First and foremost, there is no technical candidate in Somalia more qualified in civil engineering than Dr. Eng Abdulkadir Janagale, the dismissed chairperson of Puntland Highway Authority. I know he has a track record of achievements in multiple technical qualifications both in the USA and Canada. Whether he fits into the Administration of President Said Abdullahi Deni is completely another issue. Eng Janagale, however, had administrative issues with a number of Puntland State departments. He was known to have submitted Authority’s complaints to the attention of highest authorities in the land, including the House of Representatives. Instead of looking into the matter and finding the problem therein, Janagale was sacked summarily. This looks like triger-happy approach to fire a senior civil servant without due process. It makes no sense and it is certainly an arbitrary action to avenge his resorting to media coverage of his agency’s difficulties with a number of influential ministers in Puntland Cabinet.
The State President is the ultimate arbiter for justice in internal departmental conflicts. There are written job descriptions to follow as guidelines for sorting out cross-cutting issues of various departments. Here the ministry of finance can have no issue with the public works of PHA beyond collecting agency’s levies and dispensing them as required to the Authorities.
People of Puntland State expects from President Deni to strengthen public institutions, not weaken them. The case of Puntland Highway Authorities requires investigation and a just solution to the problems courageously exposed by Dr. Abdulkadir Ali Hersi Janagale. PHA, historically known as NESHA (NORTHEAST HIGHWAY AUTHORITY) is the oldest parastatal agency in Puntland, being established long before Puntland foundation. It is an historic institution that needs care and consideration. According to Eng Janagale in his recent press statement, the agency has become a dumping ground for undesirable persons from other departments and a spot for the creation of unrequired jobs to fill in unavailable vacancies on patronage.
A few international partners would be willing to deal with PHA now because of this government interference. The Agency has lost its semi-independent status and its board of directors deemed ineffective or dysfunctional. The previous Gaas Administration also had fired the PHA Managing Director with devastating outcome for the Agency.
Apart from artificial and fabricated historical distortions of facts, peoples of Puntland and Somaliland have more in common in their political, economic and cultural cooperation than anything that divides them. Despite persistent anti- Majertein propaganda promoted by opportunistic politicians from deep Southern Somalia, and those from Somaliland, who were engaged in campaigns to harm the political career of late Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the history of political cooperation between the two far outweighs than other issues that might had divided them. Proximity of geographical location and cultural affinities are also major factors that bind them. The destiny of disputed boundary and its inhabitants are issues that Puntland and Somaliland can alone amicably settle with the consent of the people concerned. The fact that there are disputes of whatever sort make the destiny of the peoples of Puntland and Somaliland intertwined, and therefore, that creates common political interests between the two. To understand this reality requires political maturity and sophistication, discarding the long-held propaganda of fake barriers by opportunistic political elite in Hargeisa.
I have every confidence that enlightened and shrewd politicians from both sides will make politically calculated moves to discover that common interests between Somaliland and Puntland that bind them permanently.
The threat of holding fresh elections everytime there is an intractable political conflict at leadership level is the way forward. The government of the day has to fall and announce fresh elections. This is a political remedy we could to apply to diffuse or resolve recurring political confrontations. Often, in Somalia, the government becomes part of the problem than the solution. It has to disband and gets itsel rid of.
Such mechanism is practised in many parts of the world where there is a democracy. One would ask the question: How would you resolve if the instigator of problem is the Head of the State? Good question. That is why the procedure of impeachment exists in many world jurisdictions. Impeach the President for violations of the articles of the constitution and misdemeanors. This is within the constitutional mandate of the parliament.
Elections are the only way to resolve current political crisis in Mogadishu. Expediate the elections for the Lower House of the Federal Parliament.
These days the social media war between supporters of former President Farmajo and Caretaker Prime Roble has reached new heights. WDM had even issued WARSAXAAFEED (press statement) on the issue.
But, of particular interest is the negative campaign aimed at character assassination against the Prime Minister Roble, alleging his past drug abuse in Sweden – claiming a court conviction against him written in English. First of all, Sweden doesn’t operate in English, and even it were true, drug abuse is a regular occurrence among the youth of Western countries. Most of them there get off the hook after a few years.
Again, if it were true, it meant Farmajo had failed in vetting him for the position of the prime minister of Somalia. It isn’t Roble’s fault. Roble didn’t lie to get elected. He was appointed by the President, whose responsibility was to vet his appointees thoroughly.
And if that were true, the Federal Parliament had had a role in confirming Roble as the Prime Minister.
We spent hours discussing and debating the dynamics of Somali National Peace and Reconciliation Conference that was in progress at time in Embagati, Kenya. I briefed General Muhoozi Kainerugaba to brief his dad, M7 of Uganda, in Kampala. He did a good a job then. He was an army major at the time. This general is not novice to Somali issues and politics of conflict. His intervention now is bad news for current Somali leaders. Remember Villa Somalia, and to a greater extent, Mogadishu, is an occupied institution by AMISOM troops for protection as their core mission to Somalia.
Now, after nearly two decades, notice the style of these meetings in Mogadishu today. Farmajo was met solo, too sensitive session to share with his team. Rooble had the presence of an eyewitness from his team.
A decade ago, Farmajo was a Somali Prime Minister. He was as difficult as he is today moving this country forward. He was asked then by AMISOM and President M7 not to be an obstacle to the TFG Transitional Process. He was removed and replaced eventually. This meeting sounds like Kampala Accord 2.0. It is a national tragedy, however, for foreign generals and soldiers to pay a visit to a Head of State in his own office, perhaps under security threats and sanctions. Shame on Farmajo!
Kenya is on high alert ahead of next month’s judgment on the Indian Ocean boundary dispute with Somalia, which is expected within government circles to be adverse.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) will announce the decision on October 12, ending a protracted case between the two neighbours that the war-torn Horn of Africa nation filed in 2014.
Its verdict is final. The timing of the judgment – it coincides with the 10th anniversary of Kenyan troops storming Somalia to fight the al-Shabaab terrorists – is also being considered a “slap in the face”.
The Nation has learnt Kenya will not accept a hostile ruling and a decision has been taken within the highest level of government to defy the court.
Disregarded
Some of the court’s verdicts have in the past been disregarded, including by the US, which in 2018 rejected the court’s order that sanctions against Iran should not include humanitarian aid or civil aviation safety.
And in 1986, the US had also attacked the court after it ruled America owed Nicaragua war reparations.
Kenya has also vowed not to accept what it considers “an illegitimate process” by an international entity.
“We are proceeding on the assumption that the verdict will be adverse. The manner in which the court conducted itself when dealing with Kenya, including rejecting a string of merited applications, is a key pointer,” a senior Kenyan official told Nation yesterday.
The official went on: “A lot is being done, including security-wise. It’s a matter with huge national security implications. A nation must guarantee the security and wellbeing of its people.”
According to the official, even what would be considered a compromise by the court would involve surrender of a part of the territory, which is unacceptable to Kenya.
Treated unfairly
Kenya contends the court treated it unfairly by rejecting a string of merited applications, including one asking that judge Ahmed Yusuf, a Somali, should step down over conflict of interest.
