After the 1st and 2nd World Wars, some Europeans and their regions ended up under occupation by different countries and regimes. That was one of the factors why wars were waged in the first place.

Since then numerous studies were launched to find out the best way forward to resolve the problem of partitioned ethnic communities in Europe. They found out that in democratic countries nationalism doesn’t play a positive role in the political process and in a free society and market economy, all residents have fair share for progress and nation-building. Today we see some of previously occupied regions and territories in France, Italy, Germany etc doing far better in economic terms than the rest of other constituencies within same country.

What is important here is that Kenya and Ethiopia have to learn from history and treat their respective citizens equally and fairly. That is the way to resolve any territorial disputes with Somalia and remove ethnic tensions within.

Author: Warsame Digital Media WDM

The problem with the 4.5 formula lies not in the idea of power-sharing itself, but in how it was designed and applied—especially the allocation of parliamentary seats among sub-clans. Many Somalis argue that the injustice began at the Mbagathi Conference (2002–2004), where questionable concessions were made to accommodate sub-clan demands in the hope of easing internal conflicts. What was intended as a temporary compromise became entrenched. Sub-clans have since treated those allocations as permanent entitlements, while others remain excluded from Somalia’s fragile political settlement.

This is why Somalis continue to complain about the 4.5 system. Unless Somalia regains stability and achieves the capacity to hold a free and fair national election, the issue will remain unresolved.

How the Formula Emerged

To understand today’s controversy, one must revisit how the 4.5 concept was first introduced during the long and troubled reconciliation process (see also An Open Letter to the New Members of the Somali Parliament).

Following the collapse of the Somali central government in 1991, certain southern clans claimed both victory in the civil war and the largest share of the national population. These claims, however, were not backed by reliable statistics or census data. Warlords in Mogadishu, who dominated the capital at the time, aggressively promoted this narrative within international diplomatic and humanitarian circles. Mogadishu’s symbolic weight as the “one-city state” gave their claims influence abroad.

As Somalia fractured into clan enclaves and de facto decentralized rule, reconciliation efforts began in Mogadishu, Nairobi, and Djibouti. All failed, deepening the political vacuum.

The Sodere Initiative

In 1996, the National Salvation Council (NSC)—known as the Sodere Group—was formed in Ethiopia at the initiative of the late Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. While receiving medical treatment in London, Yusuf asked me to draft his letter to Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, requesting Ethiopia’s support in hosting reconciliation talks. Zenawi responded positively, leading to the formal creation of the Sodere Group.

The NSC was led by a Central Committee and Executive Branch with five co-chairmen: Abdullahi Yusuf, Osman Atto, Abdulkadir Soobe, General Aden Gabyow, and Ali Mahdi. It brought together most major and minor Somali political fronts—except Somaliland and the Salbalaar faction.

By 1997, NSC members agreed to convene a national congress in Bosaso (now Puntland State of Somalia) to establish a broad-based government. Even tents for the meeting were purchased by the OAU/IGAD partners. But the Bosaso Congress was sabotaged, notably with Egyptian interference. The core challenge remained: how to distribute delegates fairly among clans.

To resolve this, Hawiye and Darood leaders met in Sodere in early 1997. They turned to the only credible Somali census—conducted by the UN in the 1950s—which showed Darood at 38% and Hawiye at 22%. In the spirit of reconciliation, Darood agreed to give Hawiye equal representation despite the numbers.

Soon after, Digil-Mirifle leader Abdulkadir Soobe requested equal status with Hawiye. Darood leaders accepted, and the same courtesy was later extended to the Dir clan. The remainder of Somalia’s population was labeled “others,” equating to half a major clan.

The Cairo Conference and the Birth of 4.5

In late 1997, the Cairo Conference brought the NSC and Salbalaar factions together. While Egypt’s hidden agenda sabotaged Bosaso’s prospects, the Cairo meeting left two legacies:

1. The collapse of both the NSC and Salbalaar.

2. Agreement in principle to adopt federalism as Somalia’s future governance model—an idea long championed by the SSDF.

The 4.5 formula itself was applied for the first time at the 2000 Arta Conference in Djibouti, forming the basis of President Abdulqassim Hassan’s government.

Conclusion

The 4.5 system is far from ideal, and many Somalis see it as unjust. Yet, until Somalia recovers its sovereignty, stability, and ability to conduct democratic elections, the formula may be an unavoidable political compromise.

As a nation, we must not lose sight of the larger goal: building a secure, viable, democratic, and prosperous Somalia. If 4.5 is a bitter medicine on that journey, perhaps we must swallow it—eyes closed—until a better alternative becomes possible.

By Ismail Haji Warsame
Former Chief of Staff, Puntland Presidency; participant in Somali national reconciliation processes since 1995. Based in Toronto, Canada.
: ismailwarsame@gmail.com