Month: May 2013

The S.F.G.’s Strategy of Political Conflict

A confrontation over the form of federalism that a future Somali state would adopt is looming, as confidential sources report that the provisional Somali Federal Government (S.F.G.) is in the process of making a concerted push to control the formation of local, regional, and presumptive regional-state administrations in south-central Somalia.

The S.F.G., say the sources, is attempting to resist the early formation of a Jubbaland state in the south that would base itself on a decentralized-federal model, as Puntland has done; head off a similar process to the one in the south in the southwestern Bay and Bakool regions by placing an administration allied to it in charge there; counter the Galmudug authority in the east-central area by backing ex-warlord Abdi Qeybdid against the sitting government; and influence the leadership that will succeed the recently-deceased chair of the Ahlu Sunna wal-Jamaa (A.S.W.J.) movement, Sh. Mohamed Yusuf Hefow, that controls most of the central and east-central regions of Galgadud and Hiiraan. On each of those political fronts, the S.F.G. faces opposition, both locally and nationally by the autonomous state of Puntland, which resists the S.F.G.’s bids for control.

The S.F.G.’s Strategy of Political Conflict

By adopting a strategy of political conflict in south-central Somalia’s regions, the S.F.G.’s president, Hassan Sh. Mohamud, is attempting to solve his most pressing political problem, which is to establish the S.F.G.’s authority – dominance and control – over those regions. In the process of trying to do so, Mohamud is forcing the issue of what the state-form of Somalia will be. The options have narrowed down to two, a centralized federalism favored by the S.F.G. and its allies, and a decentralized federalism advocated by Puntland and its allies. The core political conflict in Somalia is between the S.F.G. and Puntland over state-form; the south-central regions are the arenas in which that conflict is being played out. Both the S.F.G. and Puntland are aware of the high stakes involved in their confrontation; if the S.F.G. prevails in the south-central regions, Puntland will be politically isolated and subject to pressure to abandon its autonomy, which gives it generous control over its natural resources and security policy; if Puntland is able to block the S.F.G., the latter will have had to cede significant authority over nascent regional states. The S.F.G.’s pursuit of a strategy of political conflict has turned a constitutional issue into a political power struggle.

Whether or not the S.F.G.’s strategy succeeds – and its success is highly problematic – that strategy is intelligible and follows from the power position of the S.F.G. The new federal government was to all intents and purposes imposed by the Western “donor”-powers/U.N. under veiled and explicit threats to withdraw financial support. The “donor”-powers wanted a “permanent” government established in Somalia so that they could decrease their commitment to the country and at the same time make agreements favorable to them with it.  In pursuing those aims, they ended up settling for a provisional/interim entity operating under an incomplete constitution that left the fundamental question of state-form open; absent from the constitution was a determination of centralized or decentralized federalism, and there were not yet regional states set up in south-central Somalia.

As a result of the “donor”-powers’ actions, the S.F.G. was left with the challenge of establishing its authority in the south-central regions without a constitutional basis, scant resources to buy allies in the regions, and military forces that did not extend beyond the capital Mogadishu. Under those constraints, the S.F.G. had few options; it could renounce the attempt to control the south-central regions and allow those regions substantial autonomy, which would weaken whatever (potential) power it might have; or it could do what it has chosen to do, which is to contest the forces for decentralized federalism region by region by allying with factions in each region that felt marginalized by nascent autonomous administrations with power bases independent of the S.F.G. The new federal government opted for the latter, which set up the conditions for political conflict. A source reports that the strategy of political conflict was urged upon Hassan by his inner circle of advisers from his Damul Jadid movement.

The consequences of the conflict strategy carry severe risks to stability. The divide between the forces of centralized and decentralized federalism has become confused with sub-clan rivalries within the regions, exacerbating animosities that already existed. Those rivalries have also given the revolutionary Islamist movement, Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (H.S.M.), which had been pushed out of control over its most lucrative territories, an opportunity to recruit from disaffected sub-clans, and it has drawn Puntland into the fray.

The conflict strategy shows the power deficit of the S.F.G. and its efforts to rectify it. None of what the S.F.G. feels that it has had to do would have been necessary had an effective process of state-building been instituted, which would have involved a process of social-political reconciliation among Somali factions leading to a constitutional agreement to which the major factions would have signed on. That possibility was eliminated by the “donor”-powers’ actions, and that constitutes their most egregious political failure.

As a result of the “donor”-powers’ actions, the domestic Somali actors have been left to pick up the pieces. Absent political reconciliation and the trust that comes with it, the Somali domestic actors are constrained to pursue their perceived interests and attempt to make them prevail. There is no reconciliation process in place; the stage is set for sub-clan-impelled constitutional confrontation abetted by ex-warlords and revolutionary Islamists. Interpreted through the dramaturgical model in political science, a tragedy is unfolding in which the protagonists-antagonists can see nothing to do but play a zero-sum game.

The Status of the Conflict

It is too early in the conflict over the state-form that Somalia will/might take to make a grounded prediction about its outcomes. The S.F.G. has only attempted to implement its strategy of political conflict in earnest since the return of Hassan to Mogadishu in mid-February from his round of visits to the external actors with interests in Somalia. Having touched base and gotten promises of support, Hassan had to try to “deliver” on his end of the bargain, showing that he led a (potentially) effective government.

Hassan’s most important political front, which demands his immediate attention, is the south, where a convention is slated to be held on February 23 to form a Jubbaland state comprising the Lower and Middle Jubba regions and the Gedo region. Approximately 500 delegates, including elders from the three regions are expected to attend, with the S.F.G. and regional states (Ethiopia and Kenya) as observers. Up until the present, it has appeared that the Jubbaland process would issue in a regional state modeled on Puntland. The S.F.G. will try to reverse that outcome.

According to one source, Hassan’s strategy has found willing supporters among sub-clans in the south that feel disadvantaged by the dominance of Ahmed Madobe, the interim governor in Kismayo, and his Ras Kamboni militia, which is allied with Kenyan forces in the south and is mainly composed of members of the Mohamed Suber sub-clan of the Ogaden-Darod. That leaves other Ogaden sub-clans, the Majertein-Darod (with ties to Puntland), and the Marehan-Darod more or less disposed to thwart any attempt by Madobe to dominate the Jubbaland state.

