Day: May 18, 2025

The Bosaso Base: Security Saviour or Sovereignty Threat in Somalia’s Puntland?

By WDM
May 18, 2025

In the bustling port city of Bosaso on the Gulf of Aden, Puntland’s economic heartbeat, a quiet storm is brewing. Along its sun-scorched coastline, foreign flags fly over a sprawling military facility—a base reportedly hosting U.S. intelligence operatives, Emirati naval and military assets, and drone launchpads targeting ISIS militants in nearby Calmiskaad. While officials tout it as a critical tool for regional security, whispers of backroom deals, civilian risks, and shadowy missions beyond Puntland’s borders demand a closer look. Is this base a lifeline for stability or a ticking time bomb for Somali sovereignty? Let’s unpack the debate.

Whose Agenda Rules in Bosaso?

Foreign military bases are rarely just about “security.” In Bosaso, two global heavyweights—the U.S. and UAE—are playing very different games.

  • The U.S. Counterterrorism Playbook: Washington’s focus is laser-sharp: degrade ISIS-Somalia, a faction that’s carved out hideouts in Puntland’s mountains. Drone strikes from Bosaso have reportedly pummeled insurgent positions, but as we’ve seen in Yemen and Afghanistan, such tactics can backfire. Civilian casualties breed resentment, and “surgical” strikes often leave political wounds that fester.
  • The UAE’s Grand Chessboard: For the Emirates, Bosaso is a strategic jewel in its crown of Horn of Africa investments. With ports in Eritrea and Yemen already under its belt, the UAE seems intent on dominating trade routes and countering rivals like Turkey and Qatar. But at what cost? Leaked reports suggest murky agreements with Puntland’s leadership, including sweetheart deals for port access and presidential security. Critics argue this isn’t aid—it’s a transaction.

The Tightrope Walk: Security vs. Somali Sovereignty

Puntland’s government, which operates semi-independently from Mogadishu, faces a brutal calculus. Partnering with foreign powers brings cash, weapons, and intelligence to fight groups like ISIS and Al-Shabaab. But reliance on outsiders risks turning Puntland into a pawn in someone else’s war.

  • The Presidential Bubble: The fact that Puntland’s president now resides in the military base speaks volumes. While his safety may be guaranteed, what about the people? Locals have little say in deals struck behind closed doors, and rumours of U.S.-led strikes spilling into neighbouring regions could spark backlash.
  • Mission Creep: A Slippery Slope: Media reports hint at operations stretching beyond Puntland’s borders. If true, this risks inflaming tensions with Somalia’s federal government and neighbouring states in the sub-region. Without clear rules or oversight, the base could become a hub for proxy wars, not peace.

Risks of Foreign Presence: More Than Just Bombs?

Foreign bases often come with unintended consequences:

  1. Blowback: Concentrating foreign troops and drones in Bosaso makes it a prime target for insurgent attacks. Civilians, not soldiers, often pay the heaviest price.
  2. Proxy Wars: The UAE’s rivalry with Turkey (which backs Mogadishu) could turn Puntland into a battleground for regional power plays.
  3. Eroding Trust: Secrecy fuels distrust. If locals view the base as a tool of foreign exploitation—not protection—it could fuel the very extremism it aims to crush.

A Better Path Forward?

Security is vital, but it can not come at the cost of Somali sovereignty. Here’s what’s missing from the Bosaso equation:

  • Transparency: Puntland’s government must disclose the terms of its foreign partnerships. Who’s funding the base? What’s the scope of operations?
  • Accountability: Civilian harm from drone strikes must be investigated and compensated. No more “oops” apologies.
  • Invest in People, Not Just Drones: Jobs, schools, and hospitals do more to counter extremism than any drone. Why is 90% of foreign aid still military-focused?

Final Thoughts: Who Wins, Who Loses?

The Bosaso base is a double-edged sword. For now, it may keep ISIS at bay and line the pockets of a few elites. But if history teaches us anything, it’s that foreign military interventions in Somalia rarely end well. Without transparency, equity, and local buy-in, Bosaso’s base risks becoming another chapter in Somalia’s long story of external exploitation—dressed up as a “security partnership.”

What do you think? Is foreign military presence a necessary evil in fragile states like Somalia or a recipe for disaster? Drop your thoughts in the comments.

Background information

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has maintained a notable presence in Bosaso, the commercial hub of Somalia’s Puntland State, since 2017.  This involvement encompasses both maritime security initiatives and infrastructure development.

UAE Presence in Bosaso

The UAE has been instrumental in supporting the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), a regional security entity established in 2010 to combat piracy.  This support includes training, equipment provision, and operational assistance. 

In addition to security collaborations, the UAE, through its subsidiary P&O Ports, secured a 30-year concession in 2017 to manage and develop the Port of Bosaso.  The development plans involve constructing a 450-meter quay, dredging to a depth of 12 meters, and enhancing port infrastructure to accommodate larger vessels. 

Reports of Radar Installation

In April 2025, open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts reported the presence of a structure near Bosaso’s UAE-operated airbase that resembles an Israeli-manufactured ELM-2084 Multi-Mission Radar system.  This radar is known for its capabilities in tracking drones, missiles, and aircraft over distances up to 470 kilometres.  The installation, if confirmed, could enhance surveillance and air defence in the region. 

