Tag: politics

Talking Truth to Power

Preface

When I first compiled these essays into Talking Truth to Power, my purpose was simple: to memorialize the turbulent years of Somalia’s recent political history through independent critical analysis. What was written then, as commentary in real time, now reads like a record of warnings unheeded.

In 2025, the issues raised in these pages remain painfully relevant. Somalia’s federal experiment continues to falter, sabotaged from within by federal leaders who exploit clan identities for short-term power rather than building national institutions. The federal system, instead of evolving into a mechanism for cooperation and shared sovereignty, has become a battlefield of mistrust. The consequences are visible in the hollowing of governance, the erosion of public trust, and the weaponization of constitutional ambiguity.

Foreign interference, which I described years ago as “so many spearmen fighting over an ostrich,” has only deepened. Turkey, Qatar, the UAE, Ethiopia, and Kenya remain active players in Somalia’s politics—each pursuing strategic interests while Somalia itself remains fractured and vulnerable. Their money, weapons, and proxies have fueled division, leaving ordinary Somalis disillusioned and displaced.

At the same time, the Somali people are quietly voting with their feet. Cairo, Istanbul, Nairobi, Dubai, Kampala, and beyond now host growing Somali diasporas who left because of inflation, insecurity, and a sense that home offers little hope. This silent exodus, often overlooked in political debates, may prove one of the most significant shifts of our era: the loss of human capital and the quiet resignation of citizens who have ceased to believe in their state.

The essays in this volume—whether about Puntland’s lack of strategic vision, Mogadishu’s capture by foreign agendas, or the failures of leaders to rise above clan politics—stand as both analysis and indictment. They remind us that Somalia’s crises were neither sudden nor inevitable. They were cultivated by choices, by negligence, and by an elite class unwilling to learn from past mistakes.

Yet, there is still a lesson in these pages for the future. The Somali people have always shown resilience. SSC-Khatumo’s reassertion of political agency, Puntland’s insistence on federal rights, and civil voices demanding accountability are signs that the struggle for self-determination is not over. If anything, these scattered sparks point to the possibility of renewal—if only leaders can place principle above power, and citizens above clan.

This 2025 preface is not a republication of the book. It is a reminder that the fight to “talk truth to power” remains unfinished. My hope is that readers—whether students, diplomats, policymakers, or Somali citizens at home and abroad—will engage these writings not only as history, but as a challenge to act differently in the years ahead.

— Ismail H. Warsame

Garowe / Nairobi / Toronto, 2025

Report on the Political Implications of SSC-Khatumo’s Alignment with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Administration

May 2025

Prepared by WDM

Executive Summary

This report examines the political and strategic implications of the recent alignment between SSC-Khatumo and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s federal government. This development is analyzed in the broader context of Somalia’s federal dynamics, inter-regional relations, and the symbolic and practical ramifications of SSC-Khatumo’s emerging role within the federal framework. While the move has been seen as a symbolic victory for SSC-Khatumo, it also exposes the fragile nature of federalism in Somalia and the complex interplay between legitimacy, recognition, and political leverage.

1. Introduction

The emergence of SSC-Khatumo as a political administration in northern Somalia has altered the federal landscape. Following its military victory over Somaliland forces and the liberation of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) territories, SSC-Khatumo has moved swiftly to assert itself within Somalia’s federal structure. Its recent political alignment with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration marks a turning point with both opportunities and significant complications

2. Background and Context

SSC-Khatumo was born out of years of political marginalization, inter-regional contestation, and grassroots mobilization. Its roots lie in community resistance against both allegedly Puntland’s neglect and Somaliland’s expansionist policies. With the defeat of Somaliland forces in 2023–2024 with the assistance of Puntland State, SSC-Khatumo declared itself an autonomous administration seeking formal integration into the Somali federal system.

Simultaneously, the federal government under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has faced increasing isolation from influential federal member states (FMSs) like Puntland and Jubaland. This has left Villa Somalia with a diminished political coalition and a pressing need for new allies.

3. Analysis of SSC-Khatumo’s Alignment

3.1. Symbolic Recognition

SSC-Khatumo’s entry into the political orbit of Villa Somalia carries symbolic weight. It is viewed as a validation of its self-declared authority and an acknowledgment of its role in safeguarding Somali unity. The comparison to the Banadir Administration—Mogadishu’s local government entity without full FMS status—underlines the initial limitations of this recognition but still marks a step up from complete exclusion.

3.2. Practical Benefits and Risks

While symbolic recognition is important, practical benefits remain elusive. SSC-Khatumo lacks clear federal member state status and thus does not enjoy the same constitutional protections or budgetary entitlements as recognized FMSs. Furthermore, its relationship with the central government may expose it to co-optation risks, potentially undermining its grassroots legitimacy.

3.3. Proxy Representation of Puntland and Jubaland

In the vacuum left by Puntland and Jubaland, SSC-Khatumo is being perceived—rhetorically or otherwise—as a substitute voice in national politics. This dynamic places an unfair burden on a nascent administration and could invite tension with more established FMSs, particularly if SSC-Khatumo is seen as an instrument of Villa Somalia’s centralization agenda.

4. Implications for Somali Federalism

4.1. Fragility of the Federal System

The Somali federal model remains underdeveloped, and the selective recognition of regional entities exacerbates tensions. SSC-Khatumo’s ambiguous status is indicative of a system that lacks standardized criteria for inclusion, recognition, and political representation.

4.2. Risks of Political Fragmentation

Without a coherent framework, the piecemeal integration of new administrations could fuel further fragmentation. SSC-Khatumo’s rapid inclusion, juxtaposed with the exclusion of existing FMSs from key national processes, could provoke institutional instability and heighten inter-regional rivalries.

5. Geopolitical and Strategic Considerations

SSC-Khatumo’s emergence also affects Somalia’s geopolitical positioning. It challenges Somaliland’s claims over disputed territories, potentially reshaping diplomatic narratives. Moreover, its alignment with Villa Somalia could be leveraged in regional and international engagements, particularly regarding aid, security cooperation, and constitutional reform.

However, the symbolic recognition of SSC-Khatumo by the Federal Government could intensify the territorial disputes between Puntland and Somaliland. It challenges existing claims, alters political alliances, and adds complexity to Somalia’s federal dynamics. Resolving these disputes will require careful negotiation and a commitment to inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders

6. Recommendations

For the Federal Government:

Clarify SSC-Khatumo’s status within the federal constitution.

Ensure equitable resource distribution and institutional support.

Avoid politicizing the administration’s alignment for short-term gains.

For SSC-Khatumo:

Maintain independence in local governance to retain grassroots legitimacy.

Engage Puntland and Jubaland to avoid regional alienation.

Advocate for formal federal recognition through legal and political channels.

For International Partners:

Support inclusive dialogue on federalism and territorial administration.

Encourage a consistent framework for regional recognition.

Monitor political developments to ensure alignment with peace and stability goals.

7. Conclusion

SSC-Khatumo’s integration into President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s political alliance is both a symbolic step forward and a cautionary tale of Somalia’s federal experiment. It reflects the persistent gaps in institutional design, legitimacy, and political inclusion. The next phase of Somali state-building must prioritize consistency, dialogue, and transparency to prevent further fragmentation and to harness the energies of emerging regional actors like SSC-Khatumo for national unity and development.

Somalia at the Brink: Possible Responses if Mogadishu Falls to Al-Shabab

Introduction

Somalia stands at a perilous crossroads, as the threat of Mogadishu—the nation’s capital and symbolic center of governance—being overrun by Al-Shabab militants grows increasingly imminent. Al-Shabab, a jihadist group aligned with al-Qaeda, has persistently destabilized Somalia through guerrilla warfare, terror attacks, and the establishment of parallel administrations in rural regions. Should Mogadishu fall, it would mark not just a territorial setback, but a profound political, military, and psychological blow to the fragile Somali state. This essay explores the possible responses Somalia might undertake in such a scenario, including internal government reactions, regional and international interventions, civilian responses, and long-term strategic recalibrations.

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1. Immediate Government and Military Response

Evacuation and Relocation of Government Apparatus:
If Mogadishu is lost, the Somali federal government (SFG) would likely relocate its operations to a more secure city, such as Baidoa, Beledweyne, or Garowe. The movement would aim to preserve continuity of governance and maintain diplomatic lines with the international community. Such a move would also be aimed at preventing a total collapse of state authority.

Counteroffensive Plans:
The Somali National Army (SNA), supported by regional state forces, would likely plan an immediate counteroffensive to retake the capital. This could involve conventional assaults, urban warfare tactics, and the solicitation of emergency support from international partners, particularly the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), Turkey, and the United States.

Emergency Powers and Martial Law:
The government may invoke emergency powers or martial law, suspending normal governance structures to focus on security operations. This might include curfews, increased surveillance, and rapid conscription of local militias into government-aligned forces.

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2. Regional and International Involvement

ATMIS (now AUSSOM) Reinforcement:
The African Union, under pressure from regional stakeholders such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, may reinforce its presence in Somalia. This could involve deploying more troops or extending ATMIS’s mandate beyond its scheduled withdrawal. A fall of Mogadishu would rekindle fears of regional spillover, prompting action even from reluctant neighbors.

U.S. and Turkish Involvement:
The United States, which has conducted drone strikes and advisory missions in Somalia, may escalate its direct involvement. Similarly, Turkey, which has trained Somali forces and established significant influence in Mogadishu, might increase its support through intelligence sharing, equipment, and strategic guidance.

UN and Humanitarian Agencies:
The UN would likely ramp up humanitarian aid and may consider imposing sanctions or arms embargoes to prevent further destabilization. Humanitarian corridors might be negotiated to allow the evacuation of civilians and the delivery of aid.

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3. Civilian Reaction and Internal Displacement

Mass Exodus from Mogadishu:
A takeover by Al-Shabab would trigger a massive wave of internally displaced persons (IDPs), overwhelming nearby towns and refugee camps. The humanitarian toll would be severe, with shortages of food, shelter, and medicine. International agencies would struggle to cope with the sudden influx.

Resistance Movements:
In historically resistant neighborhoods, local militias and civilians may form spontaneous resistance groups. This could lead to prolonged urban warfare within Mogadishu itself, turning it into a battlefield similar to other war-torn capitals like Aleppo or Kabul.

Potential Ethnic and Clan Fallout:
Given Somalia’s complex clan dynamics, a power vacuum or perceived favoritism could spark inter-clan conflict, especially if Al-Shabab’s takeover is seen as benefiting or facilitated by certain groups.

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4. Long-Term Strategic Shifts

Political Realignments:
The fall of Mogadishu could force a renegotiation of Somalia’s federal structure. Regional states like Puntland or Jubaland may push for greater autonomy or even threaten secession, arguing that the central government failed to maintain national integrity.

Rebuilding from the Periphery:
If the capital is lost, the SFG might adopt a “periphery-first” strategy, rebuilding legitimacy from regional strongholds and gradually attempting to retake the capital through alliances with local power brokers.

Dialogue with Militants?
Though controversial, a devastating loss might prompt discussions—either directly or through intermediaries—about negotiating with elements of Al-Shabab. Such talks would likely focus on ceasefires or humanitarian access, not political recognition.

Cyber and Media Warfare:
Losing the physical capital would prompt an ideological war. The government and its allies might intensify propaganda campaigns to counter Al-Shabab’s narrative, using social media, religious leaders, and diaspora engagement.

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Conclusion

The fall of Mogadishu to Al-Shabab would be a catastrophic turning point for Somalia, reverberating across East Africa and the wider international community. Yet it would not necessarily signify the end of the Somali state. The resilience of Somalia’s regional structures, the capacity for guerrilla resistance, and the potential for international support all suggest that the nation could recalibrate and respond—albeit through hardship. The key to survival and eventual recovery would lie in unity, strategic foresight, and the unwavering commitment of Somalis and their allies to reclaim their capital, their sovereignty, and their future.