Another source confirms open-source reports that ex-warlord and Marehan leader, Barre Hirale, has met with Hassan and is “on good terms with the S.F.G.”  The source says that the Marehan will “listen to Hirale if he is empowered.” Meanwhile, on February 13, Garoweonline reported that a delegation whose members are involved in forming a Jubbaland state met with Puntland’s president, Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, to discuss how “Puntland’s efforts to establish [the] Jubbalnad state could be improved.” On February 15, Garoweonline reported that Hassan and the S.F.G.’s prime minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, who is Marehan, had split on the Jubbaland issue, with Shirdon supporting the ongoing process and Hassan attempting to undermine it.

The reports from closed and open sources present a picture in which fations in the south have not (yet) fully aligned, crystallized, and polarized around the issue of state-form, and around the S.F.G. and Puntland, with the S.F.G. itself split. The S.F.G.’s presence at the slated convention represents a concession by Hassan by virtue of his acknowledging the Jubbaland process, but it also is an opportunity for him to influence its outcome. Puntland will not be present at the convention, but it will attempt to work through its allies. How the local factions will align, insofar as they do, and how big a role the regional external actors decide to play, and on which of the sides, will determine the outcome, in addition to the efforts of Hassan and Farole.

The second front opened by Hassan in implementing his strategy of political conflict is the southwestern Bay region, dominated by the Rahanweyne clan, where an attempt to form a regional state composed of the Bay and Bakool regions was underway but had not advanced as far as it has in the southern regions. In the south, Hassan has been constrained to try to turn an ongoing process that was going against him to his favor or to subvert it, whereas in the southwest he has attempted to head off such a process before it began to function independently of the S.F.G.

Hassan moved by issuing an S.F.G. decree replacing the longtime Bay political leader and sitting governor, Abdifatah Gesey, who had been backed by Ethiopia and had forces in the region, with Abdi Hasow. Gesey resisted the S.F.G.’s action, declaring that he remained governor. According to a closed source, Ethiopia turned against Gesey and used its forces to oust him. On February 15, Garoweonline reported that Gesey had mobilized his militia and was still in the Bay region’s capital, Baidoa, whereas Hasow was out of public view. According to Garoweonline’s sources, the confrontation between Gesey and Hasow had caused the Bay administration to grind to a halt. Efforts to mediate the dispute were initiated and a delegation was sent to the region by the S.F.G.

On February 21, Garoweonline reported that Gesey was taken by S.F.G. security forces to Mogadishu after mediation efforts had failed. Sources in Mogadishu told Garoweonline that Gesey was “promised another title” in the regional government.
An indication of why Ethiopia switched sides and altered the distribution of power in favor of the S.F.G. is given in an Ethiopian government statement on February 16 concerning talks between the Somali Federal Parliament’s speaker, Mohamed Osman Jawari, and Ethiopia’s foreign minister, Tedros Adhomam, in which Jawari is reported to have urged the formulation of a “common position” between the S.F.G. and Ethiopia on the London conference on Somalia that will be held later in 2013. In return, Ethiopia promised to “work with Somalia on pushing donors to keep their promises.” Jawari then traveled to the ethnic Somali Ogaden region (Somali Regional State) of Ethiopia, where he met with regional officials and visited schools. Reports did not mention any hint that Jawari had taken up alleged human rights violations committed by Ethiopia and Ethiopian-backed militias in the Ogaden.

Just as in the south, the outcome of the face-off in Bay cannot be predicted. The S.F.G. has gained a foothold and has leverage, but it has yet to achieve the traction to push back its adversaries decisively.

A similar stand-off characterizes the situation in the Galmudug authority in east-central Somalia, where two governments dominated respectively by different sub-clans of the Hawiye claim claim the right to rule. According to a source, the S.F.G. has recognized one of the contenders – the faction led by ex-warlord Abdi Qeybdid – as the “legitimate” authority. During the past month there have been outbreaks of politically-inspired sub-clan violence in Galmudug with open sources claiming that Qeybdid’s militia is responsible for initiating the clashes. Again, as in the south and southwest, the S.F.G.’s strategy of political conflict is being implemented in Galmudug, and its outcome is uncertain.

In the central region of Galgadud and part of the Hiiraan region, the dominant A.S.W.J. movement is in the process of naming a leader to replace Sh. Mohamed Yusuf Hefow, who died in mid-February. Hefow had been in discussions with the S.F.G. to merge A.S.W.J. with it. A.S.W.J., which has several factions that support or oppose collaboration with the S.F.G. in various degrees, has now become subject, according to a source, to pressure from the S.F.G. to integrate with it on the S.F.G.’s terms. Again, the outcome is uncertain, but the S.F.G.’s push is underway. The source reports that a delegation from the federal parliament is in Galgadud, claiming that they are “consulting with local communities on extending government rule” to the region. The source says that the presence of the delegation has led to a dispute between some of the A.S.W.J.’s leadership and the S.F.G.

Assessment

One of the sources contributing to this analysis has put the S.F.G.’s/Hassan’s strategy of political conflict succinctly and precisely: Hassan is attempting to isolate some leaders and factions in each region and to empower others favorable to him. In doing so, Hassan is splitting each region politically, intervening in local conflicts and exacerbating them, and working with whoever will ally with him for whatever reason, whether it be ex-warlords, dissident clans, or factions within a movement. That is the familiar strategy of divide-and-rule, which is used by actors who cannot (Hassan) or do not want to expend the military and/or financial resources required to control the outcome of a conflict.

Hassan is playing the divide-and-rule game to extend the authority of the S.F.G. into the south-central regions, but in doing so he is carrying with him the program of centralized federalism. Puntland has yet to play its hand overtly, but it can be expected to do so if it appears that the centralized-federalist project is gaining traction and momentum. Since Hassan’s strategy necessitates opposition to its implementation by the forces that he is attempting to isolate, as it has done in each case, the path is open not only to confrontation at the local level and the re-activation of H.S.M., but to counter-moves by Puntland.