Justice Yusuf had been at the helm of the court since 2018 and was replaced as president of the ICJ in February by judge Joan Donoghue from the United States.
Kenya has also alleged some world powers with interests in vast minerals within the contested area have been meddling with the case to ensure Somalia, which attempted to sell some oil blocks at an international auction in London, UK, takes over the area.
Nairobi boycotted the ICJ’s public hearings, leaving Somalia to argue its case in one-sided proceedings that closed in March in The Hague.
Bias
Judge Donoghue then announced that even without Kenya’s participation, the court would rely on previous documents filed by Kenya, which accuses the world court of bias.
Before Kenya notified the court of its withdrawal from the case on March 11, it had applied to be allowed to submit new evidence that has been “missing” and is “highly relevant”.
“Most particularly, the Republic of Somalia (“Somalia”), while asserting that its 1988 Maritime Law’s reference to a ‘straight line’ refers to an equidistance line, conveniently failed to produce the map included in the law,” Kenya stated in court papers filed in February.
“This Somali map, which the court should reasonably expect Somalia to produce, is critical since it has the potential of undermining Somalia’s entire claim … Whatever Somalia’s missing map depicts is categorically not an equidistant line.”
Kenya argued that any consideration of the equidistant claim would set a dangerous precedent as it would not only reward Somalia’s belligerent conduct but also had the potential of disturbing already established boundaries, triggering disputes including with neighbouring Tanzania that could escalate to South Africa.
The dispute
As adjacent coastal states facing the Indian Ocean to the east-south east, the maritime claims of Somalia and Kenya overlap, including in the area beyond 200 nautical miles.
The parties disagree about the location of the boundary in the area where their maritime entitlements overlap, according to court records.
Somalia, which filed the case in 2014, argues the maritime boundary between the parties in the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf should be determined in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) Articles 15, 74 and 83, respectively.
Article 15 of Unclos states: “Where the coasts of two states are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two states is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two states is measured.”
But there is a rider. “The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two states in a way which is at variance therewith.”
Article 74 states: “The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between states with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.”
The same provision applies under Article 83 with respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf.
In both instances, the Articles provide where there is an agreement in force between the states concerned, questions relating to the delimitation of both the EEZ and continental shelf shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.
Equidistance principle
Somalia’s argument is based on the use of the equidistance principle as the method of determining states’ maritime boundaries.
Accordingly, Somalia argues, in the territorial sea, the boundary should be a median line since there are no special circumstances that would justify departure from such a line.
With regard to the EEZ and continental shelf, Somalia contends, the boundary should be established according to the three step process that the court has consistently employed in its application of Articles 74 and 83.
But Kenya’s case is that a boundary along the parallel of latitude has developed through the consent of Somalia since 1979.
Since Somalia never protested for that long, Kenya contends that a boundary was established by a tacit agreement between the two states.
Straight line
Accordingly, Kenya’s position on the maritime boundary is that it should be a straight line emanating from the states’ land boundary terminus, and extending due east along the parallel of latitude on which the land boundary terminus sits, through the full extent of the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf, including the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.Close
Kenya measures the breadth of its territorial sea and EEZ from a series of straight baselines covering the full length of its coast.
These baselines were first declared in the 1972 Territorial Waters Act and have been amended from time to time.
Kenya’s submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) is that the outer limit of its continental shelf lies fully 350m from its coast.
Kenya asserts that all its activities including naval patrols, fishery, marine and scientific research as well as oil and gas exploration are within the maritime boundary established by Kenya and respected by both parties since 1979.
However, in 2014, shortly before filing its case with the ICJ, Somalia claimed a maritime boundary along an equidistance line, ignoring the 35-year recognition of the maritime boundary along a parallel of latitude.
Court decision
The court will determine, on the basis of international law, the complete course of the single maritime boundary dividing all the maritime areas appertaining to Somalia and to Kenya in the Indian Ocean, including in the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.
Also, the ICJ judges will determine the precise geographical coordinates of the single maritime boundary in the Indian Ocean.
The judges are Yusuf, Peter Tomka (Slovakia), Ronny Abraham (France), Mohamed Bennouna (Morocco), Antônio Augusto (Brazil), Xue Hanqin (China), Julia Sebutinde (Uganda), Dalveer Bhandari (India), Patrick Robinson (Jamaica), James Crawford (Australia) Nawaf Salam (Lebanon), Iwasawa Yuji (Japan) and Georg Nolte (Germany).
A large delegation from the International Community representing foreign diplomats accredited to Somalia, who are mainly based in Nairobi, Kenya, would visit Puntland on Sunday, according to diplomatic sources.
The delegation led by the Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Somalia, James Swan, will probably focus on election issues, especially women’s quota in the Lower House of the Federal Parliament and political logjam in Mogadishu.
Expediting Federal Elections in Federal Member States, regardless of political confrontations within the leadership of the Federal Government of Somalia, is the main objective of this mission, according to informed sources in Nairobi.
In December 1992, as an infantry platoon commander, I was among the first Marines to land in Mogadishu at the onset of Operation Restore Hope. It was a mission that made sense to me and my fellow Marines at the time: to keep the warring factions in check and enable the delivery of relief supplies to the long-suffering population. Ten months later, after the death of nineteen US servicemen and hundreds of Somalis in the Battle of Mogadishu, that mission seemed much less clear. It dissolved altogether with the withdrawal of US forces in March 1994 and the subsequent collapse of the UN mission less than a year later. Somalia, as prevailing wisdom had it, was an irredeemable disaster, a place destined to wallow in its own misery, where the benefits of intervention were unlikely to be worth the price.
In 2019 and 2020, I returned to Mogadishu, this time as a civilian helping to train officers of the Danab Advanced Infantry Brigade. It was clear to me then why General Stephen Townsend, the commander of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), was able to cite Somalia as a place where the command was seeing real progress. But last December, despite this progress, US troops were withdrawn.
In June of this year, I visited Mogadishu again. Conditions were worse in every respect and the war against al-Shabaab was not going well. Two of the seventeen Somali army officers I had helped train the previous year were dead, and several others seriously wounded. Mogadishu had the feeling of a city under siege.
There are compelling reasons for the United States to reengage in Somalia—an important front in the fight against global extremist networks. Learning from recent mistakes, the United States now has the opportunity to implement a coherent policy to counter this threat and protect its limited but real interests in the region.
Why Somalia?
For the last few months Afghanistan has dominated the headlines, but in East Africa another threat gathers momentum. Since the withdrawal of US forces in December, the al-Qaeda–affiliated organization al-Shabaab has resurged to a position of dominance in Somalia—recapturing lost territory and launching repeated attacks in the capital, Mogadishu. The organization is regarded by AFRICOM as being the most imminent threat to US interests in the region and has recently evinced intent to strike at the homeland. This threat is unlikely to have diminished with the Taliban’s recent victory.
President Joe Biden should reverse his predecessor’s decision to withdraw troops from Somalia, or face increasing regional instability and the not unlikely prospect of al-Shabaab conducting a transnational mass-casualty attack from its Somali sanctuary. Although Biden, like President Donald Trump before him, has pledged to end the “forever wars,” the hesitancy to reengage in Somalia reflects a misunderstanding of the very real threat posed by Salafi-jihadist groups, such as al-Shabaab, once they consolidate their positions locally. It represents a misplaced conviction that what happens on the other side of the world cannot harm US interests, a belief that sadly has been disproven time and again. And it conveys the false perception that the only alternative to getting involved in “forever wars” is a policy of isolationism—rather than a mature strategy of engagement with clear objectives.