Review of “Covert Action in Irregular Wars: Unraveling the Case of Timber Sycamore in Syria (2012–2017)” by Jonathan Hackett

Introduction
Jonathan Hackett’s article, published in Small Wars Journal, offers a critical examination of the CIA’s Timber Sycamore operation, a covert program aimed at overthrowing Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime through support for rebel forces. Drawing on declassified documents, government records, and interviews, Hackett—a former Marine Corps interrogator and special operations specialist—argues that Timber Sycamore’s failures underscore systemic issues in U.S. covert operations, including oversight gaps, inadequate vetting, and accountability lapses. The article serves as a cautionary tale about the risks of blending Title 50 (covert) and Title 10 (military) authorities in irregular warfare.

Summary
Hackett traces Timber Sycamore’s origins to the Arab Spring, detailing how the CIA and SOCOM collaborated to train and equip Syrian rebels under competing objectives: regime change (CIA) and countering ISIS (SOCOM). The operation, funded by Congress and Gulf states, faced immediate challenges:

  • Weapons Diversion: Bulgarian and Romanian arms intended for “moderate” rebels were funneled to ISIS and Salafi-jihadist groups via black-market networks, including Jordanian intelligence intermediaries.
  • Vetting Failures: Trainees with ties to extremist ideologies, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra), infiltrated the program.
  • Bureaucratic Friction: Parallel State Department efforts and SOCOM’s costly Syria Train and Equip Program (STEP) created redundancies, with STEP spending $500 million to field fewer than five combat-ready fighters.

The operation’s nadir came with Russia’s 2015 intervention, which shifted U.S. focus to counter-ISIS efforts. Timber Sycamore’s legacy was further tarnished by human rights abuses by U.S.-trained forces and the ironic 2024 rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa (a former ISIS-linked figure) to power after Assad’s ouster—a outcome Hackett frames as a pyrrhic victory.

Analysis
Strengths:

  1. Primary Source Rigor: Hackett leverages FOIA disclosures, weapon lot numbers, and congressional records to substantiate claims of diversion and mismanagement. His military background lends credibility to critiques of interagency coordination.
  2. Legal Nuance: The article clarifies the blurred lines between Title 50 and Title 10 authorities, particularly “sheep dipping” (military personnel under CIA direction), and highlights exemptions from Leahy vetting laws that enabled human rights abuses.
  3. Historical Context: Comparisons to past failures (e.g., Phoenix Program, Iran-Contra) contextualize Timber Sycamore within recurring patterns of covert action overreach.

Weaknesses:

  1. Geopolitical Simplification: While Hackett notes Russian and Iranian support for Assad, he underplays their role in thwarting U.S. objectives. A deeper analysis of external actors could enrich the failure narrative.
  2. Bias Potential: The author’s special operations background may skew perspectives on CIA-SOCOM tensions, though he acknowledges both agencies’ missteps.
  3. Outcome Dichotomy: The article frames al-Sharaa’s rise as purely negative, yet briefly notes U.S. engagement with his regime. This paradox warrants further exploration: does pragmatism sometimes override ideological concerns in foreign policy?

Conclusion
Hackett’s article is a timely contribution to debates on U.S. covert operations, emphasizing the perils of lax oversight and short-termism. While dense, its empirical rigor and actionable insights—such as calls for stricter vetting and interagency transparency—make it essential reading for policymakers. However, the analysis would benefit from addressing how global power competition (e.g., U.S.-Russia tensions) shapes covert action efficacy. Ultimately, Timber Sycamore’s legacy—a fractured Syria under jihadist leadership—stands as a stark warning: without accountability, even well-resourced covert campaigns risk backfiring catastrophically.

Rating: ★★★★☆ (4/5)
A compelling, well-sourced case study that balances detail with broader lessons, though slightly constrained by its U.S.-centric lens.

Insecurity in Mogadishu and the Periodic Exodus of Federal Politicians and Employees

Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, has long been a symbol of both resilience and chaos. For years, its residents have endured a relentless cycle of violence fueled by Al-Shabab insurgency, clan-based vendettas, and business-related revenge killings. This toxic environment has earned the city the grim moniker of a “hell on earth,” a reality that even the nation’s highest-ranking officials seem unable to withstand. Recent waves of Federal Government politicians and employees, including parliamentarians, ministers, and security escorts, fleeing to regions like SSC-Khatumo—a budding regional administration in northern Somalia—highlight a troubling pattern: Mogadishu’s insecurity is not only destabilizing daily life but also paralyzing governance, driving periodic exoduses that undermine public trust and institutional legitimacy.

The Security Crisis in Mogadishu

At the heart of Mogadishu’s turmoil lies the entrenched presence of Al-Shabab, an extremist group that continues to launch brazen attacks on government installations, hotels, and civilians. Despite sustained military campaigns, the group retains the capacity to strike with impunity, turning streets into battlegrounds and sowing fear among residents. Compounding this threat are clan-driven conflicts and revenge killings, often rooted in competition for resources or political influence. Business disputes, too, escalate into violence, as powerful actors resort to armed force to settle scores. For Federal officials, navigating this landscape means living under constant threat—a reality that has rendered Mogadishu increasingly ungovernable. Even President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has faced criticism for his frequent travels, interpreted by many as an attempt to escape the capital’s dangers.

Historical Precedent: Puntland as a Refuge

The phenomenon of officials seeking respite outside Mogadishu is not new. For years, Puntland, a semi-autonomous state in northeastern Somalia, served as a sanctuary for politicians and bureaucrats weary of the capital’s volatility. Its relative stability, bolstered by local governance structures and geographic distance from Al-Shabab’s strongholds, made it a pragmatic escape route. However, this reliance on Puntland also underscored the Federal Government’s fragility, revealing a leadership more focused on survival than systemic reform.

The Rise of SSC-Khatumo as a New Haven

Recently, SSC-Khatumo has emerged as an alternative refuge. This region, which declared its autonomy in 2023 after decades of territorial disputes, offers a combination of strategic remoteness and nascent governance. For Federal officials, it represents not only a safer space but also a political opportunity. By engaging with SSC-Khatumo, Mogadishu’s elites may aim to strengthen federal alliances or legitimize their authority in contested areas. However, the optics of high-profile visits—such as Prime Minister Hamse Abdi Barre’s anticipated trip—risk being perceived as performative. Critics argue that these delegations prioritize photo-ops over substantive engagement, doing little to address the root causes of displacement.

Public Perception and Governance Implications

The exodus of officials has deepened public cynicism. To ordinary Somalis, the spectacle of leaders fleeing their posts reinforces a narrative of abandonment. Many view these trips as indulgent escapes rather than legitimate efforts to stabilize the country. This perception erodes trust in institutions already weakened by corruption and inefficiency. Moreover, the absence of key decision-makers from Mogadishu disrupts governance, delaying critical policies and security strategies. The psychological impact is equally dire: when leaders appear unwilling to share in the hardships of their citizens, it breeds disillusionment and apathy.

Conclusion: A Cycle in Need of Breaking

The periodic influx of Federal politicians and employees into regions like SSC-Khatumo is a symptom of Mogadishu’s unaddressed security decay. Until the government confronts Al-Shabab’s insurgency, mediates clan conflicts, and strengthens judicial mechanisms to curb impunity, such exoduses will persist. Sustainable solutions demand more than fleeting visits to safer regions; they require comprehensive security reforms, inclusive dialogue, and economic investments to dismantle the conditions breeding violence. For Somalia’s leaders, the choice is clear: either continue escaping Mogadishu’s chaos or commit to transforming it into a city worthy of their presence. The latter path, though arduous, is the only way to halt the cycle of fear and flight—and to restore hope in a nation weary of both.

Eradicating Corrupt Leadership in Africa: The Path to Freedom and Prosperity

Introduction
Africa, a continent brimming with potential, grapples with a pervasive challenge: corrupt leadership. The legacies of Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso and contemporary figures like Ibrahim Traoré underscore the transformative power of ethical governance. While Sankara’s revolutionary policies in the 1980s prioritized anti-corruption and social justice, Traoré’s recent rise highlights ongoing aspirations for accountability. This essay advocates for dismantling systemic corruption through democratic means, emphasizing the role of informed electorates, institutional reforms, and civic mobilization to usher Africa toward lasting freedom and prosperity.

Legacy of Visionary Leadership
Thomas Sankara, often called “Africa’s Che Guevara,” demonstrated that integrity and political will can drive change. During his brief tenure, he slashed government salaries, redistributed land, and invested in education and healthcare. Similarly, Ibrahim Traoré’s rhetoric against foreign exploitation and corruption resonates with youth and activists. However, their ascendancy through non-democratic means reveals a critical tension: sustainable progress requires systemic change, not just charismatic leaders. Sankara’s assassination and Traoré’s contested legitimacy remind us that enduring reform demands institutional, not personal, solutions.

The Corrosive Impact of Corruption
Corrupt leadership stifles development by diverting resources from critical sectors like healthcare and infrastructure. According to the African Union, corruption costs the continent over $148 billion annually, perpetuating poverty and inequality. Entrenched elites manipulate electoral systems, entrenching patronage networks that undermine democracy. Citizens, disillusioned by empty promises, often succumb to apathy or protests, as seen in recent uprisings in Sudan and Zimbabwe. The cycle of corruption and repression traps nations in stagnation leading to state failure. Somalia is the shining example of this African illness, necessitating urgent action.

Democratic Solutions: Voting Out Corruption

  1. Free and Fair Elections: Strengthening electoral commissions and enforcing transparency in voting processes are vital. Countries like Ghana and Botswana have shown that credible elections, monitored by civil society and international observers, can ensure peaceful transitions.
  2. Informed Electorate: Civic education empowers citizens to demand accountability. Mobile technology and grassroots campaigns, such as Nigeria’s #NotTooYoungToRun movement, can engage youth and combat voter apathy.
  3. Institutional Reforms: Anti-corruption agencies must operate independently, with prosecutorial power. Rwanda’s digitization of public services reduced bureaucratic graft, proving that systemic checks work.

Civil Society and Media as Watchdogs
Vibrant civil society organizations and a free press are bulwarks against tyranny. Investigative journalists, like Kenya’s John-Allan Namu, expose graft, while movements like #EndSARS in Nigeria mobilize public dissent. Social media amplifies marginalized voices, though governments often retaliate with repression. International partnerships, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism, can bolster local efforts without undermining sovereignty.

Challenges and Risks
Electoral fraud, voter intimidation, and disinformation campaigns persist. In nations like DR Congo, leaders cling to power by stifling opposition. Moreover, military coups—though sometimes popular—risk cyclical instability, as seen in Mali and Burkina Faso. True change requires patience: rebuilding trust in democracy is a marathon, not a sprint.

Case Studies: Lessons from Success
Botswana’s sustained democracy and low corruption levels stem from strong institutions and civic pride. Mauritius, ranking first in Africa for democracy, combines economic openness with robust welfare programs. These examples prove that cultural shifts toward accountability are achievable through persistence.

Conclusion
Africa’s journey to prosperity hinges on rejecting corruption and embracing participatory governance. While figures like Sankara and Traoré symbolize the hunger for change, lasting solutions lie in empowering citizens, reforming institutions, and upholding democratic principles. By voting out corrupt leaders and demanding transparency, Africans can reclaim their future—transforming the continent’s potential into tangible progress. The road is arduous, but collective resolve can turn the tide, ensuring freedom and prosperity for generations to come.

Recurring Governance Failures in Somalia: A Cycle of Division and Instability

Introduction
Somalia’s political landscape has been marred by cyclical governance failures since the collapse of General Siad Barre’s military regime in 1991. Despite transitioning to a federal structure, successive governments, including President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s current administration, have repeated historical mistakes by sidelining national reconciliation and political inclusivity. This essay examines how these governance lapses—exacerbated by centralization, constitutional violations, and foreign interference—undermine Somalia’s fight against extremism and jeopardize its fragile state-building process.

Historical Context: Authoritarianism and Clan Fragmentation
The Barre regime (1969–1991) entrenched authoritarianism, suppressing dissent and manipulating clan divisions to maintain power. Its collapse plunged Somalia into civil war, fragmenting the nation along clan lines. Post-1991 efforts to restore stability, including the transitional governments of the 2000s, failed to address deep-seated grievances. The 2012 Provisional Federal Constitution (PFC) aimed to decentralize power through federalism but has been inconsistently implemented, perpetuating mistrust between Mogadishu and regional states.

