https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/healing-old-wounds-a-call-for-dhulbahante

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/discover-truth-explore-depth-stay

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/opinion-somalilands-go-to-diversion

By: WDM

In a disturbing display of neocolonial arrogance, Turkey has escalated a media and diplomatic campaign targeting Puntland State — one of Somalia’s most stable and functional federal member states. The target of Ankara’s ire? A legal, transparent, and well-documented partnership between Puntland and the United Arab Emirates focused on trade, security, and infrastructure. This campaign is not only baseless; it is dangerous and exposes Turkey’s increasingly aggressive posture in the Horn of Africa.

Let us be unequivocal: Puntland is not a sovereign actor conducting rogue foreign policy. It is a constitutionally recognized federal state within Somalia, operating well within the bounds of its decentralized governance powers. Its cooperation with the UAE — dating back over decades — has helped combat piracy, ISIS, build ports, and inject real economic value into a region long neglected by Mogadishu.

Contrast this with Turkey’s own role in Somalia. Ankara’s deepening ties with the Somali federal government have increasingly taken the form of secretive deals, including a murky hydrocarbon agreement signed without parliamentary scrutiny, stakeholder consultation, or environmental assessment. These opaque arrangements suggest that Turkey’s growing presence is not about development or partnership — but extraction, control, and influence.

Turkey’s latest provocation — using pundits and proxies to vilify Puntland — is an unacceptable interference in Somalia’s fragile federal system. It is a brazen attempt to intimidate a peaceful region into submission, to punish Puntland for choosing practical partnerships over political allegiance, and to delegitimize any actor that does not tow Ankara’s preferred line.

This campaign also undermines the very stability that Turkey claims to support. Puntland is not a rebel territory or a breakaway enclave; it is a functioning federal member state with its own institutions, security forces, and governance structures. By attacking Puntland’s legitimacy, Turkey is not just meddling — it is fueling division and weakening Somalia’s already fragile federalism.

For a country that presents itself as a benevolent partner in Africa, Turkey is increasingly behaving like a 21st-century empire-builder — silencing dissent, pressuring local authorities, and cutting deals behind closed doors. This is not development. This is not diplomacy. It is coercion.

The international community must not stand by while a foreign power bullies a peaceful region for engaging in legal, beneficial partnerships. Turkey must be held to account for its destabilizing rhetoric and backroom dealings. Somalia needs genuine allies — not overlords.

If Turkey wants to be a partner in Somalia’s future, it must start by respecting the country’s federal structure, ceasing its propaganda against Puntland, and submitting its own dealings to the same transparency it demands of others. Until then, its influence in Somalia will be viewed not as a partnership but as provocation.

By: Warsame Digital Media (WDM)

To the international donor community,

The people of Puntland State of Somalia have watched with growing alarm as international aid, pledged in the name of unity, development, and federalism, is increasingly weaponized to serve narrow political interests. Aid intended to improve lives and strengthen governance is instead being manipulated to impose authoritarian control from Mogadishu—at the expense of equity, trust, and federalism.

This is not an accusation made lightly. Puntland, a founding pillar of the Somali Federal Republic and a model of self-governance, has been deliberately sidelined in development programming, budgetary allocations, and donor-led initiatives. Resources acquired in the name of “Somalia” are disproportionately channeled through federal institutions that lack the will—or in some cases, the constitutional authority—to represent or deliver on behalf of all federal member states.

Donors cannot claim ignorance. Repeated warnings have been issued by Puntland and other federal entities, urging a more balanced and transparent mechanism for aid delivery. Yet little has changed. Development partners continue to funnel assistance through a centralized bureaucracy that has shown open hostility toward Puntland’s autonomy and governance model.

Let us be clear: aid that undermines local ownership, disregards constitutional mandates, and serves as a lever for political compliance is not aid—it is coercion. It empowers autocracy, stifles regional initiative, and erodes the very foundations of the federal system donors once helped to craft.

Puntland has thrived not because of external largesse but because of internal resilience. We built functioning institutions while others crumbled. We maintained peace and democratic transitions while others turned to conflict. We earnesly fight extremists where others abysmally fail. We are not seeking special treatment—only our fair share, delivered through mechanisms that respect our identity, governance, and constitutional rights.

This is an urgent call for course correction. The donor community must:

1. End the monopolization of aid through Mogadishu and adopt a dual-track system that directly engages capable federal member states like Puntland.

2. Uphold constitutional principles in all aid agreements and programming.

3. Insist on transparency and accountability in the distribution of donor funds, not just at the federal level, but across all tiers of government.

4. Respect regional autonomy and avoid becoming complicit in centralization schemes that threaten peace and stability.

Donor silence is no longer neutral—it is enabling. If the international community truly values democratic governance, federalism, and sustainable development, then it must act now. Puntland will continue on the path of self-reliance and determination. But we will not remain silent as our people are denied the resources, respect, and representation they rightfully deserve.

The time for quiet diplomacy has passed. The donor community must choose between enabling authoritarian consolidation—or supporting a pluralistic and balanced federal Somalia.

Puntland has chosen its path. Will you stand with us?

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/puntland-will-not-bow-to-donor-driven

WDM EDITORIAL

In a troubling and deeply consequential trend, the politicization of donor assistance by the federal authorities in Mogadishu has reached a critical point—weaponizing aid to enforce authoritarian control over the autonomous Puntland State. What was once a mechanism to uplift Somali communities has now become a tool of coercion, deployed not for development, but for domination.

Millions of dollars earmarked for Puntland—resources secured in the name of the Somali people—are either diverted, delayed, or deliberately politicized by a federal administration bent on centralizing power at the expense of regional autonomy. The donor community, whether by willful ignorance or silent complicity, enables this injustice. By funneling aid through Mogadishu without enforcing equitable distribution, international partners are empowering a centralized elite and undermining the very federal system they claim to support.

Let it be stated clearly: Puntland will not be strong-armed into submission through manipulated aid schemes or bureaucratic blackmail. Our people have endured decades of adversity—not through handouts or appeasement—but through self-reliance, governance, and sheer determination. We built institutions when others faltered, and we maintained stability while others dissolved into chaos. To now be treated as a subordinate entity, expected to beg for what is rightfully ours, is not only unacceptable—it is an affront to our dignity and legacy.

This conspiracy to starve Puntland into political obedience will fail. No amount of donor deception or Mogadishu maneuvering will erase the will of a people determined to chart their own course. Puntland does not reject aid—it rejects manipulation. We will welcome partnership, but only one that respects our autonomy, our rights, and our people.

The international community must choose: continue propping up authoritarianism cloaked in federal rhetoric, or stand with regions like Puntland that actually embody the democratic and developmental aspirations they so often preach. Time is running out for neutrality. Silence, at this juncture, is nothing less than endorsement of tyranny.

Puntland is not for sale. We will weather this storm, as we have others—by standing firm, standing free, and standing together.

At Warsame Digital Media (WDM), we don’t answer to pressure groups.
We answer to you — our readers.

Here’s why your support is critical:

1. It protects our independence.
No outside agendas. No censorship. We tell the truth — even when it’s inconvenient for those in power.

2. It keeps us focused on real journalism, not empty clicks.
We don’t chase trends or viral nonsense. We cover stories that matter — for our communities, our future, and our freedom.

3. It keeps WDM open for everyone.
We believe everyone deserves access to honest, fearless reporting.

Right now, most of our readers enjoy WDM without paying — and that is not good enough. If you believe independent journalism is worth fighting for, we need you to step up.

A small monthly contribution or an annual fee of $37 only make the biggest difference.
It powers deep investigations, amplifies unheard voices, and shields us from outside control.

If you can, please support WDM today.
We’ll make it quick, easy — and you’ll be part of something truly powerful.

Join us at iwarsame@ismailwarsame.blog/ismailwarsame@gmail.com. +252 90 703 4081.

Protect independent media. Power the future.