In February, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced a global posture review, but the outcome of this review has not been announced, and the president has yet to come to a decision on his plans for the region. One hopes that the review will result in a strategy for Somalia that combines security, political, economic, and diplomatic efforts in a campaign supported by the same light military footprint that was previously having some success. Such an approach offers infinitely better prospects in terms of cost and risk than abrupt disengagement.
What Success Looks Like: A Niche Capability
Until last December, the fight against al-Shabaab was showing progress. A US special operations task force (SOTF), numbering some seven hundred personnel, was achieving results out of proportion to its size. Partnering with a specialized Somali force—the Danab Advanced Infantry Brigade—the SOTF’s mission was to advise its counterparts in operations against al-Shabaab. Although barely the size of a US battalion, the Danab is by far the most capable element of the Somali National Army (SNA), and the only unit involved in offensive operations. It was a partnership that exemplified one of the US military’s “niche capabilities”—a term used by Gen. Townsend in his posture statement to Congress.
The plan was to win back key terrain outside Mogadishu by focusing on the road networks connecting the capital to provincial cities. It was a version of the inkblot strategy, made famous by the French in Vietnam, and widely adopted—at least in theory—by other Western nations since. In this case, the inkblots were the various towns along each route, won back and strong-pointed by the SNA with some support from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), whose troops man a handful of bases in the lower Shabelle valley. Lacking heavy weapons, medics, and organic fire support, the Danab soldiers were largely dependent on their US counterparts. The most substantial support came from a fleet of US Special Operations Command U-28 aircraft, which launched from local airfields to deliver devastatingly accurate fires in support of the Danab. And little by little, despite circumstances that weighed on the side of al-Shabaab, it was happening.
It was an example of how partnering should work: a relationship based on trust, forged by shared goals against an imminent threat. And, for US policymakers, a demonstration of how small units, comprising the right people with responsive air support, can have strategic effect at little cost.
A Policy of Withdrawal leads to Greater Risk
The US SOTF faced obstacles aplenty, perhaps the most stringent of which were self-imposed. Restricted by increasingly limited permissions to accompany their partners, a policy intended to reduce risk, SOTF personnel were, by mid-2019, largely confined to their forward operating bases. Ironically, it may have been this policy that emboldened al-Shabaab into direct attacks. The principle here is a fundamental rule of counterinsurgency—indeed of basic infantry tactics—which is that static units, sitting behind the wire without pushing out into the surrounding area, cede ground and initiative to an aggressive opponent. On the other hand, it could simply be coincidence that, as US forces hunkered down, AFRICOM’s director of intelligence reported “a definitive shift” in al-Shabaab’s plans to attack US interests in the region.
In a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee shortly after the Manda Bay attack, Gen. Townsend described al-Shabaab as “the largest and most kinetically active al-Qa’ida network in the world,” and “the most dangerous to U.S. interests today.” A few months later, President Trump made the decision to withdraw US troops—apparently ignoring AFRICOM’s warning and the hard-learned lessons of the previous year. The move was also a rebuttal to Townsend’s advice to Congress, that “a secure and stable Africa is an enduring American interest.”
The withdrawal, completed by mid-January 2021, couldn’t have happened at a worse time. Al-Shabaab retook much of the country, recapturing the road networks that are the country’s lifelines, and launching frequent attacks against the capital.
Remote Counterterrorism Doesn’t Work
In late July, the United States resumed drone strikes against al-Shabaab after a seven-month hiatus—but these “decapitation” strikes differ in terms of purpose and effect from the use of close air support for a partner-nation force. In any case, the recent flurry of strikes is not likely to be repeated anytime soon due to policy concerns about using deadly force for collective self-defense.
“We’ve developed counterterrorism over-the-horizon capability that will allow us to . . . act quickly and decisively if needed,” President Biden said this month. If only this were true. The idea of being able to destroy our enemies and restore stability from a distance, without risk, is naturally an appealing prospect for any administration, but remains, in reality, a tantalizing chimera. Remote terrorism does not work without an effective force on the ground, especially against insurgent groups with popular support. Somalia fails this test on both counts.
A strategy based on drone strikes reflects a misunderstanding about the nature of the threat. Al-Shabaab is a product of civil war in Somalia—which in turn is caused by a range of social and environmental issues that, until resolved, will be a continual source of instability in the region. In rural areas, young Somalis flock to join al-Shabaab, induced by the remorseless effects of climate change, extreme poverty, and a perception that the Islamists offered terms under a social contract that were more reliable than those of the government. No counterterrorism strategy, however lethal, that fails to address these issues will affect al-Shabaab’s ability to draw on popular support.
The United States Doesn’t Need to Go It Alone
The international coalition whose mission it is to stabilize Somalia includes an African Union force, a United Nations mission, and training missions from the European Union, the UK, and Turkey. One of the ramifications of the US troop withdrawal and subsequent lack of policy direction has been to sap the effectiveness of these potential partners. Concerned about security, UN personnel are confined to their lodgings at Mogadishu’s airport. And though some AMISOM units had previously been willing to venture out on operations with the Danab and their US advisors, they now seldom do so. For our partners, even a light US footprint confers a heavy moral weight.
The British have plans to reinforce their small commitment in Somalia by deploying their newly formed Ranger Regiment. In a recent visit to Fort Bragg, UK Minister of Defense Ben Wallace seemed to be under the impression that in doing so, the British Rangers would be serving alongside US Special Forces. If this turns out not to be the case, it’s unclear how this will affect the decision to deploy the unit to Somalia.
All of this highlights two important points. First, whether the United States wants to acknowledge its position as a global leader, other countries still have that expectation. And second, Washington has the opportunity to reengage in Somalia as part of a coalition effort.
Accordingly, the United States should take the lead in overall coordination—failure to do so would likely result in the same disjointed patchwork of national efforts that caused such confusion in Afghanistan. But each sub-effort—economic assistance, governmental support, development, security, and building partner capacity—should be assigned to a framework, or lead nation.
A Coherent Strategy
Success in Somalia doesn’t mean winning on the battlefield. It means undermining the causes that have led to civil war in the country for the last three decades. It means leading with a coherent strategy that combines political, economic, diplomatic, and security efforts with a light military footprint. It means driving toward a negotiated solution between the government and the federal states and the most powerful clans whose frequent clashes are in themselves a significant source of instability. And it means inducing the Somali government to negotiate with al-Shabaab—providing a political offramp from conflict.
Like the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Houthis in Yemen, al-Shabaab is embedded into the social and political fabric in Somalia, intertwined with the mosaic of clans that form the backbone of Somali society, and at least some of its leaders have shown themselves willing to be part of the political process. And however much effort the United States puts into defeating al-Shabaab militarily, it is unlikely to happen—the group has proven to be remarkably resilient. US airstrikes, which rose significantly under the Trump administration, had little to no effect on al-Shabaab’s ability to conduct offensive operations.