The Recurring Failure of Reconciliation
A persistent flaw in Somali governance is the elite’s reluctance to prioritize national reconciliation. Power struggles among political actors, often rooted in clan loyalties, have taken precedence over inclusive dialogue. For instance, the 2017 electoral process, which marginalized opposition voices, and the violent aftermath of the 2021 delayed elections highlight this trend. Such exclusionary tactics mirror Barre’s playbook, fostering resentment and cyclical violence.

Mohamud’s Centralized Governance: “We Will Stop to Await Anybody”
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s second term (2022–present) has intensified centralization. His dismissal of federal member states’ perspectives—exemplified by clashes with Puntland and Jubaland over resource management and security—reflects a top-down approach. By marginalizing opposition groups and regional leaders, Mohamud risks alienating critical stakeholders. His declaration, “We will stop to await anybody,” epitomizes this unilateralism, undermining the PFC’s federal principles and deepening intergovernmental rifts.

Security Implications: Fractured Unity Amidst Extremist Threats
Al-Shabab and ISIS remain potent threats, controlling swathes of territory and exploiting governance vacuums. Effective counterterrorism requires coordination between federal and state authorities, yet Mogadishu’s strained relations with regional governments have led to fragmented military efforts. For example, Jubaland’s resistance to federal interference in its local security operations and elections has weakened offensives against Al-Shabab. Meanwhile, Somalia’s reliance on the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, now AUSSOM)) underscores the inadequacy of its nascent security forces, a vulnerability exacerbated by political disunity.

Constitutional Violations and Federalism Disputes
The PFC envisions a balance of power between Mogadishu and federal states, but its provisional status allows ambiguous interpretations. Recent controversies, such as the central government’s unilateral amendments to electoral laws and control over foreign aid, violate the PFC’s spirit of power-sharing. States like Puntland have responded by declaring autonomy, signaling a crisis of confidence in the federal project. These disputes hinder consensus on critical issues, including the constitution’s finalization and resource distribution.

Foreign Interference: Complicating Sovereignty
Somalia’s fragility has invited foreign actors to pursue competing interests. Ethiopia, Kenya, Turkey, and the UAE have invested in infrastructure, military bases, and political alliances, often exacerbating internal divisions. For instance, UAE support for certain regional leaders contrasts with Turkish backing of Mogadishu, creating parallel power centers. Such interference undermines national sovereignty and distracts from inclusive state-building.

Conclusion: Toward Inclusive Governance
Somalia’s path to stability demands breaking the cycle of exclusion. President Mohamud must prioritize dialogue with federal states and opposition groups, adhering to the PFC’s federal framework. International partners should condition support on inclusive processes rather than backing factions. Only through genuine reconciliation and shared governance can Somalia neutralize extremism, reduce foreign dependency, and achieve lasting peace. The alternative—a continuation of centralized, divisive politics—risks perpetuating the very crises that have plagued the nation for decades.

Final Reflection
Somalia’s governance challenges are a testament to the dangers of repeating past mistakes. Learning from history requires courage to embrace inclusivity, uphold the rule of law, and prioritize national unity over narrow interests. The stakes—a sovereign, stable Somalia—could not be higher.

White Paper: Overcoming Political and Constitutional Gridlock in Somalia

Proposing a Path to Inclusive Governance, Accountability, and Federal Equity

1. Context and Background

The Provisional Federal Constitution (PFC) of 2012 remains unimplemented in critical areas, enabling abuses of power. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration has been accused of:

  • Unilateral Decision-Making: Bypassing federal member states, using rubber-stamped compromised Parliament on constitutional amendments, security, resource management, and foreign policy.
  • Constitutional Violations: Ignoring mandates for power-sharing and parliamentary oversight.
  • Corruption and Illicit Sales: Auctioning public lands and properties in Mogadishu without legislative scrutiny.
  • Secret Foreign Contracts: Signing international agreements (e.g., port/energy deals) without due process or ratification.
  • Marginalization of Federal States: Excluding Puntland and others from key decisions, deepening distrust in federalism.
  • Absentee Leadership: Prioritizing non-stop overseas travels over domestic governance, delaying critical problem-solving (e.g., drought response, federal-state mediation, and security reforms).

These actions have fueled grievances, destabilized state-building efforts, and risk fracturing Somalia’s fragile federal compact.

2. Root Causes of the Crisis

A. Erosion of Constitutional Governance

  • Unilateral Executive Actions: Repeated disregard for the PFC’s federalism principles (Articles 43–54) and parliamentary ratification requirements (Article 71).
  • Opaque Resource Management: Illegal sale of public assets in Mogadishu for private gain, bypassing federal and state oversight.

B. Systemic Corruption

  • Elite Capture: Collusion between officials and private actors to exploit public lands and revenues.
  • Lack of Accountability: Weak anti-corruption institutions and judicial complicity.

C. Exclusionary Federalism

  • Centralization of Power: Marginalization of Puntland, Jubaland, and others in security, revenue-sharing, and foreign engagements.
  • Asymmetric Federalism: Ad hoc negotiations favoring Mogadishu over member states.

D. Unchecked Foreign Engagement

  • Secret Deals: Signing agreements (e.g., with Turkey, UAE) on ports, fisheries, and military bases without parliamentary or state-level input.

E. Absentee Leadership

  • Neglect of Domestic Mandate: Excessive overseas travel undermines hands-on governance, exacerbating crises (e.g., delayed famine response, stalled federal-state talks).
  • Power Vacuum: Frequent absences enable unaccountable decision-making by unelected officials.

3. Recommendations for Breaking the Gridlock

A. Restore Constitutional Order

  1. Immediate Compliance with the PFC:
    • Suspend all unilateral executive decisions until reviewed by Parliament and member states.
    • Establish a Constitutional Court to adjudicate violations (e.g., illicit land sales, unauthorized foreign agreements).
  2. Finalize the Constitution:
    • Clarify federal-state resource-sharing (Article 44) and require parliamentary ratification for international treaties (Article 71).

B. Combat Corruption and Illicit Sales

  1. Independent Anti-Corruption Commission:
    • Investigate and annul fraudulent land/asset sales in Mogadishu; reclaim public properties.
    • Prosecute officials and private actors involved in graft.
  2. Transparent Asset Management:
    • Digitize land registries and mandate public auctions under parliamentary oversight.

C. Ensure Transparent Foreign Engagement

  1. Parliamentary Ratification of Contracts:
    • Nullify existing secret agreements (e.g., Turkey’s 2024 port deal) until reviewed and approved by Parliament.
    • Publish all future foreign contracts for public scrutiny.
  2. Federal-State Consultation:
    • Require consent from affected member states for region-specific agreements (e.g., hydrocarbon exploration in Puntland).

D. Address Marginalization of Federal States

  1. Federal-State Council:
    • Create a permanent body (50% federal, 50% member states) to co-manage security, resources, and foreign policy.
  2. Equitable Revenue-Sharing:
    • Adopt a formula allocating Mogadishu port revenues to member states, per Puntland’s demands.
  3. Reconciliation Conferences:
    • Mediate disputes between Mogadishu and Puntland through IGAD-facilitated dialogues.

E. Strengthen Institutional Checks

  1. Parliamentary Oversight Committees:
    • Investigate executive misconduct (e.g., unauthorized deals, asset sales).
  2. Judicial Reforms:
    • Appoint judges through a federal-state consensus process to curb bias.

F. Curb Absentee Leadership and Prioritize Domestic Governance

  1. Travel Restrictions for Senior Officials:
    • Cap overseas travel for the president and ministers at 30 days annually unless approved by Parliament for national interest.
    • Require public reporting of travel costs and outcomes.
  2. Deputy Leadership Protocol:
    • Designate the prime minister to lead daily governance per PFC during presidential absences.
  3. Domestic Crisis Response Fund:
    • Redirect travel budgets to emergency programs (e.g., drought relief, clan mediation).

G. International Accountability

  1. Conditional Aid and Debt Relief:
    • Link IMF/WB support to progress on anti-corruption, federal inclusion, and domestic governance benchmarks.
  2. UN Monitoring:
    • Deploy experts to audit public asset sales, foreign contracts, and presidential travel expenditures.

4. Conclusion

Somalia’s survival as a functional state hinges on ending impunity, decentralizing power, and prioritizing national consensus over elite interests. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud must refocus on his constitutional mandate to govern—not grandstand abroad—while institutions must enforce accountability. By anchoring governance in the rule of law, equitable federalism, and transparency, Somalia can break its cycle of crises. The international community must uphold accountability, but Somalis themselves must lead this transformative effort.

Endorsed by WDM
Date: April 3, 2024

This framework tackles Somalia’s specific challenges head-on, offering actionable steps to resolve corruption, unilateralism, federal marginalization, and absentee leadership while restoring constitutional legitimacy.

Review of “Ethiopia’s Red Sea Politics: Corridors, Ports and Security in the Horn of Africa” by Dr. Biruk Terrefe

By Warsame Digital Media I April 2, 2025

Overview
Dr. Biruk Terrefe’s study examines Ethiopia’s strategic maritime ambitions through the lens of its 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, situating this within a century-long quest for sea access and broader geopolitical dynamics. The study, part of the XCEPT program, explores how infrastructure corridors and ports in the Horn of Africa intersect with state-building, sovereignty, and security. By analyzing Ethiopia’s Red Sea doctrine under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Terrefe argues that Ethiopia’s port negotiations transcend commercial interests, reflecting ambitions to become a regional superpower amid perceived encirclement by hostile states like Egypt and shifting global alliances.

Strengths

  1. Interdisciplinary Depth: Terrefe skillfully integrates political science, geography, and development studies, offering a nuanced analysis of how infrastructure shapes (and is shaped by) political orders. His focus on the “infrastructure-security complex” highlights the dual economic and strategic roles of corridors like Berbera and Djibouti.
  2. Historical Context: The study provides a compelling historical narrative, tracing Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations from imperial-era policies to contemporary agreements, demonstrating continuity and rupture in foreign policy.
  3. Multi-Scalar Analysis: By examining sub-national tensions (e.g., Somali-Ethiopian territorial disputes), regional dynamics (e.g., Gulf and Türkiye’s influence), and global geopolitics (e.g., Red Sea security), Terrefe avoids oversimplification, emphasizing the interconnectedness of local and international actors.
  4. Methodological Rigor: The use of interviews, public statements, and archival research enriches the analysis, particularly in unpacking Ethiopia’s securitization discourse and Somaliland’s quest for recognition.

Weaknesses

  1. Speculative Elements: The classified nature of the MoU necessitates reliance on secondary sources and media reports, leading to speculative conclusions about its military and commercial terms.
  2. Ethiopia-Centric Perspective: While the study acknowledges regional tensions, it predominantly centers Ethiopian narratives, potentially underrepresenting Somali and Eritrean viewpoints. For instance, Somalia’s sovereignty concerns are noted but not deeply interrogated.
  3. Timeliness vs. Long-Term Impact: The analysis of events up to 2024 offers immediacy but limits assessment of long-term consequences, such as the viability of the Ankara Agreement or Somaliland’s electoral outcomes.

Contributions
Terrefe’s work advances understanding of how infrastructure projects serve as geopolitical tools, particularly in conflict-prone borderlands. By framing Ethiopia’s corridor diplomacy as a “Red Sea doctrine,” he illuminates the entanglement of development and security agendas, challenging traditional narratives of trade liberalization. The study also underscores the Horn of Africa’s role in global maritime politics, particularly amid competing Gulf and Turkish interests.

Critique
While the study adeptly links Ethiopia’s domestic politics to regional strategies, it occasionally conflates economic and security motivations. For example, the claim that Ethiopia seeks to “escape encirclement” is persuasive but could benefit from deeper exploration of economic data (e.g., trade diversification metrics) to balance the security-focused narrative. Additionally, the role of China—a key investor in Djibouti’s ports—is underexamined compared to Gulf states and Türkiye.