It is too early to predict whether or not Hassan will be successful, but it can be said that a political battle is looming that will overshadow all other political issues in the territories of post-independence Somalia.

Hassan’s strategy is obviously high risk and high stakes. In his best-case scenario, Hassan prevails in each south-central region and Puntland is faced with the option of compromising its autonomy or separating from south-central Somalia. Short of the best case for Hassan, “Somalia” becomes irretrievably fragmented and balkanized, or its territories become a mixture of uncoordinated regional and local forms of administration.

It is unclear whether or not the “donor”-powers understand what is happening in Somali domestic politics and, if they do, whether they are prepared to intervene and in what way. That the “donor”-powers will act decisively to try to prevent political breakdown is unlikely. The United States, for example, was prepared to support the S.F.G.’s request to have the United Nations arms embargo on it lifted, but then backtracked after European opposition and stated that it would wait for the completion of a U.N. “review”  of the desirability of taking such action. The U.S. backtrack was a blow to the S.F.G., which had expected more robust support when the U.S. recognized it.

As it stands, no actor, external or domestic, is working to avoid the impending confrontation. There is no formal process of reconciliation underway. The discourse of Somali political actors and intellectuals is not addressing the issue directly or, in some cases, at all. The external actors are silent about it. At the point at which the conflict intensifies to the degree that it is impossible for actors to ignore it, it is likely that it will be too late to resolve; this analysis is simply an early warning.

Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago  weinstem@purdue.edu

Source: media

 

Canada expelling Eritrean diplomat for using consulate to shake down citizens for ‘national defence’

Don’t tell your daughter she is beautiful, parents told: Minister says children should avoid a fixation with looks

Puntland Petroleum and Minerals Agency, PuntlandState of Somalia

English: Coat of arms of the state of Puntland...
English: Coat of arms of the state of Puntland in Somalia (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

May 25, 2013

PRESS RELEASE

Puntland Government Position on Natural Resources in Somalia

It has come to the attention of the Puntland Petroleum and Minerals Agency (PPMA) that over the past few months the international media has been covering matters concerning hydrocarbon issues in Somalia.

Many of these reports have contained misleading information about the nature of the Somali Federal Constitution and the constitutional rights of Federated States. This press release seeks to correct and clarify the legal issues and rights and responsibilities surrounding hydrocarbon issues in Somalia.

Puntland State of Somalia is a Federated State within the Federal Republic of Somalia, with an adopted State Constitution. The people of Puntland are proud to have contributed significantly to rebuilding Somalia through their efforts to ensure peace, security, governance, and economic development, and will continue to do so.

On August 1, 2012, the Somali National Constituent Assembly – of which Puntland had delegates – adopted the Provisional Federal Constitution (PFC) in Mogadishu, under which the country’s current Lower House of Federal Parliament and new President were established.

Provisional Federal Constitution

Under Article 55 of the PFC, the Somali Federal Government (SFG) has the following four delegated powers: (a) Foreign Affairs; (b) National Defense; (c) Citizenship and Immigration; and (d) Monetary Policy. These powers, as the Constitution states, are the only “powers and responsibilities of the Federal Government” until all the Federated States of Somalia are completely established and reach a comprehensive negotiated settlement with the Federal Government, concerning the final constitutional allocation of power and resources between the Federal Government and the Federated States. The powers endowed to the SFG in Article 55 are also are subject to other constitutional provisions that guarantee the States’ rights of consultation with the SFG over federal matters and national security arrangements.

In addition, all matters specifically concerning natural resources are dealt with in Article 45 of the PFC. This Article states that the “the allocation of the natural resources of the Federal Republic of Somalia shall be negotiated by, and agreed upon, by the Federal Government and the FederatedStates in accordance with this Constitution”. The SFG and the Federated States, once completely established, shall agree upon in a negotiated settlement a system of management and revenue sharing from natural resources, to be incorporated into the finalized Federal Constitution.2 of 2 Article 45 operates parallel to Article 208 of the PFC, which stipulates: “(1) Until such time that all the Federated States of Somalia are established and the Federated State Constitutions are harmonized with the Somali Federal Constitution, the Federated States existing prior to this Provisional Constitution shall retain and exercise powers endowed by their own State Constitution. (2) Existing Federated States must be consulted in the decision-making process regarding the federal system and national security arrangements”.

PuntlandState Constitution

Following on from these Articles in the PFC, Article 54 of the PuntlandState Constitution stipulates that PuntlandState owns, administers and receives all the revenues from natural resources in Puntland. Under the provisions of the current PFC, Puntland shall retain its constitutional rights – enshrined in the Puntland State Constitution and in harmony with the PFC.

Puntland Petroleum and Minerals Agency

The Puntland Petroleum and Minerals Agency (PPMA) is the competent authority charged with the management, oversight and regulation of Puntland Government’s hydrocarbon and minerals policies and operations.

Any entity, either from the Somali Federal Government, or any individual(s) purporting to be a consultant to, or having a role in advising the Somali Federal Government or Puntland Government, whether they are foreign or Somali nationals, are not responsible for, nor have the authority to discuss, negotiate or represent Puntland Government in hydrocarbon and/or minerals operations in any part of Puntland territory, onshore or offshore, to any Somali or foreign company.

Confirmation of Support for Current PSAs in Puntland

Petroleum and Minerals Agency PPMA reaffirms that the people and Government of Puntland shall honor, respect, and uphold the current PSAs with our partners. These contracts were signed in 2007 and are legally valid agreements.

Further inquires, please contact:

Mr. Issa M. Farah, the Director General of Puntland Petroleum and Agency at

(dhollowaa@gmail.com)

Source: Puntlandi.com

CSIS knew of navy spy’s activity but held file back from RCMP

COMMUNIQUE OF THE 22nd EXTRA-ORDINARY SESSION OF THE IGAD ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

ADDIS ABABA, 24th of May 2013

The IGAD Heads of State and Government held its 22nd extraordinary summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 24th of May 2013, under the Chairmanship of H.E Mr. Hailemariam Desalegn, the Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and current Chairperson of the IGAD Assembly to discuss the political situation in the Federal Republic of Somalia.

