1. The First Somali Republic (1960–1991)

The Somali Republic was established on 1 July 1960 following the union of the former British Somaliland Protectorate and the Italian-administered Trust Territory of Somaliland. This republic existed under a unitary framework:

1960–1969: A multiparty parliamentary democracy.

1969–1991: A centralized military regime under Mohamed Siad Barre, following a coup d’état.

Despite the change in governance style, the state remained the same republic. A coup does not constitute the founding of a new republic unless accompanied by a new constitutional order. The collapse of central authority in January 1991 marked the end of the First Republic.

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2. The Interregnum and Statutory Vacuum (1991–2004)

From 1991 to 2004, Somalia experienced state collapse. Various reconciliation efforts—Djibouti (1991), Addis Ababa (1993), Arta (2000)—produced transitional arrangements, but none achieved the legal durability or institutional consolidation of a republic. This period was therefore characterized by:

Absence of a functioning central state.

Proliferation of factional and regional administrations.

Internationally mediated but temporary transitional authorities.

This was not a republic but rather a vacuum in national sovereignty.

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3. The Second Somali Republic (2004–Present)

The adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter (October 2004, Nairobi) constituted the founding of a new republic with a federal character. Key features distinguishing it from the First Republic include:

Federalism: The charter established Somalia as a federal state, in contrast to the unitary model of 1960.

Power-Sharing: Clan-based representation (the “4.5 formula”) was formalized as the framework for transitional governance.

Institutional Reset: A new presidency, parliament, and council of ministers were created under transitional mandates.

In 2012, the Provisional Federal Constitution replaced the Charter, entrenching the Federal Republic of Somalia. Despite ongoing political fragility, this framework remains in force, and Somalia is still legally in its Second Republic.

—

4. On the Misconception of a “Third Republic”

The idea of a “Third Republic” is a misconception rooted in:

Conflation of regime changes with republics. Military coups or leadership turnovers do not amount to the founding of a new republic without constitutional refoundation.

Weak civic education. The erosion of historical and constitutional literacy has led to blurred distinctions between governments, regimes, and republics.

Political rhetoric. Actors may invoke “Third Republic” for rhetorical or aspirational purposes, but it lacks constitutional basis.

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5. Correct Periodization of Somali Statehood

First Republic (1960–1991): Unitary state, collapsed in 1991.

Statutory Vacuum (1991–2004): State collapse, transitional experiments.

Second Republic (2004–Present): Federal framework, established by the 2004 Charter and entrenched by the 2012 Provisional Constitution.

—

Conclusion:
Somalia remains in its Second Republic. Any discussion of a “Third Republic” would only be accurate if Somalis adopt a new constitutional settlement that supersedes the federal arrangement. Until then, the term is historically and legally unfounded.

By Ismail H Warsame, MSc, PhD Candidate, Author of Talking Truth to Power in Undemocratic Tribal Conttext.         
Warsame Digital Media (WDM).     September 30, 2025

Keywords: criminal justice, wealth inequality, bail, pretrial detention, public defense, prosecutorial discretion, legal aid, social control.

Abstract: The Western world proudly proclaims itself the cradle of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Its courtrooms are stages for a noble performance of impartial justice. Yet, behind this veneer of order and due process lies a system deeply compromised by a fundamental bias: not of ideology, but of income. The machinery of justice, while coded in the language of fairness, often functions as an instrument of social control that systematically disadvantages the poor and marginalizes communities of color. This paper argues that the foundational principles of Western justice are subverted by a wealth-based tiering of the system, evident in the practices of pretrial detention, the crisis of legal aid, and the perverse incentives of prosecutorial conduct, ultimately transforming the ideal of justice from a fundamental right into a purchasable commodity.

Wealth-Based Detention: The Presumption of Innocence at a Price

The cornerstone legal principle of “innocent until proven guilty” is critically undermined at the juncture of the bail hearing. In theory, bail ensures a defendant’s return to court; in practice, it has become a mechanism for the detention of the indigent. As legal scholar John Pfaff argues, the rapid expansion of pretrial detention is a primary driver of mass incarceration in the United States. For the affluent, bail is a procedural formality; freedom is purchased, allowing them to await trial at home, maintain employment, and collaborate intensively on their defense. For the poor, however, pretrial detention is the default. Unable to afford even modest sums, they remain in jail for months or even years. The consequences are catastrophic: jobs are lost, homes are forfeited, and families are fractured—all before a verdict is reached. This dynamic creates a coercive pressure to plead guilty, regardless of actual guilt, simply to escape jail time. This is not a punishment for a proven crime, but a severe penalty for poverty, effectively creating a two-track system where liberty is contingent on wealth.

The Illusion of Defense: The Systemic Failure of Legal Aid

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is guaranteed, but the quality and efficacy of that counsel are not. The institution of legal aid and public defense, intended to level the adversarial playing field, is in a state of chronic crisis. Public defenders are often heroic in their efforts but are hopelessly overburdened, carrying caseloads that far exceed professional standards and make vigorous representation a mathematical impossibility. This systemic underfunding creates an inherent conflict. As organizations like the Brennan Center for Justice have documented, defenders are institutionally enmeshed within the very state apparatus they are meant to challenge, leading to a “meet ’em and plead ’em” culture in many jurisdictions. The accused is not represented by a gladiatorial advocate but by a case manager operating under triage conditions. This profound resource disparity means that from the outset, the defense is outmatched by a prosecution armed with the full investigative and financial power of the state, rendering the constitutional right to counsel a hollow formality for many.

The Incentive for Conviction: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Pursuit of Victory

The prosecutor’s ethical duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. However, the institutional and professional incentives within the prosecutorial system often prioritize conviction rates. As legal scholar Angela J. Davis demonstrates, prosecutors wield immense discretionary power with minimal accountability, and their decisions are frequently influenced by political and career ambitions. Each conviction becomes a quantifiable “win,” a credential for election campaigns or a stepping stone to a judgeship. This transforms the courtroom from a search for truth into an adversarial arena where the primary goal is victory. The pressure to secure plea bargains and high-profile convictions can eclipse the ethical duty to disclose exculpatory evidence or pursue dismissals in weak cases.The casualties of this careerist competition are, predictably, those who lack the social and economic capital to mount a formidable defense: the poor, minorities, and other marginalized groups. This dynamic reinforces the system’s discriminatory outcomes and undermines its legitimacy.

Conclusion: The Corrosion of a Democratic Ideal

The evidence from these three critical areas—pretrial detention, public defense, and prosecutorial incentives—reveals a justice system that is not merely malfunctioning but is fundamentally flawed in its design. A system that promises equal protection under the law while delivering outcomes predicated on financial capacity is a monument to systemic hypocrisy. It perpetuates cycles of poverty and incarceration, erodes public trust, and betrays the core democratic principle that the law should be a shield for the vulnerable. The commodification of justice ensures that the system remains self-perpetuating, processing the marginalized to feed the prison-industrial complex. Meaningful reform—such as the abolition of cash bail, the radical reinvestment in public defense, and the creation of robust prosecutorial oversight—is necessary to begin restoring integrity. Until there is a collective will to dismantle these profit-driven and punitive structures, Western courts will remain sophisticated engines of inequality, betraying the very ideals they were established to uphold.

——

Bibliography

Davis, Angela J. Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

Gottschalk, Marie. Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.

Pfaff, John F. Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform. New York: Basic Books, 2017.

Rabbit, Leah, and Emily Zubrovsky. “The Causes and Consequences of Overworked Public Defenders.” Brennan Center for Justice, August 10, 2022.

Subramanian, Ram, et al. Incarceration’s Front Door: The Misuse of Jails in America. New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2015.

Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. New York: The New Press, 2010.

September 29, 2025

Ladies and gentlemen, take your seats. The house lights are dimming on Somalia’s most enduring production, a theatrical masterpiece in its fifth encore: The Election. The script is cat-eared, the actors are reciting lines from a decade ago, and the audience knows every beat by heart. Yet, the show must go on, meticulously stage-managed by the Damul Jadid crew, who have at least invested in some new, distracting scenery.

Center stage, the Federal Parliament performs its signature act. This esteemed body has perfected the art of the rubber stamp to such a degree that it could single-handedly solve the national liquidity crisis, if only its endorsements were legal tender. As its mandate wheezes to a close, the only anticipated explosions are the synthetic ones—carefully curated to divert attention from the crumbling set.

In the wings, the opposition is rehearsing its own tragicomic subplot. It’s a symphony of ambition without an orchestra, where leaders hold daily press conferences to passionately debate who should be the conductor. Their primary mobilization strategy appears to be the strategic deployment of press releases and the occasional heated argument with their own reflections. The public? They are not in the audience; they are just the backdrop.

Our leading men are in fine form:

Said Abdullahi Deni, who once envisioned a triumphant march into Villa Somalia, now watches his political capital evaporate faster than a puddle in the Mogadishu sun. His path to power has narrowed to a tightrope, and he’s balancing it over a pit of his own making.

The ever-mercurial Ahmed Madoobe continues his residency as the master gamesman of Jubaland. He plays a solitary game of cards, dealing from a deck only he can see. His strategy is a masterpiece of ambiguity: a bluff here, a strategic fold there, all designed to ensure that no matter who claims to win, the house—Madoobe’s house—always wins.

Then there is Somaliland, the perennial solo artist demanding a separate stage and a starring role in the international program. They’ve been hammering at the door of global recognition for so long, the only thing that’s splintered is the handle of their own hammer. With Laascaanood acting like shifting sands beneath their feet, their diplomacy has devolved into a hopeful monologue to an empty hall.

And let us not forget the SSC territories, the human chessboard in President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s grand strategy. They are the pawns pushed forward with bold declarations, waiting for a move that resembles a plan rather than a gambit. Their future is the subject of a high-stakes teashop bet, where the only certainty is that they won’t be holding the winnings.

So, the circus is in town. The same clowns, the same tired tricks, the same roar of the crowd that is really just a sigh of collective exhaustion. The true genius of this production is its funding model: the audience pays for the ticket with their children’s futures, and the run of the show is guaranteed, indefinitely.

https://wardheernews.com/federalism-as-a-somali-solution-not-an-ethiopian-imposition-a-rebuttal/?fbclid=IwdGRzaANEZ5JjbGNrA0RlZWV4dG4DYWVtAjExAAEeCVjRrHoCcSxQdPNnoRCbxXjFNaiPv4Nump2vjZWerUS9FmJVCXpcFVjfB2A_aem_G6zXFk8fVmKIo4UiWKLmQQ&sfnsn=mo

https://x.com/GuledWiliq/status/1971305480988541296/video/1

So, ladies and gentlemen, we finally got it. The head of state of the Federal Somali Republic—yes, the man supposedly tasked with defending its sovereignty—steps up to a press podium and calls Somaliland a country. You heard it right. Not a “region,” not a “self-declared administration,” not even the diplomatic cliché of “Somaliland authorities.” Nope. Straight from the Villa Somalia dictionary of political blunders: country.

Is Hassan Sheikh Mohamud stupid, ignorant, or just auditioning for a UN press officer role in Hargeisa?

A President Who Can’t Read His Own Constitution

The same constitution he swore to uphold clearly spells out that Somalia is one, indivisible, sovereign state. Yet here he is, in front of flashing cameras, doing public relations for a secessionist project. If this isn’t political malpractice, then Somalia must have invented a new category: treason by microphone.

Somaliland Leaders Must Be Laughing

Imagine the scene in Hargeisa. Ministers sipping tea, watching Hassan on flat-screen TVs, bursting into applause. “He finally said it! We don’t need recognition from Washington, Brussels, or the African Union anymore—Mogadishu’s very own president just gave it to us live on air!” Congratulations, Mr. President. You just became Somaliland’s unpaid foreign minister.

Somalia’s Unity: Outsourced and Auctioned

This is the tragicomic state of affairs: while Ethiopian soldiers are “peacekeeping” in Beledweyne, Al-Shabaab is planting IEDs, Puntland is bleeding in CalMiskaad mountains, and youth are fleeing across deserts to die in dinghies—our president is busy redefining geopolitics at a press conference, handing out sovereignty like it’s a charity project.

The WDM Verdict

Somalia doesn’t need enemies. Not when its president is on the payroll of stupidity. Not when the man trusted with holding the Somali flag can’t distinguish between “state,” “federal member state,” and “country.” Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has just graduated summa cum laude in Diplomatic Idiocy.

And if the Somali public doesn’t shout back, loud and clear, then tomorrow he’ll be calling Puntland a kingdom, Galmudug an emirate, and Banadir a papal state.

WDM Stamp of Shame: Hassan Sheikh Mohamud – Somalia’s accidental secessionist-in-chief.

Introduction: The Misplaced Blame
A persistent narrative within certain Somali political circles claims federalism is the root cause of the nation’s instability,insecurity, and fragmentation. This centralist critique, often tinged with nostalgia, conveniently identifies the federal member states—Puntland, Jubbaland —as the primary obstacles to unity. This essay argues that this diagnosis is not merely incorrect; it is a dangerous diversion. The true engine of Somalia’s dysfunction is not the federal model itself, but the Mogadishu regime, which has systematically sabotaged the federal compact while expertly scapegoating it for its own catastrophic failures.

The Organic Origins of Federalism: A Shield, Not a Weapon
To blame federalism for Somalia’s collapse is to fundamentally misread history.Federalism was not an imported ideology imposed upon a functioning state. It was an organic, necessary response to the total vacuum left by the collapse of the centralist dictatorship in 1991. For decades, the Mogadishu-centric state was built on repression, clan favoritism, and rampant corruption, leading to its inevitable implosion. In the ensuing chaos, local communities were left to fend for themselves, forging regional administrations to provide security, justice, and basic services that Mogadishu could not. Therefore, federalism is not the cause of disintegration but a pragmatic framework to manage diversity and rebuild a fractured nation from the bottom up. It is a shield against the very tyranny that shattered the country.

The Mogadishu Regime: A Cartel of Division
The so-called Federal Government of Somalia(FGS) often operates less as a national unifier and more as a rent-seeking cartel, sustained by international donor funds and foreign security proxies. Rather than nurturing the federal project as envisioned in the Provisional Constitution, it has waged a relentless campaign of political and financial attrition against the member states. The regime in Mogadishu has perfected a cynical strategy of divide-and-rule, manipulating clan tensions and pitting regional administrations against one another to prevent a united front that could demand accountability.

This sabotage is not merely rhetorical; it is operational. Critical national functions like border control, immigration, and customs—the very levers of sovereignty—are concentrated in Mogadishu. The unchecked demographic shifts and security threats often blamed on the federal states are, in reality, enabled by a central regime that treats entry permits and border policy as political currency. While member states are accused of separatism, it is Mogadishu that fails to provide equitable infrastructure, economic opportunity, or even a reliable share of national resources, thereby creating the very conditions of neglect it then decries.

The Centralist Mirage: A Return to Failure
The argument that recentralizing power would”save” Somalia is a recipe for repeating the catastrophes of the past. The hyper-centralized state is the failed model that led to civil war. Dismantling federalism would not restore unity; it would strip communities of their hard-won autonomy and reignite the very conflicts that the federal structure seeks to manage. While the current federal system is imperfect and its implementation often contentious, it remains the only viable mechanism for balancing power and ensuring that all Somali communities have a stake in the national project. To weaken it is to empower the same centralizing impulses that destroyed the nation.

Conclusion: Accountability Over Allegory
The problem is not federalism.The problem is a Mogadishu regime that refuses to be a government for all Somalis, thrives on manufactured crises, and evades accountability by blaming the federal architecture. Somalia’s path forward does not lie in dismantling the federal system but in strengthening it. This requires building genuine partnership between the center and the states, adhering to the constitution, and, most importantly, holding the Mogadishu regime responsible for its role as a saboteur rather than a savior. True patriotism demands that we identify the real culprit, not its convenient scapegoat.

The government’s new visa system doesn’t welcome the diaspora—it monetizes their return.

September 25,2025

At the gleaming terminals of Heathrow, JFK, and Frankfurt, a new ritual of rejection unfolds. Somali travelers arrive, clutching hard-won passports from distant nations—some are worn leather testaments to stateless survival; others, fresh plastic tokens of a state supposedly reborn. Their reward for this journey home is bureaucratic whiplash: “Double Visa Required. Pay, or turn back.”

These are the diaspora Somalis—the very people who fled the ruins of civil war, who funded schools in Puntland, built hospitals in Somaliland, and whose remittances have long served as the nation’s de facto life support. Now, their own government greets them with a surcharge on their identity. The recent launch of the federal E-Visa system, demanding payment from all foreigners, deliberately ignores the unique status of the diaspora, treating them not as sons and daughters of the soil, but as revenue streams.

The irony is profound. A generation ago, the military regime of Siad Barre sowed the seeds of conflict by denying travel rights to citizens from the north. Today, a government in Mogadishu, whose authority barely extends beyond its own capital, asserts the power to tax the diaspora’s return to regions like Puntland and Somaliland—effectively demanding a fee for the right to visit their family homes. This is not federalism; it is a shakedown enabled by software. Why collect one fee when the architecture of a fractured state allows for two?

They call this “modernization.” But behind the glossy interface lies an extraction scheme with the ingenuity of a cartel and the empathy of a pickpocket. This is not digitization; it is the monetization of longing.

This policy is not governance; it is humiliation masquerading as administration. The diaspora is left to wonder: What was the sacrifice for, if the “rebuilt” homeland greets them not with open arms, but with an online payment portal?

Somalia’s E-Visa is not a travel document. It is a satirical masterpiece—a ticket to nowhere, embossed with a state seal. It teaches a final, brutal lesson: that the most intimate predation often comes from the hand that claims to hold your own passport.