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/somalias-war-within-why-al-shabaab

Somalia today is not governed by a constitution. It is ruled by corruption, impunity, and raw political power.

The 2012 Provisional Constitution, once seen as a beacon of hope after decades of civil war, has been shredded by the very leaders who were supposed to uphold it. Four chapters have been illegally altered without public consent. The rest of the constitution remains incomplete, abandoned like so many other broken promises to the Somali people.

A constitution is supposed to be sacred — a contract between the people and their government. In Somalia, it has been turned into a private tool for those in power to entrench themselves. Law means nothing when leaders at both the federal and member state levels treat institutions as personal property and parliaments as rubber stamps.

This is not governance. This is organized looting disguised as politics.

Somalia is not unique in lacking a finalized constitution. Other nations function under customary laws and respected traditions. But Somalia’s problem runs deeper: there is no functioning legal order left. Even customary laws, Islamic principles, and parliamentary practices have been hijacked by corruption and clan favoritism. The result is a lawless shell of a country, where the president’s personal interests dictate the fate of millions.

Elections are delayed or manipulated. Courts are powerless. Parliamentarians sell their votes to the highest bidder. Ordinary Somalis, facing insecurity, poverty, and injustice, are left with no voice, no protection, and no hope. Meanwhile, extremist groups exploit this vacuum, positioning themselves as more reliable dispensers of “justice” than the so-called government.

How long can Somalia survive like this? How long can a nation endure when every rule is negotiable, every law up for sale?

The international community, exhausted and distracted, has allowed Somalia’s leaders to play endless games without real consequences. But it is Somalis — the farmers, the mothers, the youth — who pay the price every day.

If Somalia is to have any future, it must start by taking back its constitution — not through secret deals among politicians, but through a public, transparent, and nationally owned process. The unfinished constitution must be finalized, ratified, and enforced. Institutions must be rebuilt to serve the people, not the rulers. And leaders who betray their oath to the law must be held accountable — without exception.

Enough is enough. Somalia does not need more speeches, false promises, or cosmetic reforms. It needs a revolution of law — a return to constitutional order — or it risks becoming a country permanently governed by force and fraud.

The Somali people deserve a government bound by law, not by the greed of the few.

By WDM Staff Writer

Introduction
The regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) in northern Somalia have long been a flashpoint in the contest for territorial control, autonomy, and clan identity. The SSC-Khaatumo movement, born out of a desire to liberate these areas from Somaliland’s administration, now faces a crisis of legitimacy and direction. Despite sacrifices by local communities and Puntland’s support, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has been accused of undermining SSC-Khaatumo’s aspirations, leaving residents trapped between Somaliland’s oppression and Mogadishu’s indifference. This essay examines the historical roots of the conflict, the post-liberation challenges, and pathways toward a sustainable resolution.

Historical Context: Clan, Colonialism, and Contested Borders
The SSC regions are inhabited predominantly by the Dhulbahante clan, a sub-group of the Harti Darod. Their historical ties to the Somali National Movement (SNM), which spearheaded Somaliland’s secession in 1991, were tenuous. Somaliland bases its claim on colonial-era borders, while Puntland asserts kinship with the Dhulbahante. This duality has left SSC residents politically fractured, navigating between Somaliland’s quest for recognition and Puntland’s clan-based governance.
The SSC-Khaatumo movement emerged in the 2000s as a third way, advocating self-governance. Its formation reflected local disillusionment with both Hargeisa’s heavy-handedness and Garowe’s political manoeuvres. The liberation struggle, particularly the 2023 recapture of Las Anod from Somaliland, was fueled by Puntland’s military backing and diaspora funding. Yet, victory has not translated into stability.

The Liberation Struggle and Post-Conflict Realities
The ousting of Somaliland forces from Las Anod in 2023 marked a symbolic triumph. However, the euphoria faded as SSC-Khaatumo struggled to transition from rebellion to governance. Key challenges include:
• Security Vacuum: Somaliland’s intermittent incursions and clan militias’ rise have perpetuated instability.
• Economic Collapse: Years of conflict destroyed infrastructure, leaving healthcare and education in disarray.
• Political Fragmentation: Internal divisions among Dhulbahante elites hinder cohesive leadership.
Puntland’s support, while instrumental, has also drawn accusations of overreach, with critics alleging Garowe seeks to absorb SSC into its administration. Meanwhile, the diaspora’s financial contributions have sometimes exacerbated factionalism, as competing groups vie for resources.

The Federal Government of Somalia: A Partner or Adversary?
The FGS’s role has been contentious. While Somalia’s Provisional Constitution (2012) allows regions to form federal states, Mogadishu has withheld recognition of SSC-Khaatumo. Critics argue this stems from:
• Political Calculations: The FGS fears antagonizing Somaliland, seen as a potential partner in future unification talks.
• Centralization Efforts: Mogadishu may view robust regional states as threats to its authority.
• Resource Allocation: The FGS, grappling with insurgencies like Al-Shabaab, prioritizes other regions.
Moreover, allegations persist that Mogadishu has tacitly supported Somaliland’s operations to weaken SSC-Khaatumo. This perceived betrayal has deepened local resentment, with residents feeling abandoned after risking lives to reject Somaliland’s secessionist agenda.

The Humanitarian Toll and Diaspora Dynamics
Civilians bear the brunt of this geopolitical stalemate. The UN reports over 200,000 displaced since 2023, with aid access restricted by conflict. Clan militias exploit the chaos, engaging in extortion and violence. The diaspora, while vital in funding relief and advocacy, often struggles to align its vision with on-the-ground realities, sometimes prioritizing symbolic victories over governance.

Pathways Forward: Autonomy, Alliances, or Arbitration?
Resolving the crisis requires addressing both immediate needs and structural inequities:
• Strengthening Local Governance: SSC-Khaatumo must prioritize inclusive institutions, integrating traditional elders and civil society to bridge clan divides.
• Engaging the FGS: Mogadishu should honor constitutional provisions for state formation, offering technical and financial support conditional on transparency.
• International Mediation: The AU and UN could broker talks between SSC-Khaatumo, Somaliland, and the FGS, ensuring residents’ voices are central. In doing so, don’t ignore that Puntland State is a critical stakeholder in these negotiations.
• Regional Alliances: Closer ties with Puntland or other federal states might provide interim security but risk dependency.

Conclusion: Toward a Dignified Future
The SSC regions’ plight underscores the fragility of Somalia’s federal experiment. Residents, having rejected Somaliland’s authoritarianism, deserve more than Mogadishu’s neglect. A sustainable solution demands courage from SSC leaders to transcend clan politics, sincerity from the FGS to uphold federalism, and international pressure to safeguard human rights. Only through inclusive dialogue can SSC-Khaatumo realize its founding ideal: a dignified existence free from oppression.

Executive Summary

This white paper examines the political dynamics between Puntland State and SSC-Khatumo following the liberation of the SSC territories from Somaliland administration. Initially, both administrations had agreed to convene a Congress to determine their future relationship. However, the congress never materialized, primarily due to SSC-Khatumo’s unilateral alignment with the Mogadishu-based federal government. This paper discusses the implications of that decision, the recent stance articulated by Puntland’s leadership, and offers recommendations for future cooperation to ensure stability and mutual benefit for the communities of northern Somalia.

Introduction

The territories of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) have long been contested spaces, central to the political disputes between Somaliland, Puntland, and emerging local administrations like SSC-Khatumo. The recent liberation of SSC territories was a significant achievement, made possible through the sacrifices of local communities and Puntland’s consistent support. The understanding at the time was that a congress would be convened to democratically decide the relationship between Puntland and SSC-Khatumo post-liberation. However, this crucial step was bypassed, altering the expected course of collaboration.

Background

Puntland State of Somalia was established in 1998 to protect and advance the interests of the Eastern Daroods (Dhulbahante, Warsangeli, Majeerteen, Lelkase, Awrtable, among others), and has maintained relative political stability, while reconstructing the failed state of Somalia.