The Assembly was attended by H. E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda; H.E. Ismail Omar Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti; H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia; H. E. Uhuru Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya. The Summit was also attended by H.E. Mr. Erastus Mwencha, Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E Ambassador Hussein Elamin Elfadil, Ambassador of Sudan and permanent reprehensive to IGAD, H.E. Nicholas Westcostt , Director General for Africa , European Union, and H.E.Amb. Renzo Mario Rosso the Ambassador of Italy to Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the AU and IGAD in his capacity as the Co-Chair of the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF).

The Assembly was preceded by the 48th Extra-ordinary Session of IGAD Council of Ministers held on 24th of May 2013, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. As a follow up to its decision on 3rd May 2013 of its 21st extra-ordinary session, the Summit received a briefing from the chairperson of the IGAD Council of Ministers H.E Dr. Tedros Adhanom, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and also a report from H.EAmb(Eng.)Mahboub M. Maalim, Executive Secretary of IGAD on the high level fact finding and confidence building mission delegated by the Summit to Mogadishu and Kismayo in the Federal Republic of Somalia.

The Summit deliberated on the report and the overall political and security situation in Somalia,

In this regard, 

The Summit: 

After listening to the briefing by H.E Dr. Tedros Adhanom,Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, on the Council consultation in its 48th Extraordinary session and Further considering the report from H.E Amb(Eng.)Mahboub M. Maalim, Executive Secretary of IGAD on the fact finding and confidence building mission to Mogadishu and Kismayo ,

Having taken Note of the findings of the mission and the recommendations made and further considering the various views observed by the Somali Federal Government as well as major stakeholders in Mogadishu and Kismayo;

Recalling the previous decisions of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers on Somalia;
Considering the major political and security priorities of the Federal Government of Somalia, and the efforts for peace and stability within the framework of the provisional constitution;

The Summit;

1. Commends the successful fact finding and confidence building mission led by H.E Amb.(Eng.)Mahboub M. Maalim;

2.  Endorses and adopts the report of the fact finding and confidence building mission to Mogadishu and Kismayo;

 3. Notes with Satisfaction the agreement of all stakeholders to respect the provisional constitution, to accept the government leadership, to conduct the process in an all inclusive manner, the need for IGAD’s
supportive role and conduct the process in a way that helps the fight against Al-Shabaab;

4. Urges that the Federal Government of Somalia should timely convene and lead reconciliation conference with the support of IGAD while consulting key stakeholders in the Juba Regions with a view to chart out a roadmap on the establishment of interim administration and formation of a permanent regional administration in accordance with the Provisional Constitution with IGAD playing a supporting role;

5. Noted with concern the situation in Kismayo and appeals for calm and
restrain by all parties as such actions may threaten peace and stability mainly the fight against Al-shabab;
6. Calls upon all parties in Mogadishu and Kismayo to uphold the tenets of the five principles enumerated in the communiqué of the 21st Extra- Ordinary Summit ;

7. Re-iterates its previous call for the Federal Government of Somalia to as soon as possible integrate the various militia forces into a unified national command of Somali National Army;

8. Stresses the need for enhanced engagement by the international community and the AU in improving the operational capacity and coordination of AMISOM and Somali National Forces in view of supporting the on-going operations for peace and greater stability;

9. Reaffirmed the strong commitment of IGAD countries to assist the peace building and the reconstruction process in Somalia;

10.Recognises the important role to be played by the Somali refugees in the reconstruction of Somalia , and calls on international community to support the initiative by the governments of Somalia and Kenya
and UNHCR to convene an international conference on repatriation of Somali refugees to be held later this year;

11. Directs the Chairperson of the Council of Ministers and IGAD Secretariat to make the necessary arrangements to ensure continuous consultation and dialogue in Somalia;

12.Expresses appreciation to international partners and Organizations that are currently providing financial, material and technical assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia and appeals for increase in the
level of support;

13.Underscored the efforts made by the Ethiopian Prime Minister H.E Mr. Hailemariam Desalegn, in his capacity as IGAD Chair, in facilitating member countries efforts for the regional peace and security;

14.Directs the IGAD Secretariat to transmit these decisions to the African Union Commission and the United Nations Security Council;

15.Congratulates the AU on the occasion of the celebration of the 50th anniversary and its accomplishments; 16.Expresses its appreciation to the Government and the people of Ethiopia for hosting this Extra-ordinary Summit and for shouldering the heavy responsibility of hosting the 50th Anniversary of the AU;

17. Decides to remain seized of this matter.

Issued this 24th of May 2013 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Sources: World Media

REPORT OF THE IGAD CONFIDENCE BUILDING MISSION TO MOGADISHU AND KISMAYO 16-19 MAY 2013

REPORT OF THE IGAD CONFIDENCE BUILDING MISSION TO MOGADISHU AND KISMAYO 16-19 MAY 2013

  1.         I.            Preamble

Following the decision by the 21st Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of IGAD as per paragraph 10 of the communiqué released on the 3rd May in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the Executive Secretary, Amb. Eng Mahboub Maalim led a delegation composed of Ambassadors of member states to Mogadishu and Kismayo to conduct a confidence building mission and collect views from various stakeholders on Juba regions state formation.

 

Premise of the mission:

  • The communiqué of IGAD 21st Extraordinary Summit of Head of States and Governments held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on the 3rd May 2013. The following paragraphs formed the basis of the mission:
    • Paragraph 4: Noted with appreciation the increased engagement, convergence of ideas and solidarity among IGAD member states in support of Somalia. In this regard, noted with appreciation the meeting between H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta, the President of Kenya, and H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia of April 27th 2013 in Mombasa, Kenya and welcomed the joint statement of understanding which elaborates principles of engagement. In this regard, urged for its full implementation.
  • Paragraph 6: Noted with appreciation and welcomed the Somali Federal government’s document titled National Stabilization Plan and reiterated the need for all processes particularly the ongoing efforts towards setting up Somali regional administration and stabilization efforts, to be anchored on the following principles: –
    • Leadership of the government of the Federal Republic of Somalia in the process;
    • Respect of the provisional constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia;
    • All inclusive consultative process with the peoples of Somalia;
    • supportive role of IGAD based on the priorities of the Somali government; and
    • Fighting the Al Shabab as the primary focus of the Somali Federal government; AMISOM; regional and international partners;

And further requested the Somali federal government to align the document with the aforementioned agreed five principles.

