Day: August 26, 2025

“The Emirati ‘Puntland Project’: Somali and Colombian Mercenaries Between Sudan and the Horn of Africa” by Ammar AlAraki (August 17, 2025):

“The Emirati ‘Puntland Project’: Somali and Colombian Mercenaries Between Sudan and the Horn of Africa” by Ammar AlAraki (August 17, 2025):

A Review

Strengths of the Document

  1. Timely and Politically Relevant
    • The piece connects developments in Sudan’s war (RSF vs. SAF) with wider Horn of Africa dynamics, especially Puntland’s role.
    • It situates the UAE as a central external actor with a consistent playbook: financing mercenaries, destabilizing fragile states, and manufacturing proxies.
  2. Investigative Value
    • Names specific Somali casualties from Bosaso, grounding the story in verifiable human details rather than vague allegations.
    • References satellite imagery analysis (Nyala airport, drones) to support claims of Emirati military involvement.
    • Identifies recruitment numbers (two Somali contingents: 320 and 670) and Colombian involvement, which enhances credibility.
  3. Analytical Depth
    • Links the RSF model in Sudan to a “Puntland experiment”, drawing parallels between Hemeti’s militia and President Said Abdullahi Deni’s foreign-funded security structures.
    • Raises broader implications for proxy warfare, sovereignty erosion, and youth commodification.
  4. Narrative Clarity
    • Well-structured sections (background, revelations, analysis, conclusion).
    • Strong framing with memorable phrases: “engineering chaos and manufacturing proxies,” “open mercenary market.”

Weaknesses / Gaps

  1. Source Limitations
    • The primary evidence rests heavily on Brown Land News, an independent but little-known platform. Without triangulation (UN reports, major media, academic studies), skeptics may dismiss it as speculative.
    • The Somali Press reference on Deni’s remarks feels only tangentially connected to the mercenary issue.
  2. Lack of Hard Evidence on Puntland Government Complicity
    • While Bosaso is highlighted as a logistical hub, the text does not prove direct Puntland state sanction or Deni’s involvement.
    • The leap from “casualties from Bosaso” to “Puntland authorities complicit” risks overextension unless more documentation is provided.
  3. Geopolitical Context Could Be Expanded
    • The report underplays Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Turkey/Qatar’s competing roles in Somalia and Sudan. Focusing only on UAE may oversimplify the proxy landscape.
    • Colombia’s mercenaries are mentioned but not fully contextualized (Why Colombians? Previous UAE use of ex-Colombian soldiers in Yemen could have been detailed).
  4. Map Inclusion
    • While the Britannica map provides regional grounding, it feels under-integrated into the narrative (more visual-analytical commentary on troop movements or ports would strengthen it).

Overall Assessment

  • Impact: This document is a hard-hitting investigative piece that exposes an under-reported Emirati project linking Somalia, Sudan, and Colombia in a mercenary network.
  • Credibility: Moderately strong but still vulnerable to criticism due to reliance on a single independent news source and limited corroborating data.
  • Analytical Value: High. It draws important parallels between RSF structures and Puntland’s externally financed forces, raising alarms about future destabilization across the Horn.
  • Usefulness: Excellent for policy analysts, researchers, and journalists examining UAE foreign policy, mercenary warfare, and Somali politics.

✅ Verdict:
The piece is an important but preliminary exposé. It successfully frames the Emirati “Puntland Project” as part of a broader proxy warfare strategy but requires further corroboration, comparative analysis, and cross-referencing to achieve maximum impact and withstand scrutiny.