Conclusion
Dr. Terrefe’s study is a significant contribution to scholarship on the Horn of Africa’s political economy, offering fresh insights into the interplay of infrastructure, sovereignty, and security. Its interdisciplinary approach and multi-scalar framework make it valuable for policymakers and scholars navigating the region’s complex geopolitics. While constrained by the opacity of recent events, the study provocatively challenges assumptions about landlocked states’ strategies and sets a foundation for future research on evolving corridor politics. By centering Ethiopia’s ambitions, Terrefe invites critical reflection on how emerging powers recalibrate regional orders in an era of infrastructural competition.

White Paper: Exploring Asymmetrical Federalism and Confederalism in the Somali Context

Executive Summary
Somalia’s governance crisis demands innovative solutions. This paper evaluates asymmetrical federalism alongside a confederal system as potential pathways to address constitutional violations, federal-state discord, and security threats. While a confederal model prioritizes maximal decentralization, asymmetrical federalism offers a middle ground, granting tailored autonomy to regions like Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland while preserving a unified state. Both models present opportunities and risks, requiring careful calibration to Somalia’s complex realities.

1. Alternative Model: Asymmetrical Federalism

Definition:
Asymmetrical federalism allows for variable autonomy among member states, recognizing historical, cultural, or political differences. Unlike classical federalism (uniform powers) or confederalism (state supremacy), it enables negotiated, region-specific arrangements under a shared constitutional framework.

Examples:

  • Canada: Quebec has distinct language and civil law privileges.
  • Spain: Catalonia and the Basque Country enjoy fiscal and linguistic autonomy.
  • India: Jammu and Kashmir (pre-2019) and Northeastern states had special status.

1.1 Key Features

  • Flexible Power-Sharing: Core federal functions (defense, currency) remain centralized, while states negotiate additional powers (e.g., policing, resource management).
  • Constitutional Recognition: Legally enshrined differences (e.g., Somaliland’s unique status).
  • Equity Mechanisms: Redistributive policies to prevent disparities between stronger and weaker states.

2. Comparative Analysis: Federal vs. Confederal vs. Asymmetrical Federalism

AspectFederal SystemConfederal SystemAsymmetrical Federalism
SovereigntySharedRetained by statesShared, with variable autonomy
Power DistributionUniform regional powersFully decentralizedTailored to state needs
Conflict ResolutionConstitutional courtsConsensus-basedHybrid (courts + negotiation)
SecurityCentralized commandState-ledMixed (central oversight + local operations)

3. Opportunities of Asymmetrical Federalism for Somalia

3.1 Addressing Somaliland’s Secessionist Ambitions

  • Grant Somaliland constitutionally recognized autonomy (e.g., control over security, customs, and education) while retaining symbolic ties to Somalia (e.g., flag, international representation).
  • Example: Greenland’s self-rule within Denmark.

3.2 Resolving FG-FMS Deadlocks

  • Allow Puntland and Jubaland to negotiate enhanced powers (e.g., oil revenue sharing, local policing) without dismantling federal institutions.

3.3 Mitigating Fragmentation Risks

  • Maintain a unified military and foreign policy to counter Al-Shabaab/ISIS, while permitting states to manage local security operations.

3.4 Electoral Flexibility

  • Adopt region-specific electoral models (e.g., Somaliland’s hybrid clan-system elections) under federal oversight to break national deadlocks.

4. Challenges of Asymmetrical Federalism

4.1 Complexity in Governance

  • Negotiating and managing diverse agreements risks bureaucratic inefficiency and legal contradictions.

4.2 Inter-State Resentment

  • States with fewer privileges (e.g., Hirshabelle, Galmudug) may reject perceived inequities, fueling new conflicts.

4.3 Constitutional Legitimacy

  • Requires broad consensus to amend the PFC, which Mogadishu and distrustful FMS may resist.

4.4 External Exploitation

  • Adversaries like Al-Shabab could exploit governance disparities to destabilize weaker regions.

5. Recommendations

  1. Constitutional Convention:
    • Draft a new charter recognizing asymmetrical autonomy for Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland, while ensuring baseline federal protections for all states.
  2. Tiered Security Framework:
    • Centralize national defense and intelligence under the FG, while delegating counterterrorism operations to capable states (e.g., Puntland’s Darawish forces).
  3. Asymmetrical Resource-Sharing:
    • Let resource-rich states retain a higher share of revenues (e.g., Jubaland’s ports) but mandate contributions to a national cohesion fund.
  4. Phased Implementation:
    • Pilot asymmetrical agreements in Puntland and Somaliland with AU/UN mediation before nationwide rollout.
  5. Strengthen Federal Institutions:
    • Build impartial mechanisms (e.g., intergovernmental councils, courts) to resolve asymmetrical disputes.

6. Conclusion

Neither confederalism nor asymmetrical federalism alone can resolve Somalia’s crises. However, asymmetrical federalism offers a pragmatic compromise: it acknowledges Somalia’s diversity without abandoning unity. To succeed, it must be paired with guarantees of equity, robust conflict-resolution systems, and international support. Conversely, a confederal system risks institutionalizing fragmentation but could appeal if distrust in Mogadishu becomes irreparable. Somalia’s leaders must weigh these models against the catastrophic costs of inaction.

Endorsed by Warsame Digital Media
Date: March 11, 2025

This white paper underscores the urgency of reimagining Somalia’s governance. Whether through confederalism or asymmetrical federalism, the goal remains: a stable, inclusive Somalia capable of defeating extremism and fulfilling its people’s aspirations.

Why Supporting WDM Means Championing Fearless, Unbiased Journalism

Introduction:
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TO STAY IN THE SOMALI FEDERATION, PUNTLAND STATE COULD STILL OPT FOR ASYMMETRICAL UNION


To navigate its quest for asymmetrical federalism within Somalia’s contentious political landscape, Puntland must leverage its unique resources, historical influence, and strategic priorities while balancing national unity. Below is a structured approach:

1. Legal and Constitutional Negotiations

  • Amend the Provisional Constitution:
    Advocate for constitutional recognition of asymmetrical federalism, allowing Puntland greater autonomy in governance, resource management, and security. This could mirror models like Quebec (Canada) or Zanzibar (Tanzania), where regions have distinct powers while remaining part of the state.
    • Key Demands: Control over marine resources (fishing, ports), cultural heritage preservation, and local security forces.
    • Leverage International Mediation: Engage the AU, IGAD, or UN to broker talks with Mogadishu, framing autonomy as a stabilizing measure amid counterterrorism efforts.
  • Draft a Puntland Charter:
    Formalize its governance structure, rights, and obligations within Somalia’s federal framework, ensuring alignment with Somali cultural norms and international law.

2. Economic Leverage and Resource Management

  • Negotiate Revenue-Sharing Agreements:
    Demand a higher share of revenues from its natural resources (e.g., frankincense, myrrh, fisheries) to fund local development. Propose a model similar to Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, which retains 17% of federal oil revenues.
    • Ports and Trade: Use control of critical ports (Bosaso, Garacad) to negotiate trade autonomy or joint federal-state management.
  • Develop Blue Economy Partnerships:
    Partner with international entities (e.g., UAE, Turkey, EU) to invest in marine resource exploitation, positioning Puntland as a hub for sustainable fisheries and maritime trade.

3. Political Coalition-Building

  • Form Alliances with Other Federal States:
    Collaborate with Jubaland, Galmudug, and others to push for a decentralized federal system. Jointly advocate for constitutional reforms that empower states while preserving national cohesion.
  • Engage Clan and Civil Society:
    Mobilize Puntland’s influential clans (e.g., Majeerteen, Warsangeli, Dhulbahante, Lelkase, others) and civil society to build grassroots support for autonomy, framing it as a safeguard against Mogadishu’s overreach.

4. Security and Counterterrorism as Bargaining Chips

  • Link Autonomy to Regional Stability:
    Highlight Puntland’s role in combating ISIS in Cal-Miskat and securing the Gulf of Aden. Argue that greater autonomy would enhance its capacity to address transnational threats, benefiting Somalia and global partners.
    • Request Security Sector Support: Seek direct international funding for PMPF, Darawiish, PSF (e.g., via UAE, EU, or U.S. AFRICOM) to reduce reliance on Mogadishu.

5. Public Diplomacy and Identity Politics

  • Promote Puntland’s Historical Legacy:
    Emphasize its pre-1960 political and administrative experience and leadership in Somali reconciliation efforts (e.g., 2004–2009). Use cultural heritage (e.g., ancient port cities like Qandala, Alula, Bargaal, Hafuun etc) to bolster claims to self-rule.
  • Media Campaigns:
    Utilize platforms like Puntland TV and social media to frame autonomy as a democratic right and economic necessity, countering Mogadishu’s centralization narrative.

6. Confidence-Building Measures with Mogadishu

  • Phased Implementation:
    Propose transitional agreements (e.g., 5–10 years) to test asymmetrical governance, allowing Mogadishu to monitor outcomes without ceding permanent authority.
  • Joint Committees:
    Establish federal-state committees on resource management, security, and constitutional reform to build trust and incremental collaboration.

7. International Advocacy

  • Lobby for Recognition:
    Leverage partnerships with Gulf states (UAE, Saudi Arabia) and Turkey, which have strategic interests in Puntland’s ports and resources, to pressure Mogadishu into concessions.
    • Engage Diaspora Networks: Mobilize Puntland’s diaspora in Europe and North America to advocate for autonomy through lobbying and remittance-funded development projects.

8. Mitigating Risks

  • Avoid Secessionist Rhetoric:
    Clearly distinguish asymmetrical federalism from Somaliland’s independence bid to retain domestic and international legitimacy.
  • Prevent Fragmentation:
    Ensure autonomy demands do not alienate minority clans in Puntland, maintaining internal cohesion through inclusive governance.

Comprehensive Analysis and Expansion of Puntland’s Counter-ISIS Strategy in the Cal-Miskat Mountains

By Jama Haji Warsame, Puntland State, Somalia

Introduction
Puntland’s battle against ISIS in the Cal-Miskat Mountain Range is a pivotal effort to stabilize Somalia and curb regional extremism. While the original reports outline a strategic framework, a deeper dive into specific challenges, stakeholder dynamics, and innovative solutions is essential for a robust policy response.

Short-Term Security Challenges: Context and Data

  1. Tactical Adaptations by ISIS:
    • ISIS has historically employed hit-and-run tactics in Somalia’s rugged terrain. For instance, in 2022, militants used similar strategies in the Golis Mountains, causing prolonged skirmishes. The use of IEDs has surged, with over 50 incidents reported in Puntland in 2023 alone, complicating troop movements and endangering civilians.
    • Humanitarian Impact: The UN estimates 30,000 civilians have been displaced since operations began, straining resources in cities like Bosaso. Organizations like the Somali Red Crescent are providing aid, but funding gaps exceed $15 million.
    • Financial Strain: Puntland’s annual security budget is 25 million dollars, yet counter−ISIS operations consume 4010 million dollars, the stabilization package, remains critical but insufficient.

Long-Term Consequences: Lessons from History

  • Security Vacuum: The 2017 withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from central Somalia led to Al-Shabab’s resurgence. Puntland must avoid this by pre-positioning trained local forces in liberated areas.
  • Economic Stagnation: The fishing and livestock sectors, contributing 60% of Puntland’s GDP, face disruption. Unemployment among youth (over 70%) heightens vulnerability to radicalization.
  • Regional Spillover: ISIS affiliates in Mozambique and the DRC demonstrate the group’s capacity to exploit governance gaps. Cross-border intelligence-sharing with Kenya and Ethiopia is vital.

Stakeholder Roles: Collaboration and Challenges

  • Local Leaders: In Somaliland, clan-led peace councils reduced intercommunal violence by 50% in 2020. Replicating this model could enhance trust in Puntland.
  • Federal Government Tensions: Puntland’s boycott of Somalia’s National Security Council in 2023 over resource-sharing disputes risks fragmenting counterterrorism efforts. Mediation by the AU or IGAD is critical.
  • International Partners: The U.S. AFRICOM provides drone surveillance and occasional airstrikes, while UAE trains PMPF troops. The UAE’s port investments in Bosaso could be further leveraged for more economic-security linkages.