SSC-Khatumo Movement emerged to advocate for the specific interests of SSC territories, opposing both Somaliland’s secessionist claims and, at times, perceived neglect by Puntland.

A shared understanding developed that post-liberation, both sides would hold a congress to formalize their future relationship.

However, post-liberation, SSC-Khatumo leadership unexpectedly aligned with the Federal Government in Mogadishu—an administration that had provided little direct assistance during SSC’s most critical battles.

Current Situation

In response to these developments, the President of Puntland State, Said Abdullahi Deni, publicly stated that SSC-Khatumo faces a strategic decision:

Option 1: SSC-Khatumo continues independently, managing its political and administrative affairs without Puntland’s direct support.

Option 2: SSC-Khatumo returns to negotiations with Puntland to formalize a cooperative framework that respects historical ties and shared strategic interests.

This declaration marks a significant turning point, emphasizing Puntland’s expectation for either renewed partnership based on mutual respect or a formal separation of paths.

Analysis

Implications of SSC-Khatumo’s Alignment with Mogadishu

Political Vulnerability: Mogadishu’s remote governance risks alienating SSC communities and ignoring their unique local needs.

Loss of Regional Support: By distancing from Puntland, SSC-Khatumo potentially weakens its bargaining power and stability prospects.

Fragmentation Risk: Without a cohesive Harti-based regional strategy, northern Somalia could descend into renewed political fragmentation.

Puntland’s Strategic Interests

Regional Stability: Puntland’s success has been rooted in maintaining stable borders and alliances.

Cultural and Clan Solidarity: The Harti clans share historical bonds that Puntland seeks to preserve.

Federalism Advocacy: Puntland supports a federal Somalia, but with meaningful autonomy for regions—a vision that aligns with SSC’s original demands.

Recommendations

For SSC-Khatumo Leadership

Return to Dialogue: Engage Puntland in formal discussions to outline a cooperative framework.

Prioritize Local Interests: Align political decisions with the immediate needs and aspirations of SSC communities.

Demand Mutual Respect: Ensure that any relationship with Puntland is based on equality and mutual benefit.

For Puntland State

Remain Open to Negotiations: Despite frustrations, keep channels open for reconciliation.

Support Local Empowerment: Emphasize partnerships that respect SSC autonomy within broader strategic cooperation.

Promote Unity Among Harti Communities: Prevent external manipulation by reinforcing internal solidarity.

For the Broader Somali Stakeholders

Support Local Initiatives: Encourage community-led political solutions rather than top-down impositions from Mogadishu.

Facilitate Dialogue: International partners and Somali federal institutions should facilitate—not dictate—discussions between Puntland and SSC-Khatumo.

Conclusion

The missed congress between Puntland and SSC-Khatumo represents a critical moment in the political evolution of northern Somalia. However, the window for constructive engagement remains open. Both sides must act pragmatically and prioritize the interests of their communities over external political alignments. A future built on negotiated partnership offers the best path forward for durable peace, autonomy, and development in the SSC territories.

Prepared by:
WDM
Date: April 26, 2025

By WDM Staff Writer

In a country emerging from decades of civil war and institutional collapse, Somalia’s fragile governance depends heavily on inclusive leadership, justice, and transparency. Yet, recent developments point to a disturbing trend that continues to haunt Somalia’s state-building efforts: the dominance of clan loyalty over national interest.

The Somali president’s recent delegation to Kampala, Uganda—composed entirely of individuals from the Mudulood subclan of the Hawiye—raises serious concerns about nepotism, exclusion, and the misuse of presidential authority. This isn’t merely a case of preferential appointments; it’s a bold, unambiguous display of tribal favoritism cloaked in the trappings of official state business.

The Delegation: A Clan Affair

A look at the names on the delegation list confirms the bias:

1. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud

2. Cali Balcad

3. Odowaa Yusuf Raage

4. Cabdirisaaq Hassan Sheikh

5. Jihaan Hassan Sheikh

6. Jihaan Abdullahi Hassan

7. Maxamed-Amiin

8. Cabdirisaaq British

9. Cabdirahmaan Xudeyfi

10. Cali Khadar

11. Maxamed Duugoow

12. Hinda Culusow

All twelve individuals are members of the Mudulood subclan. This is not only politically insensitive but constitutionally questionable, reflecting a government increasingly alienated from the ideals of inclusivity and equity.

The Dangers of Nepotism

Nepotism is more than a moral failure—it is a national threat. When state appointments are driven by clan affiliation rather than competence or merit, the result is a government that lacks diversity, credibility, and trust. It alienates citizens, fuels factionalism, and lays the groundwork for political instability.

Moreover, such blatant exclusion risks deepening clan-based grievances that have long fueled Somalia’s internal conflicts. For a nation still grappling with reconciliation and healing, leadership that favors one subclan over the rest sends a dangerous and divisive message.

Leadership or Clan Stewardship?

A president is not a clan elder. He is a national figurehead, elected to represent every Somali regardless of lineage. When presidential decisions are dictated by tribal lines, the sanctity of the office is compromised. The optics of the Kampala delegation make it appear as if the presidency is being used to serve narrow interests rather than the Somali public at large.

This situation begs the question: what message does this send to other clans and communities? That they are not part of the Somali state? That they have no place in diplomacy, governance, or policy? This exclusionary approach only reinforces feelings of marginalization and could dangerously erode any remaining trust in central governance.

Toward Inclusive Governance

Somalia cannot afford to treat national institutions as extensions of clan structures. If genuine nation-building is to take place, there must be a clear and deliberate break from the politics of nepotism and favoritism.

Accountability begins with leadership. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud must be reminded that his mandate is not to serve the Mudulood, but to serve the Somali people. The international community, civil society, and Somali citizens must hold their leaders to higher standards. There must be transparency in government appointments, a commitment to meritocracy, and respect for the multi-clan, multi-ethnic fabric of Somali society.

Conclusion: A Call for Justice

This is a betrayal of public trust, an erosion of national dignity, and a blow to the hopes of a united Somalia. Until leaders rise above clan loyalty and embody the principles of equality and fairness, Somalia will remain trapped in the cycle of division and dysfunction.

Let this moment serve not as an excuse for silence but as a rallying cry for justice.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Date: April 25, 2025
Contact: IsmailWarsame] | iwarsame@ismailwarsame.blog |Tel/WhatsApp +252 90 703 4081

Somali Voices Demand Greater Ownership in EU–Somalia Partnership:

New White Paper Calls for a Shift Toward Transparency and Inclusivity

Mogadishu — A newly published white paper critically examines the EU–Somalia Joint Operational Roadmap, arguing that despite its ambitious goals, major gaps remain in addressing Somalia’s complex realities.

The paper warns against sidelining Federal Member States, ignoring ISIS threats, politicizing aid, and maintaining unaccountable foreign missions. It proposes urgent reforms to align the EU–Somalia partnership with Somali public demands for ownership, federalism, transparency, and concrete outcomes.

“We must move beyond rhetoric and create a true partnership based on Somali leadership and constitutional respect.”

The full white paper is available at https://ismailwarsame.blog. Contact Ismail Warsame at +252 90 703 4081.

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/the-imperative-of-mass-accountability

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/the-erosion-of-somali-sovereignty

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/turkiye-is-exposed-in-somalias-hydrocarbons

Dear Valued Readers,

Thank you for your interest in supporting WDM as a paid subscriber! To join our global community and gain full access to exclusive content, kindly follow the steps below:

Subscription Details:

• Annual Fee: $37 (USD)
• Global Availability: Open to readers worldwide, including Somalia.

Payment Methods:

1. Money Transfer:
   • Send via international money transfer agencies to:
     +252 90 703 4081
     Attention: Ismail H. Warsame
2. Digital Payments:
   • PayPal or Email Transfer to:
     ismail.warsame@yahoo.ca
   • Direct email subscription on https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/

Once your payment is confirmed, you will receive a confirmation email and full access to WDM Annual content.