  • Paragraph 10: Decided to conduct a confidence – building mission to Kismayu led by the IGAD Executive Secretary and composed of representatives of the federal government of Somalia and one senior delegate from each member state of IGAD with the aim of assessing the situation and submitting a report to the IGAD summit to be held on the sidelines of the AU summit in May 2013.
  1.       II.            Methodology

The Ambassadorial team developed terms of reference based on the five principles in the communiqué and held discussions with the Federal Government and stakeholders in Mogadishu and Kismayo:

  • Mogadishu (16th-17th May)
  1. H.E President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud
  2. Hon Speaker  Mohamed Sheikh Osman (JAWARI)
  3. H.E Prime Minister Mr Abdi Farah Shirdon (SAAID)
  4. Ministers of Interior and National Security as well as Justice and Federal Constitution
  5. Members of Federal Parliament representing various clans including Hawiye, Daarood, Digil and Mirifle, Dir and the Fifth Clan
  6. Clan elders and Civil Society
  7. AMISOM
  1. AMISOM Sector II
  2. Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe),
  3. Barre Hiirale, Abdiballe Defale, Omar Burale, Iftin Hassan
  4. The technical committee  and Signatories to secession of hostilities
  5. Clan elders, Civil society and Business Community
  6. Delegation of the Federal Government in Kismayo
  7. Commander of Somali National Army and Ras Kiamboni Brigade (RKB)
  1.     III.            Positions on the Issues

a)      The Federal Government

  • The Federal Government and its Leadership including H.E. President, H.E. Speaker, H.E. Prime Minister, H.E. Ministers of Interior/National Security and Justice emphasized the government position as follows:
  1.                                                                                       i.      The process in Kismayo is not done in the spirit of the constitution
  2.                                                                                     ii.      The lead role of the Federal Government is missing
  3.                                                                                   iii.      The inclusiveness of the process is questionable
  4.                                                                                    iv.      The process does not help the joint efforts to fight Alshabab
  5.                                                                                      v.      Demanded IGAD to support the Somali Federal Government’s efforts to uphold the constitution
  6.                                                                                    vi.      Underlined the need for dialogue and reconciliation as way out of the impasse
  • Some members of the Federal Parliament from the region supported the process, while other MPs opposed the process in Kismayo.

b)      The Kismayo Actors

  • Ahmed Madobe and his team, as well as the signatories, technical committee  argued that the process:
  1.                                                                                       i.       Is in line with the Federal Provisional Constitution,
  2.                                                                                     ii.      Is inclusive
  3.                                                                                   iii.      Has significantly contributed in the fight against Alshabab and liberated many areas in Juba regions
  4.                                                                                    iv.      Appreciate continued IGAD role
  5.                                                                                      v.      Underlined the need for dialogue and reconciliation as way out of the impasse
  • Other Stakeholders in Kismayo believe that:
  1.                                                                                       i.      The process is not done in the spirit of the constitution
  2.                                                                                     ii.      The lead role of the Federal Government is missing
  3.                                                                                   iii.      The inclusiveness of the process is questionable
  4.                                                                                    iv.      The process does not help the joint efforts to fight Alshabab
  5.                                                                                      v.      Demanded IGAD to support the Somali Federal Government’s efforts to uphold the constitution
  6.                                                                                    vi.      Underlined the need for dialogue and reconciliation as way out of the impasse

c)      AMISOM

  • The Ambassadorial team was briefed by AMISOM Force Commander on the political and security situation in the country. With regard to Juba regions, AMISOM view is to implement the five principles of the communiqué. The force commander informed the team that in the initial stages there was a technical communication problem between the force headquarters and AMISOM sector II that has since been resolved.
  • The force commander informed the team that the challenge has been the fact that each troop contributing country (TCC) signed separate MOU with the African Union (AU).
  • AMISOM sector II Commander briefed the delegation on the security situation and the role the sector has been playing in ensuring peace and security in the region.
  • He stated that Alshabab’s strength and capability has been significantly diminished. He however added that probing attacks, ambushes and IEDs are still continuing.
  • He blamed the resurgence of insecurity particularly in Kismayo as a result of the political tension.

d)     Somalia National Army/ Ras Kiamboni Brigade

The delegation held a session with Somalia National Army(SNA) and Ras Kiamboni Brigade (RKB) commanders who informed the delegation on their continued efforts against fighting Alshabab and expressed their logistical and financial problems.

  1.     IV.            Findings and recommendations

Based on the summit communiqué of 3rd May 2013 and particularly on the five principles enumerated there in, the Ambassadorial team conducted its fact finding and confidence building mission, made observations and came up with the following recommendations:

  1. Whether or not the process  is being done in the spirit of the provisional constitution of the Federal Government of Somalia:
  • The Federal Government and various stakeholders in Kismayo are in agreement on the need to follow the provisional constitution in the establishment of the regional administration;
  • However the Ambassadorial team observed that there is a difference in interpretation of the provisional constitution between the Federal Government and various stakeholders in Kismayo.

      Recommendations

  • The Federal Government and Parliament of Somalia to expedite enactment of the necessary laws that govern the establishment of regional administration.
  1. Whether or not it is all inclusive:
  • The mission found the inclusivity of the Kismayo process contestable, especially among the minority.

 

Recommendation

  • Recognizing the fragility of the situation in Kismayo, the Federal Government should timely convene and lead reconciliation conference with support of IGAD while consulting key Stakeholders in Kismayo. Meanwhile the mission calls upon the stakeholders in Kismayo to go to Mogadishu and dialogue with the Federal Government regarding the interim regional administration.
  1. Whether or not the process is led by the Federal Government of Somalia:
  • The Ambassadorial team has observed that the process was not a government led process;
  • In principle all have agreed that the government needs to take leadership of the process;
  • The Federal government and the stakeholders in Kismayo however have expressed strong reasons and explanations as to why the process was not led by the government.

