The dream of a stable, unified Somalia, rebuilt upon a federal framework, has long been the central pillar of the nation’s post-conflict political order. Yet, beneath the official rhetoric of shared governance and equitable power distribution, a persistent and contentious reality simmers: the profound unevenness in federal employment across the Federal Member States (FMS). While comprehensive, verifiable statistics from sources like the World Bank remain elusive in the public domain, the political discourse in Somalia is saturated with allegations of severe regional imbalance. Critics, particularly from opposition-aligned states like Puntland and Jubaland, contend that the federal civil service is overwhelmingly dominated by employees from Mogadishu and its immediate environs, notably the Hirshabelle state. This perceived inequity is not a mere administrative grievance; it is a live wire electrifying Somalia’s most profound political crises, serving as both a symptom and a cause of the failing federal compact.
The argument, as advanced by voices such as Ismail Warsame, a former Puntland official and vocal commentator, posits a stark disparity. It suggests that a vast majority—potentially up to 65%—of federal positions are filled by individuals from the Mogadishu-Hirshabelle axis, with states like Puntland purportedly holding less than 2.5%. Whether these exact figures are accurate is less critical than the pervasive belief in their truth, a belief that fuels deep-seated resentment. This perception transforms the civil service from a national institution into an instrument of patronage, where jobs are rewards for political loyalty rather than merit-based appointments to serve all Somali people. For states on the periphery, this translates to a tangible exclusion from the economic benefits and decision-making influence of the central government, entrenching a feeling of second-class status within the very union they are meant to co-own.
This imbalance in federal employment is inextricably linked to the broader, more explosive conflicts over political autonomy and constitutional power. The uneven share of jobs is viewed as the human manifestation of a centralizing state, an accusation consistently leveled at the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The current crisis with Jubaland provides a textbook example. When Jubaland proceeded with its own regional election in late 2024, re-electing President Ahmed Madobe against the wishes of Mogadishu, the Federal Government declared the process unconstitutional. This political dispute rapidly escalated into military confrontation in the Ras Kamboni area. From Jubaland’s perspective, Mogadishu’s attempt to invalidate its election is of a piece with its refusal to share federal resources and jobs equitably—both are seen as assaults on the core principles of federalism, designed to subordinate the state to the capital’s will.
Similarly, Puntland, often described as the federation’s most stable and functional polity, has positioned itself as the lead critic of Mogadishu’s centralizing tendencies. Its leadership frames the inequity in federal representation as evidence of a “creeping dictatorship” and has formed a potent opposition coalition with Jubaland. For Puntland and Jubaland, the uneven employment landscape proves that the federal government prioritizes control over collaboration, rendering the constitutional promise of a voluntary union of equal states a hollow one.
Conversely, states perceived to be in closer alignment with Mogadishu, such as Galmudug and the Southwest State, are often characterized in opposition discourse as existing in the “shadows” of the capital. The allegation is that their relative political compliance is reciprocated with a greater share of federal patronage, including jobs, further distorting the national distribution. This dynamic creates a self-reinforcing cycle: closer alignment brings more federal resources to local elites, which strengthens their position, ensuring continued support for Mogadishu, thereby perpetuating the imbalance.
The consequences of this dysfunction are severe and extend far beyond political squabbling. A federal civil service perceived as illegitimate and exclusionary lacks the broad-based credibility to effectively implement national policy. This administrative weakness directly undermines the most critical national struggle: the fight against Al-Shabab. Military offensives require cohesive political and logistical support; a federal government distrusted by major component states cannot marshal a unified front. Reports of Al-Shabab making gains in regions like Hirshabelle in early 2025 occur against this backdrop of profound federal fragmentation, where security strategy is hampered by political distrust.
Ultimately, the debate over the uneven share of federal employees is a debate about the soul of Somali federalism. Is it a genuine pact for sharing power and building a common future, or is it a vehicle for the reconcentration of authority in Mogadishu? The palpable anger from Puntland and Jubaland, manifesting in opposition alliances and even armed clashes, suggests that for them, the current system is failing the basic test of equity. The Provisional Constitution’s vagueness on critical details of resource and power-sharing has created a vacuum filled by political conflict. Until a transparent, verifiable, and equitable framework for federal representation—in both the civil service and political institutions—is agreed upon and implemented, the Somali federation will remain an imperfect and unstable union. The equitable distribution of jobs is not just an administrative task; it is a fundamental prerequisite for building the trust necessary to hold a fragile nation together.















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