For assistance, reach out to us at ismailwarsame@gmail.com or ismail.warsame@yahoo.ca.

We are committed to serving you with credible, insightful journalism. Thank you for your support!

Best regards,
Ismail H. Warsame
Chief Editor, WDM

---

Stay informed. Stay connected.

Dear New Subscriber,

A warm welcome to the WDM community! We’re delighted you’re here, thanks to a recommendation from one of our valued subscribers and readers—a testament to the trust they place in our work, and now in you as part of this journey.

You’ve joined us during an exciting time: your exclusive trial promotion grants you full access to WDM’s trusted journalism, stories that matter, and insights you won’t find elsewhere. As a reader-supported media outlet, our mission thrives because of subscribers like you who choose to invest in independent, quality reporting.

This trial period is your invitation to explore, engage, and experience what makes WDM unique. When your promotion ends, we hope you’ll join our family of paid subscribers to ensure our work remains vibrant and sustainable. Your support directly fuels our ability to deliver the stories that inform and inspire our community.

To our longstanding subscribers: thank you for championing WDM and helping us grow. Your referrals strengthen our collective voice.

To our newcomers: dive in, stay curious, and know that your future contribution will make all the difference. We’re here because of readers like you—and we can’t wait to welcome you as an official paid member soon.

With gratitude,
The WDM Team

---

P.S. Questions or feedback? Reach out anytime. We’re here to ensure your WDM experience is worthwhile!

---

Why support WDM?
✅ Sustain independent journalism.
✅ Unlock ad-free, premium content.
✅ Empower stories that drive change.
Together, we keep the newsroom thriving.

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/the-legacy-of-clan-politics-and-ethnic

In an age where digital content floods every corner of the internet, WDM stands apart as a sanctuary for originality. Exclusivity is not merely a policy here—it is a promise. A promise to our readers that every article, essay, and entry they encounter is fresh, unfiltered, and crafted solely for this platform. To our writers, it is a challenge: to dig deeper, think bolder, and trust that their unique voice deserves a space uncluttered by repetition.

The digital world thrives on sharing, but WDM thrives on substance. When work is recycled, its impact dilutes. By prioritizing exclusivity, we reject the commodification of ideas and elevate meaningful dialogue. This is not a restriction but a curation—a deliberate choice to foster a community where quality eclipses quantity.

To those who contribute: your words matter. By offering WDM original work, you honor both your craft and our audience. To our readers: every piece you engage with is a testament to the power of unduplicated thought. Together, we build something rare—a platform where authenticity isn’t an afterthought, but the foundation.

Exclusivity is our pledge to value depth over convenience. Let’s keep it that way.

—The WDM Editorial Team

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/turkeys-role-in-somalia-a-centralized

The recent expulsion of Anna Saleem Högberg, head of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) in Somalia, has unveiled a web of corruption and conspiracy implicating high-ranking Somali officials. While the Somali government cited procedural errors in her expulsion order—a persona non grata (PNG) designation typically reserved for diplomats—the true motives appear rooted in a clandestine financial scheme and retaliation against principled governance. This scandal exposes not only the misuse of power within Somalia’s Prime Minister’s Office but also risks undermining international aid efforts and diplomatic trust.

The Facade of Protocol Errors
In June 2024, Somali authorities expelled Högberg, claiming the PNG letter was mistakenly applied, as she represented a development agency, not a diplomatic mission. Yet their refusal to revoke the letter, despite admitting the error, hints at ulterior motives. Investigations reveal the expulsion followed a contentious Nairobi meeting between Swedish and Somali officials. The Somali delegation, led by Kamal Gutale (Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office) and Prime Minister Hamse Abdi Barre’s advisor, Ahmed Ulex, clashed with Sweden over Högberg’s refusal to funnel $10 million into questionable channels.

The Repatriation Deal and Secret Payments
At the heart of the conflict is a covert agreement to repatriate individuals from Swedish prisons—some convicted of serious crimes, others not even Somali nationals. Sources indicate that Somali officials demanded $10 million in exchange for accepting these returnees. While repatriation programs are not uncommon, the involvement of monetary demands and the Prime Minister’s Office’s direct profiteering reek of extortion.
Högberg initially transferred 4million to the World Bank for development projects, bypassing Somalia’s Central Bank, which lacks transparency and is notorious for graft.This decision, endorsed by Sweden, infuriated Somali officials, who insisted funds be routed through their control. When Hogberg channelled another 6 million to the UNDP—another independent entity—the Prime Minister’s Office retaliated, weaponizing the PNG order to expel her.

Corruption, Conspiracy, and Abuse of Power
The scandal underscores systemic corruption within Somalia’s government. By demanding payments into opaque accounts, officials sought to exploit international aid for personal or political gain. Their readiness to expel a respected aid representative—and the involvement of Prime Minister Barre’s inner circle—suggests high-level collusion. Notably, Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi reportedly approved the PNG order without understanding its basis, highlighting either gross negligence or deliberate obfuscation.
Sweden’s defense of Högberg underscores the legitimacy of her actions. By prioritizing accountability, she exposed a regime more interested in profit than justice or development. The Somali government’s actions not only jeopardize foreign aid but also betray vulnerable citizens reliant on transparent governance.

Implications and the Path Forward
This scandal has dire repercussions. For Somalia, it risks alienating international partners critical to its stability. For Sweden, it raises questions about engaging with corrupt systems. Globally, it exemplifies how aid can be hijacked by predatory elites.
The international community must demand accountability. Investigations into the Prime Minister’s Office’s financial dealings, coupled with pressure to rescind Högberg’s expulsion, are essential. Donors should condition aid on institutional reforms, ensuring funds reach their intended beneficiaries.

Conclusion
The expulsion of Anna Saleem Högberg is not a bureaucratic misstep but a calculated act of retaliation by officials threatened by transparency. It lays bare a culture of corruption that undermines Somalia’s progress and international partnerships. Only through unwavering accountability and ethical leadership can such cycles be broken—for Somalia’s sake and the integrity of global solidarity.

The fall of Adan Yabaal, a strategic town in Somalia’s Middle Shabelle region, has sent shockwaves through the country’s political and security circles. Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qaeda-linked jihadist group, executed a swift and calculated offensive, overwhelming government forces and captured the town on April 16, 2025. Located roughly 245 kilometres north of Mogadishu, Adan Yabaal has long been a stronghold for government operations against insurgents. Its loss raises a daunting question: could Mogadishu be next?

Who’s Who in Al-Shabaab?

To understand Al-Shabaab’s growing threat, it’s crucial to know the figures driving the organization:

Ahmad Diriye (Abu Ubaidah) – As the emir (leader) of Al-Shabaab since 2014, Diriye has kept the group closely tied to Al-Qaeda and expanded its regional networks.

Mahad Karate – The deputy leader and head of the Amniyat, Al-Shabaab’s feared intelligence wing, which orchestrates assassinations, infiltration, and internal discipline.

Ali Mohamed Rage (Ali Dheere) – The group’s spokesperson and propaganda strategist, responsible for shaping Al-Shabaab’s public messaging and ideology.

Fuad Qalaf (Fuad Shangole) – A seasoned commander on the Shura Council, influential in the group’s expansion toward the Puntland region.

Guled Ilkacase – Recently named head of the military wing, Jabha, Ilkacase is believed to be behind recent tactical offensives, including the push into Middle Shabelle.

Ikrima (Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir) – A top-level planner and facilitator known for his logistical expertise and connections with other terror networks.

This tight-knit leadership allows Al-Shabaab to operate with remarkable discipline and adaptability, despite being under constant pressure from Somali and international forces.

Why Adan Yabaal Matters

Adan Yabaal is more than just a dot on the map. It serves as a logistical hub that connects several key regions and has historically been used by Somali security forces as a staging ground for operations into Al-Shabaab-held territory. Its capture is not just symbolic—it provides Al-Shabaab with a platform to project power closer to Mogadishu and disrupt transport and supply routes in the region.