Recommendation

  • The IGAD Ambassadorial team proposes that the Federal Government of Somalia takes the lead role in the formation of regional administrations including Juba regions.
  1. Whether or not IGAD is playing a supportive role:
  • The Ambassadorial team has observed that the role of IGAD is accepted by all stakeholders;
  • Regarding the Juba regions  process, IGAD facilitation has been absent since February ;
  • However during this period the council and the summit have remained engaged in the stabilization of Somalia.

Recommendations

  • Noting that the Federal Government and other actors have expressed willingness in IGAD role to facilitate the process, IGAD and the Federal Government should be more proactive. In this regard, IGAD to expedite support to the Federal Government in its priorities including the formation of regional Administration;
  • Calling on IGAD secretariat to provide technical support to the federal government as and when requested;
  • IGAD member countries provide the Federal Government with experience and technical assistance on federalism, devolution and decentralization as and when requested by the Federal Government.
  1. Whether or not the process is accomplished in such a way that it helps the joint effort to combat Alshabab:
  • The team has observed that this process indeed was a tool resulting in liberation of many areas of Juba regions;
  • However the last stage of the Juba regions process that ended with an election has resulted in tension;
  • The team observed that the high political tension in Kisimayo is not only threatening force cohesion and increasing insecurity but also impairing the operational tempo of the fight against Alshabab.

Recommendations

  • Calls upon the Federal Government of Somalia to provide immediate security and logistical support to the regions;
  • Calls upon the Federal government of Somalia to immediately integrate the various militia forces into a unified national command of Somali National Army and logistically provide force sustainability;
  • The AMISOM Sector II should be provided with a political support unit to help in dealing with the political aspect of the disputes in Kismayo and to facilitate cooperation and coordination between the sector and the Federal Government.

Sources: Puntlandi and World Media

Innocent Bystanders

ethnicaisle's avatarThe Ethnic Aisle

by Navneet Alang

The nightmare that has been Toronto’s political news scene for the past three years seems to have finally reached its awful zenith. With allegations that Mayor Rob Ford may have smoked crack and made homophobic, racist remarks on video, there is no end to the ill effects of this latest head-shaking fiasco: the continued reduction of our municipal political sphere to a never-ending circus; the serious harm done to Toronto’s international image by a man who claims to be raising its business profile; and the simple fact that a city that was finally starting to hit its stride has been seriously set back by its woefully inadequate mayor.

But one more unexpected, negative, and completely unnecessary effect of this mess has been the circulation of a profoundly xenophobic tone about the people who have the video in question. Though the original Gawker piece made precisely no mention of the…

View original post 628 more words

“Somalia And The Slippery Slope Of Jubbaland”

Face-saving starts with: 1. Appreciation and recognition of reality on the ground today in Jubbaland without artificially painting or treating the election of Ahmed Madoobe as disputed or unconstitutional. 2. Removal of any doubt about the letter and spirit of the Somali Federal Provisional Constitution regarding the formation of federal states without any further double talk and wishy washy ramblings or reluctance to adhere to the relevant articles. 3. Acknowledgement of wrongs of the Civil War and serious commitment to addressing them and restoring trust in central authorities and current leadership. Otherwise, any good intentions of the international community to help out Somalia one last time would be in vain and that could be the beginning of the end of Somalia as we knew it. Make no mistake!

What is the Fuss on the Formation of Jubaland State?

warsame digital media's avatarWarsame Policy & Media Network (WAPMEN)

image001I wonder why some Somalis are upset by the formation of Jubaland State. Is Jubland State for the unity of Somalia? yes! Do they recognize the Somali Federal Government? Yes! Are they against Al-Shabab? Yes! Are they inclusive and want every stakeholder to be part of the process? Yes! Are they more than one region to meet the constitutional requirements of Somalia to form a regional federal state? Yes! Are they seeking the support of Somalia’s federal leadership? Yes! Are members of the Federal Parliament from Gedo, Middle and Lower Jubaland support the formation of Jubaland State? Yes, mostly! Do they want to restore law and order there? Yes! Are they committed to protecting the rights of minorities in the state? Yes! Are they economically viable and sustainable entity? Yes? Are inhabitants of the area sick and tired of the violence, warlordism, extremism and environmental predators? Yes!…

View original post 19 more words

Somalia: Oil thrown on the fire

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/538e9550-b3e1-11e2-ace9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2TFQywgsG

Somalia Conference and Rivalry of Civilizations

HORN OF AFRICA

by   |  on May 10th, 2013 

 

A few days before the “Somalia Conference 2013” held in London on May 7, a foreign journalist friend of mine sent me an e-mail asking what my thoughts were regarding the upcoming conference hosted by Prime Minister David Cameron. I replied: “My heart’s belief in miracles outweighed my mind’s interest in the pursuit of objective analysis.”

I am as optimistic as I was then, but hardly quixotic.

While the conference’s Final Communique outlines specific acknowledgements and directives that could have various effects on various actors, the most important messages were asserted in the implicit, or by way of omission.

The communique acknowledges improved conditions such as security sector, drastic reduction in the number of pirate attacks, receding famine, and the large number of the diaspora returning home. Likewise, it acknowledges challenges such as al-Shabaab’s hit-and-run campaign of terror and the fact that the provisional constitution is an incomplete document that fails to address some of the most serious issues of contention.

On the political front, the communique welcomes the Federal Government’s plans “to resolve outstanding constitutional issues, including the sharing of power, resources and revenues between the Federal Government and the regions.” It continues to state, “We welcomed the dialogue on the future structure of Somalia that has begun between the Federal Government and the regions. We welcomed progress on forming regional administrations and looked forward to the completion of that process. We encouraged the regions to work closely with the Federal Government to form a cohesive national polity consistent with the provisional constitution.”

The message seems clear; however, there is one thing missing — the term “federal state.” Though the concept is prominently established in the constitution, oddly it is replaced with terms such as “regions” and “regional administrations” in the communique. Throughout the communique the term is sidestepped seven times.

