By WDM Editorial Board

On September 1, 2025, Somalia launched its new E-Visa portal, evisa.gov.so, heralded by authorities in Mogadishu as a leap into modernity—a triumph of efficiency, transparency, and security. Yet, beneath this veneer of techno-optimism lies a troubling reality: the platform risks exacerbating the nation’s political fractures, creating logistical chaos for travelers, and exposing sensitive data to unprecedented risk.

1. A Centralized Power Grab, Disguised as Innovation

This E-Visa system is more than an administrative upgrade; it is a profound assertion of federal authority over one of the most contentious aspects of Somali sovereignty: border control. The declaration by Puntland that the system is “illegal” on its territory, and Somaliland’s outright rejection of it, reveals a fatal flaw. A federally issued E-Visa may be nothing more than a worthless piece of paper at airports in Bosaso or Hargeisa, potentially leaving travelers stranded, forced to pay regional fees upon arrival, or denied entry entirely.

Mogadishu frames this as “integration,” but regional governments perceive it as a brazen attempt to hijack revenue and control. The gates of an airport are a powerful symbol of sovereignty, and the E-Visa has effectively weaponized them, opening a new digital front in Somalia’s ongoing federal conflicts.

2. A Recipe for Traveler Confusion and Exploitation

For the diaspora and international visitors, the system promises not convenience, but a labyrinth of uncertainty:

· Airlines as Unwilling Enforcers: With carriers mandated to check for the E-Visa before boarding, they become de facto federal immigration agents, complicating travel before it even begins.
· The Threat of Double Taxation: Travelers face the real prospect of paying online for a federal visa, only to be charged again at a regional immigration counter that does not recognize Mogadishu’s authority.
· Bureaucracy Over Urgency: For those responding to family emergencies, attending weddings, or conducting time-sensitive business, this added layer of digital red tape transforms travel into a stressful gamble.

The intended welcome mat has become a tangled and unwelcoming maze.

3. The Glaring Data Privacy Scandal

The most alarming question remains unanswered: who controls the data? Reports indicate that highly sensitive information—including biometrics, passport scans, and personal travel histories—is being processed and stored by servers outside the direct control of Somalia’s Immigration and Naturalization Agency (INIS).

In a nation with underdeveloped cyber laws, pervasive corruption, and weak state institutions, this outsourcing constitutes a severe national security threat. Where are the guarantees that this data is protected from hackers, third-party contractors, or malicious actors? Data privacy is not a luxury; in this context, it is a fundamental right and a critical vulnerability.

4. Ambiguity Breeds Corruption

The current landscape—a patchwork of regional compliance, inconsistent enforcement, and opaque rules—creates a perfect ecosystem for corruption. When the system lacks clarity and trust, power flows to those at the checkpoints. Travelers are left at the mercy of immigration officials and airline agents, where the “right” bribe can suddenly make problems disappear.

5. Modernization Requires Consensus, Not Just Code

True progress is measured not by the adoption of technology, but by the strength of the governance behind it. Imposing a centralized digital system without the genuine buy-in of federal member states is a reckless political experiment. It risks further alienating Puntland and Somaliland, pushing them toward deeper autonomy and undermining the very national cohesion the system claims to promote. This is modernization as political theater, with the Somali people and visitors as its unwitting actors.

Conclusion: From Digital Fence to Functional Gateway

To fulfill its promise, Somalia’s E-Visa must evolve from a point of contention into a tool for unity. This requires immediate and transparent action:

· Reclaim Data Sovereignty: INIS must be the unequivocal owner and manager of all visa data. Processing must be brought under transparent, Somali-controlled governance, with all third-party contracts subject to public scrutiny.
· Prioritize Federal Negotiation: The system cannot be dictated from Mogadishu. It requires a negotiated agreement with Puntland, Jubaland, and other regions on revenue sharing, operational control, and legal recognition.
· Enact Robust Privacy safeguards: The government must publicly detail its data protection protocols, storage locations, and access rules to build trust and ensure security.

Without these fundamental changes, the E-Visa will remain what it appears to be today: not a bridge to a more connected Somalia, but a digital fence, equipped with a toll booth and guarded by discord.