Al-Shabaab has no reason to negotiate unless reduced to a position of disadvantage. Organizations like al-Shabaab—or the Taliban for that matter—derive their popular support not from ideology but from their ability to close the gap between local needs and the local government’s ability or willingness to meet those needs, and herein lies an opportunity to undermine that support.
It may be that the EU or a nation with experience in conducting overseas relief operations, might be induced to lead this effort in Somalia. With Washington contributing financially, and the US and UK militaries advising SNA units in the field, someone else could lead the drive to enable local and federal administrations to provide basic services and—with the support of NGOs—focus on mitigating the conditions that provide support for al-Shabaab.
A coalition—led by the United States in this regard—will need to tie economic support to political incentives for the federal government to do the right things. Failure to do so was one of the US government’s fundamental mistakes in Afghanistan.
AFRICOM has already demonstrated that it is possible to provide effective US military assistance with a light footprint. To sustain the long-term relationships essential for this mission, advisors should deploy in rotation from the same pool of specialized units. They will require responsive air support from the type of low-cost, expeditionary platform that US Special Operations Command plans to field. And the mission must entail advising, but not leading our partners. This is an all-important distinction: the former method, under the right conditions, tends to work; the latter is more likely to fail.
While a small US special operations task force supports our partners in the fight, the coalition military mission will focus on capacity building. Here the UK, with its newly formed Ranger Regiment and experience of leading a similar project in Sierra Leone, would be a good candidate to take the lead. There is an opportunity here to avoid the mistakes of the past, by targeting corruption among senior SNA officers and using biometrics and other assessment methods to verify and track recruitment and training. The same lead-nation approach should be taken with the various nations involved in developing Somalia’s police and law enforcement services.
The Missing Piece
For Washington to implement such a plan abroad requires a functioning foreign policy establishment at home, with unity of effort among all departments and agencies. The outcome of Secretary Austin’s global policy review will be flawed unless it reflects input from stakeholders across government, and a proposal to establish a policy process that relies on close collaboration—from genesis to implementation. This was a fundamental flaw with US policy in Afghanistan: an absence of clear objectives, and a readiness to rely instead on a behemoth but futile military effort.
The precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan should remind us that Washington needs to take stock before labeling every foreign policy commitment as a “forever war” or “nation building,” thus implying intolerable cost. The United States lost fewer than one hundred soldiers over the last five years in Afghanistan—roughly the same number of Americans who die from COVID every two hours. A better approach would be to regard these types of commitment as an insurance policy. If the premiums are affordable and seem like a fair trade when balanced against the worst-case scenarios of not being covered, then the policy makes sense. Afghanistan, arguably, was just such a case, and Somalia undoubtedly so. Perhaps the most consequential deficit in US foreign policy is strategic patience.
As US involvement in Afghanistan ends in tragedy and a welter of recrimination, now is the time to avoid making the same mistakes in the Horn of Africa. We have learned that the deceptive panaceas of troop surges and counterinsurgency by saturation do not work, but neither does remote counterterrorism or influence from a distance. The plan to reengage in the Horn of Africa doesn’t have to be an all-or-nothing decision unless the United States chooses to make it one.
This administration should instead implement a cross-government and multinational plan, supported by a light military footprint. This plan should define objectives, cost, and acceptable levels of risk. Far better to do so upfront, than experience again the irreversible damage that our nation has sustained this past month.
Andrew Milburn retired from the Marine Corps as a colonel in 2019 after a thirty-one-year career. His final position in uniform was deputy commander of Special Operations Command Central, and prior to that commanding officer of the Marine Raider Regiment and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Iraq. Since retiring, he has written a critically acclaimed memoir, When the Tempest Gathers. He is a cohost of the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s Irregular Warfare Podcast. He tweets at @andymilburn8.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
A LOYAL LiEUTETANT OF FARMAJO GETS COOL RECEPTION IN GAROWETODAY
Gamal Hassan, a member of Roble Caretaker Cabinet has received cool reception at Garowe Airport today. The Federal minister of Planning and International Cooperation was on his way to Dhahar in Sanaag Region from Mogadishu to seek re-election.
The poor relationships of Puntland with former president Farmajo have spilled over to this incident, where a number of arrests were reportedly made among a group of persons trying to welcome the minister at Garowe Airport. Despite this incident, officials of Puntland Administration had received Gamal Hassan on arrival at Garowe Airport, put into VIP Hall with his vehicle at doorsteps.
Observers said the minister was targeted for his real or perceived anti-Puntland Government position or sentiments within the Federal Government understood as representing the views of Farmajo towards President Deni’s Administration. The most harmful to the minister’s reputation in Puntland, however, was his reported resistance to the construction of Gara’ad Port on the shores of Indian Ocean in Mudugh Region of Puntland State.
On his way to Dhahar via road, Minister Hassan had had lunch in his honor with Boqor Burhan in the town of Qardho, Karkaar Region. He did receive a warm welcome, though, in Dhahar, his constituency.
The incident in Garowe today involving the minister’s arrival may create hard feelings between Garowe and Dhahar for the way forward. But, given the fact that it is election campaign time, similar incidents should be better avoided in the future.
(This BREAKING NEWS has been updated since posting.)
In this interview, we are speaking with Mr. Stephen M. Schwartz, the former United States Ambassador to Somalia, about the many challenges and opportunities facing countries in the Horn of Africa, including Somaliland.
Somaliland Chronicle:Let’s start with Ethiopia: You have been in the U.S. Foreign Service since 1992 and have been a diplomat in many countries around the world and served as ambassador to Somalia. Is the United States able to exert any pressure including sanctions on the warring parties to cease hostilities and reach a negotiated settlement especially in light of the horrific human rights violations that are being reported from Tigray and possibly other parts of Ethiopia?
Schwartz: From what I see in the public domain the United States government is very concerned about the conflict in Ethiopia, the incendiary language, and the number of people killed, injured, raped, displaced, and in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. Secretary Blinken, USAID Administrator Power, and Special Envoy Feltman have pushed the parties to end hostilities. Unfortunately, it appears that Prime Minister Abiy and some of his allies are unwilling to take a constructive approach to dealing with whatever issue they had with Tigray and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). I expect the United States will continue to look for ways to pressure and persuade Abiy to seek a negotiated solution, and with continued stalemate internally and greater multilateral pressure they might succeed.
Somaliland Chronicle: Ethiopia has been viewed as the elder state in the Horn of Africa and a stabilizing force. Given the current trajectory of the conflict and how it is spreading to other regions such as Amhara and Afar, what implications does the conflict in Ethiopia could have on fragile states such as Somalia where Ethiopian forces are stationed as part of AMISOM/AU peace-keeping missions?
Schwartz: The situation in Ethiopia is very concerning. Ethiopia is a large, populous, and important country which is at risk of breaking apart and destabilizing the entire Horn of Africa. It is important to remember that Ethiopia is unique. It remains, in effect, an empire created in the late 1800s under Menelik II. It does not have a tradition of peaceful transfer of political power. Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown by the Dergue led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, and the Dergue was ousted by rebel movements led by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the TPLF. Now Abiy has been trying to destroy the TPLF even though it was no longer the predominant political power in the country but had already been reduced to running Tigray.
