashing out Al-Shabbab, another menace resulting from our too long inaction in the vacuum, perhaps also as a punishment for our collective sins and betrayal of our country, are ongoing to opt for the first scenario. Painful as it is, this is the same country whose pilots were flying supersonic jet fighters and producing the best neuro-surgeons decades ago and famous for holding first free and fair democratic elections in Africa.
Following the Ogaden War of 1977-1978 and as fallout of the lost war with the proliferation of clan-based and violent armed opposition fronts, huge refugee camps had been created in various parts of Southern Somalia. In reality, the Capital, Mogadishu, had been transformed to a big camp for refugees and internally displaced people, IDPs. With the influx of unlimited food aid from international donors at that time, residents ceased to buy food at markets altogether as it is readily available to have anyway. Even households of government officials had it delivered to their families. The result had been catastrophic, with local produce wiped out and bringing farmers to refugee camps as well. The citizens of the whole country had been reduced to mere beggars of foreign handouts. What had happened next was that the law of jangle of the fittest was ushered in and whatever left of the Somali State was up for grabs and Somalia irreversibly became a country nobody owns, leave alone someone to defend it from the imminent collapse. As the regulatory bodies disappeared, unscrupulous traders broke all rules of decency and lost moral compass to sell anything and everything Somalis owned to the highest bidder. Somalia went nuts and out of control. To understand why the Somali Civil War could not be contained, particularly in Mogadishu, one should appreciate the nature of the conflict. First, it is a family feud that will last for centuries in many forms and levels. Secondly, it is economic conflict in which a few greedy business criminals do not want it stopped to prevent the establishment of regulatory bodies of a government at any cost to avoid paying taxes. Theirs is: Deny any administration, regional or central to set up the rules of the road for their trade. Chaos, killings, and trade in expired food, medicine, and export of everything Somalis owned and adored for centuries are the only acceptable norms for their businesses to thrive. Take note that it was not the warlords, Islamic courts, and even Al-Shabab that kept the conflict in Mogadishu running so long. It is the Mogadishu new business tycoons and merchants of death and destruction that made it impossible to bring about law and order in Mogadishu.
International Conspiracy and Regional Power Play
As the Somali State finally collapsed with the disappearance of all public institutions without an exception in the height of the Civil War, Western donor countries under the framework of the international community devised economic and political plans for Somalia to fill in the power vacuum in the country. These plans are elaborate and act as a case study on neo-colonialism after the end of the Cold War. It would require volumes of books and extensive research to write on this particular subject.
In 1993, representatives of all countries interested in Somalia under the umbrella of OAU/IGAD/Partners with international Western humanitarian organizations gathered to discuss how to handle Somalia. Ironically, the venue of this gathering was Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. To make a long story short, the participants resolved to set up the infamous “Somali Aid Coordinating Body, SACB (search for how limited this name is in the Google entries), The SACB, an Exclusive Club of Western humanitarian organizations, UN agencies, European Union agencies (EC) and international NGOs. The SACB devised the following two serious documents:
WORKING WITH RESPONSIBLE SOMALI AUTHORITIES (implying here there is no authority in the country, amounting to merely working with clan leaders and local NGOs, possibly with Somaliland, Puntland State did not exist at that time).
SACB CODE OF CONDUCT (their internal regulations dealing with Somalis).
By the creation of this unresponsive, unapproachable, and invisible governing body for Somalia, The SACB, and Somalia’s sovereignty on land, air, and sea had been effectively taken over. All humanitarian aid assistance, monetary or material from donor countries must be channeled through the agencies of the UN, European Union and INGOs, who have the sole discretion and authority to allocate aid distribution as they wish without any input by or accountability to Somalis. To this day, no member country is allowed to unilaterally extend assistance to Somalia. An exception is Turkey, which does not fit into this framework and whose recent unilateral assistance to Somalia sparked off competition to do something about Somalia to preempt China’s growing and expanding influence in Africa The old SACB approach on Somalia continues to this day with different names like recent CMC (Coordination and Monitoring Committee setup to camouflage SACB as TFG appeared on the Somali political scene in 2004) with the same modus operandi. To call a spade a spade, SACB became the real Somali Government operating from luxury homes and executive suites in Nairobi while the report cards of the hundreds of its privileged expatriate employees show they are working inside war-torn Somalia on the most expensive life insurance coverage on earth for them and families. That is why we see signals and hear voices nowadays from individual Western countries that aid to Somalia would be channeled to “international agencies” and spelling that out once again after the election of the new Somali leaders in August this year. Perhaps the New Somali President knows better how to deal with them, having worked with these agencies for a long time. An extensive network of local NGOs mostly ran and operated by one man/one woman with a bag and laptops have been established in every corner of the country. Most of these local agencies do not follow the rules of associations and societies to be accountable to the Board of Directors, have secretaries of treasuries, the constitution, and mission to avoid duplication of the same activities by others Without their knowledge, many of these local NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) are the sources of information gathering for the “International Somali Government” based in Nairobi. These NGOs sometimes come under different fancy names as Non-State Actors (NSAs), Civil Societies, Non-For-Profit Organizations, Stake-holders and so on with the intention to avoid helping the establishment of effective Somali Government and in that way perpetuate the power vacuum in the country to justify the role of SACAB to the donor community and their tax-payers.