Tonight, Frontier University in Garowe, Puntland State, played host to a spectacle courtesy of the May Fakaraan Society. The main attraction was Faisal Roble, a Los Angeles–polished “urban planning” guru, flown in at great expense to lecture us on the gospel of asphalt, the sacrament of zoning codes, and the mystical virtues of public parks. Somalia, he declared in an imaginary PowerPoint certainty, must surrender to “modern urbanisation.” The hall, filled with eager converts, nodded, clapped, and scribbled in their notebooks as if transcribing divine revelation.

Yet, while Roble’s mental slides glowed with sterile visions of boulevards and roundabouts, a quieter, more profound reality was being paved over. The nomadic soul of Somalia—the camel herder guided by jingling bells and ancient stars—is being silently entombed beneath imported cement. The irony is a bitter pill, thicker than the smog over Mogadishu’s gridlock: a society that once mocked permanent walls now scrambles to build gated compounds; a people who once measured wealth in the strength of their herds now chase status in half-finished villas and the gleam of a Toyota V8.

What we call progress is not progress at all—it is a poorly staged parody. We have imported the worst excesses of the world: the cancerous sprawl of Los Angeles without its revenue, the hollow towers of Dubai without their plumbing technicians, the suffocating traffic of Nairobi without its resourceful matatus. And what of the true nomads? They are exiled to the margins, to IDP camps where they herd plastic bottles across dust-blown wastes, a tragic pantomime of their former dignity.

A more honest title for Faisal Roble’s lecture would have been: “From Camel Culture to Cement Culture: A Guide to Excavating a Nation’s Soul.” For what remains of Somali identity when the campfire tale is extinguished by generator hum? When the clan’s mobile parliament, once convened beneath a generous acacia, is replaced by the sterile bureaucracy of a municipal office? We are a people sustained by poetry and camel’s milk, yet we are raising a generation on imported soda, dodging open sewers that mock our aspirations.

The truth is, urban planning here has little to do with planning and everything to do with a deep, collective panic. It is the panic of an elite that mistakes concrete for civilization and fences for safety. It is the panic of a government that cannot manage a septic tank yet dreams of sketching skylines. It is the panic of a people who have traded timeless mobility for a 30-year mortgage, barter for predatory bank loans, and inherent dignity for the conditional charity of diaspora remittances.

Yes, cities will rise in Somalia. But if we pave over the nomadic spirit—the very bedrock of our adaptability and strength—we will not become an urban nation. We will become a nation of displaced souls in concrete labyrinths, a country that modernized its facade while selling its soul for scrap.

So we are left with the defining question: Will Somali urbanisation build a future, or merely pour a concrete grave for the last echo of the camel bell?

The Onion: Global Affairs Edition

Dateline: Mogadishu / Washington D.C. / The Green Zone of Reality

In a moving ceremony held securely within Mogadishu’s international airport—a bubble so secure most Somalis need a visa to enter their own capital—U.S. Ambassador Richard Riley stood before a handpicked group of Somali police officers and declared a resounding victory for… well, for something.

“I see before me a group of Somalis who are dedicated to the protection of their country and its people,” the Ambassador beamed, presumably reading from a teleprompter that carefully censored the words “unbalanced tribal militia,” “clan wars,” and “holistic approach”.

The new Crisis Response Team (CRT), a unit trained and equipped with a generous grant, is now officially certified to respond to terrorist attacks. This is a brilliant strategy, akin to funding an elite team of highly trained umbrella bearers to mop up water in a living room while politely ignoring the fact that the roof is on fire because you’re actively arming some of the residents to set fire to their neighbors’ sections.

The Clan-Tastic “National” Army

The cornerstone of this dazzling success is the international community’s unwavering commitment to building a “national” army. This involves a sophisticated, time-tested strategy: identify a few clans you can work with, give them guns, and call them the Somali National Army (SNA). What could possibly go wrong?

This approach is not without its critics. As recently as 2023, the Jubaland state government publicly accused federal actors of using the fight against Al-Shabaab as a pretext to arm clan militias for the purpose of destabilizing the regional state. A Jubaland minister warned that such a move was a “recipe for disaster,” hinting that “a more dangerous outfit was likely to emerge” from the attempt. But these concerns are clearly just the tedious complaints of local officials who don’t appreciate the elegant simplicity of international peacebuilding.

This policy brilliantly ignores the fact that Al-Shabaab itself, despite its claims to transcend clan politics, is deeply enmeshed in and manipulates these very dynamics. By adopting a similar strategy of co-opting some clans and alienating others, the internationally-backed government is essentially fighting fire with gasoline. The table below illustrates the chaotic genius of this approach.

Actor Stated Goal Satirical Reality (The “Clan-Blind” Strategy)
International Donors Build a unified, national security force. Fund and arm clan-based militias, creating parallel structures that undermine the very state they claim to build.
Federal Government of Somalia Extend its authority and defeat Al-Shabaab. Exploit clan rivalries for short-term military gains, risking long-term inter-clan conflict that could dwarf the current insurgency.
Al-Shabaab Establish an Islamic state that transcends clan. Masterfully exploit the grievances created by the government’s clan-based favoritism, using it as a powerful recruitment tool.

A Return to the Good Old Days (Of Civil War)

The ultimate satire is that this policy is not new; it’s a nostalgic revival of the conditions that led to the state’s collapse in 1991. By strengthening armed clan identities, the strategy expertly undermines the project of building a unified national identity. The fear among analysts is that a poorly managed campaign could simply plunge the country back into open clan-based fighting, but from the perspective of an arms dealer or a diplomat counting short-term “victories,” that’s a problem for a future funding cycle.

The real “Crisis Response Team” needed isn’t the one graduating in Mogadishu. It’s a team needed to respond to the crisis of a foreign policy that, in its desperate search for a simple solution, is actively reassembling the very bomb it claims to be defusing. But don’t worry, the diplomats are safe in their Green Zone, and the PowerPoint presentations showing declining Al-Shabaab attack statistics are absolutely stunning.

—

This satire is based on analysis and reporting from sources including the Security Council Report, the European Union Agency for Asylum, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, and news reports detailing internal Somali politics.

From Eldoret to Villa Somalia

Take a watch this historic video:

https://www.facebook.com/share/v/16FnZEw4r4/

In the theater of statecraft, there are no accidents—only carefully crafted illusions of inevitability. The 2002 Somali Peace and National Reconciliation Conference, which began in Eldoret and concluded in Mbagathi, was presented as a forum of equals: a gathering of warlords, clan elders, and civil society under the auspices of IGAD. But for our circle within Abdullahi Yusuf’s camp—I served then as his Chief of Staff in the Puntland administration—the conference was not a dialogue. It was a stage. And we intended to ensure that when the curtain rose, Yusuf would be the lead actor.

The Stratagem: A Calculated Entrance

Our maneuver was elegant in its simplicity, devastating in its effect. We would orchestrate Abdullahi Yusuf’s entry into the main conference hall to occur moments before the arrival of the IGAD Heads of State. This was not left to chance; it was a precise operational detail.

The result was political theater at its most potent. As Yusuf entered, the room’s focus—the diplomats, the journalists, the collective anticipation—snapped to him. The energy shifted. Then, the IGAD leaders processed in, not as the main event, but as guests arriving at a reception already in full swing, hosted by the commanding figure of Abdullahi Yusuf. The intended hierarchy was instantly inverted.

The Payoff: A Narrative Seized

Diplomatic conferences run on rigid protocols, each handshake and introduction meant to reinforce a predetermined order. Our choreography shattered that order. Yusuf was not presented by others; he presented himself through the sheer force of timing and presence. The optics became an unassailable argument: here was a man who commanded the room not by force of arms, but by the authority of his bearing. Rival faction leaders watched, marginalized by a spectacle they had not anticipated. The international community witnessed a leader who looked the part.

The Strategic Imperative: Why Theater Matters

Eldoret was more than a peace talk; it was an attempt to conjure a state from the void of anarchy. IGAD and its international partners were not seeking the most powerful warlord; they were desperate for a credible head of state—a symbol of order. Legitimacy in a collapsed state is not merely about control; it is about perception. It is a performance that must be believed before it can be institutionalized. We understood that to win the presidency, Yusuf first had to perform the presidency. Eldoret was his audition, and he passed unequivocally.

The Legacy: From Stagecraft to Statecraft

The resonance of that single day in Eldoret defined the entire transition. As the talks moved to Mbagathi, Yusuf carried the aura of a frontrunner. Donors engaged him as the central player, IGAD mediators saw him as the anchor for stability, and Somali delegates, however reluctantly, began to orient their strategies around his perceived inevitability. His subsequent election as President of the Transitional Federal Government in Nairobi in 2004 was not a sudden victory but the logical culmination of a legitimacy narrative set in motion two years prior.

The Enduring Lesson

Cynics will call it manipulation. Strategists will recognize it as the essential art of political positioning. In moments of profound uncertainty, leadership is often decided not by who has the most compelling platform, but by who most effectively dramatizes their claim to power. We engineered that moment of drama. We understood that before a leader can govern a reality, he must first command the stage.

We wrote the script for Eldoret. And history played its part.

A single photograph can eclipse a thousand press releases. On one side of the table sits the American delegation—postures rigid, expressions guarded, every movement a study in controlled diplomacy. Theirs is a language of power spoken through closed folders and measured gestures, a performance where confidentiality is the ultimate currency.

Across from them, the delegation representing President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud presents a jarring contrast. Notebooks lie open, blue folders are strewn about, pens scratch away without restraint. It is not transparency on display, but vulnerability. The inner sanctum of Villa Somalia appears laid bare for foreign appraisal. More alarming than the lack of discretion is the delegation’s composition: it resembles not a cabinet of state professionals, but an assembly of kin, where bloodlines seemingly outweigh institutional credentials.

This visual chasm reveals the core of Somalia’s diplomatic disadvantage. The Americans arrive with a unified strategy; Mohamud arrives with a coterie of clansmen. One side operates behind a shield of disciplined secrecy; the other parades a casualness that borders on negligence. While Washington ensures no word is spoken out of turn, Mogadishu’s representation ensures that even our weaknesses are on the negotiating table.

This is the essence of our political stagnation. We face international power brokers who operate with the precision of a state machinery, while our leadership counters with the informality of a family council. Negotiations in such settings are not between equals. They are between a well-oiled institution and a gathering in government attire, pretending to statehood.

Somalia deserves a delegation that meets discretion with discretion, strategy with strategy, and national interest with unwavering resolve. We must demand a government that understands diplomacy is not a family affair, but the serious business of safeguarding sovereignty. Until then, we will continue to bargain away our future at tables where only one side knows the rules of the game.

Abstract
This paper analyzes the political confrontation between Puntland President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s government following the 2000 Arta peace process.Drawing on the eyewitness account of Ismail H. Warsame, Chief of Staff of the Puntland Presidency, it argues that Ethiopia’s strategy of coercive mediation—using diplomatic pressure to enforce its security interests—was met with sophisticated resistance. The study demonstrates how Yusuf leveraged tactics of boycott, alternative alliance-building, and the invocation of sub-state institutional legitimacy to counter both Ethiopian hegemony and perceived manipulation by Djibouti. This clash crystallized a pattern of deep-seated distrust, revealing that sustainable political solutions in Somalia cannot be imposed by external actors but must emerge from processes that respect local agency.

Introduction
The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 created a political landscape where emergent regional entities like Puntland pursued autonomy while neighboring states,particularly Ethiopia, intervened to shape outcomes. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s government adopted a dual role as both mediator and power broker in Somalia, driven by a policy of “securitized regionalism” aimed at neutralizing threats and maintaining influence (Abbink, 2003). This paper examines a critical episode in this dynamic: the attempt by Ethiopia to compel Puntland’s Abdullahi Yusuf to endorse the Transitional National Government (TNG) created at the Djibouti-hosted Arta Conference, and Yusuf’s decisive resistance.

Using the first-hand testimony of Ismail H. Warsame (2021), a central participant in these events, this study contends that the post-Arta confrontation was not merely a diplomatic dispute but a defining moment that highlighted the limits of external coercion. It reveals how Somali leaders, even from a position of relative weakness, exercise significant agency by strategically navigating the demands of regional powers. The enduring legacy of this clash is a persistent distrust that continues to complicate relations between Somalia and Ethiopia.

The Arta Conference and the Roots of Contention
The Arta Conference(2000) was a significant international effort to re-establish a central government in Somalia, resulting in the TNG. However, the process was flawed. From the perspective of Puntland officials, including Chief of Staff Ismail Warsame, the conference was compromised by the meddling of Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh, who was seen as steering outcomes to favor certain Mogadishu-based actors (Warsame, 2021). Furthermore, the exclusion of major armed factions and regional leaders like Yusuf led Puntland to reject the TNG’s legitimacy. For Yusuf, endorsing Arta meant surrendering Puntland’s hard-won autonomy to a process he viewed as illegitimate and externally manipulated.

Ethiopia’s Coercive Mediation
Alarmed by the TNG’s perceived links to Islamist elements,Ethiopia moved to control the political fallout. As recounted by Warsame, Addis Ababa deployed a strategy of coercive mediation. This involved dispatching a private jet to transport the Puntland delegation to Djibouti, where senior Ethiopian officials like Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin applied direct pressure on Yusuf to join the TNG. The objective was clear: to incorporate and thereby neutralize a powerful rival by bringing him under the umbrella of an Ethiopian-influenced government. Yusuf was faced with a choice: submit to Ethiopian and Djiboutian dictates or chart an independent course.

The Repertoire of Somali Agency: Boycott, Alliances, and Institutional Legitimacy
Abdullahi Yusuf’s response demonstrated a sophisticated repertoire of resistance.His strategy was threefold:

1. Conditional Demands: He countered Ethiopian pressure not with a flat refusal, but with a strategic condition: the inclusion of Mogadishu’s powerful warlords, who had also been excluded from Arta. This was a move to undermine the TNG’s exclusivity and strengthen his own bargaining position.
2. Symbolic Boycott: Yusuf and his delegation ultimately refused the Ethiopian-chartered flight, opting instead for commercial travel. This was a powerful symbolic act, asserting independence from Addis Ababa’s orchestration.
3. Invocation of Institutional Sovereignty: Most significantly, Yusuf insisted that any decision to join the TNG required consultation with Puntland’s legislative council. This elevated his resistance from a personal stance to a defense of Puntland’s institutional sovereignty, providing a legitimate platform to reject external coercion.

This combination of tactics illustrates that Somali actors were not passive recipients of foreign policy but active strategists working to defend their political interests and institutional projects.

Consequences and Enduring Distrust
The immediate consequence was a sharp rift between Yusuf and Zenawi.Ethiopia temporarily shifted its support to other Somali figures. The fluidity of Somali politics, however, led to a paradoxical outcome: by 2004, Yusuf became president of the Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This shift underscores the pragmatic, interest-driven nature of alliances in the region. However, the foundational distrust born from the Arta confrontation persisted. Yusuf’s presidency remained fraught with tension and ultimately ended in 2008 amid disagreements over Ethiopian military presence, proving the instability of arrangements built on coerced cooperation.

Conclusion
The clash between Abdullahi Yusuf and Meles Zenawi over the Arta Conference was a microcosm of broader regional dynamics.Ethiopia’s coercive mediation collided with the determined agency of a Somali leader who skillfully used diplomatic conditioning, symbolic actions, and claims to institutional legitimacy to resist. The episode demonstrates that while external powers can influence Somali politics, they cannot control them without generating resistance and enduring suspicion. The lesson for contemporary state-building and mediation efforts is clear: sustainable peace requires inclusive processes that respect local autonomy and agency. Solutions imposed through pressure risk replicating the very cycles of conflict and fragmentation they aim to resolve.

—

References

Abbink, J. (2003). Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa after the Cold War: The politics of securitization. African Affairs, 102(406), 507–523.

Warsame, I. H. (2021, January 31). Departing ways with Meles Zenawi government. Warsame Digital Media. https://ismailwarsame.blog/2021/01/31/departing-ways-with-meles-zenawi-government/

https://www.facebook.com/share/v/18n5FN9cU7/

Executive Summary

Puntland’s gravest threat is not foreign invasion but government inaction. The blood spilled in Garowe’s elections has gone unanswered; criminals roam free, emboldened by silence. Now, Mogadishu-aligned actors shift their operations into Garowe itself, embedding within clan networks and pushing SSC-style alternatives to hollow Puntland from within—while President Deni looks away, chasing Villa Somalia. Refusal to enforce the law is complicity. Each unpunished crime invites the next; each silence cedes sovereignty. Puntland is not a pawn on Mogadishu’s chessboard. It demands leadership with courage to defend its institutions before the point of no return.

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Full Editorial

The law is not ornamental prose for dusty shelves nor a polite suggestion to be ignored at will. It is the foundation of governance—the shield that protects rulers and ruled alike. When broken and left unenforced, it ceases to be law at all. What follows is impunity, and impunity is the slow poison that kills a state from within.

Puntland today stands at that precipice. Pre-election violence that should have provoked swift justice was buried under silence. Who answers for the blood spilled in Garowe during the last election cycle? Dozens of lives were lost—yet not a single perpetrator has been held to account. Instead, those responsible are emboldened, regrouping and destabilizing Puntland from Mogadishu and Laascaanood, daring the state to act. They test the limits of our patience and sovereignty with confidence that there will be no reckoning.

And what has been the response from the Deni Administration? A studied look in the other direction. Call it cowardice, call it cynical calculation—the result is the same: Puntland’s stability pawned off for short-term political convenience. Worse still, these dark forces are not hiding in caves or compounds. They walk freely in Garowe itself—the seat of government—shielded by clan structures and emboldened by local advocates. This is not merely negligence; it is betrayal.

What is the broader plan? The shift of political operations from Mogadishu into Garowe is no accident. It is a calculated strategy to destabilize Puntland at its core while Deni’s focus drifts toward Villa Somalia. Federal-aligned actors have perfected this playbook: infiltrate through local allies, fuel clan divisions, and legitimize alternative administrations like SSC-Khaatumo to chip away at Puntland’s territorial and political coherence. The aim is simple—hollow Puntland from within while presenting Mogadishu as the indispensable center of power.