How Real Is the Threat to Mogadishu?

While it’s too early to predict a full-scale takeover of the capital, there are growing concerns about Al-Shabaab’s increasing momentum:

What Favours Al-Shabaab:

Military Gaps: Somali forces are stretched thin and are grappling with the drawdown of ATMIS (African Union Transition Mission in Somalia).

Local Support in Rural Areas: In some territories, clan grievances and distrust in the federal government create fertile ground for Al-Shabaab recruitment and presence.

Operational Agility: Al-Shabaab’s hit-and-run tactics, suicide bombings, and ambushes are designed to exploit weaknesses without engaging in prolonged battles.

What’s Working Against Them:

Urban Fortifications: Mogadishu is well-defended with a strong security presence and surveillance.

Public Rejection: The population in the capital, weary of extremism and violence, remains largely hostile to Al-Shabaab’s ideology.

International Partnerships: Despite funding issues, the Somali government still enjoys critical support from international partners in terms of intelligence, air support, and training.

What’s Next?

Al-Shabaab’s resurgence in Middle Shabelle is a stark reminder that the group remains one of the most dangerous insurgent movements in Africa. While a full seizure of Mogadishu is unlikely in the immediate future, the fall of Adan Yabaal proves that complacency is not an option.

To prevent further territorial losses, Somalia’s government must move quickly—reorganize its military strategy, enhance local governance, and foster genuine reconciliation with marginalized communities. The fight against Al-Shabaab is no longer just military; it is also political and ideological.

Final Thought:
Al-Shabaab’s eyes may be on Mogadishu, but the battle for Somalia’s soul will be decided in its rural heartlands. Unless those are secured, the threat will keep inching closer to the gates of the capital.

Introduction
The security landscape in South-Central Somalia has deteriorated alarmingly in recent months, marked by the resurgence of Al-Shabab militants and the Somali government’s faltering response. The fall of Adan Yabaal again, a strategic town in the Middle Shabelle region, to Al-Shabab in late 2025—and reports of Somali National Army (SNA) commanders fleeing the battlefield—underscore a crisis of governance and military capability. This essay examines the roots of the escalating violence, the Somali federal government’s controversial handling of the threat, and the implications for regional stability.
Al-Shabab’s Resurgence and Territorial Ambitions
Al-Shabab, an Islamist militant group active since 2006, has capitalized on Somalia’s political fragmentation to regain control of key territories. Despite decades of counterterrorism efforts by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM,  ATMIS, now AUSSOM) and U.S.-backed airstrikes, the group dominates rural areas and increasingly encroaches on urban centers. Their tactics—a blend of guerrilla warfare, taxation systems, and ideological appeals—have enabled them to besiege towns like Adan Yabaal, disrupting supply routes to Mogadishu and emboldening claims of encircling the capital.

Government Incompetence and Deflection
Critics argue that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s administration has downplayed the severity of the threat. The loss of Adan Yabaal, a town critical to securing Middle Shabelle, exposed systemic military weaknesses: poor troop morale, inadequate equipment, and leadership failures. The humiliation of an SNA commander reportedly fleeing on foot during the battle epitomizes these institutional cracks. Instead of addressing these issues, government officials have shifted blame, accusing AUSSOM commanders of sympathizing with militants—a move perceived as scapegoating international partners to mask domestic mismanagement.
Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi’s role in deflecting criticism has drawn particular scrutiny. As the regime’s spokesperson on global platforms, Fiqi has framed the crisis as a failure of the international community rather than a product of Somalia’s governance deficits. This rhetoric risks alienating allies whose support remains crucial for financial aid and security assistance.

Humanitarian and Regional Implications
The security collapse has dire humanitarian consequences. Over 3.8 million Somalis are displaced, and Al-Shabab’s blockade tactics restrict aid access, exacerbating famine risks. Meanwhile, the group’s cross-border ambitions threaten regional stability, with Kenya and Ethiopia facing recurrent attacks.

International Community at a Crossroads
The Somali government’s accusations against AUSSOM complicate the already fraught transition, which aims to gradually transfer security responsibilities to Somali forces. However, the SNA’s unreliability and political infighting have stalled this process. The U.S. and EU, key funders of Somalia’s security sector, now demand accountability for their investments, urging reforms to curb corruption and improve military oversight.

Pathways to Stability
A sustainable solution requires a dual approach: robust international support paired with Somali-led governance reforms. Strengthening local governance, integrating clan militias into formal security structures, and addressing grievances that fuel Al-Shabab’s recruitment are critical. The international community must balance pressure for accountability with sustained engagement to prevent state collapse.

Conclusion
The crisis in South-Central Somalia is a stark reminder of the costs of political short-sightedness. President Mohamoud’s administration must confront internal rot rather than externalize blame. Without urgent reforms, Somalia risks descending into another cycle of violence, with devastating repercussions for its people and the Horn of Africa. The window for action is narrowing, but a coordinated strategy prioritizing governance and inclusivity could yet steer the nation toward stability.

The Somali National Army (SNA), tasked with defending the nation against insurgency and restoring state authority, stands as a symbol of both hope and despair. Under the DamulJadiid administration, the SNA has been crippled by systemic mismanagement, clan-based politicization, chronic underfunding, and a lack of cohesive national identity. These factors have rendered the army ineffective in countering Al-Shabaab’s relentless insurgency, while deepening public distrust and international skepticism. This essay examines the structural and operational failures of the SNA, arguing that without urgent reforms, the army will remain incapable of fulfilling its constitutional mandate.
Clan-Based Recruitment and the Erosion of National Unity.

A critical flaw in the SNA’s structure is its recruitment strategy, which disproportionately draws from a single clan, undermining its legitimacy as a national institution. Historically, Somali military forces have been fragmented along clan lines, but the DamulJadiid administration’s reliance on clan loyalty to consolidate power has exacerbated this division. By prioritizing one clan in recruitment and promotions, the SNA has alienated other communities, fostering perceptions of the army as a partisan entity rather than a guardian of the nation. This lack of inclusivity weakens morale, discourages cross-clan cooperation, and fuels grievances that Al-Shabaab exploits to recruit disenfranchised youth. A military that mirrors Somalia’s clan divisions cannot unify the country or command broad public support.
Chronic Underfunding and Operational Paralysis
The SNA’s operational capacity is severely hampered by financial neglect. Soldiers endure months of unpaid salaries, dilapidated equipment, and inadequate logistics, leaving them vulnerable in combat. While Al-Shabaab leverages illicit financing to sustain its operations, the SNA struggles to procure basic supplies, such as ammunition, medical kits, and vehicles. This disparity has dire consequences: demoralized soldiers often desert their posts or collude with militants for survival. Moreover, the absence of air support, intelligence infrastructure, and modern weaponry leaves the SNA outgunned in asymmetrical warfare. Underfunding is not merely a budgetary issue but a strategic failure, reflecting the government’s inability to prioritize national security over political patronage.
Political Interference and the Collapse of Command.

The SNA’s chain of command has been repeatedly undermined by political interference. Military appointments are often based on clan allegiance or loyalty to the DamulJadiid elite rather than merit, resulting in inexperienced leadership and incoherent strategies. Politicians routinely override military decisions for short-term gains, such as delaying offensives to appease clans or diverting resources to secure votes. This meddling has led to catastrophic battlefield losses, including the 2023 fall of key bases in Galmudug and Hirshabelle, where Al-Shabaab overran SNA positions due to poor coordination and last-minute political directives. Such interference erodes discipline and perpetuates a culture of impunity, where accountability is absent.
Strained Relations with International Partners.