Post-Conflict Engagement: Innovative Solutions

  1. Rehabilitation Programs:
    • Nigeria’s “Operation Safe Corridor” DE radicalized 2,000 Boko Haram fighters via psychosocial support. Puntland could partner with UNICEF to replicate this, focusing on vocational training in agriculture.
  2. Infrastructure Development:
    • Prioritize towns-Cal-Miskat road projects to enhance market access and security mobility. Mobile health clinics piloted in Galmudug, reduced maternal mortality by 30%, and could be expanded.
  3. Gender-Inclusive Strategies:
    • Include women in community policing, as seen in Kenya’s “Nyumba Kumi” initiative, which improved local intelligence by 40%.
  4. Environmental Considerations:
    • Mine-clearance efforts must integrate environmental NGOs to restore grazing lands. The HALO Trust’s work in Somaliland offers a blueprint.

The Way Forward: Integrated Strategies

  • Phased Governance Rollout: Within 6 months of liberation, mobile administration units (MAUs) could be deployed to provide basic services, building on lessons from the Somali Regional State in Ethiopia.
  • Economic Revitalization: Partner with the World Bank’s Somalia Urban Resilience Project to fund youth entrepreneurship in Bosaso, targeting sectors like renewable energy and digital services.
  • International Coordination: Establish a “Cal-Miskat Stabilization Coalition” with the AU, EU, and Gulf states, modeled on the Global Coalition Against Daesh, to pool resources and intelligence.

Conclusion
Puntland’s success hinges on transcending military action to embrace holistic governance, economic inclusivity, and regional cooperation. By integrating lessons from global counterinsurgency efforts and addressing gaps in gender and environmental policy, Puntland can transform Cal-Miskat into a beacon of resilience, deterring extremism through sustainable development. The international community must act decisively, recognizing that stability in Puntland is a linchpin for regional security.

UNDERSTAND WHY THE ARABS ARE NOW CONDEMNING KING ABDALLAH OF JORDAN

Some Arab political pundits have criticized King Abdullah II of Jordan for meeting with President Donald Trump and endorsing his policy proposal on Gaza and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict for several reasons. These criticisms often stem from political, ideological, and regional perspectives, as well as concerns about the implications of Trump’s policies for the Palestinian cause and Arab unity. Below are the key reasons for such condemnation:

1. Perceived Alignment with U.S. Policies Unfavorable to Palestinians

  • Trump’s Pro-Israel Stance: President Trump’s administration was widely seen as heavily biased in favor of Israel, exemplified by decisions such as recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, and endorsing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. These actions were viewed as undermining Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem and the two-state solution.
  • The “Deal of the Century”: Trump’s Middle East peace plan, often referred to as the “Deal of the Century,” was criticized for favoring Israeli interests at the expense of Palestinian rights. Many Arab pundits saw King Abdullah’s engagement with Trump as tacit approval of a plan that they believe marginalizes Palestinian aspirations for statehood and self-determination.

2. Erosion of Jordan’s Historical Role as a Defender of Palestinian Rights

  • Jordan’s Unique Position: Jordan has historically positioned itself as a key advocate for Palestinian rights, partly due to its large Palestinian population and its custodianship of Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. Critics argue that meeting with Trump and appearing to support his policies undermines Jordan’s moral and political standing as a defender of the Palestinian cause.
  • Perceived Betrayal: Some pundits view King Abdullah’s engagement with Trump as a betrayal of Jordan’s historical commitment to the Palestinian struggle, particularly at a time when the Palestinian leadership rejected Trump’s proposals outright.

3. Regional and Domestic Political Pressures

  • Arab Public Opinion: Across the Arab world, there is widespread sympathy for the Palestinian cause, and Trump’s policies are deeply unpopular. By meeting with Trump, King Abdullah risks alienating not only Palestinians but also broader Arab public opinion, which sees the U.S. approach as unjust and one-sided.
  • Domestic Concerns: Jordan has a significant Palestinian population, and any perceived shift away from supporting Palestinian rights could provoke domestic unrest or criticism from political factions within Jordan.

4. Concerns About Normalization with Israel

  • Normalization of Israeli Occupation: Trump’s policies, particularly those related to Gaza and the West Bank, are seen as attempts to normalize Israeli occupation and annexation of Palestinian territories. Critics argue that King Abdullah’s engagement with Trump could be interpreted as endorsing this normalization, which contradicts the Arab consensus on the need for a just and comprehensive solution to the conflict.
  • Impact on Arab Unity: Some pundits fear that Jordan’s actions could encourage other Arab states to follow suit, further fragmenting the Arab position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and weakening collective bargaining power.

5. Lack of Palestinian Inclusion in the Process

  • Marginalization of Palestinian Voices: Trump’s policies were crafted without meaningful consultation with Palestinian leaders, leading to accusations that the U.S. was imposing a solution rather than facilitating a negotiated settlement. Critics argue that King Abdullah’s engagement with Trump legitimizes a process that excludes and disempowers Palestinians.
  • Undermining the Palestinian Authority: By engaging with Trump, King Abdullah risks undermining the Palestinian Authority’s position and weakening its ability to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people.

6. Geopolitical Implications for Jordan

  • Balancing Act: Jordan walks a fine line between maintaining its strategic relationship with the U.S. and upholding its commitment to the Palestinian cause. Critics argue that King Abdullah’s meeting with Trump prioritizes U.S. ties over regional solidarity, potentially isolating Jordan within the Arab world.
  • Regional Rivalries: Some pundits suggest that Jordan’s actions could be seen as aligning with U.S. and Israeli interests at the expense of broader Arab and Islamic solidarity, particularly in the context of regional rivalries involving countries like Iran and Turkey.

Conclusion

The condemnation of King Abdullah II by some Arab political pundits reflects broader concerns about the direction of U.S. policy under President Trump and its implications for the Palestinian cause. Critics view Jordan’s engagement with Trump as undermining its historical role as a defender of Palestinian rights, legitimizing a one-sided peace process, and risking regional and domestic backlash. While Jordan may have sought to balance its strategic interests with its commitment to the Palestinian cause, the perception of alignment with unpopular U.S. policies has fueled criticism and skepticism among Arab commentators.

Ultimately, the controversy highlights the complex geopolitical dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the challenges faced by Arab leaders in navigating competing pressures from domestic, regional, and international actors.

White Paper: Puntland State’s Strategic Options for Preserving Stability and Autonomy within the Somali Union

Executive Summary
The Puntland State of Somalia has long been a cornerstone of stability and governance in northeastern Somalia, playing a critical role in countering violent extremist groups such as ISIS and Al-Shabab. However, the lack of meaningful support from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has exacerbated longstanding grievances, including concerns over constitutional adherence, economic marginalization, and disproportionate policies affecting Puntland’s residents. These challenges have reignited debates about Puntland’s future within the Somali Federation, particularly in light of Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1991.

This white paper explores three strategic options for Puntland to address these challenges while preserving stability and autonomy: (1) convening a National Congress for Constitutional Reforms, (2) transitioning to a Confederation Model, and (3) pursuing a Declaration of Independence. Each option is analyzed for feasibility, challenges, and steps forward, with recommendations for prioritizing dialogue, engaging international mediators, and addressing security collaboratively. The paper concludes that while independence remains a last resort, incremental steps toward confederalism or constitutional reform could preserve Somali unity while addressing governance grievances.

Introduction
Puntland State has been a stabilizing force in Somalia for decades, contributing significantly to governance reconstruction and countering violent extremism. Despite these efforts, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has failed to provide adequate support, leading to growing discontent over issues such as constitutional violations, economic marginalization, and inequitable policies. These tensions have prompted a reevaluation of Puntland’s role within the Somali Federation.

This white paper examines three potential pathways for Puntland to navigate its current challenges: constitutional reform, confederalism, and independence. Each option is assessed for its feasibility, potential challenges, and actionable steps, with the aim of providing a roadmap for Puntland’s leadership and stakeholders.

Option 1: National Congress for Constitutional Reforms
Feasibility and Challenges
Consensus-Building: A National Congress could foster dialogue between Puntland and the FGS, but success depends on Mogadishu’s willingness to engage. Historical precedents, such as the 2000 Arta Conference, highlight the difficulties of overcoming clan rivalries and centralization tendencies.

Legal Framework: The 2012 Provisional Constitution provides a foundation for reform, but amendments require broad political buy-in from federal states and Mogadishu.

International Support: Mediation by regional bodies like the African Union (AU) or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as involvement from civil society and traditional leaders, could lend legitimacy to the process.

Steps Forward
Coalition-Building: Partner with other federal states, such as Jubaland and Galmudug, to form a united front advocating for constitutional dialogue.

Preconditions: Secure guarantees for equitable representation and international oversight to ensure Mogadishu’s compliance.

Phased Approach: Prioritize urgent issues like resource-sharing and security cooperation, while deferring contentious topics such as electoral models to later stages.

Option 2: Confederation Model
Feasibility and Challenges
Autonomy vs. Unity: A confederation would grant Puntland greater sovereignty, including independent security forces and fiscal control, while maintaining nominal Somali unity. However, Mogadishu is likely to resist ceding power.

Regional Dynamics: Neighboring states like Ethiopia and Kenya may oppose a confederation if it destabilizes Somalia, though some might tacitly support it to counter Al-Shabab.

Constitutional Hurdles: Transitioning from federalism to confederalism would require redefining the social contract, potentially through a referendum or inter-state treaty.

Steps Forward
Draft a Framework: Propose a confederal constitution outlining shared competencies (e.g., foreign policy, currency) and state-level powers (e.g., taxation, security).

Lobby Internationally: Highlight the confederation as a stability measure to international donors like the EU and UAE, emphasizing parallels with decentralized models such as the UAE’s federalism.

Pilot Cooperation: Initiate cross-state projects, such as joint counterterrorism operations and trade agreements, to demonstrate the benefits of confederalism.

Option 3: Declaration of Independence
Feasibility and Challenges
Legal and Diplomatic Barriers: Under international law, secession is rarely recognized without central government consent. Puntland would face significant challenges in gaining recognition, similar to Somaliland’s unresolved status.

Security Risks: Mogadishu could retaliate militarily, exacerbating conflict and providing opportunities for Al-Shabab to expand its territory.

Economic Implications: Loss of access to Somali financial systems and international aid (via Mogadishu) could cripple Puntland’s economy unless alternative partnerships are secured.

Steps Forward
Preparatory Measures: Strengthen governance institutions, diversify revenue streams (e.g., port fees, diaspora bonds), and seek bilateral aid from countries like the UAE and Ethiopia.

Regional Diplomacy: Court neighboring states for recognition, framing independence as a stabilization measure and leveraging Puntland’s role in countering extremism.

Gradual Unilateralism: Incrementally assert sovereignty (e.g., issuing visas, signing trade deals) while avoiding overt provocation until international backing is assured.

Recommendations
Prioritize Dialogue: Exhaust all avenues for constitutional reform and confederation before considering independence. A united front with other federal states increases leverage in negotiations with Mogadishu.

Engage International Mediators: Involve regional and international bodies such as IGAD, the AU, and key Somalia donors like Qatar and Turkey to pressure Mogadishu into meaningful negotiations.

Contingency Planning: Prepare discreetly for independence by building foreign alliances and securing revenue streams, while publicly advocating for reform.

Address Security Collaboratively: Propose a federal-state security pact with AU support (e.g., AUSSOM) to counter extremists, showcasing Puntland’s commitment to Somali stability.

Conclusion
Puntland’s strategic options—constitutional reform, confederalism, and independence—each present unique opportunities and challenges. While independence remains a last resort, incremental steps toward confederalism or constitutional overhaul could preserve Somali unity while addressing governance grievances. By prioritizing dialogue, engaging international mediators, and addressing security collaboratively, Puntland can navigate its current challenges and secure a stable and autonomous future within or alongside the Somali Federation.

This white paper serves as a foundation for informed decision-making by Puntland’s leadership, stakeholders, and international partners, ensuring that any path forward prioritizes stability, autonomy, and the well-being of all Somali people.

White Paper: Addressing the Erosion of Institutional Memory and Governance in Somalia and Puntland

White Paper: Addressing the Erosion of Institutional Memory and Governance in Somalia and Puntland

Date: February 7, 2025

Executive Summary

Somalia’s failure to institutionalize historical knowledge, coupled with political leaders’ suppression of experienced talent, threatens national recovery and survival. This white paper synthesizes evidence from academic analyses, governance studies, and conflict reports to outline the dangers of neglecting institutional memory and propose actionable solutions. Key issues include clan-based governance, systemic corruption, and the deliberate erasure of historical education, all of which perpetuate instability and hinder state-building efforts.