Welcome to the era of neo-colonialism, where Somalia is a rather blatant example of the “New World Order”. Or, rather, the Somali case is a direct rule by foreign powers. This unmasked way of running Somalia exposes the extent of the depth of the problem in Third World countries today and sheds light on Western political expectations from “Arab Spring” uprisings.
Every year, these international agencies compile what they call “Consolidated Humanitarian Aid Appeal For Somalia” amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of Somalia. From various sources of their addressees, I had the unique privilege to see first hand and disturbed by the stunning Cover Letters enclosed with these “Humanitarian and Development Appeals. Cover letters addressed to foreign Western donors read, and I quote:
“ON BEHALF OF THE SOMALI PEOPLE” and continue to this day ignoring any Somali political leadership, institution (even “Responsible Authorities”).

It is equally important to note here that the European Union has been transformed into a collective body politic in the course of its existence in regards to its foreign aid to 3rd World countries (Developing Countries). To prevent unilateral aid by individual member countries to emerging markets and countries and avoid duplication of such assistance on shopping list by the leaders of developing countries, a document or an agreement called The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness had been produced in February, 2005, effectively controlling who gets what and on what European terms are applicable to a specific country or block of countries. Since Somalia is not signatory to any accord after Lome’ (Togo) Convention of 1975-1989 on Trade and Aid between ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) and European Community countries, including Cotonou (Benin) Accord, its role and interests have been mandated and taken over by a small unit of individuals within European Commission Delegation to Kenya, called The Somali Unit, acting practically and effectively as the National Authorizing Officer (NAO) for Somalia, the very function a Somali Officer would have played if there were a government in Somalia.
Has anyone heard Italy, a longtime colonial power of Southern Somalia, producing a single initiative to help find solutions to Somalia’s predicament? Italy always claims in world forums on Somalia to have the exclusive rights of the Somali issues on the basis of being a former colonial power and legitimate authority to listen to and be respected with regards to Somalia while at the same has nothing to show for in deeds. Italy understood well that once her initiative on Somali peace and reconciliation fails, she will lose all credibility in the eyes of other powers and will be immediately out of the picture in Somalia. Italy’s strategy was reduced to sabotaging other powers’ help in resolving the Somali problem. Her political position has been quite detrimental to Somalia’s national interests and prolonged the agony of the Somali people.
How Other States Rate in the Somali Saga
On the Arab front, Somalia is a predominantly suuni liberal religious society. Over many years, however, the Saudis have been engaged in extending religious scholarships to thousands of Somali youths to indoctrinate them in their Wabi version, undeniably responsible for the current religious upthe country. This has created religious crises and conflicts within the community unrecorded before in the history of Somalia. People in Somalia now suffer a crisis of identity with regards to their religion (even crisis of attire and clothing as strange foreign fashion of Afghani, Pakistani and Arab tribal origin are imposed on them).
Sheikhdoms in the Gulf were pouring fuel into the fire in Somalia by paying Zakka to the extremist groups on an individual basis and through religious charities. Egypt, a country that has been boasting to have strong historical ties with Somalia, could not even provide safe passage within its territory to Somali refugees fleeing civil war. Yemen, with its meagre resources and its own severe tribal problems, has been overwhelmed by Somali refugees, many of whom had perished in the high seas of the Red Sea trying to reach it borders. In short, the Arabs have been disappointing to Somalis in their time of need. Ironically, it is only them that can extend meaningful assistance without strings attached to any decent administration in Somalia, but that is only if the country has a government that became difficult to achieve for decades.
Djibouti played more than its capacity with regards to the spoils of the Somali Sate by putting herself in the shoes of her mother Somalia at League of Arab States. Since the fall of the Somali Central Government, it has been hosting a number of improvised Somali reconciliation meetings to enhance its role among other power players in the region.
Kenya is a country that got the most benefit out of the Somalia’s misery as the HQ of the “International Somali Government” (foreign diplomats and expatriate aid workers of the donor community with hundreds of millions of dollars ear-marked for Somalia spent in Nairobi alone). Speak about the huge capital flight from Somalia, remittances from Somali Diaspora and investment and entrepreneurial talents shaping up Kenya as the East African business hub, not to mention about a broken and desperate people trying to calm their nerves with plane loads of stimulant drug mira (khat), another curse in the Somali tragedy, from Nairobi in exchange for cold cash dollars.
With regards to Ethiopia, a major issue of Somali foreign policy, everybody seems to have an opinion and knows better. Here, I would limit myself by saying that Somalis are forgiving, but Ethiopia has to choose only one of these two options:
Be a peaceful, friendly neighbour and regional ally by trying to help heal past wounds and reverse the historical burden between the two brotherly peoples. Ethiopia has to stop running Somali affairs from Addis Ababa and instruct its diplomats in foreign capitals to immediately cease their traditional diplomatic lobby undermining Somali unity It has to stop infiltrating into Somali society and bullying Somali leaders with its power plays.
Be an enemy in the region the Somalis have to deal with and risk losing all chances of being trusted ever again.
Eritrea seems to be more sincere and sympathetic to Somali cause than Ethiopia, but its rivalry with Ethiopia via proxy war has been causing havoc to ordinary Somalis in Southern Somalia.
Nevertheless, it would be rather mean not to recognize that the above-mentioned states and organizations have been doing something good as well that had saved lives, lessened pain, and suffering among the general population.
In conclusion, Somalia will rise up again, hopefully in my lifetime, and when it does, we will be stronger than ever before to be a force of good to reckon with.
By Ismail Haji Warsame
E-Mail: ismailwarsame@gmail.com