Official Denials and Regional Dynamics

The Puntland government has officially denied the existence of any UAE military base or radar installations in Bosaso.  Minister of Information, Mahmoud Aydid Dirir, labelled the reports as “fabricated propaganda” aimed at undermining Puntland’s stability and progress in counter-terrorism efforts. 

These developments occur amid complex regional dynamics, with various international actors seeking strategic footholds in the Horn of Africa.  The UAE’s activities in Bosaso reflect its broader strategy to secure maritime routes and expand its influence in East Africa.

⚠️ Conclusion

While the UAE’s involvement in Bosaso is evident through its support for the PMPF and port development projects, reports of advanced military installations like the ELM-2084 radar remain unconfirmed and are officially denied by Puntland authorities.  The situation underscores the intricate interplay of local governance, foreign interests, and regional security concerns in Somalia’s northeastern corridor.

Opinion: Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo Is No Role Model for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud

(C) 2025 WDM Copyright

The suggestion that Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo could serve as a political blueprint for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is not merely misguided—it risks erasing the lessons of Somalia’s recent history. While both leaders have occupied the presidency, their approaches to governance, constitutional integrity, and national cohesion diverge sharply. To position Farmaajo as a model for Mohamud is to endorse a legacy of authoritarianism, foreign policy recklessness, and clan-based division—a path incompatible with Somalia’s fragile democratic aspirations.

1. Authoritarian Centralization vs. Sectarian Fragmentation

Farmaajo’s tenure was defined by a systematic erosion of democratic norms. His administration weaponized state institutions to silence critics, imprison journalists, and stifle opposition through tactics like the 2018 electoral meddling in Galmudug and Jubbaland. By centralizing power in Mogadishu, he destabilized Somalia’s federal framework, undermining hard-won progress toward inclusive governance.

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, while navigating Somalia’s complex clan dynamics, has faced accusations of favoring his Hawiye lineage, particularly in appointments and resource allocation. However, unlike Farmaajo’s overt power grabs, Mohamud’s challenges stem from the perennial tension between clan loyalty and national unity—a struggle inherent to Somalia’s political landscape. Emulating Farmaajo’s autocratic playbook would only exacerbate these divisions rather than resolve them.

2. Foreign Policy Gambles vs. Diplomatic Pragmatism

Farmaajo’s alignment with Qatar and Turkey alienated traditional partners like the UAE and Western donors, polarizing Somalia’s foreign relations during a critical period of state-building. His 2018 agreement ceding Somali airspace management to Ethiopia—crafted in secrecy without parliamentary oversight—exposed a blatant disregard for sovereignty. This deal, framed as “regional cooperation,” set a perilous precedent for external interference.

Mohamud, by contrast, has pursued a more balanced diplomatic strategy, reaffirming ties with multilateral institutions like the African Union while cautiously engaging Gulf partners. His administration’s support for the Somali National Army’s offensive against al-Shabaab, backed by international allies, reflects a pragmatic approach to security—one that avoids Farmaajo’s reliance on foreign patronage.

3. Clan Populism vs. Incremental Reconciliation

Farmaajo’s rhetoric of “Somali nationalism” often served as a veil for sub-clan favoritism, deepening societal fractures. His manipulation of clan loyalties, exemplified by the politicization of security forces and federal agencies, prioritized short-term control over long-term reconciliation.

Mohamud’s efforts, though imperfect, have leaned toward dialogue. His handling of the SSC-Khatumo crisis—a breakaway region challenging Puntland’s authority—illustrates this contrast. Where Farmaajo ignored the 2019 Las Anod protests, enabling violent crackdowns, Mohamud has cautiously supported SSC-Khatumo’s quest for representation, framing it as a constitutional rather than partisan issue. This shift, while contentious, acknowledges local agency—a marked departure from Farmaajo’s top-down coercion.

4. Constitutional Sabotage vs. Institutional Reform

Farmaajo’s most damaging legacy lies in his assault on electoral norms. His 2021 bid to illegally extend his term via a rubber-stamp parliament ignited street battles in Mogadishu, threatening a return to civil war. Such brinkmanship exposed a willingness to trade stability for personal power.

Mohamud, meanwhile, has cautiously advanced constitutional reforms, including controversial amendments to Somalia’s electoral model. While critics argue these changes centralize power, they also aim to universalize suffrage—a step toward one-person, one-vote elections absent since 1969. The difference? Farmaajo sought to bend institutions; Mohamud, however haltingly, seeks to rebuild them.

Conclusion: Charting a New Path Beyond Populism

Somalia’s next chapter demands leaders who transcend the zero-sum politics of the past. Farmaajo’s tenure—a case study in the perils of populism—offers no roadmap for progress. His foreign gambles, clan patronage, and disdain for federalism exacerbated the very crises he vowed to solve.

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud need not replicate these failures. Instead, his administration must prioritize inclusive dialogue, strengthen judicial independence, and depoliticize security forces. The SSC-Khatumo question, for instance, should be resolved through constitutional mechanisms, not backroom clan deals.

Somalia’s future hinges on rejecting the false choice between strongman rule and sectarian fragmentation. Leaders must embrace compromise over coercion, transparency over secrecy, and nationhood over clanhood. Farmaajo’s legacy is a warning, not a model—and Mohamud’s success depends on learning from it, not reviving it.

Somalia deserves leaders who build bridges, not walls. The stakes are too high for anything less