I. Current Challenges

  1. Suppression of Institutional Memory
    • Clan-Centric Governance: Political leaders in Somalia and Puntland prioritize clan loyalty over meritocracy, viewing experienced administrators as threats to their power. This undermines professional governance and entrenches nepotism
    • Erasure of Historical Education: Schools have ceased teaching Somali history, disconnecting younger generations from lessons of past governance, conflict resolution, and state-building. This vacuum enables cyclical violence and poor policymaking.
    • Fragmented Security Institutions: The Somali Police Force (SPF) and regional forces like Puntland’s lack cohesive institutional memory due to decades of fragmentation, reliance on international aid, and clan rivalries.
  2. Political Dysfunction
    • Elite Power Struggles: Leadership crises, such as the 2021 clash between President Farmaajo and PM Roble over intelligence agency control, illustrate how personal interests override national stability.
    • Weak Federalism: Somalia’s federal model has devolved into clan enclaves (e.g., Somaliland, Puntland), where regional leaders act as “independent rulers,” sabotaging national unity.

II. Consequences of Neglect

  1. Security Vulnerabilities
    • Al-Shabaab exploits governance voids, offering dispute resolution and public services in areas neglected by the state. Clan militias and federal forces, lacking institutional coordination, fail to hold recaptured territories.
    • Somaliland’s recent clan conflicts in Las Anod highlight how weakened institutions enable external actors (e.g., al-Shabaab, Gulf states) to destabilize regions.
  2. Economic and Social Stagnation
    • Puntland’s corruption and mismanagement of resources exacerbate youth unemployment and infrastructure deficits, fueling resentment and radicalization.
    • The 2023 famine, affecting 6.7 million Somalis, underscores how poor governance amplifies humanitarian crises.
  3. Loss of National Identity
    • Clan-based administrations erase shared Somali identity, replacing it with fragmented loyalties. This undermines efforts to counter extremist ideologies like al-Shabaab’s.

III. Recommendations

  1. Revive Institutional Memory
    • Historical Curriculum Reform: Integrate Somali history and governance lessons into school curricula, emphasizing pre-1991 state-building successes and post-collapse failures.
    • Archival Projects: Collaborate with international partners (e.g., UNDP) to digitize historical records and oral histories, preserving knowledge for future leaders.
  2. Strengthen Governance Structures
    • Merit-Based Appointments: Establish independent oversight bodies to ensure administrative roles prioritize competence over clan affiliation.
    • Decentralized Power Sharing: Adopt Somaliland’s community-centric dispute resolution models to balance federal and local governance.
  3. Counter External Exploitation
    • Regulate Foreign Interference: Limit Ethiopian and Gulf state interventions that fuel clan divisions. Leverage regional partnerships (e.g., AU) to enforce sovereignty.
    • Redirect International Aid: Shift funding from militarization (e.g., U.S. counterterrorism) to capacity-building programs for education and infrastructure.
  4. Engage in Inclusive Dialogue
    • Negotiate with Al-Shabaab: Explore conditional talks to secure humanitarian access and local ceasefires, as proposed by the International Crisis Group.
    • Clan Reconciliation Forums: Revive traditional xeer (customary law) systems to mediate inter-clan disputes and integrate marginalized groups into governance.

IV. Call to Action

Somalia’s survival hinges on rebuilding trust in institutions and reclaiming its historical narrative. This requires:

  • Political Will: Leaders must prioritize national over clan interests, as seen in Somaliland’s incremental state-building.
  • International Collaboration: Donors should align aid with Somali-led reforms rather than imposing external agendas.
  • Public Advocacy: Civil society and media must amplify grassroots demands for accountability and historical preservation.

Conclusion
The erosion of institutional memory is not merely a governance failure but an existential threat. By addressing these issues through education, inclusive governance, and strategic diplomacy, Somalia can break cycles of conflict and reclaim its path to stability.

References
[1] Stability Journal, Remembrance of Things Past: Somali Roads to Police Development
[2] Statecraft, Political Crisis Looms in Somalia
[3] Responsible Statecraft, Clan Fighting Threatens Somaliland
[4] SCIRP, Ineffective Leadership in Puntland
[5] Responsible Statecraft, Negotiate with Terrorists in Somalia
[6] Responsible Statecraft, US Military Exacerbates Violence
[7] Somali Times, Somalia’s Top 5 Security Threats
[8] Sciences Po, Puntland Social Analysis
[9] CFR, Somalia’s Political Paradoxes
[10] Brookings, Somalia’s Challenges in 2023

This white paper synthesizes insights from diverse sources to provide a roadmap for policymakers, educators, and civil society. For further details, consult the referenced articles.

Postscript:

Addressing the issue of forfeiting institutional memory in Somalia requires a multifaceted approach that tackles the root causes and implements sustainable solutions. Here are some key strategies:

  1. Documentation and Archiving:
  • Establish comprehensive archives: Create physical and digital repositories to store government documents, records, and data. This includes everything from policy papers and legal documents to financial records and historical data.
  • Develop standardized systems: Implement clear and consistent systems for organizing, classifying, and retrieving information. This will ensure that data is easily accessible and usable in the future.
  • Invest in technology: Utilize modern technology to digitize existing records and create secure databases for storing and managing information.
  1. Capacity Building:
  • Train staff in record management: Provide training to government employees on proper record-keeping practices, data management, and the use of archiving systems.
  • Promote knowledge sharing: Encourage a culture of knowledge sharing within government institutions. This can be done through mentorship programs, workshops, and online platforms.
  • Invest in education: Support educational institutions in developing programs that focus on archival science, library studies, and information management.
  1. Institutional Strengthening:
  • Develop clear legal frameworks: Enact laws and regulations that mandate the preservation of institutional memory and outline clear procedures for managing government records.
  • Establish independent oversight bodies: Create independent bodies to monitor and enforce compliance with record-keeping regulations and ensure the long-term preservation of institutional memory.
  • Promote transparency and accountability: Foster a culture of transparency and accountability within government institutions. This will encourage employees to value and preserve institutional memory.
  1. Community Engagement:
  • Involve civil society organizations: Partner with civil society organizations to raise awareness about the importance of institutional memory and to support initiatives aimed at preserving it.
  • Engage with local communities: Work with local communities to document and preserve their own histories and traditions. This can help to complement official records and provide a more complete picture of Somalia’s past.
  • Promote research and scholarship: Encourage research and scholarship on Somali history, culture, and institutions. This will help to ensure that institutional memory is used to inform policy-making and development initiatives.
  1. International Cooperation:
  • Seek technical assistance: Collaborate with international organizations and experts to obtain technical assistance and training in record management and archival science.
  • Share best practices: Participate in international forums and networks to share best practices and learn from other countries’ experiences in preserving institutional memory.
  • Mobilize resources: Seek financial support from international donors to support initiatives aimed at preserving institutional memory in Somalia.
    By implementing these strategies, Somalia can begin to address the issue of forfeiting institutional memory and ensure that its rich history and knowledge are preserved for future generations.

HOW TO RESOLVE POLITICAL FRICTION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA AND PUNTLAND STATE

Resolving the political friction between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Puntland State requires addressing deep-seated grievances over power-sharing, resource allocation, and constitutional interpretation, while fostering trust and institutionalizing cooperative governance. Below is a structured approach informed by Somalia’s political dynamics, federalism challenges, and lessons from similar conflicts:

1. Address Core Grievances

  • Constitutional Clarity:
    • Finalize and ratify Somalia’s provisional constitution to clarify federal-state powers, including:
      • Revenue Sharing: Establish transparent mechanisms for distributing resources (e.g., port revenues, fisheries, oil/gas).
      • Security Arrangements: Define roles for federal and state forces in combating terrorism (e.g., Al-Shabab, ISIS) and managing local militias.
    • Ensure Puntland’s concerns about overcentralization are addressed, balancing autonomy with national unity.
  • Resource Management:
    • Create joint committees to oversee natural resource exploration and revenue-sharing agreements (e.g., Puntland’s oil blocks).
    • Adopt models like Nigeria’s derivation principle, where states retain a percentage of locally generated resources.

2. Institutionalize Dialogue Mechanisms

  • National Reconciliation Framework:
    • Revive platforms like the National Consultative Council (NCC), ensuring Puntland’s equal participation alongside other federal member states.
    • Involve traditional elders (Guurti), civil society, and religious leaders to mediate disputes and legitimize agreements.
  • Third-Party Mediation:
    • Engage neutral actors (e.g., IGAD, AU, or Qatar/Turkey as trusted partners) to broker talks and guarantee implementation of deals.

3. Build Trust Through Incremental Steps

  • Confidence-Building Measures:
    • Jointly manage critical infrastructure (e.g., Bosaso Port) to demonstrate shared benefits.
    • Cooperate on security operations against Al-Shabab/ISIS in contested areas (e.g., Galgala mountains).
  • Symbolic Gestures:
    • Publicly acknowledge Puntland’s historical role in stabilizing Somalia and its contributions to counterterrorism.
    • Avoid inflammatory rhetoric; instead, emphasize shared Somali identity in official communications.

4. Learn from Past Failures and Successes

  • Avoid Past Mistakes:
    • The 2016 Mogadishu Declaration failed due to lack of implementation. Future agreements must include timelines, monitoring mechanisms, and penalties for non-compliance.
  • Emulate Positive Models:
    • Borrow from Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism (though imperfect) to balance regional autonomy with federal oversight.
    • Study the Puntland-Somaliland dialogue (e.g., 2014 Tukaraq ceasefire) for lessons on conflict de-escalation.

5. Strengthen Federalism Through Equity

  • Equitable Representation:
    • Ensure Puntland holds influential positions in federal institutions (e.g., Parliament, Cabinet, Supreme Court).
  • Development Parity:
    • Direct international aid (e.g., World Bank, EU) to Puntland’s infrastructure and services to reduce perceptions of marginalization.

6. Mitigate External Interference

  • Regional Actors:
    • Counteract divisive roles played by Gulf states (e.g., UAE vs. Qatar rivalries influencing Somali federalism).
  • Donor Coordination:
    • Unify international partners (UN, U.S., EU) behind a coherent strategy supporting Somali-led solutions, not competing agendas.

7. Prepare for Political Transitions

  • Electoral Reforms:
    • Ensure Puntland’s buy-in to Somalia’s electoral model (e.g., one-person-one-vote vs. clan-based systems) to prevent boycotts.
  • Leadership Engagement:
    • Foster personal rapport between FGS and Puntland leaders (e.g., President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Puntland’s Said Abdullahi Deni).

Challenges and Risks

  • Spoilers: Hardliners in Mogadishu or Garowe may sabotage deals to retain power.
  • Resource Curse: Oil/gas discoveries could exacerbate tensions if not managed transparently.
  • Security Vacuum: Stalemates risk ceding territory to ISIS/Al-Shabab, as seen in Galmudug and Bari regions.

Conclusion

The FGS-Puntland rift reflects broader struggles to reconcile Somali nationalism with federal autonomy. A sustainable solution requires constitutional finality, equitable resource governance, and inclusive dialogue backed by enforceable agreements. International partners should support Somali-owned processes without imposing external models. While compromise will be difficult, incremental progress—such as joint security operations or revenue-sharing pilots—can rebuild trust and demonstrate the benefits of cooperation over confrontation. Ultimately, Somalia’s stability depends on balancing the aspirations of its federal states with the imperative of a united, functional central government.

HANDLING THE SURRENDER OF HIGH PROFILE ISIS AND AL-SHABAB LEADERS

Handling the surrender of high-profile extremist leaders like Amir “Lahore” while ensuring justice for the victims is a complex and sensitive issue. Both Puntland and Somali Federal Governments have experienced this dilemma before. Federal Ministers for Religious Affairs Mukhtar Roobow and Defence “TikTok” were high-profile Al-Shabab leaders. The President of Juabaland State Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Ahmed Madoobe) also comes under those politically rehabilitated Al-Shabab leaders. Others included Al-Shabab leader in Galgala mountains of Bari Region  in Puntland State, “Amir Atom,” exiled to Qatar some years back. These former extremist leaders denounced Al-Shabab, while Col. Hassan Dahir Aweys, leader of Al-Shabab and defunct Union of Islamic Courts, refused to abandon extremist ideology and preferred detention instead.