By Ismail H. Warsame – Warsame Digital Media (WDM) ©2025 WDM

Introduction

A persistent and pernicious myth dominates discussions of Somali governance: that the country’s federal structure was a foreign imposition, orchestrated primarily by Ethiopia. This narrative, perpetuated by domestic centralists, foreign analysts, and even some academics, is not only historically inaccurate but also politically corrosive. It strips Somalis of their agency in shaping their own political future. While Ethiopia provided crucial logistical support for peace conferences, the intellectual and political origins of Somali federalism are profoundly indigenous. They emerged from the ashes of state collapse, were forged in the crucible of armed resistance, and were articulated through the Somali “building-block” approach to state reconstruction. This article corrects the historical record, arguing that federalism was a Somali-designed solution to Somali-created problems, with Ethiopia playing a limited, facilitative role.

Historical Background: From Authoritarian Collapse to Decentralized Resistance

The pivotal turning point for modern Somalia was the Ogaden War (1977-78). The defeat of Siad Barre’s regime shattered its pan-Somali nationalist legitimacy and triggered a brutal crackdown on perceived dissent, particularly against the Majeerteen, Isaaq, and Hawiye clans. It was in this oppressive environment that the first organized resistance movement, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), was formed.

The SSDF was more than a militia; it was a political project. Its leadership articulated an early vision for a pluralistic, decentralized Somalia—a direct response to the centralized dictatorship in Mogadishu. They advocated for a constitutional order that would prevent the re-emergence of tyranny by empowering local governance. This ideology laid the foundational intellectual groundwork for what would later evolve into the federal model.

The 1991 Collapse and the Sociological Roots of Federalism

The fall of Mogadishu in 1991 did not merely represent a change of government; it was the utter disintegration of the state. The capital descended into clan-based mob rule, characterized by widespread looting, mass killings, and targeted campaigns of persecution. As scholar Lidwien Kapteijns meticulously documents, this period was one of “clan cleansing,” a systematic effort to remove specific clans from power and territory.¹

This catastrophe triggered a massive reverse migration, as hundreds of thousands fled to their ancestral homelands. This desperate movement created the sociological substrate for federalism. In regions like Puntland, Somaliland, and later Jubaland and others, communities began rebuilding from the ground up—establishing local security, judiciary, and economic structures. Out of this necessity, Somali intellectuals and traditional elders formalized the “building-block” approach: the concept that stable, legitimate local administrations (the building blocks) must be established first, and would later coalesce into a voluntary federal union.

Ethiopia’s Role: Facilitator, Not Architect

Ethiopia’s involvement is often misrepresented as that of an architect. In reality, its role was that of a facilitator. Following the collapse, Addis Ababa provided irreplaceable logistical support that enabled Somali-led dialogue. This included:

· Providing neutral venues (e.g., the Sodere conference in 1997) for Somali factions who could not meet safely inside Somalia.
· Coordinating international observers from the AU, IGAD, and the UN to lend legitimacy to the talks.
· Offering critical logistical support, including security and transportation for delegates.

Crucially, Ethiopia did not impose the federal model. The core tenets of the system—including the contentious 4.5 power-sharing formula—were painful compromises hammered out in protracted negotiations among Somalis. Ethiopia’s interest was in stabilizing its neighbor, not designing its constitution.

The Political Utility of a Misleading Narrative

The myth of Ethiopian authorship persists because it is politically useful. For centralists in Mogadishu, it serves to delegitimize federal member states, painting them as foreign puppets rather than legitimate expressions of local autonomy. For populist nationalists, it provides a convenient scapegoat, channeling legitimate grievances into simplistic anti-Ethiopian rhetoric. This narrative deliberately obscures the Somali agency that was evident from the SSDF’s early advocacy to the grassroots rebuilding efforts in the regions.

Conclusion

Somalia’s federal model was not born in a conference room in Addis Ababa; it was forged in the trauma of the 1991 collapse and painstakingly built over decades by communities seeking security and self-determination. To misattribute its origins to Ethiopia is to engage in a dangerous historical revisionism that undermines the very legitimacy of the federal project and perpetuates distrust between the center and the states. A sustainable political future for Somalia requires an honest reckoning with its past. Recognizing that federalism is a homegrown response to historical failure is the essential first step toward building a functional and consensual union.

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References

1. Kapteijns, Lidwien. Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
2. Menkhaus, Ken. “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping.” International Security 31, no. 3 (2006): 74–106.
3. Samatar, Said S. Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil. Minority Rights Group, 1994.
4. Mubarak, Jamil. “The ‘Hidden Hand’ Behind the Resilience of the Stateless Economy of Somalia.” World Development 25, no. 12 (1997): 2027–2041.
5. Bradbury, Mark. Becoming Somaliland. Progressio, 2008.
6. Clapham, Christopher. “War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea.” In The African State at a Critical Juncture, edited by L. Villalón and P. Huxtable. Lynne Rienner, 1998.