Somalia 2024: Fractured States, Foreign Patrons, and the Looming Storm of Conflict

Somalia 2024: Fractured States, Foreign Patrons, and the Looming Storm of Conflict

Puntland’s Bold Gambit: Autonomy, ISIS, and the SSC-Khatumo Flashpoint
In a seismic shift, Puntland severed ties with Mogadishu in January 2023, declaring itself an “independent government” in protest against constitutional amendments centralizing power. President Said Abdullahi Deni, buoyed by UAE patronage and Ethiopian security cooperation, now positions Puntland as a kingmaker in Somali politics. His ambitions clash directly with SSC-Khatumo, a union of the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn regions demanding self-rule. SSC-Khatumo’s quest for autonomy has turned the Sool region into a battleground, with Puntland and Somaliland forces clashing as recently as February 2024. Deni’s critics accuse him of prioritizing UAE-backed port projects (e.g., Bosaso) over resolving local grievances, risking a prolonged conflict that could draw in clans and foreign actors.

New Frontlines: Puntland’s War on ISIS and Territorial Control
Puntland is mobilizing for a major offensive against ISIS-Somalia factions entrenched in the Cal-Madow and Galgala mountains—a strategic corridor near contested Somaliland territories. ISIS, though smaller than Al-Shabaab, has exploited governance vacuums since 2015, using smuggling routes to fund attacks. Deni’s campaign, backed by UAE logistics and Ethiopian intelligence, aims to neutralize ISIS while asserting territorial claims. Success could bolster Puntland’s sovereignty narrative but risks inflaming tensions with Somaliland, which views Galgala as part of its Sanaag region. Meanwhile, SSC-Khatumo leaders warn that the offensive may displace clans and deepen marginalization, further destabilizing the north.

Somaliland’s Geopolitical Play: Ethiopia’s Port Deal and Internal Repression
Somaliland’s January 2024 MoU with Ethiopia—granting naval access in exchange for potential recognition—marked a geopolitical coup for President Muse Bihi. The deal, tacitly backed by the UAE (a key investor in Berbera port), has angered Mogadishu and Puntland. However, Bihi’s authoritarian crackdown on dissent in Sool and Aynabo, where SSC-Khatumo support runs deep, threatens to ignite broader unrest. Somaliland’s reliance on UAE funds and Ethiopian security ties risks alienating clans caught between Hargeisa’s repression and Puntland’s intervention.

Jubaland: The Tinderbox of Gedo
Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe’s feud with Mogadishu over control of the Gedo region has reached a boiling point. The Federal Government insists on deploying Somali National Army (SNA) units to secure the area for elections and counter Al-Shabaab, but Madoobe, backed by Ethiopian troops and UAE-funded militias, frames this as federal overreach. A February 2024 standoff near Beled Hawo underscores the volatility. Analysts warn that open conflict in Gedo could cripple counterterrorism efforts, allowing Al-Shabaab to exploit clan divisions and smuggling routes.

Central Somalia Under Siege: Al-Shabaab’s Resurgence
While northern conflicts dominate headlines, central Somalia faces escalating threats:

• Hirshabelle: Al-Shabaab’s late 2023 offensive in Hiraan region exposed federal weaknesses, with militants seizing villages and taxing supply routes to Ethiopia. Clan militias, nominally allied with the SNA, lack coordination, enabling the group to exploit Hawadle-Jajele sub-clan disputes.
• Galmudug: Galmudugh is unraveling as Al-Shabaab exploits local grievances between fractious Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a militia and regional authorities. Galmudugh and Hirshabelle regional states exist merely on the federal government’s lifeline.

Foreign Patrons: UAE and Ethiopia’s Divide-and-Conquer Tactics

• UAE: Abu Dhabi’s “ports-and-proxy” strategy invests in Berbera (Somaliland) and Bosaso (Puntland) to counter Turkish/Qatari influence. By backing Deni, Bihi, and Madoobe, the UAE ensures control over trade chokepoints.
• Ethiopia: Landlocked Addis Ababa prioritizes port access (Berbera, Kismayo) and security, backing Somaliland and Jubaland despite undermining Mogadishu.

Mogadishu’s Impossible Calculus
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government faces intersecting crises:

• Election Chaos: Disputes over the 2024 suffrage model threaten a repeat of the 2020 clan-vetted indirect elections.
• Foreign Meddling: UAE-Ethiopia alliances weaken federal authority, while Turkey and Egypt vie for influence via military aid.
• Al-Shabaab’s Resilience: Despite U.S. support, federal forces struggle to project power beyond cities, leaving rural zones to militants and underpaid militias.

The Storm Ahead: Fragmentation or Confederation?
Somalia’s instability is no longer local. As regional leaders prioritize foreign patrons over unity, the nation risks morphing into a confederation of client states. The SSC-Khatumo revolt, Puntland-Somaliland clashes, and Jubaland’s defiance could spark a perfect storm of interstate warfare, electoral crises, and insurgent resurgence. For ordinary Somalis, already weary of decades of strife, 2024 may bring neither peace nor progress—only deeper entanglement in global power struggles.

Why This Matters: The Horn of Africa’s stability hinges on Somalia. With the Red Sea a theater of U.S.-China rivalries and Middle Eastern power plays, the world can ill afford another collapse. Whether Somali elites reconcile or remain pawns will determine the fate of millions—and the security of one of the world’s most strategic waterways.