The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the UN-supported AUSSOM have long underpinned Somalia’s security framework. However, their partnership with the SNA is marred by mistrust and condescension. ATMIS officials often sideline SNA commanders in planning operations, viewing them as incompetent or corrupt. This patronizing dynamic fosters dependency rather than empowerment, leaving the SNA ill-prepared to assume security responsibilities as ATMIS withdraws. Furthermore, international donors, wary of mismanagement, channel resources through parallel structures, bypassing the SNA entirely. This cycle of marginalization stifles institutional growth and perpetuates the army’s reliance on external actors.

Conclusion: A Failing Institution in a Fragile State.
The Somali National Army, as currently constituted, is a microcosm of Somalia’s broader governance crisis. Clan favoritism, financial neglect, political exploitation, and international skepticism have coalesced into an existential threat to the army’s viability. Without radical reforms—including inclusive recruitment, depoliticization of command structures, increased budgetary transparency, and equitable international partnerships—the SNA will remain incapable of defeating Al-Shabaab or securing Somalia’s future. The DamulJadiid administration’s failure to address these issues not only jeopardizes national security but also risks entrenching Somalia’s status as a perpetually fragmented state. The choice is stark: rebuild the SNA as a truly national institution, or accept its collapse—and with it, the collapse of hopes for lasting stability.

The long-standing aspiration for Somaliland’s independence has recently been overshadowed by a growing pattern of regional destabilization and troubling allegations of collusion with extremist groups. Once viewed as a model of relative stability in the Horn of Africa, Somaliland’s territorial ambitions, particularly over the contested SSC-Khatumo region, have resulted in significant political fallout and increased regional isolation.

The Crumbling Claims Over SSC-Khatumo

Somaliland’s territorial claims over SSC-Khatumo (Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn regions) have long been contested by local populations and rival administrations. Recent developments have seen Somaliland’s grip over these regions falter dramatically. Widespread resistance, particularly from the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans, has delegitimized Somaliland’s authority in the area. The failure to secure SSC-Khatumo through military means or political dialogue marks a critical blow to Somaliland’s secessionist ambitions and calls into question its ability to function as a viable state across diverse clan territories.

Internal Discontent and Regional Disintegration

Meanwhile, discontent is spreading to other regions under Somaliland’s control. The Awdal region, dominated by the Gadabuursi clan, is experiencing a resurgence of anti-Hargeisa sentiment, with increasing calls for self-determination and alignment with federal Somalia. Similarly, the Issa clan in the far western part of Somaliland maintains stronger ties to neighboring Djibouti than to Hargeisa, further eroding national unity. These fractures reflect the inability of the Somaliland administration to foster inclusive governance and accommodate the diverse aspirations of its constituent regions.

Regional Fallout: Ethiopia and the Berbera Port

Somaliland’s once-promising commercial relationship with Ethiopia, particularly through the Berbera Port, is also deteriorating. Recent hostilities involving Ethiopia’s Somali Region (Region Five) and suspicion around Somaliland’s military posturing have made Ethiopia reassess its strategic partnerships. The viability of Berbera Port as a regional trade hub is being undercut by rising insecurity and mistrust, threatening one of Somaliland’s few economic lifelines.

Alarming Allegations of Extremist Collaboration

Perhaps most concerning are the grave allegations implicating Somaliland authorities in the support of terrorist networks. Intelligence sources and regional actors have accused elements within Somaliland’s leadership of facilitating the movement of ISIS and Al-Shabaab fighters, especially through territory under their control. The Galgala mountains in Puntland have reportedly become a theater of conflict fueled by such movements, with fleeing fighters from Calmiskaad using Somaliland-administered corridors to regroup. Even more alarming are reports that foreign fighters are finding safe passage through Somaliland, and that some Al-Shabaab leadership hail from Somaliland regions.

While these allegations require thorough investigation, the optics are damaging. The perceived support or tolerance for terrorist elements undermines Somaliland’s claims to sovereignty and further alienates potential international supporters. Alleged celebrations by some Somaliland-affiliated political actors over Al-Shabaab victories in south-central Somalia only compound these concerns.

The Path Forward: Countering the Threat

To address these destabilizing trends, a multi-pronged approach is essential:

1. Independent Investigations: The Federal Government of Somalia and international actors must support independent investigations into the alleged collaboration between Somaliland authorities and extremist groups. Transparency is key to either validating or refuting these serious accusations.

2. Regional Cooperation: Somaliland must engage constructively with Puntland, Djibouti, and Ethiopia to restore trust and promote regional stability. This includes intelligence sharing and border security coordination.

3. Internal Dialogue and Federalism: A political solution to Somaliland’s internal fractures requires inclusive dialogue that recognizes the autonomy and aspirations of regions like Awdal and SSC-Khatumo. Federalism may offer a viable path toward decentralization and coexistence under the Somali state.

4. Counterterrorism Efforts: The Somali government, with international partners, must prioritize counterterrorism operations in Galgala and surrounding regions. Disrupting the flow of fighters and resources through Somaliland territory is essential to regional security.

5. Sanctions and Accountability: Should investigations confirm collaboration with terrorist groups, targeted sanctions against implicated Somaliland officials must be considered. Accountability will be a deterrent against future collusion.

Conclusion

The dream of Somaliland independence has lost its moral high ground in the face of regional unrest, rising secessionist sentiments within its own borders, and troubling links to extremist networks. The destabilization attributed to Somaliland authorities poses a grave threat to the peace and security of Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa. Reversing this dangerous trajectory requires firm regional cooperation, international vigilance, and a recommitment to inclusive governance. Only then can Somalia chart a path toward unity and stability.

In 1991, the collapse of the Somali government thrust the country into a state of chaos, pushing hundreds of thousands of Somalis to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, especially Kenya. This mass displacement marked the beginning of a long and painful journey for a nation that, decades later, remains trapped in cycles of instability, corruption, and failed statehood. While international efforts have aimed at reviving Somalia, a paradox has emerged—many Somalis who once fled the country now return from overseas not to rebuild it, but in some cases to exploit it, investing instead in Kenya and other more stable regions while serving as ineffective or self-serving officials in Somalia. This dual reality highlights the contradictions at the heart of the Somali diaspora’s relationship with their homeland.

The Refugee Experience and Initial Flight

The fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991 unleashed a torrent of civil strife that disintegrated Somalia’s central government. Clan warfare, famine, and lawlessness left the country in ruins. Kenya, sharing a porous border and cultural ties, became a primary destination for Somali refugees. Camps such as Dadaab grew rapidly, becoming one of the world’s largest refugee settlements. While some Somalis remained in Kenya, many others sought asylum in Western countries—Europe, North America, and Australia—where they gained education, wealth, and a renewed sense of security.

Efforts at Revival and Repeated Collapse

Over the years, Somalia has seen repeated attempts at political reconstruction. Transitional governments were formed, peace agreements signed, and international conferences hosted. Yet, each effort has often ended in disillusionment. Corruption, weak institutions, external interference, and clan-based politics have continually sabotaged progress. The leaders meant to steer the country toward stability have frequently failed, focusing more on short-term gain than long-term nation-building.

The Return of the Diaspora: Hope or Harm?

In recent years, a new trend has emerged: Somalis from the diaspora returning to play political, economic, and administrative roles in Somalia. While this could be seen as a hopeful development, the reality is more complex. Many returnees come not to sacrifice or serve, but to benefit. They arrive with foreign passports, foreign education, and sometimes foreign interests, securing powerful positions within Somalia’s fragile government. Yet rather than strengthening the state, many contribute to its dysfunction—entrenched in corruption, detached from the people, and unaccountable due to their ties abroad.

Simultaneously, these same individuals invest heavily in Kenya. Nairobi’s Eastleigh neighborhood, for example, has transformed into a booming business hub driven by Somali capital. Real estate, import-export businesses, and banking ventures flourish, yet this wealth is not reinvested in Somalia. Kenya, ironically, benefits more from Somali enterprise than Somalia itself. This is the core of the paradox: those who fled a failed state, having gained success abroad, return not to fix what was broken, but to participate in its continued failure while building futures elsewhere.