The TPLF-led government in the early 1990s established ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. Abiy’s government is now trying to crush one of those federal states, and by bringing other ethnic state militias into the contest, he risks creating ethnic nationalist forces he, his Prosperity Party, and the central government cannot manage. The conflict’s impact on Somalia has been limited thus far but that could change.
Somaliland Chronicle: The outgoing President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Mr. Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, took office during your tenure as the US Ambassador to Somalia. You have worked with him. What is your view on how things have turned out in Somalia given that he is still in power past his mandate and seems intent on instigating constitutional crises to remain in office?
Schwartz: Mr. Farmaajo came to office in 2017 with tremendous popular support from Somalis across the Horn of Africa. Under his predecessor, Hassan Sheikh Mohammed, Somalia completed the establishment of its new federal character and the government developed further from being “transitional.” Somalis and the international community had high hopes that as president, Mr. Farmaajo would strengthen Somalia’s new and weak institutions, both civilian and military. Sadly, this did not occur. Al Shabaab controls at least as much territory today as it did when Mr. Farmaajo took office. Rather than strengthen the federal system, he did everything he could to control, ignore, and weaken the federal member states. He failed to finalize the negotiated national security architecture to reform the Somali National Army and Police and clarify federal and member state authorities and responsibilities. He made no progress on reconciliation – including with Somaliland – or ratification of the constitution. And he made no progress creating the conditions for One Person One Vote, or a vote of any kind. Three and a half years into his four-year presidency he was forced to accept an electoral process that is almost identical to the one used in 2016. Since then, he continues to try to influence the process – including through the appointment of loyal or vulnerable people to various electoral bodies – to extend his time in office and improve his chances of retaining the presidency.
Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest piece “Somalia’s Leaders Need to Seize Immediately the Lessons of Afghanistan“ you have drawn a parallel to the spectacular implosion of the Afghan army following the US withdrawal and you have warned about a similar outcome in Somalia as you have written on the eve of the US’s withdrawal from Somalia in January. Your main argument is that the problem lies not in the equipment or the size of the army but the fact that the government institutions are hollowed out by rampant corruption. Is it fair to say that the United States and its successive Ambassadors bear some responsibility by not holding the Somali government and particularly President Farmaajo accountable to ensure their taxpayer’s funds are spent as intended?
Schwartz: I can only speak for what occurred during my tenure as ambassador, though I believe the general approach has some relevance to how things were managed after I left. As best as I can recall, no U.S. funding went directly to the Somali government to support its military effort. The U.S. directly funded the recruitment, training, and equipping the Danab special operations battalion and provided salary stipends and food rations to about 1/3 of the SNA. In 2017, after failing to get an adequate accounting of which SNA soldiers were receiving the stipends, the U.S. suspended the payments. The U.S. investment in Danab has been extremely successful and provided Somalia with a multi-clan, capable force that operates nationally and in three of the four southern and central member states. It is worth noting that the U.S. government helped create the Puntland Security Force and conducted operations with it for a number of years, and now it operates successfully and is independent of the U.S. or other external support.
Somaliland Chronicle: Although Mr. Farmaajo has renounced his US citizenship, many in his inner circle have dual citizenship and may include US citizens. Is there anything that the United States and possibly other countries can do to hold their citizens accountable for corruption and allegations of human rights violations in a foreign territory?
Schwartz: I am not an attorney, but I believe the United States and most western governments can investigate and hold accountable their citizens for at least some crimes committed outside of their country of nationality. Those citizens often have family and property in their adopted country and would seek to travel to that country whether or not they retain its citizenship. If, like Mr. Farmaajo, they have renounced their foreign citizenship, presumably they would need to apply for a visa to visit that country and the visa-issuance process has many laws and procedures governing who can travel to the United States and for what reason. Personally, I have no idea whether Mr. Farmaajo has committed crimes, or whether sufficient evidence exists of such possible crimes, for him to be held accountable in the United States. Ideally, if such evidence exists, he should be tried in a Somali court under Somali law for crimes committed in Somalia.
Somaliland Chronicle:Now on to Djibouti, an extremely important ally of the United States that is currently hosting a U.S. military base in addition to other countries’ militaries including China. General Townsend’s predecessor General Thomas D Waldhauser testified to the US Senate on concerns “preponderance of foreign forces”. Do you see any long-term strategic risks to the United States in maintaining a foothold in Djibouti given China’s huge investments in the country?
Schwartz: Djibouti has been an important partner for the United States since its independence and for the U.S. military for almost 20 years. Its location, stability, and infrastructure have served U.S. strategic interests well over this period. In general, there should be no reason why the United States and China cannot maintain military facilities in Djibouti that serve their respective interests. Unfortunately, China has not been content to co-exist with the U.S. in Djibouti but has undertaken a number of acts hostile to the United States. One well-publicized act was the repeated use by China of lasers to blind pilots flying military jets. To address your question, I think it would be advantageous for the United States to have alternate sites in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden region which would be used to base some of the military personnel and equipment currently in Djibouti. Having options increases U.S. negotiating power, adds flexibility, and reduces the negative impact on U.S. capabilities if an external shock develops.
Somaliland Chronicle: In contrast to his concern over the presence of multiple foreign armies in Djibouti, General Waldhauser has said “Berbera’s location, close to the entry and exit point of the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, will be strategically valuable for both Somaliland and with whomever they choose to partner.” What is your thought on this and how much value do you think the US should place in Somaliland’s strategic location in the Red Sea?
Schwartz: Berbera appears to offer a desirable location and infrastructure for any country looking for military basing in a strategic part of the world. That said, Berbera featured as a potentially useful deep water port for both the Soviet Union and then the United States during the Cold War, but its potential was never needed or developed. Also, as attractive a strategic location as Somaliland and Berbera might be, their value would be affected by what other possible sites exist in the area and what their attributes might be.
Somaliland Chronicle: We have recently reported a United States Air Force C-130J-30 Super Hercules transport aircraft that landed in the recently renovated Berbera Airport and a high-level meeting between Somaliland and US military personnel has taken place, both sides have declined to shed any light on the flight and the meeting but as someone who understands the dynamics of the region and the United States strategic interests, what do you make of this?
Schwartz: I have not had any discussions on this topic with anyone in the U.S. government, so I have no actual idea what the purpose of the trip was. That said, it would be smart and prudent for the United States military to visit and assess all sites anywhere with potential military use. In most cases that use would be relatively short notice and there would not be time to conduct a full assessment before the operation. Such eventualities could be an emergency humanitarian operation, aircraft landing, ship visit, or hundreds of other possible contingencies.
Somaliland Chronicle: Somaliland and Taiwan diplomatic ties which the People’s Republic of China was unsuccessful in unraveling was viewed as good news by the former U.S. administration’s NSC and many current US government officials, how do you see this particular nexus between Taiwan and Somaliland? And in your view why hasn’t Somaliland benefited from the TAIPEI Act?
Schwartz: I collaborated with Taiwan officials while working on some issues related to the Pacific Island nations and believe Taiwan can offer useful assistance. This would appear to be the same conclusion reached by Somaliland officials. The TAIPEI act became U.S. law well after I retired and I am unfamiliar with its provisions and application so cannot address that aspect of your question.