President Deni seems to believe appeasement will smooth his way to the throne of Villa Somalia. But Puntland is not a pawn on Mogadishu’s chessboard. It is a hard-won state, built with blood, sacrifice, and struggle. To gamble with its security for personal ambition is a sin history does not forgive. The price of inaction will be fragmentation: Garowe reduced to a hollow capital, districts peeling away under the lure of federal patronage, and Puntland’s bargaining power within the union stripped bare.

Let us be clear: refusing to enforce the law is not neutrality—it is complicity. Every crime unpunished becomes an invitation to the next. Every silence from leadership is an endorsement of chaos. Each failure to act chips away at Puntland’s sovereignty until nothing is left but a fragile shell ripe for takeover.

Leaders who trade their people’s future for personal gain are condemned not by rhetoric but by history itself. Puntland deserves more than silence, more than cowardice, more than transactional politics. It demands leadership that defends its institutions, enforces its laws, and shields its people. The hour is late, but not yet past saving—if courage replaces calculation before the point of no return.

General Ahmed Qalyare’s martyrdom in the shadows of the CalMiskaad Mountains casts a long light—illuminating a path of supreme sacrifice and exposing the precipice we now face. His fall marks a decisive, and deeply treacherous, turning point. We have entered the conflict’s twilight, where a cornered enemy is at its most lethal, lashing out with the desperate cunning of a wounded beast. Their strategy has narrowed to the ambush in the narrow pass, the booby-trapped trail, the bomb buried in the dark.

In this hour, the greatest threat is not the enemy’s strength, but the whisper of complacency. The courage of Puntland’s forces has brought us here, but ISIS wages a war on the psyche. Their true aim is to poison our resolve with fear, to slow our advance with hesitation, to cloud our vision with exhaustion.

Therefore, we must temper our grief into a weapon of sharper steel. General Qalyare’s sacrifice must forge an even greater discipline, a deeper web of intelligence, and a more relentless campaign to scour the enemy from their mountain lairs. Every valley, every cave, every silent path in the CalMiskaad must be met with unwavering vigilance. The last mile of this journey is often the most dangerous.

To honor the General is to reject the hollow comfort of ‘mission accomplished.’ We honor him not with words, but with action—by ensuring his blood waters the roots of an unshakeable, enduring vigilance. This war will only be over when the last hideout is silent and the last vestige of this ideology has been erased from the land.

General Qalyare has passed the torch. It now burns in our hands—a flame of remembrance and a flare of warning. We must navigate this twilight with the caution of those who know the night, and the iron resolve of those who are determined to greet the dawn. The future is waiting to be written by our next actions.

Date: September 22, 2025
Author:WDM Policy Unit
Subject:Urgent Policy Interventions Required to Halt Environmental Degradation and Secure Puntland’s Economic Future

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1. Executive Summary

Puntland faces an existential environmental crisis characterized by rapid desertification, deforestation, and soil erosion. This degradation directly threatens the state’s economic stability, primarily by undermining the livestock sector and the viability of key infrastructure like the Bosaso trade corridor. The current trajectory, if unaddressed, will lead to increased food insecurity, displacement, and economic collapse. This brief argues that the crisis is not inevitable but is exacerbated by a lack of targeted policy and governance. It proposes immediate, actionable policies focused on banning destructive charcoal exports, launching a large-scale reforestation program, and integrating climate resilience into core economic planning.

2. Context and Problem Analysis

The environmental situation in Puntland has reached a critical point. Anecdotal and observational evidence points to a severe decline in vegetative cover and soil health.

· Economic Lifeline at Risk: The road from Garowe to Bosaso, the state’s primary trade artery, traverses increasingly degraded land. This threatens transport routes and symbolizes the erosion of the natural capital upon which the economy is built.
· Primary Drivers: The key drivers of this crisis are:
  1. Unregulated Charcoal Production: The cutting of trees for charcoal, often for export, is a primary cause of deforestation, destroying biodiversity and reducing soil cohesion.
  2. Climate Shocks: Increased frequency of droughts and flash floods exacerbates land degradation, creating a vicious cycle of poverty and environmental loss.
  3. Policy Gap: The absence of stringent environmental regulations and a strategic vision for natural resource management has allowed these destructive practices to continue unchecked.

3. The Core Challenge: A Governance Gap

The central challenge is a deficit in governance and political will. Environmental protection is often treated as a secondary concern, disconnected from economic and security priorities. The ongoing focus on short-term political maneuvering and revenue collection (e.g., E-Visa fees) occurs at the expense of long-term strategic planning for sustainable development. This failure to act decisively is the greatest amplifier of the environmental threat.

4. Policy Recommendations

The following interventions are recommended for immediate implementation by the Puntland government.

Recommendation 1: Enact and Enforce a Ban on Unregulated Charcoal Production and Export.

· Action: Issue an immediate executive order declaring unregulated charcoal production and export an economic crime, as it destroys long-term economic assets for short-term gain.
· Implementation: Task the Ministry of Environment, in collaboration with security agencies, with enforcing the ban at production sites and key checkpoints on the Bosaso road.

Recommendation 2: Launch a State-Led, Mass Reforestation and Land Rehabilitation Program.

· Action: Establish a “Puntland Green Future Initiative” with the goal of planting ten million native trees annually.
· Implementation: Mobilize public works programs, engage youth groups and local communities, and provide incentives for landowners to participate. This program should be a top priority for public investment.

Recommendation 3: Mainstream Climate Resilience into All Economic Planning.

· Action: Mandate that all major infrastructure projects, including port expansions and road developments, include an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and a climate resilience plan.
· Implementation: The Ministry of Planning must integrate these requirements into its approval process. Development partners should be engaged to provide technical and financial support for building climate-resilient infrastructure.

5. Conclusion

The environmental crisis in Puntland is fundamentally a governance crisis. The choices made today will determine whether Puntland secures a prosperous future or succumbs to irreversible decline. The policy recommendations outlined above provide a clear roadmap for action. By prioritizing environmental security, Puntland’s leadership can protect its people, ensure long-term economic stability, and fulfill its fundamental responsibility to safeguard the state for future generations.

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WDM Policy Unit advocates for evidence-based policy solutions to promote sustainable development and good governance in the Horn of Africa.

By WDM

Garowe’s past holds a ghost of a different landscape. The late Abdirahman Shuke, former PDRC director, recalled a greener childhood. Today, the city is not just dusty; it feels like a stage for a dystopian drama where the wind is the primary antagonist. The surrounding countryside has become a grim theater of despair, where starving livestock, displaced herders, and charcoal merchants act out a final, desperate play that is consuming the last of the region’s natural wealth—a crisis enabled by political neglect.

The road east from Garowe to Bosaso, Puntland’s economic lifeline to the Gulf of Aden, is a monument to this political failure. This is not a route of development, but a funeral procession for the land itself. The highway cuts through a landscape so severely degraded it resembles a moonscape—a place where the wind now erodes the economy as fiercely as it does the soil, each gust carrying away another layer of Puntland’s future, a direct result of inaction.

If Bosaso is the beating heart of Puntland’s economy, then the surrounding environment is the life-support system that sustains it. That system is now in critical condition, and the diagnosis points to a failure of governance. The advance of desertification, the scouring of arable land by flash floods, and the relentless cutting of trees for charcoal are collectively suffocating the region’s economic potential. No port expansion or foreign investment deal can resuscitate an economy built on dead soil, a reality our leaders refuse to confront.

Confronted with this existential threat, the political response has been a masterclass in negligence. Leadership is preoccupied with divisive squabbles over E-Visa revenues, tribal posturing on social media, and the perpetual calculus of the next election. They are debating who should rule in Villa Somalia while the very foundation of Puntland’s prosperity—its land—turns to dust. We risk a future where Bosaso’s port imports food aid for a starving population instead of exporting livestock to sustain it, a direct consequence of political priorities.

Globally, this locally orchestrated tragedy is either ignored or met with cynical mockery. Climate deniers, from boardrooms to political rallies, dismiss the science as a hoax—a luxury of disbelief afforded to those not yet watching their livelihoods blow away on the wind. The West often frames climate change as a distant, political abstraction, while the Global South lives its brutal, tangible reality. Yet, this global indifference does not absolve Puntland’s own leadership; it makes their proactive role more critical.

It is time to stop dismissing this crisis as an unavoidable “act of God.” This is an act of man, and a failure of politics: a man-made apocalypse fueled by industrial emissions abroad and enabled by local short-sightedness and a catastrophic lack of governance.

WDM CALL TO ACTION

Climate change is not merely an environmental issue; it is the ultimate test of our political will. Puntland must choose to reforest or face irreversible decline. This demands immediate, concrete action that places responsibility squarely on the state:

· A Moratorium and a Mission: Enforce a ban on unregulated charcoal production and launch a massive, state-led reforestation campaign. For every tree cut, ten must be planted. This is a primary function of government, not an optional program.
· Accountability: Treat the export of charcoal not as commerce, but as an economic crime that mortgages the future for temporary gain. The law must recognize the gravity of this destruction.
· Political Reckoning: Make ecological stewardship the central metric of leadership. Any official who ignores this crisis must be held accountable at the ballot box before the next sandstorm buries Bosaso’s lifeline for good.

The alternative is not just a struggling state, but a cautionary tale of political failure written on the dust-blown shores of the Gulf of Aden.

BREAKING: Maddow, Colbert, and Kimmel Just Walked Away From the System — And Built a Newsroom That Has Networks Shaking.
https://harmonieshub.com/posts/ld-breaking-maddow-colbert-and-kimmel-just-walked-away-from-the-system-and-built-a-newsroom-that-has-networks-shaking-ld/

Rachel Maddow, Stephen Colbert, and Jimmy Kimmel have stunned the media world by joining forces to launch an independent newsroom, free from advertisers, corporate gatekeepers, and editorial restraints. Their mission is clear: to expose corruption, challenge power, and deliver journalism that speaks directly to the people.

Frustrated by years of network pressure and watered-down narratives, the trio is tearing down the old rules of broadcasting. Maddow brings her piercing analysis, Colbert his fearless satire, and Kimmel his sharp late-night edge — a fusion designed to disrupt an industry that has grown complacent.

As legacy networks scramble to respond, audiences are rallying behind this bold experiment, calling it the rebirth of real journalism. What began as a daring collaboration now looks like a movement — one that could mark the start of a new era in media.

OP-ED BY MP DR. ABDILLAHI HASHI ABIB (Redrafted by WDM for effect)

September 21, 2025

BREAKING NEWS FROM THE PARLIAMENT FLOOR:

Ladies and gentlemen of Somalia, brace yourselves. While you were busy worrying about inflation, power cuts, and Al-Shabab taxes, a new flight is preparing to land at Aden Adde International Airport this Monday at exactly 17:00 hours — and no, it’s not Turkish Airlines bringing diaspora doctors or UN food aid. It’s Stockholm’s latest gift to Mogadishu: 28 convicted Somali-Swedish criminals, including one INTERPOL-flagged child predator.

Yes, you heard me. Mogadishu — once the proud White Pearl of the Indian Ocean — is now officially the world’s first tax-free penal colony, courtesy of corrupt deal-makers in Villa Somalia.

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THE SMOKING GUN: THE “SPECIAL CASE” DEAL

For six months, our so-called “officials” — Ahmed Dahir, Kamal Gutale of the PM’s Office, and Yahya Hagi, the unelected “De Facto DG” of Immigration — have turned Mogadishu into a revolving door for European rejects. For a mere $45,000 per head, these gentlemen of high office have been happily importing Europe’s finest: rapists, gang leaders, and yes, pedophiles, freshly deported from Sweden, Norway, and the UK.

If this were a livestock contract, at least we’d get a quarantine certificate. Instead, these criminals are quietly released into the streets of Mogadishu — no tracking, no parole officers, no plan. Just dumped like toxic waste.

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THIS IS NOT IMMIGRATION — IT IS TREASON

Let us be very clear:

This is not “repatriation.”

This is not “diaspora return.”

This is bribery, state capture, and human trafficking at the highest levels.

Mogadishu’s streets are already struggling under the weight of unemployment, insecurity, and militia checkpoints — do we now need Scandinavian gangsters setting up branch offices of Stockholm’s Somali Mafia in Hamar Weyne?

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THE CALL TO ACTION

I demand:

1. Immediate cancellation of Monday’s “Special Case” flight.

2. Arrest and prosecution of every official who signed this secret deal.

3. A parliamentary inquiry into how Mogadishu became Europe’s preferred crime-disposal site.

4. A national policy that forbids importing convicts as a form of development aid.

Somalia is not for sale. We are not Europe’s landfill.

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A FINAL WORD TO EUROPE & THEIR LOCAL AGENTS

If Stockholm, Brussels, or London wish to rehabilitate criminals, they have excellent prisons, psychologists, and probation programs. Don’t export your social failures to us. Mogadishu is struggling to keep its own streets safe — we do not need to add “Swedish gang wars” to the agenda.

As a candidate for President of Somalia, I vow this betrayal will be stopped dead in its tracks. The Pearl of the Indian Ocean deserves better than to become Europe’s Guantanamo Bay.

Respectfully but ruthlessly,

Dr. Abdillahi Hashi Abib, BA, MA, MASc, Ph.D
Member, Foreign Affairs Committee
Candidate for President of the Federal Republic of Somalia

abdillahi.abib@parliament.gov.so / dheemaal@yahoo.com
W: +1-571-436-7586 | M: +252-6108-22469

Mogadishu, September 21, 2025 – Warsame Digital Media (WDM) is issuing an urgent humanitarian appeal following the displacement of residents from Mogadishu’s Daynile district. Our offices are receiving desperate pleas for help, with many asking for as little as $5 to meet basic needs.

This crisis stems from the recent government demolition of homes and neighborhoods, actions that have left countless families homeless, hungry, and without shelter. When a state’s policies force its citizens to beg for survival from the diaspora, it fails in its most fundamental duty.

We call on our readers and the international community to help. Even a small contribution can provide a lifeline.

· Donate: Contribute to reputable charities operating in Mogadishu.
· Share: Raise awareness of this crisis.
· Act: Demand accountability from those in power.

Do not let these cries for help go unanswered. Stand with the people of Daynile.

——
Warsame Digital Media is an independent Somali news outlet committed to reporting truth and advocating for the public interest.

#Mogadishu #Daynile #Somalia #HumanitarianCrisis

Reputable Mogadishu-Based Charities / NGOsSomali Charity for Relief and Development (SCRD) Community-driven sustainable development; humanitarian assistance; advocacy; health, education, WASH, and economic empowerment. Mogadishu. Email: info@somalicharityrelief.so
Juba Foundation Works with displaced communities; provides education, shelter, protection, health, nutrition, WASH; relief & emergency programs. HQ: Waberi District, House No.8, Maka Al-Mukarama Road (behind Cinema Somalia), Mogadishu. Phone: +252 61 5571454. Email: info@jubafoundation.org
Hormuud Salaam Foundation Local foundation doing humanitarian work (often shelter, livelihoods, etc.), focused in Mogadishu and areas around. Opp. Imamu Shafie School, KM4, Hodan District, Mogadishu. Email: info@hormuudsalaamfoundation.org. Phone: +252 1 859259 / +252 1 859258.
Nile Foundations Works in Mogadishu (and other parts of Somalia) on health, community development, possibly emergency relief. KM5, Zoobe Street, Mogadishu. Email: nilefoundations@gmail.com. Phone: 0613361655.
Elman Peace & Human Rights Center Founded in Mogadishu; work includes peace building, empowerment, human rights, assistance for gender-based violence survivors via Sister Somalia; counseling, housing support, advocacy. Based in Mogadishu. (They have a strong track record and recognition locally & internationally.)
IIDA Women’s Development Organisation Women’s empowerment, advocacy, peacebuilding, training, rights of children and youth; works in Mogadishu and beyond. HQ in Mogadishu. Contact via their website (IIDA) for specific donation channels.

Benjamin Netanyahu is a man besieged, not by Hamas rockets, but by a shifting reality he long believed he could control. His shock is palpable—not stemming from any pang of conscience for the tens of thousands dead in Gaza, but from the deafening silence now emanating from sections of his once-reliable cheering section in the West. His lifelong political insurance policy—“do whatever you want, America will pay the bill and provide diplomatic cover”—is showing catastrophic cracks, threatening to expire in full view of the world.

In a monstrous gamble, Netanyahu went full rogue. Betting that the sheer, brutal arithmetic of violence—carpet-bombing one of the most densely populated places on earth, systematically starving its people, and flattening its hospitals and universities—would finally “solve” the Palestinian question. This strategy, however, is born of his own cynical creation. For years, his policy was to financially prop up Hamas, funneling Qatari millions into Gaza to bolster the militants as a wedge against the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, deliberately sabotaging the prospects for a unified Palestinian state and a negotiated peace. He believed he could manage a controlled burn of a contained conflict. Now, the fire he fed has consumed his legacy.

Instead of security, he has achieved a darkly historic first: becoming an Israeli prime minister openly branded a war criminal on the floors of Western parliaments and denounced by a U.N. commission of inquiry. For the first time in living memory, the phrases “international law” and “Israel’s actions” are being uttered in the same breath across global media—and not as a cynical punchline, but as a serious indictment.

This is Netanyahu’s Gaza Gamble: a scorched-earth campaign of collective punishment so extreme, so televised, and so digitally documented that it has forced the world to use vocabulary it had reserved for history’s darkest chapters. The irony is lethally tragic. He believes this carnage is saving Israel. In truth, he is single-handedly excavating its diplomatic grave. The foundational myth of Israel’s eternal impunity is shattering.

