WDM EDITORIAL

The headline is simple: Somali immigrants are not “participating” in Western politics — they’re shaping it. Minnesota is the clearest case study: a tight, disciplined, neighborhood-level machine built on mosques, tenant unions, small-business corridors, and relentless door-knocking has turned a once-invisible refugee community into a decisive bloc in primaries, city halls, and statehouses. And Europe is watching the same movie with a short delay.

Minnesota: From Refugee Apartments to Power Brokers

Start in Minneapolis’ Ward 6 — Cedar-Riverside, Little Mogadishu. Abdi Warsame broke the ceiling in 2013, became councilmember, then moved to run the city’s Public Housing Authority — institutional power, not symbolism. Jamal Osman succeeded him and chairs the Business, Housing & Zoning Committee — real leverage over permits, landlords, and development pipelines.

At the state level, Rep. Ilhan Omar moved from the Minnesota House to Congress in 2018, anchoring an unapologetically progressive 5th District operation. Meanwhile, Sen. Omar Fateh became the first Somali American in the Minnesota Senate and, in 2025, briefly secured the DFL endorsement for Minneapolis mayor before party officials voided the convention — a drama that still signals how far Somali organizers have pushed inside the machine. Zaynab Mohamed’s win made her one of the first Black women — and the youngest woman — in the Minnesota Senate. Add Rep. Hodan Hassan’s tenure and you get a full bench, not a one-person brand.

Zoom out to mayoral politics. Deqa Dhalac in Maine (first Somali-American mayor, selected by council in 2021) and Nadia Mohamed in St. Louis Park, Minnesota (first Somali American elected mayor of a U.S. city in 2023) show executive-office reach beyond Minneapolis proper. That’s institutional normalization, not a protest wave.

Data check. Minnesota hosts the country’s largest Somali-American community, concentrated in the Twin Cities — a base big enough to swing primaries and municipal RCV tallies, and diverse enough to punish national parties when they misread local sentiment (see Somali-heavy precincts’ visible dissent in 2024).

What Makes the Minnesota Model Work

1. Grassroots density: apartment blocks, cooperative markets, and mosque networks translate into rapid turnout operations that outperform their size.

2. Issue discipline: housing, immigration services, wage enforcement, and diaspora foreign-policy concerns (Horn of Africa, Gaza) align local to global.

3. Institutional savvy: leaders moved into committees that control budgets, zoning, and public housing — the levers that change daily life.

This is why Muslim-American wins shattered records in the 2022 midterms — it’s not just demographic drift; it’s hard organizing.

Europe: The Parallel Story

If Minnesota is the lab, Europe is the replication:

Sweden: Leila Ali Elmi became the first Somali-Swedish MP (Green Party) in 2018, rooted in Gothenburg community work.

Finland: Suldaan Said Ahmed entered Parliament in 2021 — first Somali-Finnish MP — after city-level organizing in Helsinki.

Norway: Marian Hussein rose to deputy leader of the Socialist Left Party, a strategic seat in coalition arithmetic.

United Kingdom: Magid Magid jumped from Sheffield councillor to Lord Mayor and then to the European Parliament — a masterclass in insurgent branding plus grassroots ties.

The Research: Why This Keeps Scaling

Solid scholarship explains the engine behind these wins:

Transnationalism with teeth. Somali diasporas fuse local service work with long-distance political agendas — remittances, advocacy, and elite brokerage — making them unusually organized compared to other newcomer groups. (Lindley; Danstrøm et al.; Liberatore; EUI studies on Somalis in Europe).

From “remitters” to policymakers. After years of being framed as senders of money, diaspora leaders now sit at tables that allocate public money — committees and ministries — a qualitative shift in power. (SOAS/Anna Lindley’s corpus; peacebuilding roles mapped in Nordic journals).

The Political Consequence

When parties respect this base, it delivers. When they don’t, it defects or abstains, sending shockwaves through supposedly safe urban strongholds. And that’s the point: Somali-origin voters are no longer a footnote; they are a veto and a vehicle — capable of elevating candidates (Omar, Fateh, Mohamed, Dhalac) and punishing those who take them for granted.

The Next Fronts

Executive power: expect more mayors and committee chairs in U.S. cities with RCV and strong ward politics; similar openings in Nordic municipalities.

Policy pipelines: housing authorities, school boards, and immigration ombuds offices are gateways to national clout.

Coalition bargaining: diaspora foreign-policy priorities (Somalia, Red Sea security, refugee protection) will continue to shape endorsements and turnout.

Bottom line: “Refugees” became constituencies, then coalitions, then kingmakers. Minnesota wrote the playbook; Europe is updating it in real time.

Select Evidence & Further Reading

Minnesota seats and figures: Ilhan Omar (U.S. House), Omar Fateh & Zaynab Mohamed (MN Senate), Hodan Hassan (MN House), Jamal Osman & Abdi Warsame (Minneapolis).

Mayoral milestones: Deqa Dhalac (South Portland, 2021) and Nadia Mohamed (St. Louis Park, 2023).

Scale of the U.S. Somali diaspora and Minnesota concentration: Pew; U.S. Census/ACS; Minnesota Compass.

Europe’s Somali-origin officeholders: Sweden (Leila Ali Elmi), Finland (Suldaan Said Ahmed), Norway (Marian Hussein), UK (Magid Magid).