Somaliland Chronicle: What is your view on Somaliland’s offer to host some Afghan SIVs temporarily?
Schwartz: It was a generous humanitarian gesture. It also portrays Somaliland authorities as responsible international partners willing to work constructively to address global challenges.
Somaliland Chronicle: As the former US Ambassador to Somalia, you were able to work with the government of Somaliland to a certain degree without presenting credentials due to its lack of recognition, and this is the case for every foreign Ambassador to Somalia, in your view what signal does this send to you, your government about the seriousness of Somaliland in terms of its independence and quest for recognition?
Schwartz: Somaliland has done a tremendous job creating, financing, and sustaining the full array of government functions. As a result, anyone wanting to do business with Somaliland must deal with its authorities and jurisdiction. During my tenure, the embassy staff and I worked well with Somaliland officials on a range of issues. We dealt with the officials and institutions that had effective authority and control over the situations we were working on. I recall one important issue involving assisting American citizens in Somaliland in which a number of Somaliland officials provided critical assistance.
The question of Somaliland’s sovereignty being recognized internationally is obviously a top priority for Somaliland officials and has been for 30 years. My view, which I have shared with senior Somaliland officials, is that the best way to pursue their goal is through a negotiated agreement with the Somalia government. All new states that have attained a seat in the United Nations – the ultimate determination of international recognition – have obtained their sovereignty with the consent of the former state to which it belonged. Some recent examples are Ethiopia consented to Eritrea’s independence, Sudan consented to South Sudan’s independence, Indonesia consented to Timor Leste’s independence, and Serbia consented to Montenegro’s independence. By contrast, Serbia has not consented to Kosovo’s declaration of independence and despite being recognized by about 100 countries, Kosovo is not seated in the United Nations and struggles to achieve full independence. Whether negotiations with authorities in Mogadishu leads to independence or some form of association is entirely up to the negotiators. What should not occur is that Mogadishu prolong a resolution of Somaliland’s status by refusing to enter undertake serious negotiations.
Somaliland Chronicle: Lastly, as a career and seasoned diplomat who knows the region very well, what advice would you give Somaliland in terms of how it engages with the world and particularly the United States.
Schwartz: I think the best thing Somaliland can do to engage with the world is to continue to improve its internal situation. Building a state with security and the rule of law, a strong and growing economy, a healthy well-educated population, and productive physical infrastructure would be a huge service to the people of Somaliland and a worthy end in itself. It would also attract increasing attention from people, businesses, and governments outside. Somaliland has very capable representation in the United States. This could be boosted by occasional high-level visits by leaders from both governments.
Somali traditional clan system was reportedly famous for tribal conflict resolution. However, upon close examination of the issue, one would find out that this mechanism for settlement of disputes was never fond of setting up neutral or independent bodies. The negotiating sides were selected from the opposing parties, each side advocating for the interests of their respective party. The protagonists must trust the judgment of their envoys to be reliable defenders and effective advocates. The main takeaway of this tool of conflict resolution is their intention to lower the temperature of the conflicting parties by keeping them talking and to address their grievances to each other. In the end that approach may produce:
Restraint
Appreciation of each other’s points of view.
Mutual understanding and reconciliation
Compromise with possible outcome of settlement of dispute(s).
That is why one notices that this approach also applies to politics in Somalia, and in a situation where Federal public institutions have lost legitimacy, the only way to avoid conflagration of violence and civil conflict is to appoint persons representing the main antagonists in the conflict. Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo selected his political allies in the name of Speaker of now defunct Federal Parliament, Mohamed Mursal, who attempted to extend President’s mandate to two more years just recently, and Galmudugh President, known as Qoor Qoor, Ahmed Abdi Kariye, who owes his position in Galmudugh presidency to only Farmajo’s help. This approach is also true to Caretaker prime minister, Mohamed Hussein Roble, with the selection of loyal junior ministers in the Caretaker Federal Cabinet.
They say that a civil war breaks out when parties to a conflict stop talking to each other. As long as there are talks going on between the parties in Mogadishu political stalemate, including the opposition elements, there will be still a chance to settle down the political and security tensions there.
But, regardless of the outcome of Mogadishu power struggle within the leadership of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), Federal Member States (FMS) must proceed to hold the elections to expeditiously resolve the logjam in Mogadishu by electing a new federal parliament, which will elect a new Federal President. Act now before the conflict in Mogadishu gets out of hand.
ELECTIONS FOR THE LOWER HOUSE OF SOMALI FEDERAL PARLIAMENT SHOULD PROCEED WITHOUTDELAY
The Federal Member States (FMS) should conduct elections expeditiously as the only legal instrument to break the political logjam and power struggle in Mogadishu. They should take note of the senseless confrontations between the Caretaker prime minister, Mohamed Hussein Roble and former president, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, whose constitutional mandate to stay in Villa Somalia had expired eight months ago, but still stuck there issuing unlawful executive orders.
The idea behind enshrining a federal system in the Federal Constitution was to allow Somalia to continue to function under similar circumstances of political and security upheavals in the Capital City. This is the time to show Somalis and world community at large that Somali State shall never collapse as it did in 1990s.
Donors and members of the international community (IC) should understand this fundamental historical change in Somalia’s governance – that there are functioning federal states in the country, which need all the support and logistics necessary to hold the elections now, despite the political paralysis at Federal Government leadership. This is the time to act decisively at both FMS and IC levels. Let us not miss this golden opportunity.
Did you get yet the main reason for the present political confrontations between #Farmaajo and #Rooble? Is it Ikram’s case, elections, Kenya, Qatar, UAE or something else?
The main reason for this conflict is the politicization of security forces by Farmaajo. Directors of NISA and commanders of Police Force and Somali National Army, SNA, had been recruited for political purposes by Farmaajo to stay in power. It was impossible to conduct free elections with the security and financial grip of Farmaajo in the country. The mastermind of this policy was Fahad Yassin. This policy was in the making for the entire mandate of Farmaajo. Countries like Turkey, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda had been used for this objective in mind only, whether they knew it or not didn’t matter. Farmaajo and Rooble are struggling now for the control of security forces, especially the powerful NISA secret and intelligence service.
This dangerous situation was exposed during Farmaajo’s attempt to illegally extend his term to two more years and subsequent armed confrontations between the forces of the opposition and government. Lives had been lost in exchange for foiling Farmaajo’s military and constitutional coup.
Ikram’s case, among many others, yet to be contested are excuses and symptoms of the conspiracy to a power grab before everybody’s eyes. It is really madness to ignore the laws of the land to attempt to cling to power in this 21st century. It is simply not normal state of mind to try this nowadays.
By Rachel Chason and Omar Faruk Today at 1:38 p.m. EDT
NAIROBI — The disappearance of a young intelligence officer in Somalia has led to a rapidly escalating power struggle between the president and prime minister that has torn the government apart and potentially gives new openings to al-Qaeda-linked militants.
Details of what happened to Ikran Tahlil Farah, a 25-year-old cybersecurity analyst, are still murky. But her abduction led President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed on Thursday to suspend the powers of the prime minister, who has accused him of obstructing justice in Tahlil’s case.