This tragedy is compounded by the haunting accusations surrounding the October 7th attack itself. Beyond the failed strategy of empowerment, some within Israel’s own security establishment and bereaved families now level a far more damning charge: that Netanyahu, warned of potential violence, gave standing-down orders to forces near Gaza, a catastrophic miscalculation or neglect that left kibbutzim and military bases vulnerable to Hamas’s heinous assault. Whether born of arrogance or incompetence, this failure is the original sin of the ensuing apocalypse, a fact that fuels the domestic fury against him.

One day very soon, Netanyahu will wake to a chilling discovery: his entire war machine is sustained not by righteousness, but by the waning patience of a single superpower, the diminished influence of a powerful lobby, and the world’s fast-depleting reserves of political hypocrisy.

And here is the strategic blunder that will define his legacy: he has deliberately, viciously blurred the critical lines of identity. There is a profound difference between the nation of Israel and the political project of Zionism, just as there is a chasm between the terror group Hamas and the two million Palestinian civilians of Gaza. By conflating them, Netanyahu has made every Israeli bomb a referendum on Israel’s own legitimacy, radicalizing a new generation and alienating its most crucial allies. He has become Hamas’s greatest, if unwitting, recruiter.

Meanwhile, the international response paints a picture of a world order in crisis. Western capitals, gripped by a guilty paralysis, are now breaking ranks in an unprecedented wave. In a stunning diplomatic rupture, key European nations are formally recognizing Palestinian statehood against the explicit wishes of the United States, signaling that Washington’s veto at the UN Security Council is no longer a magic wand to halt global consensus but a symbol of its own isolation. This move leaves the U.S. and Israel as outliers, clinging to a failed status quo. Much of the Global South—the Muslim world, Asia, Africa, and Latin America—watches this Western fracture with grim validation, having long seen not a complex conflict but a stark colonial nightmare, and are rapidly moving to isolate Israel in every international forum. Theirs is not sleepwalking, but a gathering storm of a new geopolitical alignment, one where Western double standards on human rights are no longer tolerated.

Netanyahu’s ultimate tragedy—and Israel’s—is that he may yet claim a pyrrhic victory in Gaza, reducing it to rubble and calling it peace. But in the process, he has mortgaged his nation’s future for a fleeting moment of vengeful dominance. He will have lost the war for history, forever remembered not as a protector of Israel, but as the architect of its deepest isolation—the leader who first empowered a monster, then failed to protect his people from it, and finally unleashed a hell that shattered his country’s standing on the world stage.

Ismail H Warsame                              Warsame Digital Media (WDM)   September 21, 2025

Abstract

While international counter-terrorism discourse concerning Somalia has predominantly focused on the Federal Government in Mogadishu and the threat of al-Shabaab in the south, the semi-autonomous state of Puntland has conducted a sustained, iterative counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign in its northern territories for over three decades. This article argues that through a process of tactical adaptation and strategic learning, Puntland has developed an effective, locally-led doctrine focused on severing the logistical connection between vulnerable port settlements and mountainous insurgent sanctuaries. By analyzing five distinct conflict phases from the rise of Al-Itihaad al-Islami (AIAI) to the recent offensive against Islamic State affiliates in the Cal Miskaad range, this study demonstrates how regional authorities can develop a sustainable capacity to degrade transnational terrorist cells. This history, often overlooked due to its remote theater and fragmented documentation, offers a significant case study in the primacy of terrain and logistics in asymmetric warfare. The analysis draws on United Nations monitoring reports, historical studies, and the firsthand accounts of local officials like Ismail H. Warsame to articulate a coherent narrative of Puntland’s strategic evolution.

Keywords: Somalia, Puntland, Counter-Insurgency, Al-Shabaab, Islamic State, Terrorism, Horn of Africa, Logistics, Regional Security

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Introduction: The Littoral-Highland Battlespace

The strategic geography of Northern Somalia presents a quintessential challenge for counter-insurgency (COIN). The rugged Cal Miskaad and Golis mountain ranges, with their complex systems of caves and wadis, offer natural sanctuary for non-state actors.[^1] This terrain is juxtaposed with a long, porous coastline dotted with isolated villages and inlets, providing critical access points for personnel and material. The persistent objective for a succession of jihadist groups has been to fuse these two domains—mountain sanctuary and littoral logistics—into a durable operational base.[^2]

Despite the strategic significance of this region, the sustained conflict within Puntland’s borders has received scant scholarly attention compared to the upheavals in South-Central Somalia. This gap in the literature exists because much of Puntland’s conflict has unfolded in inaccessible terrain, was reported in scattered field dispatches and monitoring group memos, and was often overshadowed by concurrent political crises in Mogadishu.[^3] This article synthesizes these fragmented sources to construct a coherent historical narrative. It posits that through a process of iterative learning across three decades, Puntland’s security forces have evolved from reliant on ad-hoc militias to a professionalized, integrated command structure capable of executing a sophisticated COIN doctrine. This doctrine, culminating in the 2024-25 Cal Miskaad offensive, is predicated on a single, consistent strategic imperative: control the coastline to isolate the highlands, thereby rendering terrain-based sanctuaries unsustainable.

The Precedent: Al-Itihaad al-Islami and the Foundational Lessons (Early–Mid 1990s)

Before “counter-terrorism” became a pillar of international engagement with Somalia, Puntland’s founding authorities faced their first organized Islamist challenge. In the early 1990s, Al-Itihaad al-Islami (AIAI), then the most coherent Islamist formation in the country, briefly established a governance project in the major port city of Bosaso.[^4] AIAI sought to impose its Sharia-first system as warlordism raged elsewhere, effectively using the port as a source of revenue and legitimacy.

This experiment was short-lived. SSDF-aligned forces, representing Puntland’s nascent governing authority, rolled back AIAI’s control in the north, while a devastating Ethiopian military intervention smashed its rear bases around Luuq and in the Ogaden corridor.[^5] This initial episode was formative. It imparted two enduring lessons that would echo through subsequent conflicts: first, port cities are high-value strategic prizes whose control is essential for any group seeking sustained operations; and second, the northern mountain ranges, while not the primary front in this early episode, were recognized as potential sanctuaries and force-multipliers. The response also set a precedent for cooperation with external actors, namely Ethiopia, which has remained a recurring feature of Puntland’s security strategy.[^6]

Phase I: The Islamic Courts Union and the Battle of Bandiradley (December 2006)

The rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 and its rapid territorial expansion presented a direct conventional threat to Puntland. In late 2006, ICU forces surged northward, with the strategic town of Bandiradley becoming the forward pressure point. The battle for Bandiradley was a short, sharp engagement. Puntland forces, operating in concert with militias from Galmudug and with critical support from Ethiopian units, broke the ICU’s line and pushed it south.[^7]

Strategically, the victory at Bandiradley halted an Islamist pincer movement aimed at Galkayo—a key economic hub—and the artery of the Bari road.[^8] It served as a blocking action, buying Puntland crucial time to harden its internal defenses and consolidate its territorial control. This phase demonstrated Puntland’s initial capacity to integrate external military support and local militias to defeat a conventional advance, reinforcing the lesson that the mountain passes were critical terrain that must be denied to an invading force.

Phase II: The Galgala Insurgency and Attritional Warfare (2009–2011)

Following the conventional defeat of the ICU, the conflict evolved into a protracted insurgency. A former AIAI member, Mohamed Said “Atom,” nested cells and ambush teams within the limestone folds of the Galgala-Calmadow range.[^9] Atom claimed affiliation with al-Shabaab, which was now the dominant jihadist force in the south, operating with a degree of autonomy as a franchise.[^10]

Puntland’s counter-insurgency response became attritional. The Puntland Security Force (PSF), a more professionalized unit, led raids and conducted painstaking ridge-to-ridge clearances. The critical strategic effort, however, was the gradual isolation of Atom’s supply lines extending to the coast.[^11] By late 2010 and into 2011, the hills remained contested but Atom’s cadre had been bled dry and scattered. The Galgala campaign proved a vital lesson: mountainous terrain offers immense advantages to guerrillas, but only if they can maintain a steady flow of logistics. A strategy of littoral denial could starve a mountain-based insurgency.

Phase III & IV: Littoral Maneuver and Jihadist Fracture (2016)

The year 2016 witnessed a tactical shift by insurgents and a fracturing of the jihadist landscape, testing Puntland’s adaptive capacity.

In March, al-Shabaab executed a strategic pivot towards littoral warfare. Fighters landed by boat and overran the small port of Gara’ad (Garacad), briefly opening a second front while operations in Galgala continued.[^12] Puntland forces counter-attacked within days and restored control, but the message was unambiguous: the coastline was a critical vulnerability, and any unpoliced cove could be transformed into a staging point.[^13]

Later that same year, a new threat emerged. An ISIS-aligned splinter faction led by ‘Abd al-Qadir Mu’min seized the coastal town of Qandala, hoisting its flag for several weeks before being ejected.[^14] This event had significant implications. Puntland now faced two distinct jihadist brands—al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia—competing for the same strategic space. The response demonstrated Puntland’s growing sophistication; it learned to contain both groups simultaneously and, crucially, to deny either a permanent port facility, adhering to the core principle of its emerging doctrine.

Phase V: The Cal Miskaad Offensive and Doctrine Culmination (2024–2025)

The most recent and large-scale operation represents the maturation of the Puntland Doctrine. In a coordinated multi-service offensive, units from the PSF, Darawish, PMPF, and police surged into the Cal Miskaad range to dismantle the strongholds of ISIS-Somalia.[^15] This campaign was notable for its integration of external enablers, who provided precision strike capabilities, alongside highly mobile local forces with superior knowledge of the terrain. The operation rolled up base clusters, reopened key tracks, and provoked a costly, mass-casualty counterattack by ISIS on December 31, 2024—a sign of the pressure applied. By early 2025, officials reported dozens of sites cleared and significant territory retaken.[^16]

The Cal Miskaad offensive was not merely a tactical victory. It was the culmination of a doctrine hammered out over three decades: treat the littoral-mountain system as an integrated battlespace, close the coves, and starve the hills. It also carried a potent political message: regional forces, with targeted external support, can effectively degrade transnational terrorist cells without waiting on a centralized national command from Mogadishu.[^17] This aligns with the long-standing principle of self-reliance chronicled by local observers of Puntland’s political development.[^18]

Analysis: The Through-Lines of a Doctrine

Synthesizing these five conflicts reveals the consistent pillars of Puntland’s strategic approach:

1. The Primacy of Logistics over Terrain: Every militant surge, from AIAI to ISIS, targeted a port or coastal landing point. Puntland’s strategy correctly identified that controlling terrain is secondary to controlling its sustenance. A mountain sanctuary is worthless without a pipeline of resources.[^19]
2. Adaptive Learning: Puntland’s command structure evolved iteratively in response to new threats. Its forces transformed from ad-hoc militias to a specialized PSF, and finally to an integrated command capable of coordinating multiple units and leveraging external precision support. This organizational learning curve proved steeper than the tactical adaptations of its adversaries.
3. The Efficacy of Regional Initiative: The consistent success factor was local leadership and knowledge. Forces from Puntland, with an intimate understanding of the human and physical geography, proved to be the most effective instrument for COIN in this complex environment. This aligns with the observations of insiders like Ismail H. Warsame, who has chronicled Puntland’s institution-building and its strategic principle of self-reliance in security matters.[^20] The model of local lead with targeted, enabling external help has been the only one to consistently achieve tactical and strategic effects.

Conclusion

The history of conflict in Puntland is not a series of disconnected skirmishes but a continuous, thirty-year arc of strategic learning. The “Puntland Doctrine” that emerged is a pragmatic, terrain-specific approach to counter-insurgency that understands the critical link between logistics and sanctuary. As articulated by local figures like Warsame, this doctrine is rooted in a pragmatic assessment of local needs rather than abstract theories imposed from outside.[^21] The 2024-25 campaign in the Cal Miskaad mountains is not an isolated event but the logical endpoint of a strategy refined since AIAI first tested the defenses of northern ports.

This case study offers broader lessons for security studies and COIN theory. It underscores that effective counter-insurgency often depends on granular, local knowledge and regional initiative rather than solely on centralized national strategies. It also reaffirms the timeless military axiom that logistics, not just terrain, dictate the viability of an insurgency. For policymakers, the Puntland case argues for a model of security cooperation that empowers capable local actors with the precise support they need, rather than imposing top-down, one-size-fits-all solutions. The untold story of Puntland’s long defense of its ridgelines and coastline is, ultimately, a story of strategic adaptation and the enduring importance of controlling the means of sustenance in war.

—

Notes

[^1]: Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2004), 45-48.
[^2]:United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2017/924 (New York: United Nations, 2017), 12-15.
[^3]:Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 112.
[^4]:Matt Bryden, The Rise and Fall of Al-Itihaad al-Islami in Somalia (Nairobi: UNPD Somalia, 1999), 22.
[^5]:Bryden, Rise and Fall, 28-30.
[^6]:United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2010/91 (New York: United Nations, 2010), 51.
[^7]:Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 134.
[^8]:United Nations Security Council, S/2010/91, 54.
[^9]:United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, S/2022/822 (New York: United Nations, 2022), 19.
[^10]:Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 156.
[^11]:United Nations Security Council, S/2017/924, 21.
[^12]:United Nations Security Council, S/2017/924, 34.
[^13]:United Nations Security Council, S/2017/924, 35.
[^14]:United Nations Security Council, S/2017/924, 38-40.
[^15]:United Nations Security Council, S/2022/822, 25.
[^16]:United Nations Security Council, S/2022/822, 27-29.
[^17]:Ismail H. Warsame, “Puntland’s Strategy Against Terrorist Groups,” WardheerNews, October 15, 2016, https://wardheernews.com/puntlands-strategy-terrorist-groups/.
[^18]:Ismail H. Warsame, “The Genesis of Puntland State of Somalia,” (self-published monograph, 2018), 45.
[^19]:Menkhaus, State Collapse, 72.
[^20]:Warsame, “Puntland’s Strategy Against Terrorist Groups.”
[^21]:Warsame, “The Genesis of Puntland State of Somalia,” 102.

—

Bibliography

Bryden, Matt. The Rise and Fall of Al-Itihaad al-Islami in Somalia. Nairobi: UNPD Somalia, 1999.

Hansen, Stig Jarle. Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Menkhaus, Ken. Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism. New York: Routledge, 2004.

United Nations Security Council. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. S/2010/91. New York: United Nations, 2010.

———. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. S/2017/924. New York: United Nations, 2017.

———. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. S/2022/822. New York: United Nations, 2022.

Warsame, Ismail H. “Puntland’s Strategy Against Terrorist Groups.” WardheerNews, October 15, 2016. https://wardheernews.com/puntlands-strategy-terrorist-groups/.

———. “The Genesis of Puntland State of Somalia.” Self-published monograph, 2018.

Abstract: While international counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia have historically focused on Mogadishu and South-Central regions, the semi-autonomous state of Puntland has for three decades served as a critical bulwark against the entrenchment of jihadist groups in the strategic littoral-highland nexus of the Horn of Africa. This analysis synthesizes scattered field reports and operational data to trace an untold strategic arc: Puntland’s iterative adaptation against five successive extremist projects, culminating in a locally-led doctrine that severs the connection between mountain sanctuaries and port logistics. This historical examination, structured around the interplay of ports, mountains, and organizational evolution, argues that regional initiative, terrain-specific strategies, and an evolving force structure have been decisive in denying militants a permanent foothold.

Introduction: The Littoral-Highland Battlespace

The conflict in Northern Somalia is defined by a geographic dichotomy: the rugged Cal Miskaad and Golis mountain ranges provide natural sanctuary for insurgents, while the porous coastline offers critical access for logistics and support. The constant strategic objective for extremist groups has been to fuse these two domains into a durable operational base. Puntland’s sustained resistance to these efforts represents a critical case study in regional counter-insurgency (COIN). The following history is structured along three concurrent strands that illustrate the evolution of this conflict:

1. The Struggle for Ports & Littorals: The battle to control logistics hubs and landing points.
2. The War in the Mountains: The fight to deny insurgent sanctuary in the rugged interior.
3. Organizational Shifts: The evolution of both jihadist groups and Puntland’s security apparatus.

This triad provides the framework for analyzing the distinct “Puntland Doctrine.”

The Chronological Evolution of the Conflict

The Precedent: Establishing the Strategic Paradigm (Early–Mid 1990s)

· Ports & Littorals: The major port city of Bosaso was the initial prize. AIAI’s seizure of it was a deliberate attempt to establish a governance project and secure a primary logistics hub.
· Mountains: While not the main battleground, the northern ridges were recognized as a potential rear base and force-multifier, establishing their strategic value from the outset.
· Organizational Shifts: This period featured the first organized jihadist challenge from Al-Itihaad al-Islami (AIAI). Puntland’s response was conducted by ad-hoc SSDF-aligned militias, setting the baseline from which all future adaptation would occur.

Phase I: Conventional Threat and Mountain Defense (December 2006)

· Ports & Littorals: (This round emphasized land-based conventional advance, though it aimed to ultimately control all territory, including coasts.)
· Mountains: The Battle of Bandiradley was a decisive mountain engagement. Halting the ICU surge here protected the strategic approaches to Galkayo and the vital Bari road.
· Organizational Shifts: The rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) introduced a new, powerful challenger. Puntland’s response evolved into a coalition of its militias with key Ethiopian military support, demonstrating an early understanding of the need for partnered operations.

Phase II: Protracted Insurgency and Attritional Denial (2009–2011)

· Ports & Littorals: The strategy shifted to littoral denial. Puntland focused on disrupting Atom’s ability to draw supplies from coastal towns, making his mountain holdings unsustainable.
· Mountains: The Galgala-Caladow range became the epicenter of a protracted guerrilla campaign under Mohamed Said “Atom”, who expertly leveraged the complex limestone terrain.
· Organizational Shifts: Atom’s group operated as a semi-autonomous al-Shabaab affiliate, illustrating the franchise model of jihad. In response, Puntland professionalized its forces, establishing the more capable Puntland Security Force (PSF).