Was this the result of collective amnesia, or was it a deliberate action articulated in a carefully crafted language? If I were a betting person, I’d go with the latter.

As a newly rebranded coalition mandated by a new resolution, the international community has a new plan and initiative that will most likely to be much different than the discredited version outsourced to the hegemon of the Horn- Ethiopia. Hegemons tend to grant themselves the right to roam around freely and randomly exploit any ventures they deem expedient to their perceived unilateral self-interest.

Despite the fact the U.S. dual-track policy still has a de facto presence on the ground, this new language seems to have been injected to indicate rejection of the prevalent domestic clan-centric political order. Who can ignore the stubborn fact that, in current day Somalia, “federalism” means nothing other than legalized clan domination? The Alfa Clan, or the most armed, mainly gets the lion’s share and subjugates others while crying wolf.

The writing is on the wall: Somalis must renegotiate the form of government and indeed governance in a way that decentralizes power, leaves space to accommodate Somaliland, and brings the nation back together. The international community has been receiving earful of grievances from various clans, such as those from Sol, Sanaag, Ein and Awdal who inhabit Somaliland and say they are facing existentialist threat from the current arrangement, and, as such, are invoking their rights to stay in the union.

However mortifying this may be to some actors, reason should prevail. Staying the old course is a recipe for renewed civil war and perpetual instability. Somalia is too war-weary and too important to let it drift back into chaos again.

Contrary to the common perception, Somalia is perhaps the most important political theatre in the 21stcentury as it is where geopolitics, geoeconomic and georeligious dynamics intersect and interplay. And it is where two old empires (British and Turkish) are positioning themselves for global influence. Meanwhile, the curtains are slowly opening to unveil the covert rivalry of civilizations, instead of the clichéd “clash.”

According to Jamal Osman of U.K. Channel 4, “Western nations are uneasy about the rapid growth of Turkish influence in Somalia, and the UK government’s initiative is seen as part of the West’s agenda to counter it.”

Whether or not this latest high profile conference would prove “a pivotal moment for Somalia” would depend on two particular factors. First, it depends on how soon the Somali leadership comes to understand that without reconciliation, improved security, public services and development cannot be sustained. Second, it would depend on how key international partners avoid the political temptation of zero-sum gains.

Competition of civilizations can be healthy so long as the key actors cooperate, collaborate and negotiate ways that would not take away from each other and the others. However, it’s no secret that the difference between pre-Erdogan (Turkish Prime Minister) and post-Erdogan visit of Somalia is day and night, and that Turkey has been quite humble about the life-changing provisions it has made available for the Somali people and nation.

At the end of the day, what tips the scale and wins the hearts and minds of people are the tangible direct services provided to them at their most dire moment. Everything else is considered a costly symbolism. “There are two kinds of people, those who do the work and those who take the credit;” said the late Indira Gandhi. “Try to be in the first group; there is less competition there,” she added. This, of course, is even more pertinent to the Somali government.

While improvement of security apparatus, finance system and rule of law are indeed issues of high priority, the federal government would have to provide substantive public services far beyond Mogadishu. More importantly, the government must strategically balance the ways, means and ends at its discretion to achieve its objective of secure, reconciled and cohesively functioning Somalia. That is what Somalis yearn for, and that is what the international community wishes to assist Somalia with.

To think strategically is to recognize “what time is it.” What works today might not work tomorrow; and what is available today might not be available tomorrow.