The political showdown risks becoming a security crisis, experts say, and has blown up any pretense that Somalia’s federal government is functioning. That could strengthen the hand of al-Shabab — which Somalia’s government has been fighting for years, aided by billions of dollars in security support from the United States.Story continues below advertisementnull
“Anytime you have this level of political infighting, it benefits al-Shabab in so many ways,” said Omar Mahmood, senior Somalia analyst at the International Crisis Group. “This narrative paints into everything they say about the federal government. That it is ineffective, weak, divisive and provides nothing to the public. And it is hard to argue against that.”
Implications of the back-and-forth between the president, known by his nickname, Farmaajo, and Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble rippled Friday across international borders. The president’s office accused neighboring Djibouti of illegally detaining the former head of the National Intelligence and Security Agency, Fahad Yasin, as he tried to board a flight to Mogadishu. Roble suspended Yasin — who is known as the president’s right-hand man — earlier this month in connection with Tahlil’s disappearance.
The events were just one example of increasing tensions that could risk further delaying an already slow-moving election process, Mahmood said. The elections involve committees of sub-clan elders convened around the country to elect members of Parliament, which then elects the president. Only 37 of the 330 open seats, including the presidency, have been filled, he said. The president is currently serving more than seven months past his term.
“It’s time to start talking about more punitive measures from the international community to keep everyone in line before the election,” Mahmood said.
Among officials in Washington, there has been increased concern about the situation in Somalia since February, when gunfire broke out on the streets of the capital, Mogadishu, after the president did not hold scheduled elections. That raised questions about the depth of Somalia’s political instability — and about whether U.S. strategy needs to shift.
But there have been few changes to U.S. policy since the Trump administration ordered the removal of 700 U.S. soldiers from the country, with the United States continuing to support military operations in the region against al-Shabab.
Al-Shabab controls the majority of Somalia’s interior and has about 10,000 active fighters in the country, experts believe, with a much larger network of supporters. An attack it launched in Kenya last year killed one U.S. service member and two American private contractors, according to a U.S. military statement. But the biggest risk al-Shabab poses, experts say, is to residents within Somalia and to its neighbors in the region, where attacks are regular.
Biden’s top intelligence official said Monday that the greatest terrorism threat to the United States does not come from Afghanistan but from countries including Somalia, Yemen, Syria and Iraq.
Members of the U.N. Security Council released a statement Saturday expressing “deep concern about the ongoing disagreement within the Somali Government and the negative impact on the electoral timetable and process.”
Rep. Michael McCaul (Tex.), the ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said he is closely monitoring current political divisions within Somalia and “deeply concerned about the trajectory of the country.”
“With the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia and an emboldened al-Qaeda network from the continued debacle in Afghanistan, al Shabaab is surely taking notes,” McCaul said in a statement. “They remain a dangerous and capable threat to U.S. interests and the homeland. Unfortunately, years of support to the Somali armed forces and billions of dollars of assistance has barely moved the needle toward lasting stability in the country.”
It was not too long afterward — on June 26 — that the analyst Tahlil was abducted, said her mother, Qali Mohamud Guhad, in an interview. The last time she spoke with her daughter was via a WhatsApp call that night, Mohamud said. Tahlil told her that she was going to see the security chief Yasin, who she said had been calling her all day.
The intelligence agency announced in early September that an investigation found that al-Shabab had killed Tahlil. But the terrorist group quickly denied it, saying it takes responsibility for attacks on intelligence officers and did not kill her.
Mohamud said she is still holding out hope that her daughter is alive somewhere in captivity. She said she does not know why Tahlil was abducted, but noted that her daughter had information about soldiers from Somalia who were rumored to have been sent by the government to fight in Ethiopia, which has been one of the many political weak spots for Somalia’s president.
Mohamud personally met this month with Roble, who she said assured her that he would take the steps necessary to achieve justice.
Roble’s decision to suspend Yasin — over the objections of the president — reportedly led this month to a brief military standoff, after each selected a different person to lead the intelligence agency. Roble’s spokesman, Mohamed Ibrahim Moalimuu, said in an interview Saturday that he views the president’s suspension of his powers as unconstitutional and that the prime minister is committed to seeing the elections through.
“The more [the president] stays and keeps doing these illegal and unconstitutional behaviors, the closer we get to a civil war,” said Ismail Osman, a former NISA deputy chief, who is based in Washington.
Matt Bryden, director of Sahan Research, a Somalia-focused think tank, said that al-Shabab’s strength is always in inverse proportion to the weakness of its adversaries.
“It fills a vacuum,” he said. “And this is a protracted vacuum.”
The UK is deeply concerned by the escalation of the current political crisis in Somalia. The situation threatens to undermine the credibility of Somalia’s leadership and risks the safety and future of the Somali people.
It is vital that Somalia’s leaders refrain from unilateral actions that could deepen political tensions, including any further public statements and personnel announcements which could increase the risk of violence.
We urge that all stakeholders maintain peace to avoid any risks to Somalia’s stability and security. Likewise, it is important that Somalia’s security forces remain focused on countering the common threat of Al Shabaab, who stand to gain from this ongoing political crisis. As champions of the debt relief efforts, the UK also urges the de-politicisation of Somalia’s finances to protect the gains made through the process.
This is a moment for statesmanship, restraint and compromise. We look to Somalia’s leaders to engage in meaningful mediation and to agree ways forward that de-escalate the situation and restore the focus on the priority of conducting peaceful elections, as agreed on 27 May, without further delay. Somalia needs effective governance. The continued failure to move quickly towards elections will increase insecurity and exacerbate the grave humanitarian challenges the country is facing.
A continued deterioration in the situation leading to further electoral delays will have a substantial impact on the legacy of Somalia’s leaders.
In April 2021, after Somalia was on the brink of civil war, it seemed for a long time that the solution would be found in a tough (s)election process. The May 27, 2021 agreement and Prime Minister Roble’s timetable presented at the end of June stipulated that this process would be completed by October 10, 2021. A new president would then also be elected by the new deputies of both chambers by the end of the year. With just over a month to go before the end of this deadline, events in Mogadishu are coming to a head. In order to grasp the significance and impact of these upcoming events, the protagonists must be introduced once again:
(1) Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (“Farmajoo”) came to the presidency with great sympathy in February 2017. However, his tenure has been marked by increasing political violence and a politicization of the security and army apparatus. Although there has been modest economic growth, little progress is visible in the areas of state-building, political freedoms, anti-corruption, or democratization. He is considered an ally of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrea’s autocratic president, Isayas Afewerki. With other neighbours, conflicts have been repeatedly reported. Conflicts that triggered breaking points in diplomatic relations. In the spring of 2021, his attempt to extend his term by two years provoked considerable opposition both in Somalia itself and among international partners.
