Day: April 12, 2025

Puntland Governance: Sinecures and Inefficiency. Situational Report

In brief:

1. Collapse Factors: Donor Dependency and Institutional Decay

  • Designed for Donor Projects, Not Sovereignty:
    • Many government agencies were structured to operate on donor-funded projects rather than sustainable domestic revenue streams. This created a “project-based governance” model, where salaries, services, and infrastructure depended on external aid. With donors disengaging (due to shifting priorities, fatigue, or dissatisfaction with corruption), these agencies lack the financial and operational capacity to function, leading to paralysis.
  • Erosion of Public Trust:
    • As departments collapse, basic services (healthcare, education, sanitation) vanish, deepening public disillusionment. Citizens may turn to informal networks, clans, or extremist groups for support, further destabilizing the state.

2. The “One-Man Rule” Problem

  • Centralized Power and Accountability Gaps:
    • Concentrated authority in the hands of a single leader (or a small clique) stifles institutional autonomy, innovation, and checks on corruption. Departments become extensions of patronage networks rather than functional entities, with appointments based on loyalty, not competence.
  • Systemic Decay:
    • Under one-man rule, institutions atrophy because they are not allowed to operate independently. For example:
      • Finance Ministries may lack authority to audit spending.
      • Judiciaries cannot hold leaders accountable.
      • Local Governments are sidelined, eroding grassroots governance.

3. Donor Withdrawal: A Double-Edged Sword

  • Short-Term Crisis:
    • Donors often fund governments to meet humanitarian or geopolitical goals (e.g., counterterrorism, migration control). When they withdraw, they leave vacuums. In Puntland, this has exposed the state’s failure to build self-reliant institutions or revenue systems (e.g., taxation, resource management).
  • Long-Term Lessons:
    • Donor dependency masked governance failures for years. The collapse reveals that no genuine institution-building occurred—agencies were hollow shells propped up by external cash. This underscores the need for domestic resource mobilization (e.g., fair taxation, leveraging ports/livestock exports) to reduce reliance on donors.

4. Pathways Forward (Amid Crisis)

Immediate Priorities

  • Negotiate Donor Re-engagement with Conditions:
    • Lobby donors for emergency funding tied to governance reforms (e.g., audits, anti-corruption mechanisms). Transparency could rebuild donor trust.
  • Decentralize Power:
    • Empower local councils and technocrats to bypass centralized bottlenecks. Communities often self-organize effectively in Somalia—harness this social capital.

Long-Term Reforms

  • Expand Domestic Revenue Systems:
    • Formalize taxation (e.g., port tariffs, business licenses), combat smuggling, and invest in sectors like fisheries and livestock to generate state income.
  • Institutional Overhaul:
    • Restructure agencies to prioritize merit-based hiring, clarify mandates, and depoliticize roles. For example, create independent civil service commissions to end clan-based appointments.
  • Public Accountability Mechanisms:
    • Support media, civil society, and citizen oversight to pressure leaders. Social accountability tools (e.g., participatory budgeting, grievance redress systems) could empower communities.

5. Risks of Inaction

  • State Failure and Extremism:
    • Collapsing institutions create vacuums that groups like Al-Shabaab could exploit, framing themselves as providers of security and services.
  • Mass Displacement and Regional Instability:
    • Economic collapse may trigger migration waves, straining neighboring regions (e.g., Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda) and international aid systems.

Conclusion

Puntland’s crisis is a symptom of deeper pathologies: governance designed for external validation (not public service), leadership that conflates personal power with statehood, and a citizenry abandoned by both their government and donors. Breaking this cycle requires radical transparency, inclusive governance, and economic pragmatism. While challenging, the alternative—total state failure—would destabilize not just Puntland but the entire Horn of Africa.

Insecurity in Mogadishu and the Periodic Exodus of Federal Politicians and Employees

Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, has long been a symbol of both resilience and chaos. For years, its residents have endured a relentless cycle of violence fueled by Al-Shabab insurgency, clan-based vendettas, and business-related revenge killings. This toxic environment has earned the city the grim moniker of a “hell on earth,” a reality that even the nation’s highest-ranking officials seem unable to withstand. Recent waves of Federal Government politicians and employees, including parliamentarians, ministers, and security escorts, fleeing to regions like SSC-Khatumo—a budding regional administration in northern Somalia—highlight a troubling pattern: Mogadishu’s insecurity is not only destabilizing daily life but also paralyzing governance, driving periodic exoduses that undermine public trust and institutional legitimacy.

The Security Crisis in Mogadishu

At the heart of Mogadishu’s turmoil lies the entrenched presence of Al-Shabab, an extremist group that continues to launch brazen attacks on government installations, hotels, and civilians. Despite sustained military campaigns, the group retains the capacity to strike with impunity, turning streets into battlegrounds and sowing fear among residents. Compounding this threat are clan-driven conflicts and revenge killings, often rooted in competition for resources or political influence. Business disputes, too, escalate into violence, as powerful actors resort to armed force to settle scores. For Federal officials, navigating this landscape means living under constant threat—a reality that has rendered Mogadishu increasingly ungovernable. Even President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has faced criticism for his frequent travels, interpreted by many as an attempt to escape the capital’s dangers.

Historical Precedent: Puntland as a Refuge

The phenomenon of officials seeking respite outside Mogadishu is not new. For years, Puntland, a semi-autonomous state in northeastern Somalia, served as a sanctuary for politicians and bureaucrats weary of the capital’s volatility. Its relative stability, bolstered by local governance structures and geographic distance from Al-Shabab’s strongholds, made it a pragmatic escape route. However, this reliance on Puntland also underscored the Federal Government’s fragility, revealing a leadership more focused on survival than systemic reform.

The Rise of SSC-Khatumo as a New Haven

Recently, SSC-Khatumo has emerged as an alternative refuge. This region, which declared its autonomy in 2023 after decades of territorial disputes, offers a combination of strategic remoteness and nascent governance. For Federal officials, it represents not only a safer space but also a political opportunity. By engaging with SSC-Khatumo, Mogadishu’s elites may aim to strengthen federal alliances or legitimize their authority in contested areas. However, the optics of high-profile visits—such as Prime Minister Hamse Abdi Barre’s anticipated trip—risk being perceived as performative. Critics argue that these delegations prioritize photo-ops over substantive engagement, doing little to address the root causes of displacement.

Public Perception and Governance Implications

The exodus of officials has deepened public cynicism. To ordinary Somalis, the spectacle of leaders fleeing their posts reinforces a narrative of abandonment. Many view these trips as indulgent escapes rather than legitimate efforts to stabilize the country. This perception erodes trust in institutions already weakened by corruption and inefficiency. Moreover, the absence of key decision-makers from Mogadishu disrupts governance, delaying critical policies and security strategies. The psychological impact is equally dire: when leaders appear unwilling to share in the hardships of their citizens, it breeds disillusionment and apathy.

Conclusion: A Cycle in Need of Breaking

The periodic influx of Federal politicians and employees into regions like SSC-Khatumo is a symptom of Mogadishu’s unaddressed security decay. Until the government confronts Al-Shabab’s insurgency, mediates clan conflicts, and strengthens judicial mechanisms to curb impunity, such exoduses will persist. Sustainable solutions demand more than fleeting visits to safer regions; they require comprehensive security reforms, inclusive dialogue, and economic investments to dismantle the conditions breeding violence. For Somalia’s leaders, the choice is clear: either continue escaping Mogadishu’s chaos or commit to transforming it into a city worthy of their presence. The latter path, though arduous, is the only way to halt the cycle of fear and flight—and to restore hope in a nation weary of both.