Phase III & IV: The Littoral Gambit and Jihadist Fracture (2016)
The year 2016 saw two nearly simultaneous challenges that highlighted the integrated nature of the battlespace and a shifting organizational landscape.

· Ports & Littorals (Mar 2016): Al-Shabaab executed a strategic pivot with the Gara’ad incursion, a seaborne assault to capture a minor port and open a new logistical front.
· Ports & Littorals (Late 2016): The ISIS-Somalia splinter faction then occupied the port town of Qandala, demonstrating that multiple groups now coveted a coastal foothold.
· Mountains: Throughout this period, the Galgala range remained an active insurgency, forcing Puntland to contend with a potential two-front conflict linking the coast to the highlands.
· Organizational Shifts: This period was defined by fracture and competition. The emergence of ISIS-Somalia created a rival to al-Shabaab, fracturing the jihadist movement and complicating Puntland’s threat landscape.

Phase V: Doctrine Culmination – Integrated Systems Control (2024–2025)

· Ports & Littorals: The overarching goal of the Cal Miskaad Offensive was to permanently sever all clandestine coastal supply lines feeding the mountain insurgency.
· Mountains: The operation represented the largest-ever push to clear ISIS-Somalia strongholds in the rugged Cal Miskaad range, treating the mountain system as a single, integrated battlespace.
· Organizational Shifts: This campaign showcased the full maturation of Puntland’s model: an integrated command of PSF, PMPF, Dervish, and police units, effectively leveraged partner-provided precision strike capabilities. This validated the doctrine of local lead with targeted external support.

Analysis: The Through-Lines of a Doctrine

Synthesizing these five conflicts through the lens of the three strategic lanes reveals consistent principles:

1. The Primacy of Logistics (Ports & Littorals): Every militant surge, from AIAI to ISIS, targeted a port. Puntland’s core strategic imperative has been to deny and disrupt this link, understanding that terrain without supply is ultimately indefensible.
2. Terrain Control via Economic Warfare (Mountains): Military control of mountainous terrain is secondary to controlling its sustenance. Success was achieved not merely through clearances but by systematically isolating insurgents from the local micro-economies and supply chains that made their presence viable.
3. Adaptive Learning (Organizational Shifts): Puntland’s command structure demonstrated a capacity to learn and adapt at a pace that matched, and often exceeded, that of its adversaries. Its evolution from militias to a integrated, specialized force capable of combined arms operations is a testament to organizational learning under fire.

Conclusion: An Unwritten History and Its Implications

This history has remained largely “untold” due to its occurrence in inaccessible terrain, its overshadowing by events in Mogadishu, and its manifestation in tactical engagements that mask strategic weight. By reconstructing it along the interwoven strands of ports, mountains, and organizational change, the consistent application of a deliberate Puntland Doctrine becomes clear. The 2024-25 Cal Miskaad campaign is not an isolated event but the logical culmination of a strategy honed over thirty years: control the coastline, isolate the highlands, and prevent any tactical victory from becoming a strategic permanent base. This case study offers critical lessons for COIN strategies in similar littoral-mountain environments elsewhere, highlighting the efficacy of regional, terrain-literate forces operating with targeted external enablement.

By Ismail H. Warsame | Warsame Digital Media | © 2025 WDM

Welcome to Mogadishu, the only city in the world where the word “capital” means two capitals fighting over the same piece of sand.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has apparently discovered the cure for Somalia’s economic stagnation: land grabs. Forget agricultural reforms, industrialization, or revenue-sharing agreements—Mogadishu’s real GDP is measured in square meters of seized plots. Every clan elder with a bulldozer and a militia is now an “investor,” courtesy of Villa Somalia’s urban renewal program.

But not everyone is applauding the President’s real estate hustle. The Banadir parallel administration, which functions like Mogadishu’s shadow government, has now threatened action against this latest land-grabbing spree. And here’s the punchline: even Al-Shabab found this whole spectacle corrupt enough to issue a statement condemning it.

Yes, you read that correctly: Al-Shabab, the same group that detonates hotels for breakfast, is now lecturing Villa Somalia about legality. Imagine Pablo Escobar giving a TED Talk on drug policy.

E-Visa: Somalia’s Newest Pyramid Scheme

If the land grabs were not enough, the Federal Government’s flashy E-Visa project has turned into a textbook scandal. The system that was supposed to streamline travel and showcase Somalia’s “digital future” has become the equivalent of a tollbooth for presidential relatives.

Reports are flying that Mohamud’s immediate family members are linked to offshore accounts and shady kickbacks. Instead of a secure, transparent platform, we now have a Somali version of FTX—minus the tech genius and with double the clan politics.

Even Puntland, the last remaining adult in the federal room, refused to play ball on the E-Visa revenue-sharing deal. Now travelers must pay two fees—one to Villa Somalia and another to Puntland. Double taxation? No problem—because in Mogadishu math, this is called “federalism.”

The whole circus is a perfect reflection of Somalia’s “state-building” effort:

The Punchline

A President moonlighting as a landlord.

A shadow government threatening civil action.

A terrorist group claiming to be the voice of legality.

A national digital visa system collapsing into clan-based corruption.

And the international community still insists this is a “fragile democracy.”

At this rate, Mogadishu may soon have three governments—one for land grabs, one for fighting land grabs, and one for collecting E-Visa fees. That should finally satisfy the donors, who love to fund “multi-stakeholder approaches.”

Executive Summary: A high-level U.S. delegation, led by Ambassador Larry E. Riley and SOCAFRICA Commander Maj. Gen. Claude K. Tudor, has publicly endorsed Puntland’s forces as the “tip of the spear” in the fight against ISIS-Somalia. This language signifies a major shift from rhetorical support to a tangible, effects-based partnership. This report analyzes the strategic messaging, the corroborating battlefield evidence, and the significant implications for U.S. policy, regional security, and Puntland’s standing.

The Signal: A Deliberate Strategic Message

The recent meeting between U.S. officials and Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni was more than diplomatic theater. The presence of both the U.S. Ambassador and the commander of U.S. special operations forces in Africa (SOCAFRICA) indicates coordinated, whole-of-government backing.

The designation of Puntland’s security formations as the “tip of the spear” is a loaded term in military-diplomatic parlance. It explicitly frames Puntland’s forces as the main effort—the lead combat element—with U.S. forces playing an enabling role through airpower, intelligence, and advisory support. This is a powerful statement of policy, resource allocation, and political legitimacy.

Decoding Washington’s Telegraph: Four Key Points

1. Validation of the Puntland Front: Washington is explicitly acknowledging that the primary center of gravity for ISIS-Somalia is in the Golis Mountains (Cal-Miskaad) and areas surrounding Bosaso, Puntland. The sustained tempo of U.S. airstrikes in this region, as documented by AFRICOM, confirms that this fight is a strategic priority, not a peripheral engagement.
2. Elevated Special Operations Focus: The involvement of SOCAFRICA Commander Maj. Gen. Tudor, a senior special operations leader with prior AFRICOM experience, signals a deep and sustained commitment. Senior SOF command attention is a finite resource; its investment here underscores the operational priority assigned to this theater.
3. Synchronized Air-Ground Campaign: U.S. actions are not occurring in a vacuum. Reporting from outlets like Reuters details significant Puntland ground offensives that have retaken approximately 250 km² of territory and dozens of ISIS positions. U.S. airstrikes and the July raid that captured ISIS-Somalia’s finance chief are directly enabling this local ground scheme, representing a mature and effective combined campaign.
4. Explicit Homeland Security Nexus: The Embassy and AFRICOM have directly linked the fight in Cal-Miskaad to threats against “the region and our homeland.” This public framing is crucial for justifying the allocation of resources, intelligence assets, and strike authorities under U.S. policy, tying local operations to core U.S. national security interests.

The Battlefield Ledger: Evidence of a Campaign (2025)

· Airstrike Tempo: U.S. Africa Command has publicized multiple strikes targeting ISIS-Somalia in Puntland throughout 2025, including a confirmed action on July 6 southeast of Bosaso and follow-on strikes into September. This consistent rhythm indicates a sustained campaign, not isolated events.
· Territorial Gains: Puntland forces have reportedly reclaimed significant territory, with intense fighting resulting in heavy losses for both sides—an estimated 85 ISIS militants killed and 17 Puntland soldiers fallen.
· High-Value Targeting: The capture of ISIS-Somalia finance chief Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf by U.S. operators in July represents a critical blow to the group’s logistics and funding networks, enabling further disruption operations.
· Record Resources: The pace of U.S. airstrikes in Somalia in 2025 is on track to be one of the highest on record, an unambiguous signal of increased resource commitment to the conflict.

Strategic Implications: Why This Alignment Matters

· For Puntland: This endorsement confers a major “credibility dividend.” Being recognized as the “tip of the spear” elevates the status of Puntland’s security institutions (PSF, PMPF) and validates their strategy. It strengthens their position both militarily and in future political negotiations.
· For Maritime Security: U.S. praise for Puntland’s “maritime security” efforts is a direct encouragement to maintain pressure on coastal smuggling and piracy networks that ISIS exploits for revenue and logistics.
· For U.S. Strategy in Somalia: This partnership highlights a clear U.S. preference for funding and enabling effective, locally-led military operations with measurable results. It creates a strategic contrast with more contested and less effective federal government-led fronts elsewhere in Somalia.

Corroborating Sources:

· AFRICOM: Public releases detailing airstrikes against ISIS-Somalia in the Bosaso/Cal-Miskaad region.
· Reuters: Reporting on Puntland’s ground offensive and territorial gains.
· Task & Purpose & Stars & Stripes: Documentation of the increased U.S. strike tempo and details on the raid capturing ISIS-Somalia’s finance chief.
· International Crisis Group: Analysis confirming ISIS-Somalia’s entrenched footprint in the Bari region, validating the geographic focus of U.S.-Puntland operations.

WDM Assessment

Washington’s message is not charitable praise; it is a strategic contract. The terms are clear: Puntland must continue to deliver decisive battlefield effects, and the United States will provide the enabling support—precision airpower, special operations collaboration, and political cover.

Puntland is currently holding up its end of the bargain. In return, it is being paid in the most valuable currency available: sustained military capability and high-level recognition. The strategic imperative is now to maintain pressure, consolidate gains, and ensure the Cal-Miskaad region becomes the graveyard of ISIS-Somalia’s operational capability.

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Reporting Desk: WDM Security & Geopolitics.

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By Ismail H. Warsame
© 2025 WDM

Donald J. Trump’s understanding of history appears to extend only as far as his own reflection. His commentary on Russia suggests a nation that sprang, fully formed, from the will of Vladimir Putin—a geopolitical novelty act of hackers, missiles, and shirtless bravado. He mistakes the current regime for the ancient state.

History, however, is unforgiving to those who ignore it. Russia is not a recent invention. It is a civilization that has absorbed the Mongol yoke, turned Napoleon’s Grand Armée into a frozen monument to hubris, and ground Hitler’s war machine into the snows of Stalingrad. It has built and lost empires, ignited revolutions that reshaped the global order, and consistently defied every Western prophecy of its collapse—from the Tsars to the Soviets to the so-called “post-Soviet chaos.”

A Millennium of Statehood vs. A Quarter-Millennium of Experiment

To compare the timelines of Russia and the United States is to compare a deep, slow-moving river to a powerful but youthful stream. As George Washington crossed the Delaware, Russia’s empire already spanned continents, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean. While American founders penned Enlightenment ideals, Empress Catherine the Great was practicing them—and simultaneously annexing Crimea—proving that Russian statecraft has always blended philosophy with realpolitik.

Consider its enduring assets: Russia commands a treasure trove of oil, gas, uranium, and wheat that keeps Europe dependent, America anxious, and China engaged. Its scientists launched Sputnik into the cosmos while America was perfecting the television commercial. Its literary giants—Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov—were probing the depths of the human soul before the United States had a distinct literary voice. This is not merely a nation; it is a civilization with a long memory and profound cultural reserves.

The “Putin Let Me Down” Fallacy

This context makes Trump’s recent lament—“Putin let me down!”—so profoundly naive. He framed a geopolitical rift as a personal betrayal, as if a business partner had reneged on a handshake deal in Atlantic City. The error is fundamental: Vladimir Putin is not a contestant on The Apprentice: Geopolitics Edition. He is the calculated steward of a thousand-year tradition of Russian statecraft, for whom strategy is measured in centuries, not news cycles.

Trump evaluates world leaders as he does Yelp reviews: bestowing five stars for flattery, one star for defiance. Putin, by contrast, plays chess on a board where the pieces are history, energy, and power. He understands that a single-term American president is a temporary variable in Russia’s long equation.

The West’s Convenient Amnesia

Yet, this myopia is not Trump’s alone; it is a recurring Western affliction. We sanction, moralize, and tweet, treating Russia as a petulant child to be disciplined. Russia responds by having its bombers probe NATO airspace over Poland, Estonia, and Romania—not to start a war, but to remind the alliance of its reach and its resolve. It endures these punishments like a veteran boxer who knows how to absorb a punch. From Napoleon to Hitler to NATO expansion, it has been declared finished by its adversaries, only to remain—bruised, resilient, and eternally relevant. It is not a fleeting problem to be solved but a permanent fixture to be understood. Its strategy extends into culture and information, launching its own “Intervision” song contest not merely to troll Eurovision, but to build a parallel sphere of influence, dividing the West with a catchy melody.

WDM Verdict

Donald Trump’s failure is not merely a misunderstanding of Russia, but a rejection of history itself. America is still drafting its story; Russia is on its second or third draft, each written in the blood and ink of centuries. The Kremlin will not lose sleep over a former president’s bruised ego. Russia has outlived tyrants, invaders, and ideologues far more formidable than Trump. It will assuredly outlast his indignation.

© 2025 WDM | By Ismail H. Warsame

For decades, mass deportation was a silent policy in the shadows of the Gulf—a brutal tool for managing migrant labor. Now, it has been imported, polished, and implemented with chilling efficiency by its former critics in the West.

The Great Reversal

Where glass palaces of moral authority once stood, deportation centers now rise. Western capitals that long lectured the world on human rights are perfecting a new craft: the industrial-scale expulsion of asylum seekers, often back to the very conflicts and crises they fled. The irony is historic. As Riyadh and Abu Dhabi modernize their labor laws, Washington, London, and Paris are adopting the zeal—if not the exact methods—of the Gulf’s immigration police of a bygone era.

This is more than a policy shift; it is a fundamental reversal of the West’s civilizational narrative. The nations that authored the doctrine of universal human rights are now revealing its fine print: those rights are conditional, reserved primarily for the right kind of people.

From Citizenship to Conditional Residency

The logical next step is already materializing: the redefinition of citizenship itself. Under the banners of “security” and “social cohesion,” the inviolable guarantees of passports and birthrights are being quietly rewritten. The unstated goal is a last stand against demographic change—an effort to preserve a certain image of nationhood that looks less like a diverse modern state and more like a nostalgic advertisement.

The hypocrisy is staggering. The same Western think tanks that for years advised Gulf monarchies on “integrating” their migrant populations are now watching as their governments test mass deportation as a legitimate tool of domestic policy. If hypocrisy were an Olympic sport, the medals would be awarded in gold, silver, and bronze to its founding proponents.

The Collapse of a Global Order

The long-term consequences are yet to be seen. Can the international human rights framework, already on life support, survive this betrayal by its architects? Or are we witnessing the birth of a new, grim global standard: “Rights for us, walls for you”?

The message for now is unequivocal. The West has become what it once claimed to resist. The moral high ground has been sold, its proceeds funding a sprawling network of detention camps and deportation flights. The world is watching the teacher become the student, and the lesson is one in realpolitik, devoid of principle.

Villa Somalia’s Shadow War on Puntland

By Ismail H. Warsame | © 2025 WDM

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Introduction: The New Battleground

In today’s Somalia, war is no longer fought only with militias and mortars — it is fought with money, memes, and manipulated narratives. The real front line is digital. And if our investigation is correct, Villa Somalia under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has quietly opened a new campaign — one that targets Puntland State not with tanks, but with federal cash, proxy agents, and internet propaganda designed to fragment its autonomy and capture its political future.

This is not federalism. This is a hostile takeover.

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I. The Funding Trail: Following Mogadishu’s Money

In the shadow corridors of Villa Somalia, untraceable “emergency funds” are reportedly diverted from donor-financed budgets and security allocations. These funds don’t go to rebuilding roads or schools — they allegedly bankroll proxy influence networks.

The Alleged Pipeline:

1. Federal Treasury → “Special Projects” Fund
2. NGO & Civil Society Fronts → Grants & Consultancies
3. Local Elders, Influencers, Media Owners → Social Media Campaigns

But here is the most explosive allegation: internationally donated development funds intended for Puntland’s infrastructure projects are being deliberately frozen by Mogadishu.

Road-building funds, health program disbursements, and even teacher salary support packages are said to be held back — not because Puntland failed compliance, but because Villa Somalia uses the money as leverage:

“Cooperate with Mogadishu, or watch your roads crumble.”

This is economic warfare by bureaucratic chokehold. Puntland’s citizens suffer stalled projects while Mogadishu’s loyalists boast about “holding Garowe accountable.”

When Puntland clashed with Mogadishu over E-Visa fees, the propaganda machines went into overdrive: Facebook pages accusing Puntland of “secessionism,” TikTok videos portraying Garowe as “anti-federal,” and WhatsApp rumors about imminent “federal sanctions.”