(2) Fahad Yasin, was until recently head of the notorious NISA intelligence agency and is considered a close confidant of the president. After the largest terrorist attack in the country’s history, on October 14, 2017, with nearly 600 dead, the intelligence service was initially disbanded and shortly thereafter reconstituted with presidential loyalists. Fahad Yasin is considered the mastermind of the strategy of using violence, intimidation, and pressure on individuals as political tools. This included the targeted recruitment of employees of certain clan affiliations to secure loyalties. NISA has since evolved to be an uncontrollable force in the country. Al Shabab has never claimed responsibility for the devastating attack in 2017. Suspicions suggest that this only served as a smokescreen to reorganize the intelligence service at the time as well as Somalia’s entire security apparatus accordingly. Fahad Yasin is also considered Qatar’s representative in Somalia. He is said to have ties to Al Shabab and Al Qaeda. Many political assassinations claimed by Al Shabab, such as the assassination of the former mayor of Mogadishu, Abdirahman Osman (“Yerisow”), were only possible through insider knowledge. As a result, rumors of cooperation between NISA and the terrorist organization have surfaced time and again.
(3) Ikraan Tahliil, (was) a young woman from Mogadishu who was considered highly gifted in mathematics as a child. She was recruited early by NISA and trained in cybersecurity. It is said about her that she had no concerns with the new direction of the intelligence agency. She quickly made a career for herself, arguably gaining information about intelligence activities that made her a danger to Fahad Yasin and other top regime officials, such as the background of certain assassinations. This was followed by her flight to Great Britain. After apparently threatening her family, she returned to Mogadishu in late June 2021. After a brief visit with her family, relatives report, she was picked up by a high-ranking NISA employee in an official vehicle. After that, her trace was lost. The parents put pressure on the public and worried about the fate of their daughter. Calls for an independent investigation were made. Two months later, in early September, Radio Mogadishu (a pro-government station) announced, without further background, that she had been murdered by Al Shabab. This account was followed by widespread public scepticism, especially on social media. How could an experienced intelligence officer have been abducted and murdered from one of Somalia’s most secured buildings – the NISA headquarters? Shortly after the radio reports, Al Shabab also denied having anything to do with the young woman’s disappearance.
(4) Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble is formally the head of government and thus also the chief executive. After former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire was unexpectedly dismissed without prior political debate in July 2020, Farmajoo appointed the politically completely unknown Roble, a man from the Swedish diaspora, as the new prime minister on September 23, 2020. Judging by his past actions, he seems committed to a prompt and transparent election. He is supported by the opposition in this. He has repeatedly been said to have presidential ambitions, though he has always expressed the opposite view. On one of his conspicuously frequent visits abroad, he recently said that he could not be a neutral mediator in the elections if he ran himself. He is seen as a reconciler with neighbouring Kenya and also strikes more moderate tones with regard to Somaliland and Saudi Arabia.
A lot has happened between these actors in the last two weeks. After public protest regarding the alleged death of Ikraan Tahliil did not die down, Roble set a 48-hour deadline for the head of NISA to personally brief him on the background of the case. After 24 hours, Fahad Yasin then published an open letter in which he made a counter-proposal. He suggested reporting to the Presidential Security Council instead. It was not the intelligence chief’s first disrespect for the prime minister. When Roble removed Deputy Intelligence Chief Abdullahi Kulane a few weeks ago for intimidating opposition politicians on behalf of the government and being responsible for various acts of violence within the country, Fahad Yasin promptly appointed him as his personal security advisor. It was an affront that called into question the prime minister’s authority. Immediately after the counterproposal, Roble therefore dismissed Fahad Yasin and appointed a new intelligence chief. Farmajoo, whose term expired Feb. 8, 2021, strongly criticized this decision, calling it unconstitutional – also on social media. After initially trying to keep his confidant Fahad Yasin in office, he later appointed him his personal security adviser and promoted the NISA chief of Mogadishu, who was loyal to him, as the new Somali intelligence chief. He published this decree via also the official account of the Somali Chancellery, Villa Somalia (413,246 followers). These two political counter-positions physically clashed at NISA headquarters. While the headquarters was surrounded by Farmajoo loyalists to prevent the prime minister-appointed chief from entering, Robles’ supporters took control inside the building, according to media reports. Concern is high that there will be fighting between government forces. The opposition, as well as some states, support the prime minister’s actions. So do large parts of the cabinet. After some ministers declared that they were loyal to the prime minister, Roble took advantage of this moment to dismiss another of the president’s confidants, the minister of security (interior minister).On September 9, 2021, he instructed the Minister of Finance to disburse all payments from public budgets, including funds provided by the IMF, only after prior approval by the Prime Minister’s Office.
1 Month Before the Elections
With just over a month to go before the elections, the country is therefore once again on the brink of armed conflict. Not so much between the opposition and the government, as was the case in April 2021, but the split appears to be running amidst the government. If the goal of either side was to make the situation as confusing as possible, it has succeeded very well. Outsiders, such as the international community, find it difficult to comprehend the moves of the individual actors, and the comments are correspondingly thin-lipped. On the prime minister’s credit side, despite these events, the upper house elections in Puntland, Jubaland, Galmudug and South West State have already been completed, and the elections in Hir Shabelle and for Somaliland seats will be concluded shortly. What impact this will have on the electoral process for the lower house and the support of each presidential candidate is unclear. One can assume, however, that in many places the actual political course has already been set with the upper house elections in mind, and that the lower house elections can be realized much more quickly. In Mogadishu itself, however, the situation has intensified. If Roble prevails, Farmajoo seems significantly weakened politically. With Fahad Yasin, he loses his eyes and ears as well as his arsenal of threats. In addition, he loses the ability to appeal to and mobilize his still quite numerous supporters in the military and security apparatus through the usual chains of command. He and his supporters also appear to have lost access to finances, one of the most important instruments in Somali political practice, especially with regard to the loyalty of the security forces.
While now the president’s (remaining) supporters argue that the prime minister was originally given the power to organize only the election and therefore there is something unconstitutional about his behaviour, the prime minister’s supporters take the position that only with this power can the ongoing disruptive manoeuvres on the part of Villa Somalia be prevented and the elections properly conducted. The point, they say, is to prevent continued negative influence on the elections and thus not to jeopardize the credibility of the incoming government. However, the whole skirmish is more than just about who has the real power in the country. It is also a bit about the soul of the country. Is it permissible to have a power in the country, NISA, that can get away without a judicial process even in targeted killings? An experience the country has had over decades of Siad Barre’s dictatorship. The appointment of those responsible as advisors to the government currently serves primarily to protect them from prosecution. Thus, part of the conflict is also the question of whether the case of Ikraan Tahliil will be investigated by a military court or whether-as Farmajoo has suggested-there should only be a compensation payment to the family to prevent a public investigation. Already, the first voices are being raised to prevent a possible departure/escape of those responsible, including Farmajoo, so that his reign can be judicially reviewed. These voices are matched by other cases being brought all over the country, such as against those responsible for the kidnapping of the Islamist and then candidate for state-president of South West State, Mukhtar Robow. The latter has reportedly been held without trial in house arrest in Mogadishu since 2018. Several people were killed in the demonstrations against this detention. If one wants to find something positive in this situation, it is ultimately these reflexes to the rule of law that make one optimistic. Should Somalia succeed in electing a new and accepted government, the population and also the (clan-) system would have proven resilient to autocratic structures-despite all prophecies of doom. The international community should honor this fact accordingly.
Warsame Policy & Media Network (WAPMEN) 
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