The Identity Crisis and National Accountability

This situation reveals a deeper identity crisis within the Somali diaspora. For many, Somalia is an emotional homeland, but not a political or economic priority. It is a place of heritage, not responsibility. This mindset allows for a dangerous disconnection: one can hold a Somali title, govern Somali people, and wield Somali power—while living, spending, and investing abroad. It creates a hollow government: Somali in name, but lacking the will, courage, or sincerity to uplift its own nation.

Conclusion: Learning From History or Repeating It

The story of Somalia over the past three decades is a lesson in the dangers of unaccountable leadership, fractured identity, and misplaced priorities. The diaspora has a vital role to play in Somalia’s future, but that role must be rooted in genuine commitment to the country’s reconstruction, not just exploitation of its resources and status. If history is to stop repeating itself, Somalis—both at home and abroad—must reckon with this paradox and make a conscious choice: to rebuild Somalia not just in name or nostalgia, but in action, sacrifice, and accountability.

1. Al-Shabaab Captures Strategic Town in Middle Shabelle, Somalia

Al-Shabaab militants have captured a key strategic town of Adan Yabaal in the Middle Shabelle region, marking a significant escalation in the group’s operations across South-Central Somalia. This town, situated along a vital corridor for movement and supply, had been under government control in recent months and played a critical role in the federal campaign to reclaim territory from the insurgents.

The fall of this town underscores the growing momentum of Al-Shabaab in central Somalia and raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of the Somali National Army and its allied clan militias. Humanitarian sources indicate that thousands have begun fleeing the area amid fears of reprisals and instability. The group’s ability to retake such ground points to tactical weaknesses within government operations and persistent logistical challenges.

New reports today suggest that these gains have sparked widespread fear in the capital, Mogadishu, with foreign expatriates and diplomats housed in the heavily fortified Halane International Compound reportedly fleeing the city throughout the day and night. The exodus signals mounting concern among the international community about the deteriorating security landscape, and possibly foreshadows a shift in foreign engagement if the capital itself comes under threat.

—

2. Puntland Electoral Commission (PEC) Members Accused of Selling Registration Data

At least three members of the Puntland State Electoral Commission are under investigation after being accused of selling voter registration data to the Federal Government in Mogadishu, according to Gaylan Media. This explosive allegation has provoked strong political backlash and raised serious concerns over data privacy, electoral integrity, and interference in regional governance.

The move is seen by some Puntland officials and observers as an attempt by federal actors to assert influence in Puntland’s internal electoral processes. If verified, the accusations could spark a constitutional showdown between the Puntland administration and the federal authorities.

Civil society groups, opposition leaders, and international observers are calling for an independent inquiry and for measures to ensure the integrity of electoral processes in all federal member states.

—

3. Somali Ambassador to U.S. Promotes Sool Oil Blocks Under Federal Control

Somali Ambassador to the United States, Hassan Nur “Cadami”, has briefed American oil firms that exploration blocks in the Sool region—part of the SSC-Khatumo territory—fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government of Somalia and are now open to foreign investment.

This statement, delivered during meetings with U.S. energy representatives in Washington, is a bold assertion of federal authority over contested territories and is likely to inflame tensions with both the SSC-Khatumo administration and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, both of which lay claim to the region.

Analysts warn that Cadami’s remarks may destabilize already fragile federal-regional relations and provoke backlash from local authorities who view such moves as undermining autonomy and violating the principle of equitable resource sharing. The move, however, also signals Mogadishu’s growing push to court international investment in the oil and gas sector as a pathway toward economic revitalization.

—

4. Electoral Violence Disrupts Registration in Shagaani District, Banadir

Electoral registration activities in the Shagaani District of Banadir Region were violently disrupted today after unknown assailants attacked registration centers. Reports confirm that essential materials were destroyed or looted, while election officials fled the scene.

This appears to be a coordinated attempt to sabotage the democratic process in one of the capital’s most densely populated districts. The attack could delay or derail preparations for local elections and raises fears of further political violence or interference.

Authorities have vowed to restore operations and pursue those responsible, but the incident highlights the vulnerability of Somalia’s democratic institutions, especially in urban zones where control is fragmented and political tensions remain high.

https://www.facebook.com/share/v/19VFp6C8mM/

—

Conclusion

The security and political landscape in Somalia is entering a period of heightened volatility. Al-Shabaab’s territorial gains, political corruption in Puntland, federal overreach in resource allocation, and the disruption of democratic activities all point to a fragile state under multiple pressures.

The flight of foreign diplomats and personnel from Mogadishu is a particularly stark signal of how seriously the international community is viewing the current deterioration. Without immediate and coordinated responses from both Somali actors and their international partners, the country risks descending into deeper instability.

The world is undergoing a seismic shift in political and economic dynamics. The Western world, once seen as the pillar of global stability and prosperity, is now facing growing internal crises—economic stagnation, political division, and declining global influence. The prolonged Ukraine war has exposed both the financial and strategic limits of Western countries. As the war drains Western resources and patience, there are signs that donor fatigue is setting in, with implications far beyond Europe. For countries heavily reliant on external aid—such as Somalia—the question arises: can they survive if Western donor-related assistance disappears?

The Current State of External Assistance in Somalia

Somalia has depended for decades on foreign aid for humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, health, education, and infrastructure development. Organizations like the United Nations, USAID, the European Union, and various NGOs have played a pivotal role in helping Somalia manage crises, from famine to conflict. The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, now AUSSOM), supported largely by Western donors, has been central in fighting al-Shabaab and maintaining fragile stability.

Yet, this aid has often come with challenges—dependency, corruption, lack of long-term strategy, and donor-driven priorities that do not always align with Somali realities. Nonetheless, external assistance has been a lifeline, particularly in times of drought, displacement, and terrorism.

The Cracks in Western Commitment

The war in Ukraine has drained Western treasuries and political focus. Billions of dollars are being poured into military support and humanitarian relief for Ukraine. As inflation rises and domestic social needs intensify, Western voters and governments are increasingly questioning the wisdom of funding faraway conflicts or humanitarian missions. Aid budgets are being cut, peacekeeping missions are being downsized, and “aid fatigue” is becoming more pronounced. Somalia and many other aid-dependent nations risk falling off the global priority list.

Moreover, geopolitical shifts—such as rising nationalism in the West, growing distrust in global institutions, and new power centers like China and the Gulf states—are reshaping aid dynamics. Western hegemony is fading, and with it, the old models of humanitarianism may disappear.

Can Somalia Survive Without Western Aid?

The short answer is: not easily—but not necessarily forever.

Challenges:

1. Security: The Somali government still lacks the military strength to confront al-Shabaab without support. A withdrawal or reduction of external funding for ATMIS could create a security vacuum.

2. Humanitarian Crises: Climate shocks, displacement, and food insecurity would likely worsen without donor-backed relief programs.

3. Economic Stability: Somalia’s economy is fragile, heavily reliant on remittances, livestock exports, and foreign assistance. A sudden aid cut could trigger economic collapse in some sectors.

4. Institutional Fragility: Government institutions remain underdeveloped and often lack the capacity to fill the gap left by international agencies.

Opportunities for Survival:

1. Regional and Islamic World Support: Turkey, Qatar, and the UAE have increasingly stepped in with investment and development aid, often without the heavy political strings attached by the West.

2. Diaspora Power: The Somali diaspora sends over $1.3 billion annually—this remittance economy is resilient and could be a foundation for a more independent financial future.

3. Self-Reliance Movement: With the right leadership and vision, Somalia could harness local entrepreneurship, build agricultural self-sufficiency, and reform governance to reduce dependency.

4. Alternative Alliances: A multipolar world may allow Somalia to diversify its partnerships—China, the Gulf, or even African regional blocs may become more influential players.