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II. The Digital Troll Army

Enter Anti-Puntland elements, the networks long accused of running psychological operations. Today, they have gone fully online. Thousands of burner accounts, Telegram channels, and paid TikTok activists flood the discourse with carefully crafted messages:

SaveSSCFromPuntland Hashtag trends just as Laascaanood erupts.

FederalismNotClanism is amplified another hashtag whenever Puntland asserts its constitutional rights.

Deni’s photo is memed into a villain whenever he resists Villa Somalia’s agenda.

This isn’t random noise — this is coordinated information warfare. It is designed to make Puntland youth question their own government’s legitimacy and to reframe Mogadishu as the only source of order.

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III. Laascaanood: The Prototype Operation

The Laascaanood crisis was not just a territorial war — it was a political laboratory.

Puntland fought, bled, and spent heavily to liberate SSC from Somaliland. Then, as soon as the dust settled, Villa Somalia swooped in with “peace conferences” and “reconciliation forums.” Within months, SSC had its own “Federal-recognized administration,” effectively cutting Puntland out of the equation.

The message was unmistakable: Puntland could fight, but Mogadishu would rule.

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IV. The Political Endgame: Building a Puppet State

The long-term objective, as this WDM investigation frames it, is chillingly clear:

1. Create a Parallel “North-East State”: Recognized by Mogadishu but not Garowe.
2. Split Puntland’s Federal Representation: Send loyalists to Mogadishu who will vote with Villa Somalia.
3. Negotiate Directly: Secure oil deals, security compacts, and donor funds bypassing Puntland’s government entirely.

If successful, Puntland becomes a geographic region with no political teeth — a federal unit in name only.

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V. The Fallout: A Federation in Name Only

If Villa Somalia continues down this path, Somalia is not heading toward a stronger federation — it is heading toward a Mogadishu-centered unitary state disguised as federalism. That is a recipe for more rebellion, not stability.

Somali politics thrives on negotiated coexistence, not digital colonization. Turning federal money into propaganda weapons — and freezing internationally donated development funds — will deepen mistrust and accelerate the cycle of fragmentation.

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Editorial Verdict: Somalia’s Digital Empire

If even half of these allegations hold water, Villa Somalia has traded nation-building for Banadir fiefdom. It is governing with hashtags instead of consensus, bots instead of ballots, and propaganda instead of partnership.

Somalia cannot survive another round of centralizing authoritarianism. The future of federalism depends on restraint, dialogue, and respect for the autonomy of member states — not on secret budgets, internet troll armies, and psychological warfare campaigns.

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WDM Calls to Action

Transparency: Donor funds must be ring-fenced and delivered to Puntland without political manipulation.

Digital Ethics: Somalia’s political actors must agree to a code of conduct against bot-driven campaigns and paid disinformation.

Constitutional Discipline: Federalism must mean partnership, not dominance.

Executive Summary

Puntland’s stability, autonomy, and relative success have made it a prime target in Somali politics. What Mogadishu could not achieve through direct confrontation, it is now pursuing through a calculated campaign to discredit Puntland’s institutions and leadership.

This campaign is not random criticism—it is organized reputational warfare. Academics provide intellectual cover, framing Puntland’s actions as violations of international norms. Influencers turn minor setbacks and tragic incidents into viral scandals. Political networks amplify these narratives until they dominate public discourse. And at the top, Villa Somalia and its Aaran Jaan operators act as strategic beneficiaries, using the resulting chaos to weaken Garowe’s negotiating power within the federal system.

The result is a deliberate erosion of Puntland’s credibility—turning security operations, judicial decisions, and local disputes into tools for delegitimization. This is no longer just politics; it is a sustained effort to fragment Puntland’s influence and force it into a weaker, more manageable position.

For Puntland, the new front line is not only in the mountains or parliament but in the information space. Narrative warfare is now the main battlefield—and losing it could mean losing much more than reputation.

The Players Behind the Campaign

1. The Legitimacy Provider – Professor Abdiwahaab & Associates
Abdiwahaab and likeminded academics supply the intellectual cover for this effort. Their papers and opinion columns provide “evidence” for claims that Puntland’s governance is failing or abusive. This is not neutral scholarship—it is political narrative building. When ordinary criticism fails to resonate, their analysis escalates into sweeping geopolitical claims, portraying Puntland as a client of foreign powers or an actor outside legitimate Somali politics.

This academic packaging gives smear campaigns an air of credibility and helps mobilize diaspora outrage under the guise of principled activism.

2. The Digital Enforcers – Hussein Jama’s Media Wing
Hussein Jama and similar online influencers serve as the amplification arm. Their goal is not to inform but to inflame. Minor bureaucratic failures are turned into national scandals; tragic but complicated incidents are framed as state-sanctioned atrocities. Their work is optimized for maximum outrage and viral spread—not for nuance, accuracy, or solutions.

This digital warfare targets Puntland’s social cohesion, exploiting fault lines such as SSC-Khaatumo and weaponizing grief from real tragedies to undermine trust in Garowe’s leadership.

3. The Political Vehicle – Damul Jadid Networks
Damul Jadid operates as the political distributor of the narrative. Its loose networks “curate” stories, circulate claims through social media and political forums, and give the appearance of broad consensus. When challenged, they can deny coordination, claiming to be independent voices merely “raising concerns.”

Their true function is to ensure every story damaging Puntland gains visibility and traction.

4. The Strategic Beneficiary – Villa Somalia and Aaran Jaan
At the top sits Villa Somalia, under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, with Aaran Jaan serving as the operational hub. The first-term approach—direct confrontation with Puntland—failed. The new approach is indirect: deploy federal resources, sympathetic intellectuals, online activists, and diaspora networks to gradually weaken Puntland’s credibility and bargaining position.

This is not a random smear campaign. It is a deliberate strategy to fragment Puntland’s influence and create a political environment where Garowe can be bypassed or subdued in national decision-making.

The Methods: A Playbook of Reputational Warfare

Isolate and Extrapolate: Turn one official’s misconduct into evidence of systemic rot.

Bury Achievements, Amplify Failures: Successes disappear into footnotes, failures dominate headlines and hashtags.

Emotional Weaponization: Complex issues like counter-terrorism justice are reduced to slogans—“They execute children”—designed to provoke outrage.

Targeted Narrative Delivery: Content is micro-targeted to specific clans, diaspora communities, and political blocs to ensure maximum polarization.

Case Study: Judicial Warfare

When Puntland’s military courts tried insurgents accused of atrocities—some as minors—the legal and moral complexity was stripped away.

Academics produced papers denouncing “violations of international norms.”

Influencers paired these quotes with dramatic video clips and grieving families.

Diaspora networks translated and circulated the content until it dominated discussion.

Federal officials then demanded “greater oversight” of Puntland courts, framing Garowe as reckless and unaccountable.

The result: Puntland’s security institutions were weakened in perception, precisely when they were most active against insurgents.

Case Study: Exploiting SSC-Khaatumo

The assassination of a Warsengeli elder in Sanaag became a propaganda gift.

Narrative framing painted Puntland as the aggressor, erasing the complexity of the conflict.

Media packages turned tragedy into proof of Garowe’s alleged “expansionism.”

Targeted dissemination ensured the most incendiary messaging reached the most affected communities.

Instead of fostering reconciliation, the campaign inflamed divisions—keeping Puntland politically preoccupied and unable to consolidate gains.

Conclusion: A Calculated Campaign, Not a Conspiracy

This is not the work of a lone agitator. It is a coordinated ecosystem of academics, influencers, political networks, and federal operators pursuing a single strategic goal: erode Puntland’s standing until it can no longer act as a counterweight to central authority.

What is happening to Puntland is not constructive criticism, and it is not a debate about governance. It is a reputational war—outsourced, deniable, and relentless.

For Puntland, the challenge is no longer just military or financial. It is a narrative. The state must defend not only its borders, but its story. Because in this new battlespace, perception is power—and right now, that power is being systematically stripped away.

Subject: The Right to Return is Not For Sale: A Call to Abolish the E-Visa for Somali Citizens

Excellencies,

We write to you today not as foreigners, but as your sons and daughters. We are the doctors, engineers, students, truck drivers, and entrepreneurs who were scattered to the winds by the storm of civil war. We are the ones who have kept the heart of Somalia beating from afar, through decades of relentless hardship.

Our remittances have been the bedrock of the nation’s survival, providing a lifeline for millions of our relatives and funding the very foundations of recovery. Our investments are rebuilding our cities, our skills are desperately needed, and our love for our homeland is unwavering.

Yet, we are now met with a profound and painful betrayal: the Somali E-Visa system.

This policy places a digital tollbooth at the border of our own country. It demands a ransom for a right that is inherent, sacred, and guaranteed by the Provisional Federal Constitution of Somalia—the right of every Somali citizen to return to their homeland.

To us, this is not modernization; it is monetization of our citizenship. It is a message that our value is measured in foreign currency, not in our shared blood, our sacrifices, or our enduring hope for Somalia.

Therefore, we, the undersigned members of the global Somali diaspora, state our unequivocal opposition to the E-Visa requirement for Somali citizens and dual nationals. We declare that the right to return is fundamental and must not be taxed.

We demand the following:

1. Immediate Suspension: The immediate and unconditional suspension of the E-Visa mandate for all Somali passport holders and dual nationals.
2. Constitutional Review: A full, transparent, and public review by independent Courts to affirm that this policy does not violate our fundamental rights as citizens.
3. Inclusive Dialogue: The formation of a committee with genuine representation from the diaspora and Federal Member States to design a dignified and modern entry system that facilitates—rather than penalizes—the return of Somalis.

The diaspora is not a resource to be extracted from; we are partners to be embraced. This policy risks alienating the very people who possess the resources, skills, and passion to lead Somalia into a prosperous future.

Do not extinguish our hope. Do not lock the door to those who helped build the house.

We await your immediate action.

Respectfully,

The Somali Diaspora

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This open letter is endorsed by: Somali Diaspora Associations Across Europe, North America, and the Gulf, The Somali Economic Forum, The Somali Youth Development Network, and the countless individual sons and daughters of Somalia who demand the right to return home with dignity.

A New Capital for a New Somalia: Relocating the Seat of Government to Forge a Unified Future

By Ismail H. Warsame Copyright © 2025 WDM

Executive Summary

For over three decades, Mogadishu has functioned less as a national capital and more as a contested prize. The city’s entrenched clan-based power structures, severe security challenges, and symbolic association with conflict undermine its ability to serve as a neutral and unifying seat of federal power. This brief argues that relocating Somalia’s capital is not merely an infrastructural project, but a fundamental prerequisite for lasting state-building and federal cohesion.

Drawing on successful precedents from Nigeria (Abuja), Tanzania (Dodoma), and Kazakhstan (Astana), this paper outlines a feasible strategy for establishing a purpose-built Federal Capital Territory (FCT). A new, centrally located capital would be politically neutral, secure, and symbolically owned by all Somali people. It would catalyze economic development, strengthen federal institutions, and demonstrate a decisive break from the divisive politics of the past.

1.0 Problem Statement: The Case Against Mogadishu

Mogadishu’s role as the capital is a legacy of a pre-civil war state and is fundamentally incompatible with the goals of a modern, federal Somalia.

· 1.1 Political Capture & Exclusion: The perception of clan hegemony over key institutions and territories in Mogadishu fosters deep-seated alienation among other Somali communities. This reality undermines the legitimacy of the federal government and perpetuates a cycle of political exclusion and instability.
· 1.2 Security as a Barrier to Governance: The fact that the government operates from fortified compounds, reliant on international security forces, is not a sustainable model. This environment stifles free political engagement, public access to institutions, and the normalization of civic life.
· 1.3 Symbolic Failure: A national capital should be a symbol of unity and pride. Instead, Mogadishu evokes fear, resentment, and trauma for many Somalis, acting as a constant reminder of division rather than a beacon of collective national identity.

2.0 International Precedents: Strategic Capital Relocation

History offers clear blueprints for successfully relocating a capital to overcome internal divisions and strategic vulnerabilities.

· Nigeria (Abuja): Relocated from Lagos to a geographically and ethnically neutral central zone to promote national unity and decentralize economic power.
· Tanzania (Dodoma): Moved the political capital from Dar es Salaam to integrate the interior and solidify national cohesion.
· Kazakhstan (Astana): moved the capital northward to secure its territory, rebalance demographic pressures, and stimulate economic development in a remote region.

These examples demonstrate that with political will and careful planning, building a new capital is a viable nation-building strategy.

3.0 Policy Proposal: A Framework for a New Federal Capital Territory (FCT)

This proposal outlines a phased, pragmatic approach to establishing a new capital.

· 3.1 Location Criteria:
  · Political Neutrality: A central location, e.g.,  with access to multiple tribes (clans) like Mudugh- land without exclusive historical clan ownership claims.
  · Security & Strategic Value: Inland to mitigate external threats, yet proximate to major transportation and economic corridors.
  · Land Availability: Ample, sparsely populated territory that can be acquired transparently by a national land commission for public use.
· 3.2 Constitutional and Legal Framework:
  · Enact a constitutional amendment designating the new city as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), with a special administrative status.
  · Establish an independent Federal Capital Authority (FCA) tasked with planning, governance, and management of the FCT.
· 3.3 Urban Planning and Infrastructure:
  · Develop a master plan for core government functions (Parliament, Presidency, Supreme Court, foreign embassies).
  · Prioritize modern, sustainable infrastructure: renewable energy, digital connectivity, and integrated public transit.
  · Plan for residential zones, public services, and commercial districts to create a livable city from the outset.
· 3.4 Phased Implementation Roadmap:
  · Phase 1 (Years 0-2): Political consensus building, constitutional amendment, site selection, and establishment of the FCA.
  · Phase 2 (Years 2-5): Initial infrastructure development (roads, power, water) and construction of essential government buildings.
  · Phase 3 (Years 5-10+): Gradual relocation of federal ministries, agencies, and the diplomatic community.

4.0 Expected Benefits

· Political: Establishes a neutral ground for federal politics, free from the influence of localized militias. Strengthens the legitimacy of the federal project for all member states.
· Economic: Creates massive employment in construction and services. Attracts diaspora investment into new real estate and technology sectors. Redistributes national wealth and ends Mogadishu-centric development.
· Security & Diplomacy: Provides a secure environment for government operations and encourages the international community to engage directly with Somali institutions in a stable setting.

5.0 Conclusion and Recommendation

Maintaining Mogadishu as the capital is an act of convenience that perpetuates Somalia’s deepest dysfunctions. The bold but necessary step of relocating the seat of government is an investment in Somalia’s future—a definitive statement that the nation is moving beyond the conflicts of the past.

Mogadishu will rightly remain Somalia’s primary commercial and cultural hub. However, its tenure as the political center must end. We recommend that the Federal Government of Somalia immediately initiate a national dialogue and commit to a feasibility study for this critical nation-building endeavor.

By Ismail H. Warsame © 2025 WDM

Introduction: The Permanent Condition

Conventional political science often treats polarization as a systemic anomaly—a pathology to be cured through dialogue and institutional reform. This perspective is not just optimistic; it is fundamentally misguided. In tribal societies, polarization is not a bug but the operating system. It is the essential logic of the political order, dictating the allocation of power, resources, and security. Nations like Somalia, Yemen, and Afghanistan are not mere examples of state failure; they are archetypes of societies where polarization is the default state, where trust is a finite commodity reserved for kin, and where compromise is perceived as capitulation.

As Lidwien Kapteijns argues in her study of Somalia’s collapse, the civil war was a moment when “moral worlds collapsed,” forcing kinship to become the ultimate arbiter of security and identity (Kapteijns 2013). This is more than historical analysis; it is a predictive framework. When modern state institutions evaporate, human allegiances retract to the oldest and most resilient bonds: those of blood and tribe. The ballot box is a modern convenience; the clan is a permanent reality.

Somalia: The Institutionalization of Division

Somalia’s post-1991 implosion offers a masterclass in polarization’s endgame. Clan-based militias partitioned Mogadishu into sovereign enclaves, converting government ministries into ethnic fortresses and state arsenals into private armories. The ensuing “peace conferences” were less exercises in reconciliation than they were tense negotiations to codify a new clan-based balance of power. The resulting “4.5 Formula”—which allocates political power among four major clans and a coalition of minor ones—is not a tool for unity but the constitutional sanctification of tribal polarization (Menkhaus 2006). It is a system designed to manage perpetual distrust, not to overcome it.

Consequently, the Somali “state” exists as a fragile truce between armed kinship networks. What is called peace is merely the interval between violent contests for resources and dominance.

Yemen: The Vengeance Cycle

Yemen’s conflict, while often framed in sectarian terms, operates on a deeply tribal logic. The war between Houthis and their adversaries is a feedback loop of honor and vengeance, where each drone strike and battlefield loss is registered as a blood debt demanding repayment. The much-lauded National Dialogue Conference, intended to forge a pluralistic democracy, instead served as a catalyst, hardening factional identities and crystallizing polarization into full-scale civil war (Juneau 2016). The process of inclusion, ironically, exposed the irreconcilable fractures it sought to mend.

The West: Manufacturing Tribal Instincts

If tribal societies generate polarization organically, Western nations are now engineering it through demographic and cultural shifts. Driven by economic demand for labor, mass immigration has rapidly created multicultural societies that test the limits of social cohesion. In response, aging native majorities, anxious about cultural displacement and demographic decline, have embraced backlash politics—from Brexit and MAGA to the rise of the AfD in Germany and the National Rally in France.

The complacent assumption that Western democracies are “consolidated” and immune to collapse has proven false. Trust between the cosmopolitan elite and the nationalist populace has eroded to dangerous, Weimar Republic-like levels (Norris and Inglehart 2019). The January 6th insurrection was not an aberration but a prologue: a glimpse of a future where political violence escalates into organized militia activity and secessionist rhetoric, culminating in scenarios once confined to the academic study of civil wars (Walter 2022).