Drawing from historical cases such as Mukhtar Roobow, Ahmed Madoobe, Amir Atom, and Hassan Dahir Aweys, the following framework emerges that the Puntland government could consider to balance amnesty, justice, and long-term stability:

1. Conditional Amnesty

  • The amnesty offered by the Puntland government could be conditional, requiring individuals like Lahore to provide actionable intelligence, disclose the locations of other fighters, and cooperate fully with authorities in dismantling extremist networks.
  • This approach ensures that the surrender contributes to broader security goals while holding individuals accountable for their actions.

2. Transparent Legal Process

  • Even if Lahore has surrendered under an amnesty, he should still face a transparent legal process. This could involve a public trial where evidence of his crimes is presented, and victims or their families are given a platform to share their experiences.
  • A fair trial would demonstrate the government’s commitment to justice and the rule of law, while also addressing the grievances of those affected.

3. Victim-Centered Justice

  • Establish mechanisms for restorative justice, such as truth and reconciliation commissions, where victims and their families can confront perpetrators and seek closure.
  • Compensation or reparations for victims’ families could also be considered as part of the justice process.

4. Public Accountability

  • The government should communicate clearly with the public about the terms of the amnesty and the legal process Lahore will undergo. Transparency is key to maintaining public trust and ensuring that the amnesty is not perceived as a free pass for serious crimes.

5. Rehabilitation and Reintegration

  • For lower-level fighters who surrender, the government could focus on rehabilitation and reintegration programs to help them rejoin society. However, for high-profile leaders like Lahore, rehabilitation should only be considered after they have fully accounted for their actions and served any sentences imposed by the courts.

6. International Cooperation

  • Given the transnational nature of groups like ISIS and Al-Shabab, Puntland could seek assistance from international partners, such as the African Union, the United Nations, the US and EU, to ensure that the legal process meets international standards and to provide additional resources for justice and reconciliation efforts.

7. Long-Term Security Measures

  • While addressing individual cases like Lahore’s, the government should also focus on long-term strategies to prevent the resurgence of extremism. This includes addressing root causes such as poverty, lack of education, and political marginalization.

8. Balancing Amnesty and Justice

  • The government must strike a delicate balance between offering amnesty to encourage defections and ensuring that serious crimes are not overlooked. Amnesty should not equate to impunity, especially for those responsible for mass atrocities.

By taking a multifaceted approach that prioritizes justice, transparency, and reconciliation, the Puntland government can address the immediate challenge of dealing with surrendered extremists while laying the groundwork for long-term peace and stability.

MEMO FOR THE SOMALI OPPOSITION (FEDERAL MEMBER STATES, OPPOSITION ELEMENTS, AND PERSONS ASPIRING LEADERSHIP ROLES)

The main issues in Somalia are corruption, abuse of power, unilateral decisions on elections, and lack of consultation with federal member states. Steps to tackle with these serious problems could include:

1. Strengthening anti-corruption measures: Maybe creating or empowering an independent anti-corruption body. But if the government itself is corrupt, how would that happen? Maybe with international help or civil society pressure.

2. Promoting accountability: Ensuring that the executive, legislative, and judiciary are separate and can check each other. If the President is controlling all three, that’s a big problem. Maybe supporting the judiciary’s independence, but how?

3. Electoral reforms: The President is pushing for one person one vote elections, but without proper consultation. Maybe advocating for inclusive dialogue with federal states to agree on electoral processes. This could involve regional leaders, civil society, etc.

4. Civil society and media: Supporting these groups to raise awareness and hold the government accountable. But if the government is oppressive, this might be risky. Maybe international support for these groups?

5. International pressure: Engaging the African Union, UN, or other international bodies to mediate or pressure the government to reform. Sanctions or conditional aid?

6. Legal avenues: If the constitution is being violated, maybe challenging the President’s actions in court. But if the judiciary isn’t independent, that might not work.

7. Public mobilization: Organizing peaceful protests or campaigns to demand change. But this could lead to crackdowns, so safety is a concern.

Possible steps could be:

– Building coalitions among federal member states to present a united front against unilateral decisions.

– Engaging international mediators to facilitate dialogue between the federal government and states.

– Supporting independent media and civil society to document and expose corruption and abuses.

– Lobbying for international actors to tie aid to governance reforms and anti-corruption measures.

– Working within the legal framework, if possible, to challenge unconstitutional actions.

But also, ensuring that any actions taken are peaceful and within the law to avoid escalation.

Another angle is electoral reform. If the President is pushing for one person one vote without proper consultation, maybe advocating for a more inclusive process that involves all stakeholders to ensure the elections are free and fair. This could prevent the consolidation of power.

Additionally, addressing corruption might require both top-down and bottom-up approaches. For example, creating transparency in government contracts, public financial management reforms, and citizen oversight committees.

But in a situation where the administration is resistant, these steps might face pushback. So maybe starting with smaller, achievable goals to build momentum.

Also, considering the role of parliament. If the legislative branch is co-opted, maybe working with opposition members or those willing to push back against executive overreach.

In summary, the answer should outline a combination of domestic efforts (strengthening institutions, civil society, legal challenges, federal-state dialogue) and international engagement (pressure, conditional aid, mediation). It’s important to emphasize peaceful, inclusive, and legal methods to avoid further instability.

Addressing the challenges posed by the current Somali administration requires a multifaceted approach that combines domestic resilience and international engagement. Here’s a structured strategy to handle the situation:

1. Strengthening Domestic Institutions and Accountability

  • Independent Anti-Corruption Mechanisms: Advocate for the establishment or reinforcement of an independent anti-corruption commission, possibly with international oversight, to investigate and prosecute corruption cases. Transparency in public finances and contracts is crucial.
  • Judicial Independence: Support legal reforms and training for judges to ensure judiciary autonomy. International legal bodies or NGOs could provide technical assistance and monitor judicial processes.

2. Inclusive Electoral Reforms

  • Federal-State Dialogue: Encourage a nationally inclusive dialogue involving federal member states, civil society, and opposition groups to agree on credible electoral frameworks. Regional organizations like the African Union (AU) or IGAD could mediate.
  • One Person One Vote (1P1V) with Safeguards: While 1P1V is a democratic ideal, ensure its implementation includes checks (e.g., independent electoral commissions, international observers) to prevent manipulation.

3. Empowering Civil Society and Media

  • Protect Civic Space: Provide training and resources to journalists and activists to safely expose abuses. International donors could fund platforms for citizen reporting and whistleblower protections.
  • Public Awareness Campaigns: Use radio, social media, and community networks to educate citizens on their rights and hold leaders accountable.

4. Coalition-Building and Federalism

  • Unite Federal Member States: Strengthen collaboration among federal states to form a united front against unilateral decisions. This could involve joint statements or coordinated negotiations with Mogadishu.
  • Decentralization Advocacy: Push for constitutional adherence to power-sharing, ensuring states retain autonomy over local governance and resources.

5. International Pressure and Support

  • Conditional Aid and Sanctions: Lobby international partners (e.g., EU, UN, US) to tie financial aid to governance reforms, anti-corruption progress, and inclusive elections. Targeted sanctions on corrupt officials may deter abuses.
  • Diplomatic Mediation: Engage the AU, UN, or regional actors to facilitate dialogue between the federal government and stakeholders, ensuring compliance with Somalia’s provisional constitution.

6. Legal and Peaceful Resistance

  • Constitutional Challenges: Oppose unilateral actions through legal avenues, such as petitions to Somalia’s courts or regional human rights bodies, if domestic systems are unresponsive.
  • Peaceful Mobilization: Organize nonviolent protests, strikes, or advocacy campaigns, ensuring coordination with security stakeholders to minimize risks.

7. Long-Term Structural Reforms

  • Public Financial Management: Implement transparent budgeting and procurement systems, with citizen oversight committees.
  • Civic Education: Invest in programs to build political literacy, fostering a populace that demands accountability.

Conclusion

Sustainable change requires patience and collaboration. Prioritize incremental gains—such as small anti-corruption wins or localized dialogues—to build momentum. Balancing internal grassroots efforts with strategic international partnerships can create pressure for reform while minimizing instability. The goal is to restore trust in governance through inclusivity, transparency, and adherence to the rule of law.

Neo Economics: A NEW PARADOX OF ECONOMICS

By Dr. Jagdish Bhagwati, an Indian economist in the US

Japanese save a lot. They do not spend much. Also, Japan exports far more than it imports. Has an annual trade surplus of over 100 billion. Yet Japanese economy is considered weak, even collapsing.

Americans spend, save little. Also US imports more than it exports.
Has an annual trade deficit of over $400 billion. Yet, the American economy is considered strong and trusted to get stronger.

But where do Americans get money to spend? They borrow from Japan, China and even India.
Virtually others save for the Americans to spend. Global savings are mostly invested in US, in dollars.

India itself keeps its foreign currency assets of over $50 billion in US securities. China has sunk over $160 billion in US securities.
Japan’s stakes in US securities is in trillions.

Result:
The US has taken over $5 trillion from the world. So, as the world
saves for the US – It’s The Americans who spend freely. Today, to keep the US consumption going, that is for the US economy to work, other countries have to remit $180 billion every quarter, which is $2
billion a day, to the US!

A Chinese economist asked a neat question. Who has invested more, US in China, or China in US? The US has invested in China less than half of what China has invested
in US.

The same is the case with India. It have invested in US over $50
billion. But the US has invested less than $20 billion in India.

Why the world is after US?

The secret lies in the American spending, that they hardly save. In fact they use their credit cards to spend their future income. That the US spends is what makes it attractive to export to the US. So US imports more than what it exports year after year.

The result:

The world is dependent on US consumption for its growth. By its deepening culture of consumption, the US has habituated the world to feed on US consumption. But as the US needs money to finance its consumption, the world provides the money.

It’s like a shopkeeper providing the money to a customer so that the customer keeps buying from the shop. If the customer will not buy, the shop won’t have business, unless the
shopkeeper funds him. The US is like the lucky customer. And the world is like the helpless shopkeeper financier.

Who is America’s biggest shopkeeper financier? Japan of course. Yet it’s Japan which is regarded as weak. Modern economists complain that Japanese do not spend, so they do not grow. To force the Japanese to spend, the Japanese government exerted itself, reduced the savings
rates, even charged the savers. Even then the Japanese did not spend (habits don’t change, even with taxes, do they?). Their traditional postal savings alone is over $1.2 trillion. Thus, savings, far from being the strength of Japan, has become its pain.

Hence, what is the lesson?

That is, a nation cannot grow unless the people spend, not save. Not just spend, but borrow and spend.

Dr. Jagdish Bhagwati, the famous Indian-born economist in the US, told Manmohan Singh that Indians wastefully save. Ask them to spend, on imported cars and, seriously, even on cosmetics! This will put India on a growth curve. This is one of the reason for MNC’s coming down to India, seeing the consumer spending.

‘Saving is sin, and spending is virtue.’
But before you follow this Neo Economics, get some fools to save so that you can borrow from them and spend !!!

THE IDIOSYNCRACIES OF THE SOMALI MAN

Somalis are pseudo-Muslims and are almost pagan in behavior and ways of life. Murder, theft and acts of blasphemy are considered patches of honor. Public theft, abuses of entrusted position, revenge, and punishment of real or perceived opponents and rivals are fair games for both ordinary men and Somali public officials. It is only in Somalia where you hear the President of a Republic claiming that his kids have the right to take advantage of his position in acquiring undeserved government privileges and unearned wealth; government officials, including ministers, looting government coffers, on the top of misappropriating salaries of their employees in daylight with impunity, and remain a functioning official or minister in Cabinet. One can infer from this that the boss of that particular minister was doing the same and didn’t bother firing the corrupt subordinate. The list of similar behaviors goes down to the office messengers and cleaners.