Scholarship on diaspora political incorporation & transnationalism: Lindley & SOAS corpus; Nordic/European studies.

——-

Support WDM — the home of fearless, independent journalism that speaks truth to power across Somalia and the region. Tel/WhatsApp: +252 90 703 4081.

Warsame Digital Media (WDM) Editorial

A Protocol Written in Bias

Since 1991, Djibouti’s political theatre under successive rulers — from Hassan Gouled Abtidon to Ismail Omar Guelleh — has maintained a consistent “Djibouti Protocol” on Somali affairs. It is a doctrine not written on paper, but etched into every diplomatic gesture, every conference seating plan, and every whispered “brotherly” intervention in Somali politics.

When President Hassan Gouled hosted the first post–civil war Somali Reconciliation Conference, he revealed more than hospitality. He revealed bias. The sharp remark of the late Prime Minister Abdirizak Haji Hussein — “Djibouti has received some of us as brothers and the rest as friends” — was not simply a complaint about protocol. It was a diagnosis of Djibouti’s selective fraternity — a chronic political virus that continues to infect Somali diplomacy three decades later.

The Origins of the Bias

Three geopolitical currents shaped Djibouti’s enduring hostility toward a strong or united Somalia:

1. French Neo-Colonial Leash: Paris never truly released Djibouti; it merely outsourced control. The tiny port-nation remained a garrison for French interests, designed to counter both Somali nationalism and Eritrean independence ambitions. France viewed Somalia as the ghost of Greater Somalia, a dream that once nearly consumed the Horn.

2. Ethiopian Imperial Paranoia: Successive regimes in Addis Ababa, from Menelik II to Abyi Ahmed, maintained a standing doctrine: “Keep Somalia divided or risk Ethiopian fragmentation.” Djibouti became their perfect proxy, a miniature client state designed to suppress Somali nationalism under the banner of “regional stability.”

3. Abtidon’s Inferiority Complex: Siad Barre once treated Djibouti as a natural Somali province — an attitude that insulted Abtidon’s fragile sense of sovereignty. His answer was to exaggerate Djibouti’s independence by humiliating Somali delegates and aligning with forces that would keep Mogadishu weak and divided.

From Arta to Arrogance

The Arta Conference of 2000 was the apotheosis of the Djibouti Protocol — a spectacle disguised as peace. Under Guelleh, Djibouti transformed reconciliation into political theater. Delegates from Puntland and other federalist constituencies were deliberately sidelined, while Hawiye leaders were elevated as “national saviors.” The conference crowned Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the same man whose leadership ignited clan wars in Mogadishu, as the face of Somalia’s “new dawn.”

This was no accident. It was strategy. Arta institutionalized the marginalization of federalist and Darood-aligned regions, creating a political monopoly that Villa Somalia continues to exploit today under Damul Jadiid and its foreign backers.

The Five Pillars of the Djibouti Protocol

1. Political Marginalization of Darood Clans:
The so-called “Erir-Samaale” ethnographic myth is weaponized to delegitimize the Darood political base, painting it as “foreign” or “less Somali.” Djibouti’s propaganda machine sells this nonsense to Hawiye elites who happily buy it — because it keeps them in power.

2. Inheritance of Somali Arab League Seat:
When Somalia collapsed, Djibouti slid into its diplomatic vacuum, masquerading as the Arab world’s “gateway to the Horn.” It now markets Somali suffering as its own strategic capital.

3. Exploitation of Somali Collapse:
Djibouti’s economy thrives on Somali decay. Somali money transfer companies, import-export businesses, and traders keep Djibouti’s ports alive. Somalia’s misery is Djibouti’s GDP.

4. Control through Cultural Narratives:
The “Erir Samaale” myth is not anthropology — it is political anesthesia. It keeps Hawiye politicians loyal to Guelleh’s foreign policy while convincing the rest of Somalia that Djibouti is their benevolent “big brother.”

5. Economic Capture through Banking Dependency:
Djibouti’s banks are the offshore vaults of Somali capital. Every hawala, remittance firm, and logistics company operates through Djibouti’s financial arteries. It’s the perfect colonial model: Somalia’s money builds Djibouti’s skyscrapers.

The Hidden Empire of a Tiny State

Djibouti’s real power lies not in its size, but in its ability to weaponize Somalia’s weakness. With foreign military bases paying rent and Somali elites paying homage, Guelleh’s government has perfected the art of manipulation — dressing exploitation as “regional cooperation.”

From Arta to every subsequent “summit,” Djibouti has played the double game: peace-broker in public, political pickpocket in private. Its latest act — hosting recycled Somali politicians under the guise of “unity” — is nothing but déjà vu.

Conclusion: Djibouti’s Small State, Big Game

The Djibouti Protocol is not diplomacy; it is a doctrine of dependency. It thrives on Somali disunity and foreign indulgence. Every Somali leader who kneels in Arta or Djibouti City strengthens the very hand that profits from Somalia’s brokenness.

Until Somalia — particularly Puntland and the federalist north — confronts this parasitic arrangement, the “Djibouti Protocol” will remain the invisible constitution of Somali politics.

——–

Support WDM — the home of fearless, independent journalism that speaks truth to power across Somalia and the region.
Tel/WhatsApp: +252 90 703 4081.