The Future: When the Center Is a Fiction

Western polarization may not be genealogically tribal, but it is psychologically tribal. “Blue” and “Red” factions increasingly inhabit separate informational universes, adhere to contradictory mythologies, and view each other as existential threats. As Barbara Walter’s research confirms, when political groups begin to see their rivals as enemies deserving of neutralization, and when demographic change alters the balance of power, the risk of internal conflict intensifies dramatically (Walter 2022).

The supreme irony is that the analytical models developed for Mogadishu and Sana’a may soon be applied to Minneapolis and Marseille. The scholars who once observed tribal polarization from a distance may find it unfolding in their own communities.

Conclusion: A Satirical Prophecy

Satire converges with prophecy when reality outstrips imagination. The West, having spent decades lecturing failed states on governance, may find itself taking lessons from them. Somalia’s “4.5 Formula” could foreshadow an American “2.5 Formula”—a precarious power-sharing agreement between two irreconcilable nations sharing one geographic space, perpetually on the verge of dissolution over a Supreme Court decision or a contested election.

The future of global politics may not be a unified village but a world of interconnected tribal quarrels, armed with ancient grievances and modern weapons.

References

Kapteijns, Lidwien. Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.

Menkhaus, Ken. “Governance without Government in Somalia.” International Security 31, no. 3 (2006): 74–106.

Juneau, Thomas. “Explaining Yemen’s Civil War: The Role of Grievances, Identity, and External Actors.” Middle East Policy 23, no. 4 (2016): 54–69.

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Walter, Barbara F. How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them. New York: Crown, 2022.

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This paper is based on my recent readings and observations. Ismail H Warsame.

By Ismail H. Warsame ©2025 Warsame Digital Media (WDM)

MOGADISHU, GAROWE, HARGESIA – A new, digital tollgate has been erected at Somalia’s airports. Its target? Not foreign visitors, but the nation’s own sons and daughters. The Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) E-Visa system, implemented in Mogadishu, to be adopted in Garowe (Puntland), and mirrored in Hargeisa (Somaliland), is not a tool of modernization. It is a brazen act of constitutional betrayal and state-sanctioned extortion against the Somali diaspora.

The Unconstitutional Toll

The scheme is a direct assault on Somali citizenship. Article 8 of the Provisional Federal Constitution is unequivocal: every person of Somali origin has an inalienable right to citizenship. This right is not contingent on the passport one holds. Dual citizenship is explicitly protected.

Yet, the FGS, along with regional administrations, has chosen to monetize this birthright. By charging Somali citizens—often those holding foreign travel documents—a $60 fee for an “E-Visa” to enter their own homeland, these governments are not processing immigration; they are running a protection racket. The dystopian reality is that Somalis must now pay for the privilege of being Somali. This is not policy; it is piracy, a chilling echo of the warlord checkpoints of the past, now digitized and bureaucratized.

From Remittance Lifeline to Government ATM

The irony is devastating. The very diaspora being shaken down is the same group that sustains the Somali economy with over $2 billion in annual remittances—the nation’s most vital financial lifeline. These funds support families, build communities, and fuel small businesses. This policy punishes the backbone of the nation’s survival, transforming returning family members into revenue streams. It is a profound insult and a catastrophic failure of moral governance.

A Kleptocratic System, Not a Digital One

Sold under the guise of “security” and “digital transformation,” the E-Visa program raises alarming questions:

· Where does the money go? The revenue stream is opaque, lacking public accountability or oversight, making it a perfect vehicle for graft.
· Who controls the data? The biometric and financial information of Somali citizens is being harvested and stored by third-party contractors abroad, far from the oversight of the Somali Immigration and Naturalization Agency. This constitutes a severe national security and privacy risk.

Somalia has effectively outsourced its sovereignty and turned its borders into a privatized, for-profit enterprise.

WDM’s Final Call: This Must End

This practice is a fundamental breach of the social contract. Governments are meant to protect citizens, not prey upon them.

The message from Warsame Digital Media is clear: This unconstitutional extortion must cease immediately.

The administrations in Mogadishu, Garowe, and Hargeisa are playing with fire. The diaspora will not tolerate being treated as foreigners in their own land. The political backlash for funding their own humiliation will be severe and deserved.

Repeal this illegal fee. Respect the Constitution. Honor your citizens.

By WDM Editorial Board

On September 1, 2025, Somalia launched its new E-Visa portal, evisa.gov.so, heralded by authorities in Mogadishu as a leap into modernity—a triumph of efficiency, transparency, and security. Yet, beneath this veneer of techno-optimism lies a troubling reality: the platform risks exacerbating the nation’s political fractures, creating logistical chaos for travelers, and exposing sensitive data to unprecedented risk.

1. A Centralized Power Grab, Disguised as Innovation

This E-Visa system is more than an administrative upgrade; it is a profound assertion of federal authority over one of the most contentious aspects of Somali sovereignty: border control. The declaration by Puntland that the system is “illegal” on its territory, and Somaliland’s outright rejection of it, reveals a fatal flaw. A federally issued E-Visa may be nothing more than a worthless piece of paper at airports in Bosaso or Hargeisa, potentially leaving travelers stranded, forced to pay regional fees upon arrival, or denied entry entirely.

Mogadishu frames this as “integration,” but regional governments perceive it as a brazen attempt to hijack revenue and control. The gates of an airport are a powerful symbol of sovereignty, and the E-Visa has effectively weaponized them, opening a new digital front in Somalia’s ongoing federal conflicts.

2. A Recipe for Traveler Confusion and Exploitation

For the diaspora and international visitors, the system promises not convenience, but a labyrinth of uncertainty:

· Airlines as Unwilling Enforcers: With carriers mandated to check for the E-Visa before boarding, they become de facto federal immigration agents, complicating travel before it even begins.
· The Threat of Double Taxation: Travelers face the real prospect of paying online for a federal visa, only to be charged again at a regional immigration counter that does not recognize Mogadishu’s authority.
· Bureaucracy Over Urgency: For those responding to family emergencies, attending weddings, or conducting time-sensitive business, this added layer of digital red tape transforms travel into a stressful gamble.

The intended welcome mat has become a tangled and unwelcoming maze.

3. The Glaring Data Privacy Scandal

The most alarming question remains unanswered: who controls the data? Reports indicate that highly sensitive information—including biometrics, passport scans, and personal travel histories—is being processed and stored by servers outside the direct control of Somalia’s Immigration and Naturalization Agency (INIS).

In a nation with underdeveloped cyber laws, pervasive corruption, and weak state institutions, this outsourcing constitutes a severe national security threat. Where are the guarantees that this data is protected from hackers, third-party contractors, or malicious actors? Data privacy is not a luxury; in this context, it is a fundamental right and a critical vulnerability.

4. Ambiguity Breeds Corruption

The current landscape—a patchwork of regional compliance, inconsistent enforcement, and opaque rules—creates a perfect ecosystem for corruption. When the system lacks clarity and trust, power flows to those at the checkpoints. Travelers are left at the mercy of immigration officials and airline agents, where the “right” bribe can suddenly make problems disappear.

5. Modernization Requires Consensus, Not Just Code

True progress is measured not by the adoption of technology, but by the strength of the governance behind it. Imposing a centralized digital system without the genuine buy-in of federal member states is a reckless political experiment. It risks further alienating Puntland and Somaliland, pushing them toward deeper autonomy and undermining the very national cohesion the system claims to promote. This is modernization as political theater, with the Somali people and visitors as its unwitting actors.

Conclusion: From Digital Fence to Functional Gateway

To fulfill its promise, Somalia’s E-Visa must evolve from a point of contention into a tool for unity. This requires immediate and transparent action:

· Reclaim Data Sovereignty: INIS must be the unequivocal owner and manager of all visa data. Processing must be brought under transparent, Somali-controlled governance, with all third-party contracts subject to public scrutiny.
· Prioritize Federal Negotiation: The system cannot be dictated from Mogadishu. It requires a negotiated agreement with Puntland, Jubaland, and other regions on revenue sharing, operational control, and legal recognition.
· Enact Robust Privacy safeguards: The government must publicly detail its data protection protocols, storage locations, and access rules to build trust and ensure security.

Without these fundamental changes, the E-Visa will remain what it appears to be today: not a bridge to a more connected Somalia, but a digital fence, equipped with a toll booth and guarded by discord.

By Ismail H. Warsame – Warsame Digital Media (WDM) ©2025 WDM

Introduction

A persistent and pernicious myth dominates discussions of Somali governance: that the country’s federal structure was a foreign imposition, orchestrated primarily by Ethiopia. This narrative, perpetuated by domestic centralists, foreign analysts, and even some academics, is not only historically inaccurate but also politically corrosive. It strips Somalis of their agency in shaping their own political future. While Ethiopia provided crucial logistical support for peace conferences, the intellectual and political origins of Somali federalism are profoundly indigenous. They emerged from the ashes of state collapse, were forged in the crucible of armed resistance, and were articulated through the Somali “building-block” approach to state reconstruction. This article corrects the historical record, arguing that federalism was a Somali-designed solution to Somali-created problems, with Ethiopia playing a limited, facilitative role.

Historical Background: From Authoritarian Collapse to Decentralized Resistance

The pivotal turning point for modern Somalia was the Ogaden War (1977-78). The defeat of Siad Barre’s regime shattered its pan-Somali nationalist legitimacy and triggered a brutal crackdown on perceived dissent, particularly against the Majeerteen, Isaaq, and Hawiye clans. It was in this oppressive environment that the first organized resistance movement, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), was formed.

The SSDF was more than a militia; it was a political project. Its leadership articulated an early vision for a pluralistic, decentralized Somalia—a direct response to the centralized dictatorship in Mogadishu. They advocated for a constitutional order that would prevent the re-emergence of tyranny by empowering local governance. This ideology laid the foundational intellectual groundwork for what would later evolve into the federal model.

The 1991 Collapse and the Sociological Roots of Federalism

The fall of Mogadishu in 1991 did not merely represent a change of government; it was the utter disintegration of the state. The capital descended into clan-based mob rule, characterized by widespread looting, mass killings, and targeted campaigns of persecution. As scholar Lidwien Kapteijns meticulously documents, this period was one of “clan cleansing,” a systematic effort to remove specific clans from power and territory.¹

This catastrophe triggered a massive reverse migration, as hundreds of thousands fled to their ancestral homelands. This desperate movement created the sociological substrate for federalism. In regions like Puntland, Somaliland, and later Jubaland and others, communities began rebuilding from the ground up—establishing local security, judiciary, and economic structures. Out of this necessity, Somali intellectuals and traditional elders formalized the “building-block” approach: the concept that stable, legitimate local administrations (the building blocks) must be established first, and would later coalesce into a voluntary federal union.

Ethiopia’s Role: Facilitator, Not Architect

Ethiopia’s involvement is often misrepresented as that of an architect. In reality, its role was that of a facilitator. Following the collapse, Addis Ababa provided irreplaceable logistical support that enabled Somali-led dialogue. This included:

· Providing neutral venues (e.g., the Sodere conference in 1997) for Somali factions who could not meet safely inside Somalia.
· Coordinating international observers from the AU, IGAD, and the UN to lend legitimacy to the talks.
· Offering critical logistical support, including security and transportation for delegates.

Crucially, Ethiopia did not impose the federal model. The core tenets of the system—including the contentious 4.5 power-sharing formula—were painful compromises hammered out in protracted negotiations among Somalis. Ethiopia’s interest was in stabilizing its neighbor, not designing its constitution.

The Political Utility of a Misleading Narrative

The myth of Ethiopian authorship persists because it is politically useful. For centralists in Mogadishu, it serves to delegitimize federal member states, painting them as foreign puppets rather than legitimate expressions of local autonomy. For populist nationalists, it provides a convenient scapegoat, channeling legitimate grievances into simplistic anti-Ethiopian rhetoric. This narrative deliberately obscures the Somali agency that was evident from the SSDF’s early advocacy to the grassroots rebuilding efforts in the regions.

Conclusion

Somalia’s federal model was not born in a conference room in Addis Ababa; it was forged in the trauma of the 1991 collapse and painstakingly built over decades by communities seeking security and self-determination. To misattribute its origins to Ethiopia is to engage in a dangerous historical revisionism that undermines the very legitimacy of the federal project and perpetuates distrust between the center and the states. A sustainable political future for Somalia requires an honest reckoning with its past. Recognizing that federalism is a homegrown response to historical failure is the essential first step toward building a functional and consensual union.

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References

1. Kapteijns, Lidwien. Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
2. Menkhaus, Ken. “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping.” International Security 31, no. 3 (2006): 74–106.
3. Samatar, Said S. Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil. Minority Rights Group, 1994.
4. Mubarak, Jamil. “The ‘Hidden Hand’ Behind the Resilience of the Stateless Economy of Somalia.” World Development 25, no. 12 (1997): 2027–2041.
5. Bradbury, Mark. Becoming Somaliland. Progressio, 2008.
6. Clapham, Christopher. “War and State Formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea.” In The African State at a Critical Juncture, edited by L. Villalón and P. Huxtable. Lynne Rienner, 1998.

Publisher: Warsame Digital Media (WDM) September 2025 © 2025 WDM – All Rights Reserved

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Copyright Page

This white paper is published by Warsame Digital Media (WDM). The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any affiliated institutions. Unauthorized reproduction or distribution is prohibited. For queries, please contact: ismailwarsame@gmail.com; Tel/WhatsApp: +252 90 703 4081.

Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction: A Dispute of Principle, Not Just Revenue
3. Constitutional Jurisdiction and the Ambiguities of Federalism
4. The FGS Revenue-Sharing Proposal: A Rejected Offer
5. Puntland’s Position: Sovereignty and the Precedent of Overreach
6. Analysis: Governance Deficits and the Failure of Cooperative Federalism
7. Implications: Economic Costs and Political Risks
8. Policy Recommendations: A Pathway to Resolution
9. Conclusion: A Critical Juncture for Somali Federalism

1. Executive Summary

The launch of the Somali E-VISA system by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has ignited a significant constitutional and political dispute with Puntland State. This paper argues that the core of the conflict extends beyond superficial accusations of corruption to a fundamental breakdown in Somalia’s federal model. It is a crisis of constitutional interpretation, fiscal federalism, and intergovernmental cooperation.

While the FGS holds clear constitutional authority over immigration, its proposal of an 18/42 revenue split—offering Puntland the majority share ($42 of every $60 fee)—was rejected. Puntland’s refusal stems from concerns over federal overreach and the erosion of its fiscal autonomy, not the specific financial terms. With monthly revenues from Puntland airports exceeding $200,000, this impasse has become a major flashpoint.

This paper analyzes the legal underpinnings of the dispute, the governance failures it exposes, and its grave economic and political consequences. It concludes with concrete policy recommendations to resolve the immediate crisis and establish durable mechanisms for cooperative federalism in Somalia. Failure to do so risks deepening fragmentation, undermining public trust, and stifling economic recovery.

2. Introduction: A Dispute of Principle, Not Just Revenue

In Somalia’s nascent federal architecture, disputes over resource allocation and jurisdictional boundaries are inevitable. The E-VISA conflict, however, represents a critical test of the system’s viability. Public discourse has often simplified the issue, but this paper contends that the standoff between Mogadishu and Garowe is primarily a conflict of principle. It is a manifestation of unresolved tensions inherent in Somalia’s Provisional Constitution, pitting federal authority against state rights and highlighting the absence of a trusted framework for sharing power—and revenue.

3. Constitutional Jurisdiction and the Ambiguities of Federalism

The Provisional Constitution (2012) explicitly grants the Federal Government exclusive jurisdiction over four key areas:

1. Foreign Affairs
2. National Defense
3. Citizenship and Immigration
4. Monetary Policy

Visa issuance is unequivocally a function of foreign affairs and immigration, placing the E-VISA system within the FGS’s constitutional mandate. However, the constitution is silent on the practical implementation of these exclusive powers, particularly when their exercise generates revenue within a federal state’s territory and relies on its infrastructure (e.g., airports) and administrative support (e.g., border control).

Puntland’s argument is not a direct denial of federal authority but a demand for a cooperative implementation model that recognizes its operational role and fiscal rights.

4. The FGS Revenue-Sharing Proposal: A Rejected Offer

In an attempt to address these concerns, the FGS presented a revenue-sharing proposal. According to Puntland finance sources, the terms were:

· Fee: $60 per E-VISA
· Proposed Split: $42 to Puntland, $18 retained by FGS
· Estimated Revenue: >$200,000/month from Puntland airports

This arrangement would have transferred an estimated $2.4 million annually to Puntland’s treasury, representing a significant potential investment in local infrastructure and services. The rejection of this ostensibly favorable financial deal underscores that the dispute is fundamentally about governance and sovereignty, not mere revenue.

5. Puntland’s Position: Sovereignty and the Precedent of Overreach

Puntland’s refusal of the 18/42 split is rooted in three core concerns:

1. Unilateral Federal Action: Puntland contends that the FGS overstepped by implementing a revenue-collection system at Puntland airports without prior agreement on a jointly administered mechanism.
2. Dangerous Precedent: Accepting a share of federally collected revenue, even a majority one, is viewed as legitimizing federal encroachment into state jurisdiction and setting a precedent that could be applied to other areas like natural resources or port revenues.
3. Political Leverage: There is a deep-seated fear that control over the revenue stream provides the FGS with a political tool to pressure or punish federal states, thereby eroding their hard-won autonomy.

6. Analysis: Governance Deficits and the Failure of Cooperative Federalism

This dispute reveals systemic weaknesses in Somalia’s governance structure:

· Absence of a Fiscal Federalism Framework: There is no legal framework to define revenue sources, sharing formulas, and responsibilities for jointly administered functions.
· Institutional Vacuum: No standing, empowered intergovernmental body exists to mediate such disputes, forcing ad-hoc negotiations that are vulnerable to political volatility.
· Profound Trust Deficit: A history of centralized rule and unmet agreements fuels a zero-sum mentality, where cooperation is perceived as concession.