The Path Forward: From Survival to Sovereignty

Somalia must begin preparing for a post-Western aid world. That means investing in local governance, encouraging private sector growth, building domestic revenue systems, and enhancing regional cooperation. Civil society, the business community, and the diaspora must be empowered to play larger roles. External aid, if it continues, should shift from emergency response to capacity building.

The West’s decline may be a wake-up call—a painful but necessary turning point that forces Somalia to embrace a new era of self-determination. Survival is not guaranteed, but with strategic planning, Somalia can pivot from fragile dependence to resilient independence.

Every so often, a book comes along that doesn’t just tell a story—it redefines how we think about courage, leadership, and what’s truly possible in the fight against terrorism. The Sword That Broke Terror is that book.

Set against the harsh backdrop of northern Somalia’s Calmiskaad mountains, this 400-page powerhouse chronicles how Puntland, an often-overlooked region, pulled off one of the most stunning counterterrorism victories in recent memory. With no support from Somalia’s federal government, minimal resources, and a heavily fortified ISIS enemy, Puntland’s forces achieved what some of the world’s strongest militaries couldn’t.

What makes this book so compelling isn’t just the action (though there’s plenty of that—think mountain raids, drone warfare, and night assaults). It’s the broader message: that victory doesn’t always come from numbers or high-tech gear. Sometimes, it comes from unity, grit, and fearless leadership.

The book doesn’t shy away from making bold comparisons—drawing sharp lines between Puntland’s triumph and the failures of more powerful nations like the U.S. in Afghanistan or Nigeria’s ongoing struggle with Boko Haram. These comparisons are sobering but necessary, and they elevate the story from regional success to global significance.

Beyond the battlefield, The Sword That Broke Terror dives into political dysfunction, especially highlighting the Somali federal government’s two-decade struggle against Al-Shabaab. It’s a tough but fair critique, backed by facts and history.

Why you should read it:

It’s inspiring and deeply relevant.

It challenges assumptions about power and military effectiveness.

It tells a story that the world has largely ignored—but desperately needs to hear.

Whether you’re into military history, African affairs, or just love stories about underdogs flipping the script, this book is a must-read.

Bottom line:
The Sword That Broke Terror is not just a book. It’s a wake-up call—and a reminder that sometimes, the strongest sword is forged not in steel but in unity, determination, and the will to fight for what’s right.

The cancellation of this year’s Somali National Army Day (April 12) marks a sobering moment for Somalia, underscoring the profound struggles facing its armed forces. The decision, attributed to shortages of personnel, funding, and equipment, is not merely a logistical setback but a symbolic indictment of the systemic issues plaguing the nation’s security apparatus. This development reflects decades of instability, underscoring the urgent need for comprehensive reforms to stabilize a country still grappling with existential threats.

Historical Context and the Army’s Role

Since the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalia has endured cycles of conflict, warlordism, and insurgency. The Somali National Army (SNA), once a symbol of national pride, disintegrated during this period, leaving the country vulnerable to fragmentation. Efforts to rebuild the SNA over the past two decades have been central to restoring state authority, particularly in the fight against Al-Shabaab, the Islamist militant group that controls swathes of rural Somalia. The SNA’s role extends beyond combat; it is a pillar of state legitimacy, critical to securing governance, elections, and public trust.

The Triad of Crises

1. Personnel Shortages: The SNA’s capacity is hamstrung by a lack of trained soldiers. Factors include low recruitment, high casualty rates, desertions due to unpaid salaries, and competition from regional forces and militias. Reports suggest that the SNA’s operational strength is far below the projected 20,000 troops needed, with many units existing only on paper.
2. Funding Deficits: Somalia’s government, burdened by limited domestic revenue and debt, relies heavily on international donors to fund its security sector. Corruption and mismanagement exacerbate the problem, with leaked audits revealing that stipends for soldiers often vanish before reaching frontline troops. This financial precarity undermines morale and operational effectiveness.
3. Equipment Gaps: Outgunned by Al-Shabaab, which profits from illicit taxation and smuggling, the SNA lacks modern weapons, armored vehicles, and communication systems. Soldiers frequently report entering battles with outdated gear, placing them at a severe disadvantage.

Broader Security Implications

The SNA’s weaknesses have dire consequences. Al-Shabaab continues to launch devastating attacks, including recent assaults on military bases and hotels in Mogadishu. The army’s reliance on the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, now AUSSOM) and foreign donors—such as the U.S., Turkey, and the EU—highlights a precarious dependency. While international partners provide training and equipment, their support is often inconsistent or undermined by local corruption.

Moreover, the cancellation of Army Day erodes morale and public confidence. The event, meant to honor sacrifices and foster unity, instead becomes a reminder of institutional neglect. For soldiers risking their lives without adequate pay or protection, this symbolic blow may deepen disillusionment.

Pathways to Reform

Addressing these challenges requires a multi-pronged approach:

• Security Sector Reform: Streamlining the SNA’s structure, improving accountability, and professionalizing ranks through rigorous training.
• Domestic Revenue Mobilization: Expanding tax collection and combating corruption to reduce reliance on volatile foreign aid.
• International Coordination: Ensuring donor funds are transparently managed and aligned with Somalia’s priorities, not external agendas.
• Community Engagement: Winning local support by integrating clan militias into formal structures and addressing grievances that fuel Al-Shabaab’s recruitment.

Conclusion

The cancellation of Somali National Army Day is a poignant metaphor for a nation at a crossroads. While the government has made security a stated priority, progress remains hamstrung by systemic dysfunction. Without urgent reforms, the SNA’s vulnerabilities will persist, leaving Somalia trapped in a cycle of fragility. The international community must recalibrate its support, but ultimately, Somalia’s future hinges on its ability to forge a resilient, sovereign security force—one capable of defending its people and reclaiming its dignity.

Andrew J. Bacevich’s the Age of Forever Wars is a critical examination of the failures of modern military strategy, particularly in the context of America’s prolonged and inconclusive conflicts in the Middle East and beyond. A retired Army colonel and historian, Bacevich argues that the U.S. has entered an era of endless warfare, where traditional notions of victory and defeat no longer apply—yet policymakers continue to rely on military force as a primary tool of statecraft.

Key Themes and Arguments

1. The Illusion of Victory – Bacevich dismantles the idea that modern wars can be “won” in the conventional sense. From Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. has repeatedly misjudged the political and cultural complexities of its interventions, leading to quagmires rather than decisive outcomes.
2. Militarized Foreign Policy – The book critiques the over-reliance on military solutions for geopolitical problems. Bacevich highlights how the post-9/11 era saw an unprecedented expansion of U.S. military engagements, often with little strategic coherence or measurable success.
3. The Costs of Forever War – Beyond battlefield casualties, Bacevich emphasizes the financial, moral, and societal toll of perpetual conflict. The trillions spent on war, the erosion of civil liberties, and the normalization of endless deployments have, in his view, weakened rather than strengthened American security.
4. Strategic Myopia – The U.S. foreign policy establishment, Bacevich argues, suffers from a failure to adapt. Instead of reevaluating failed strategies, leaders double down on militarism, driven by institutional inertia, defense industry influence, and a misguided belief in American exceptionalism.

Strengths and Weaknesses

Bacevich’s analysis is sharp, well-researched, and persuasive, particularly in his critique of the bipartisan consensus favoring military intervention. His personal experience as a career soldier lends credibility to his arguments.

However, some readers may find his pessimism overwhelming. While he effectively diagnoses the problem, his proposed solutions—greater restraint, diplomatic engagement, and redefining national security—remain broad and face significant political obstacles.

Conclusion

The Age of Forever Wars is a vital read for anyone concerned with U.S. foreign policy and military strategy. Bacevich’s sobering assessment forces a reckoning with the reality that more firepower does not equate to lasting success. In an era where new conflicts continually emerge, his call for a fundamental rethink of America’s approach to war is both timely and necessary.

Rating: 4.5/5 – A compelling, if grim, analysis that challenges conventional wisdom on warfare and security.