“According to the Greeks, there are three types of people on earth:

  • The idiots
  • The tribesmen, and
  • Citizens

When the Greek used the word idiot, they didn’t use it as a curse word. Idiots are the people who just don’t care, if they write an exam, they’d cheat, if they’re in government, they’d steal. An idiot just doesn’t care at all. If he eats bananas, he throws the peels anywhere instead of putting it in a trash.

According to the Greek, some some societies have more idiots than tribesmen and citizens.

The next set of people are tribesmen, these are the set of people that look at everything from the point of view of their tribe. These are people who believe in you only if you’re part of their tribe. It can really be terrible to have a tribesman as a leader, he would alienate the rest.

When the Greeks talk about it, it’s not just about ethnicity, they also consider religion as a tribe. A great deal of Africans are tribes men because they view everyone from the point of view of their tribes. They trust only their tribesmen.

The last group of people are citizens. These people like to do things the right way, they will respect traffic light rules even if no one is watching them, they drive within speed limit. They respect laws, in an exam, they won’t cheat, if they’re in government, they won’t steal. They are compassionate people, they give to others to promote their well-being.

Some countries have more citizens than tribesmen and idiots, others have so many.

A tribesman can become a citizen through orientation, and an idiot can become a citizen by training and constant enforcement of the law.

Things will fall apart if you elect an idiot or a tribesman to lead if he has not been reformed,” truly reflecting most of the Somali men.

Based on this description, the Somali man is an extreme combination of the characters of THE IDIOT AND TRIBESMAN. Can he be reformed, and whose duty is it to do?

WHERE IS THE QUESTION PERIOD IN PUNTLAND PARLIAMENT? ARE THEY COMFORTABLE BEING PERPETUALLY RUBBER-STAMPED LIKE THEIR COUNTER-PARTS IN SOUTH-CENTRAL SOMALIA?

WDM EDITORIAL

Puntland House of Representatives is currently holding its 55th Session. Among the dignitaries and guests in attendance are Puntland State MPs in the Federal Parliament in Mogadishu, South-Central Somalia. It is an important session, given the fact that Somalia is at crossroads between a failed state again and the survival of the Federal System Somalis agreed upon,  following the Civil War. We will be watching whether they can meet the challenges ahead.

In the meantime, let us remind ourselves that the main function of any parliament is government budget allocations and approval. This involves scrutiny, approval, and follow-up of expenditures consistent with budget allocations. It involves investigations of abuses and mismanagement of this budget. It ensures appropriate and competent financial personnel are appointed by an independent commission. It checks out that the government must have independent auditors and accountants in the financial system, starting with the Auditor-General and Chief Accountant. Barring major economic and natural calamities, the government budget must meet with approved allocations. If not, questions must be raised to expose any malpractices. Critical public services, public law and order, and government operations must be maintained as sine qua non for the state’s existence and survival.

Parliament committees must be active and engaging to carry out their duties as functioning representatives of the people. Government officials and executives, including the State President can be summoned anytime to answer parliament questions in the people’s interest, consistent with the principles of checks and balances of power. These legislative duties should be ongoing as a routine of parliament function. Without this, we can’t have an independent parliament. A dangerous situation develops when the Executive Branch unconstitutionally takes all power from the other two branches of the government, producing a rubber-stamped House of Representatives. When the State President becomes too powerful and unresponsive to an independent parliament, it leads to a government system called “Madax-ka-Nool” in Puntland State – a Somali term coined by the people of Puntland State many years ago, but now used widely throughout Somalia.

We wish them successful session.

‐————

Postscript. Puntlanders don’t realise that the State President has two functions – he is the Head of State and he is Head of Government (Prime Minister). As Head of Government, he is subject to scrutiny by the LEGISLATIVE like any other minister in the government.

INTEREST IN POLITICS ALONG AGE AND GENDER AND BY REGION. WDM TEST

WHY ORDINARY PEOPLE PERCEIVE POLITICIANS AS DISHONEST AND LIARS

By Ismail Warsame
Opinion Columnist

Politicians have difficult decisions to make that is almost always incompatible with being nice or fair to all. Politicians cannot please everybody as it is practically impossible to do so. On the one hand, if a politician in power tries to show soft public image, political opponents and vast number of the population take it as weakness. On the other hand, if a politician plays taugh all the time, that politician is perceived as cruel. There is a fine line to walk here. Historically, a leader of men was considered a warrior, among multiple other characteristics.

The bulk of the population in any nation is ignorant and irrational. They are all bad in abstract thinking. Mostly, they are visual and judge things through images, not by deliberation and critical thinking. They see better such things as construction of roads, bridges etc rather than listening policy objectives and vision for the future. They mostly take things in through personal, group and tribal interests.

In terms of leadership, they hate and respect might and power equally. Being nice to them doesn’t necessarily pay dividends or political capital to a politician, but being taugh with them earns one both respect and hatred. Sometimes they want to witness awe and sheer power. As Niccolò Machiavelli advised in his 16th Century classic book, The Prince, for a politician, it is better to be feared than loved. This is the choice of a politician in a position of power or leadership. There is nothing nice about sheer power and therefore nothing nice about real politics. Administration of Justice for all is an empty expression that cannot be achieved fully in a society. The concept of justice is relative. It is good politics, though, to strive to achieve justice for as many people as possible in a society, but there is no absolute social justice for all. Be realistic.

Deceptions, lies and political manipulations etc, sometimes with good intentions, all come with the job of a politician in power. To think politics otherwise is ultimate naivety. But understand that nobody says that politics is inherently dishonest – it is just the nature of politics and being a politician, who is often confronted to decide between death and life scenarios.

https://amazon.com/author/ismailwarsame

SOMALIA: POVERTY, POLITICS AND POWER

https://ismailwarsame.blog/2021/06/30/somalia-poverty-politics-and-power-3/

SOMALIA: POVERTY, POLITICS AND POWER

Reposted from 2019 WDM articles

A country, where people are suffering from unemployment rate of nearly 90%, political parties are unheard of for 50 years, politicians are too polarized and clannish, scarce public resources are looted and used against the poor to remain poor and bribe them when needed for political advantage, the few educated are selfish, corrupt, short-sighted and intellectually bankrupt to rise up above tribal bickerings at arm-chair lazy debates, schools of poor quality ill-educate the youth, such a country will not create opportunities for the persons of Ilhan Omar’s strength and talent or the rise of Abdiqawi Yusuf and Ahmed Hussein Dirir, the President of International Court of Justice at Hague, and Canada’s Minister for Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, respectively. Those personalities had managed to flee their country of origin, Somalia, to become what they are today elsewhere in a globalized world.

 Those, who practise in corruption, cronyism and nepotism in public service are blind to cultivation of talent under meritocracy. They also feel vulnerable and threatened in their privileged existence to open up to and widen opportunities for others. Poor leadership in all spheres of life and endeavors tap into that school of thought on protectionism and maintenence of status quo. This is what has happened to Somalia, a nation of poets and powerful minds.

The vicious circles of Poverty, Politics and Power embedded in Somalia’s socio-economic circles, especially in today’s religious and political elites in all urban centers of Somalia must be uncoiled to expand opportunities to all citizens. That way the New Somalia would produce not only its abundant native talents of Ilhan type, but also attract more from other countries to help explore and extract Somalia’s resources of the near and distant future.

 In conclusion, Somalia’s traditional leaders are no longer the sacred cows as they become as corrupt as Nigerian Chiefs. It is time to revisit and do away the ills of Somalia’s clan system. How could one defend serial murderers and serial rapists to remain a clan leader?

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Correspondence Corner

Dear Fernandez,

To answer your questions, inquiries on personal background are relevant because in the Somalia of today, and as a result of the most vicious civil war in its history, objectivity in political analysis becomes an issue. Emotions usually play out into Somali authors’ essays and descriptions of events in the country. Although Somalis are patriarchal in their lineages, my mother is Northerner while father is from Central Somalia regions. I was born in Northern Somalia and raised in Mudugh Region ( Galkayo) of Central Somalia and Banadir Region (Mogadishu) of Southern Somalia. I finished formal education (High School) in Mogadishu. I went overseas for higher learning and trained as Mechanical Engineer with Masters Degree in thermal power engineering. Since then, I have been acquiring other skills as well, including public administration and political science.

Since I was raised mostly in Mogadishu, I am deeply connected to Southern Somalia too. My political constituency is PuntlandState of Somalia in the North Eastern Somalia though. I therefore consider myself as someone having broad multi-clan background. I am not sure whether that makes sense to you.

I travel a lot in Europe, North America and East Africa and therefore I cannot say I am stationed in one place. My e-mail address, ismailwarsame@gmail.com, however, is permanent if someone wants to reach out to me. Right now, I am in Garowe, Puntland, Somalia.

With regards to your question on whether Somalia can become a Federal state, I attach my relevant views on the subject expressed in these articles found both in; http://Wardheernews.com and http://imailwarsame.com

The Way Forward for Somalia

Kismayo Solution: The South-West State of Somalia

The Current Status, Goals and Vision of the Transitional Federal Government

Public Trust Deficit in Somalia

Federalism, a Guarantor of Peace among Somali Clans

Self-Governance Options for Somaliland

Hope and Lessons in Somalia

Outside View: Building a Secure Somalia

TFG Top Priorities as Expressed by the President

Somalia, Foreign and International Conspiracy

AYA Response to Riyale’s Provocations

AYA Memo on Escalating Conflict in Somalia’s Northern Regions

Letter to Prime Minister Berlusconi

Other articles of interests are

NATTCO Mandate

EU and Africa Guiding principles for Cooperation

ICG London Meeting

UN 2006 Security and Humanitarian Report on Somalia

Ambassador’s Report Back

UN Arms Embargo Monitoring Group Report

TFG and ICU

Presidential Briefing at ICG Meeting

Diplomatic Briefing

European Union Policies on Multilateral issues

SACB Secretariat

Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) Guiding Principles

Basis for European Union-Somalia Relationship

SACB Addis Declaration on Somalia

Declassified briefing to the European Union member states by the Author

Safarkii Dheeraa ee Wiilka Reer Miyiga

The Long Journey of the Nomadic Boy

Don’t get high on Khat (aka Kat, Qat, Chat); It is not worth it

In addition, there is a Provisional Federal Constitution to be adhered to by Somalia’s leadership as well as the basis for governance for new Somalia. Respecting that Constitution by all is the basis for restoring trust among people of Somalia.

I am not so sure if I understood well your question regarding the role of religion in Somalia. However, I must say that there are two permanent factors in the country.

1. Clan

2. Islam (in the form of Somali traditional Sunni sect).

Islamic religion in Somalia is now experiencing deep crisis as the new adherents of Saudi Wahabism make their presence felt and forcefully imposed upon the population, hence extremism and radicalism resulted in the creation of Al-Shabab, Al-Itihad, Al-Takfir, Al-Islah, among others of fundamentalist Islam. Wahabism now is a political and religious force to be reckoned with. You may be aware that Saudi Arabia has been extending religious scholarships to a huge number of Somali youths for decades. When these graduates came back to Somalia, the resulting effect is devastating for the stability of the country and religious harmony. That is the main source of the current religious intolerance never recorded in the history of religion in Somalia.

I hope this will give you a brief introduction to the “state of the union” in Somalia.

Regards,

Ismail

Dear Ismail

It is a pleasure to contact you and I appreciate your qick answer.

I found your blog through a Somali news site, named Wardheer News. An article signed by you and look up in the web who you are, and I found your blog. That`s all. It has been my first contact with the blog but it will not be, for sure, the last one.

I guess you are living in America (US or Canada), Aren’t you? Sorry for asking some personal questions. Are you a national Somali?, if so where are you or your family coming from in Somalia?, and, finally, which is your family clan?

My tow first (non personal) questions is basics and difficult. It is about the future of Somalia.

– Will Somalia be a real Federal state?

– Is Islam more than the nationalistic idea what is going to unify Somalia?

I have watched out about this three aspects of (name of the city omitted for privacy reasons). I am leaving the country before Summer what is a wise decission I took…

Thnaks in advance. Best regards.

Fernandez (name of the sender modified for privacy protection)

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