7. Implications: Economic Costs and Political Risks

7.1 Economic Impact

· Lost Revenue: Puntland forgoes a stable revenue stream critical for local service delivery.
· Double Taxation: Travelers are now subject to both the federal E-VISA fee and a separate Puntland visa fee, increasing costs and creating bureaucratic redundancy.
· Investment Deterrence: The uncertainty and added expense undermine confidence among the diaspora and international investors, hindering economic recovery.

7.2 Political Fallout

· Escalating Tensions: The dispute exacerbates existing conflicts over security, elections, and resource management.
· Erosion of Legitimacy: The public perceives both governments as engaged in counterproductive turf wars, undermining their legitimacy.
· Fragmentation Risk: Prolonged impasse could lead Puntland to establish parallel systems, fracturing national policy and weakening integration.

8. Policy Recommendations: A Pathway to Resolution

To resolve this dispute and fortify Somali federalism, we recommend:

1. Immediate Establishment of a Joint Technical Committee: Composed of technical experts from the FGS Ministry of Finance and Puntland’s Treasury, this committee should work to implement a temporary revenue-sharing agreement with full transparency.
2. Enact a National Fiscal Federalism Law: A priority for the federal parliament should be to legislate a clear framework for revenue-sharing from all federal competencies exercised within state territories, including visas, ports, and natural resources.
3. Formalize a Federal-State Council: Create a constitutionally-mandated intergovernmental council with the authority to negotiate and bindingly resolve disputes, moving beyond ad-hoc political dialogues.
4. Implement Transparent Reporting: Both governments should commit to publishing audited monthly reports on E-VISA revenue collection and distribution to build public trust and eliminate speculation.
5. Leverage International Technical Assistance: Engage neutral international partners (e.g., World Bank, IMF) to provide technical models for revenue-sharing and facilitate mediation, ensuring the solution is perceived as fair and evidence-based.

9. Conclusion: A Critical Juncture for Somali Federalism

The E-VISA dispute is a microcosm of the broader challenges facing Somalia’s federal project. It is a stress test that neither level of government can afford to fail. Resolving it requires moving beyond a winner-takes-all approach to embrace a philosophy of cooperative federalism. The choice is between forging a collaborative path that strengthens the union or descending into further fragmentation. The establishment of transparent, predictable, and legally sound mechanisms for sharing power and revenue is not just a solution to this crisis—it is the essential foundation for a stable and prosperous Somalia.

By Ismail H. Warsame

Puntland’s leaders have perfected the art of political sloganeering. For years, they’ve reminded Mogadishu that the Federal Government has only four constitutionally mandated jurisdictions: foreign policy, national defense, national treasury (currency and finance), and citizenship/passport control. Everything else, they say, belongs to the States. It sounds principled — a rallying cry for federalism and constitutionalism.

But slogans are not strategy.

The latest E-Visa debacle proves that Puntland’s political class has mistaken stubborn posturing for visionary statecraft. By refusing to recognize the Federal Government’s electronic visa system — reportedly rejecting a fee-sharing proposal — Puntland has managed to create a situation where ordinary residents are now paying double: once to Mogadishu, once to Garowe.

When Federalism Becomes a Tollbooth

Let’s be clear: a national passport and its supporting visa system fall squarely under foreign affairs — one of the very four areas Puntland itself concedes to Mogadishu’s jurisdiction. By resisting the federal E-Visa, Puntland is not “defending federalism”; it is building a second tollbooth at the airport gate, extracting revenue from its own citizens and diaspora visitors.

The losers in this political tug-of-war are not Mogadishu bureaucrats — they are ordinary Puntlanders, businesspeople, students, and diaspora families forced to pay extra for what should be a streamlined, single process.

Visionless Politics, Costly Consequences

What we are witnessing is not simply a bureaucratic mishap — it is the cumulative effect of bad decision-making and lack of vision by Puntland’s current administration. Instead of negotiating a fair revenue-sharing formula or developing a long-term federal-state harmonization strategy, Garowe has opted for confrontation and quick cash grabs.

And the damage does not stop there. Some Puntland ministers (Finance, as example) have alienated not only the Federal Government but also international partners whose cooperation is critical for Puntland’s development:

Broken Trust with Donors: Key international donors have quietly reduced their direct funding to Puntland after repeated policy U-turns and accusations of financial opacity.

Suspicion from Global Financial Institutions: The World Bank and IMF have voiced concern over Puntland’s lack of cooperation and its reluctance to integrate with national fiscal reforms — jeopardizing Puntland’s access to future development programs. President Said Abdullahi Deni was either kept in the dark or an accomplice in his ministers’ administrative misconduct to harm Puntland State policy and economy. Some of those ministers still remain close advisers of the President.

Diplomatic Missteps: Garowe’s confrontational approach has frustrated UN agencies and international NGOs, resulting in delays in infrastructure projects and humanitarian aid delivery.

Investor Flight: Several foreign investors have paused or cancelled projects in Bosaso and Garowe due to mixed signals from Puntland’s ministries, who at times contradict each other on taxation and legal guarantees.

This is the same short-termism that has cost Puntland its influence in SSC-Khaatumo, its credibility in democratization efforts, and its leverage over the federal government. At this rate, Puntland risks becoming a provincial fiefdom that survives by taxing everything that moves — while forfeiting its role as the intellectual and political engine of Somali federalism.

The Bigger Picture: Puntland’s Shrinking Strategic Depth

An administration that cannot think beyond next quarter’s tax revenue cannot lead a federalism project that was once the pride of Somalia. The E-Visa fiasco is a warning sign: Puntland’s political elite are content to fight Mogadishu over scraps while failing to articulate a coherent long-term vision of governance, economic development, and constitutional order.

Unless Puntland reverses course, harmonizes its systems with the Federal Government where constitutionally mandated, and rebuilds trust with international partners, it risks alienating its own population, isolating itself diplomatically, and losing its claim as the pioneer of Somali federalism.

WDM Verdict

This is more than an airport nuisance — it is a political failure with a price tag. Puntland’s residents deserve better than double taxation wrapped in the flag of federalism. True federalism requires cooperation, not endless confrontation; vision, not reaction; institution-building, not rent-seeking.

Puntland’s founding fathers imagined a state that would lead Somalia into constitutional order — not one that would charge its own citizens twice just to come home, while simultaneously alienating the very donors and partners who could have financed a brighter future.

By Ismail H. Warsame

GAROWE – In Puntland, the dream of democracy is not dead; it has been taken hostage. The ransom is the presidential ambition of one man: Said Abdullahi Deni. His grand promise of “one person, one vote”—a reform pledged to transform this federal state into Somalia’s democratic vanguard—has evaporated like a mirage, leaving behind the familiar, cracked earth of clan-based selection politics.

The international community applauded. Donors opened their coffers. Puntland’s intellectuals and youth dared to hope. For a fleeting moment, it seemed the region would make history, becoming the first in Somalia since 1969 to elect its leaders by direct public suffrage. The machinery was set in motion: voter registration drives, civic education campaigns, and a timeline that pointed toward a transformative election.

Then came the siren call of Villa Somalia.

The Calculated Betrayal

In 2022, instead of shepherding Puntland’s fragile democratic experiment to maturity, President Deni pivoted. State resources, political capital, and the goodwill of his constituents were mobilized not for local elections, but for a lavish, high-stakes campaign in Mogadishu. He arrived with a coterie of lobbyists and a portfolio of political IOUs, chasing the federal presidency.

The result was a foregone conclusion: a resounding defeat. The cost, however, was borne not by Deni alone, but by all of Puntland. The democratization process was shelved indefinitely. The political capital was squandered. The state was left more polarized and disillusioned than before his gambit. Get me right. There is nothing wrong for Puntland State producing able and competent national candidates, however, we are sick and  tired of using Puntland resources for personal political ambitions.

Déjà Vu: The 2026 Re-Run

Now, in 2025, the promises have returned. The rhetoric of elections is being dusted off. But the calculus remains just as cynical. Deni’s new currency for his second bid is not reform, but militarism. The ongoing offensive against ISIS militants in the Cal Miskaad mountains is being meticulously packaged and paraded as Exhibit A of his strong leadership. The objective is clear: to transmute security victories into electoral currency at the federal level, making him an indispensable candidate for a nation besieged by Al-Shabaab.

But this is a devastating bargain. The citizens of Puntland are once again being asked to mortgage their own democratic future to fund their leader’s national campaign. The blood and treasure spent in Cal Miskaad should secure Puntland’s stability, not serve as a stepping stone for one man’s ambition.

The Laascaanood Catastrophe: A Strategic Surrender

If the betrayal of democratization was Said Abdullahi Deni’s first political sin, the Laascaanood debacle was his second — and the one that will define his legacy. Puntland poured blood and treasure into the liberation of SSC (Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn) territories from Somaliland’s occupation. Puntland soldiers fought and died in the trenches of Goojacade and Tukaraq. The state treasury was emptied to finance the war effort. Every ounce of political capital Puntland had accumulated since 1998 was staked on the cause.

History has long memories. General Mohamud Muse Hersi “Adde Muse” was punished at the ballot box after losing Laascaanood to Somaliland in 2007. Yet Deni — despite presiding over its liberation — committed an even greater crime: allowing the victory to be hijacked and rebranded in Mogadishu.

Through a stunning mixture of political negligence, reckless opportunism, and strategic myopia, Deni presided over Puntland’s single greatest geopolitical loss in its modern history. SSC, once the northern buffer and strategic depth of Puntland, was surrendered not to Somaliland but to Villa Somalia — a hostile, Damul Jadiid–aligned federal project intent on dismantling Puntland as the last functioning federal member state.

This was not merely a blunder. It was a strategic self-destruction, a gift-wrapped victory for Mogadishu’s centralizers and Puntland’s fiercest rivals. Deni’s political ambition blinded him to the cost: the slow-motion erosion of Puntland’s northern frontier, the demoralization of its armed forces, and the fracturing of its social contract. The “Laascaanood Catastrophe” will be remembered as the moment when Puntland’s hard-won territorial leverage was bargained away in exchange for nothing — except Deni’s second ill-fated dream of Villa Somalia’s top seat.

The Silent Coup: Elite Complicity in a Rigged System

To lay the blame solely at Deni’s feet, however, is to ignore the rotten foundation upon which his rule is built. Puntland’s political class—a constellation of clan elders, complicit parliamentarians, and business oligarchs—is deeply invested in the status quo. They engage in a carefully choreographed theater of debating democracy while quietly ensuring the selection-based system remains intact. This system is their insurance policy, a mechanism that guarantees the continuous recycling of power within a closed, elite circle without the messy uncertainty of the public will.

They are not bystanders; they are co-conspirators in the deferral of democracy.

The Reckoning

Puntland stands at a precipice. President Deni’s failure to deliver public suffrage is more than a broken promise; it is an existential crisis that threatens to nullify Puntland’s founding claim to be Somalia’s most stable, functional, and progressive state.

The path forward is not complicated, but it requires courage. The citizens of Puntland—its youth, its intellectuals, its business community—must now make a choice. They can continue to acquiesce to the endless cycle of ambition and neglect, or they can demand that their future be prioritized over one man’s pursuit of power in Mogadishu.

The message must be clear: If Said Abdullahi Deni wishes to chase Villa Somalia once more, he is free to do so. But he must do it on his own time and with his own resources. Puntland’s democracy is not his campaign fund. It is time to leave the mirage behind and build the real thing.

Courtesy

Somalia Between CIA and KGB: A Legacy of Intervention and the Struggle for Sovereignty

Abstract This paper examines Somalia’s modern history through the lens of foreign intervention and its corrosive impact on sovereignty. It traces the trajectory from colonial partition and Cold War proxy politics to the era of conditional aid and counter-terrorism partnerships. The argument advanced is that Somalia’s instability is not an inherent condition but a legacy of external manipulation and the failure of successive Somali leadership to construct resilient, accountable institutions. The conclusion posits that a patriotic and realistic foreign policy—anchored in economic sovereignty, technology transfer, and mature diplomacy—is the only path toward ending dependency and realizing the nation’s latent potential.  

1. Introduction: The Geopolitical Crucible

Somalia is a state born out of external design. Its borders, carved by European colonial powers, disregarded ethnic and cultural unity and imposed fragmentation. This fragmentation embedded permanent insecurity and made Somalia a prime target for Cold War competition. In the decades following independence, Somalia oscillated between Soviet and Western patronage, experiencing military rule, state collapse, and externally driven interventions under humanitarian or counter-terrorism labels. This paper argues that a realistic understanding of Somalia’s historical trajectory is essential for building sovereign policy anchored in economic development, accountability, and diversified partnerships.  

2. Colonial Division and the Cold War Trap (1960s–1980s)

2.1 The Colonial Legacy and Independent Non-Alignment

Somalia emerged from colonialism divided among British, Italian, and French administrators. Independence in 1960 gave rise to a Republic whose borders excluded Somali-inhabited regions in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. The early government under President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke experimented with non-alignment, cautiously maintaining ties with both Cold War blocs while leaning toward the West in style but engaging the Soviet Union for military assistance.

2.2 The Soviet Embrace and Military Rule

The USSR invested heavily in Somalia’s military establishment, training officers, embedding advisers, and supplying advanced equipment. By the mid-1970s, over 1,400 Soviet military advisers were present, and thousands of Somali officers were trained in Moscow. This Soviet-backed military elite facilitated the 1969 coup, installing Siad Barre and orienting Somalia toward Marxism-Leninism. Italy, by contrast, pursued institution-building, focusing on police and judicial structures.

2.3 The Ogaden Betrayal and Western Realignment

In 1977, Somalia invaded Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. The USSR abandoned Somalia in favor of Ethiopia, supporting Addis Ababa with Cuban troops and material aid. Somalia’s defeat exposed the risks of overreliance on a single patron. Barre expelled Soviet advisers and turned to Western and Arab allies, yet the authoritarian structure remained. The United States, eager to counter Soviet influence, tolerated Barre’s governance failures, reinforcing corruption and a lack of accountability.  

3. State Collapse and the Era of Chaos (1991–2000s)

The fall of Barre in 1991 left a vacuum that foreign and regional actors quickly exploited.

• UNOSOM II and the Mogadishu Crisis (1993): The U.S.-UN humanitarian mission devolved into direct combat with Somali factions. The October 1993 “Black Hawk Down” battle, resulting in 18 U.S. soldier deaths and hundreds of Somali casualties, prompted a full American withdrawal. Somalia was branded a “failed state,” and Washington retreated to containment strategies: limited intelligence operations, occasional strikes, and minimal aid.
• Proxy Warfare: Neighboring and Gulf states armed rival Somali factions, worsening fragmentation. Foreign manipulation perpetuated civil war and obstructed reconciliation.

4. The New Frontier: Counter-Terrorism and Conditional Aid

The rise of the Islamic Courts Union and Al-Shabaab reframed Somalia’s conflict through the counter-terrorism paradigm.

• Terrorist Creation and Empowerment: Indiscriminate strikes and interventions fueled radicalization, expanding militant recruitment.
• The Conditional Aid Trap: Billions in aid were securitized, tied to military purchases and donor agendas. Aid dependence entrenched, enriching foreign contractors rather than empowering Somali citizens.

5. A Patriotic Path Forward: Realism, Sovereignty, and Development

Somalia’s contemporary partnerships, particularly with Turkey and Qatar, suggest new models linking security cooperation with infrastructure, education, and health investment. For a sustainable future, Somalia requires a patriotic and realistic foreign policy based on:

1. Sovereign Accountability: Leadership must answer to citizens, not foreign donors. Ending corruption is central to public trust.
2. Economic Diplomacy: Somalia possesses vast underutilized resources:
   • 1 million hectares of arable land capable of achieving food sovereignty.
   • Africa’s largest livestock population with potential for export-led growth.
   • A 3,333 km coastline rich in fishing and blue economy prospects.
   • Suspected mineral and hydrocarbon reserves requiring transparent management.
3. Technology Transfer, Not Just Aid: Foreign partnerships must prioritize training, university cooperation, and industrial capacity-building.
4. Balanced, Mature Foreign Relations: Somalia should diversify partners, avoiding dependence on any single bloc, while cultivating a professional diplomatic corps capable of navigating multipolar realities.

6. Conclusion

Somalia’s instability is the product of colonial partition, Cold War proxy politics, authoritarianism, and externally imposed interventions. Neither Soviet militarization nor American containment fostered sovereignty. Italy’s institution-building efforts, though more modest, were overshadowed by superpower rivalry. Post–Cold War interventions deepened chaos, while counter-terrorism frameworks reduced Somalia to a security problem rather than a sovereign partner. The path forward lies not in another foreign roadmap but in an internal awakening: institution-building, resource-based development, and a mature foreign policy. Somalia must leverage its human and natural capital, pursuing partnerships grounded in equality, technology transfer, and economic growth. By addressing root causes—poverty, inequality, and weak governance—Somalia can achieve stability and independence, standing as a sovereign actor in a multipolar world.  

References

Britannica. (n.d.). Black Hawk Down. In Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com Cambridge University Press. (n.d.). Soviet-Somali relations in the 1970s. Country Studies. (n.d.). Somalia: A country study. Library of Congress. Office of the Historian. (n.d.). U.S. relations with Somalia: Cold War era. U.S. Department of State. Scribd. (n.d.). Somalia and the Ogaden War. The Guardian. (2013). Black Hawk Down: The lasting legacy of America’s ill-fated mission in Somalia. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com Wikipedia. (n.d.). Ogaden War. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org Brelience Research http://www.brcsom.com 2025.

[Courtesy: Copyright ©️ Brilliance Research and Consulting].