Source: Foreign Policy Association

by world security affiars journalist bashir tadhase Somalia has long been defined by terrorism, famine, and piracy. But as the United States this week pledged another $40 million towards its recovery, Somalia’s leaders said the country had finally turned a corner in the fight against the al Qaeda-linked militant group, al-Shabab. “A bright future for Somalia is within touching distance,” Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon proclaimed on Twitter as the U.S. attended a global summit in London to discuss the country’s future. Organizers of the conference sought to build upon the new normality creeping into the nation’s capital, Mogadishu. The country that is often referred to as “the world’s most dangerous” is not as dangerous as it once was. Pirates have not successfully hijacked any ships off Somalia’s coast in almost a year and a growing sense of security and confidence has been fueled by the relative retreat of al- Shabab, which controlled much of the country until Kenyan forces invaded in 2011. Somalia is a battleground not only for its own rival factions, but also for the U.S. and its allies in the fight against al Qaeda, which is opening up Africa as a new global front line. U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron said the international community should be careful to avoid Somalia becoming a hotbed for radicalism. “If we ignore it, we will be making the same mistakes in Somalia that we made in Afghanistan in the 1990s. I’m not prepared to let that happen,” he told the summit on Tuesday. To that end, the U.S. has pumped more than $1.5 billion worth of assistance into the country since 2009, including the $40 million pledged on Tuesday. It is among the countries pledging aid in the hope that stability will encourage security. The fall of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991 left Somalia without effective central government and awash with weapons. But there are signs of fragile progress. Airplanes flying in from neighboring Kenya are filled with members of the diaspora returning home after being forced out by hunger and civil war. Last year, Turkish Airlines decided to start a commercial service from Istanbul. Officials in Mogadishu hope that the city’s beaches might one day attract a significant number of tourists on those flights. But Somalia’s renaissance has limits. Mogadishu is still considered too dangerous to host a meeting of world leaders and senior government officials. Although al-Shabab has been pushed to the outskirts of the capital by foreign peacekeepers, it maintains the ability to strike at its heart. Mohamed Abdiwahab / AFP – Getty Images Security surround the area following a suicide attack on a government convoy in Mogadishu on May 5. Around 11 people were killed. It proved its deadly potential on April 14 when terrorists attacked Mogadishu’s courthouse. A deadly car bomb was detonated in the center of the city a month earlier. On Sunday, a suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden car into a convoy carrying Qatari officials, killing at least eight Somalis. Ahmed Soliman, research assistant at British think tank Chatham House, believes such attacks will become more frequent as al- Shabab tries to disrupt areas it no longer controls. “Al-Shabab still controls the majority of rural and south-central areas of Somalia,” he said. “The shift toward insurgent attacks could be a sign of weakness – that it has been forced to change tactics and attack areas that it no longer dominates. But I think it could also play a game of cat-and-mouse with foreign troops by trying to make gains in northern areas just as the troops establish control in south- central areas.” “It is being kept at bay by international forces under AMISOM [the African Union Mission in Somalia] but that will only last as long as those forces are there. Things are undoubtedly changing, but the jury is still out on whether al-Shabab has been defeated.” Abdulhakim Haji Faqi, Somalia’s defense minister, said his country’s forces desperately need military resources. “In order to win this war against al-Shabab, we need to get the proper equipment,” he said. “We are not asking for air forces, we are not asking for ships, we are not asking for huge military equipment, we are asking only for light weapons and ammunition so that our soldiers can effectively fight.” He added that this was an “international issue,” not just a problem for Somalia as extremists from Pakistan, Yemen and Afghanistan — as well as the U.S., Canada and Britain — had been operating in the country. “International organizations based in Somalia are trying to attack neighboring countries in the region and are also trying to cause international problems elsewhere,” he said. Somalia’s fledgling U.N.-backed government, which took power in September after more than a decade of transitional rule, insists things are looking up – but admits the process will take time. “Somalia is a country that has been exposed to anarchy for over two decades,” President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud told the U.K.’s Sunday Telegraph newspaper in an interview ahead of the summit. “When I was elected I was attacked within two days, and there were suicide bombers in every corner of my hotel. There are threats against me all the time.” “There is a huge amount at stake in Somalia: the future of this country, the security of the region, the removal of the piracy stranglehold,” he added. The sharp reduction in attacks on commercial ships off East Africa has been driven by a government amnesty for young pirates backed by international military patrols . Slideshow: Famine strikes East Africa Dai Kurokawa / EPA Somali refugees are seeking shelter in Mogadishu and Kenya from extreme drought and hunger in what the UN’s refugee agency is calling the worst humanitarian disaster in the world. Launch slideshow “As long as the international naval presence remains, piracy rates will stay low,” said Adjoa Anyimadu, research associate at Chatham House . “It’s impressive how much countries have worked together to provide naval protection – China and Russia are among those working in the U.S.-led operation.” In another potential sign of recovery, Deputy U.N. Secretary-General Jan Eliasson wants to shift aid efforts away from away from humanitarian aid and toward development projects. The U.N. estimates Somalia will need $1.33 billion this year. The country still faces desperate poverty. More than 200,000 children under 5 are acutely malnourished, and just under half of Somalis live on less than $1 a day. Millions still live in refugee camps, and that country lacks government structures such as schools, hospitals and sanitation. “The main reason we have hope now, more than ever …. is we now have a leadership which has a sense of responsibility,” Eliasson told Reuters on Tuesday. “The trend is positive, but it has been interrupted, and it might still be interrupted by sporadic attacks of the nature we have seen. Al-Shabab are still a threat.” Al-Shabab is blamed not only for causing instability across the Horn of Africa, but for contributing to the famine that struck Somalia between 2010 and 2012. According to a report released last week by the U.S.-funded famine early warning system (FEWSNET) and the United Nations, more than a quarter of a million people died during the crisis. A peaceful solution to these problems is far from likely. Al-Shabab remains an attractive organization to many in country where youth unemployment is running at about 70 per cent. “Al-Shabab pays its fighters and gives them food,” Soliman noted. “Several of its commanders are high on the list of the U.S. government list of most wanted terrorists,” so direct peace talks are off the agenda, Soliman said. However, unofficial meetings with Somalia’s government are possible. There are also problems with the country’s own forces. In a report published Monday, Human Rights Watch said it had documented “serious abuses” by Somali security forces , including the army, police, intelligence agencies, and government-affiliated militia. “Abuses documented include murder, rape, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and looting,” the report said. “These abuses were committed with almost complete impunity.” However, Somalia’s president remains committed to the task ahead. “One thing is very clear…that Somalia is fragmented into pieces,” Mohamud said. “Reversing all that has been happening in the past two decades is a very tedious work that requires some time.”

More Trade News in Brief – Week 19 (6 – 12 May 2013)

Bogdan Marius Beleuz's avatarTrade News in Brief

 
* WTO – New Trade Monitoring Database
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has launched new trade monitoring database provides detailed information on trade measures implemented by WTO members and observers.
 
Read more following the link.
 
——————————————————————————————————————————————–—
 
* UAE Rejoined WTO
 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has rejoined the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) after 26 years of having left the entity
 
Check here.
 

View original post

Up to 3,000 African peacekeepers killed in Somalia since 2007: U.N.

By Louis Charbonneau

Thu May 9, 2013

(Reuters) – As many as 3,000 African Union peacekeepers have been killed in Somalia in recent years in an attempt to end an Islamist insurgency and bring stability to the Horn of Africa nation, a senior U.N. official said on Thursday.

“I want to pay tribute to the countries and to their soldiers who paid such an enormously heavy price,” U.N. Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson told reporters.

“You would be shocked to learn that maybe it is up to 3,000 AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) soldiers that have been killed during these years that AMISOM has been there,” he said.

The 17,700 strong African Union force began deploying to Somalia in 2007. It includes troops from Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Djibouti.

“Uganda, Burundi have paid a tremendous price,” he added. “The Kenyan troops are, of course, also a large part of AMISOM.”

By way of comparison, 3,096 U.N. peacekeepers have died since 1948, according to the website of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Somalia is only just emerging from two decades of civil war. Its government is struggling to rebuild a country riven by clan divisions and whose infrastructure and institutions are in tatters.

A newly appointed parliament last year elected a new president, the first vote of its kind since the toppling of former military dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991.

African Union peacekeepers have been largely responsible for pushing al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab out of the capital Mogadishu and other urban centers in the past two years, but the group is still able to launch major attacks, including a suicide bombing on Sunday that killed at least eight people.

Eliasson said on the sidelines of a donor conference in London earlier this week that sought pledges to rebuild Somalia that the United Nations has given strong backing to the country’s new leadership.

Source: AMISOM/Reuters

Somalia Conference 2013: Communiqué

07 May 2013

The International Somalia Conference final communiqué

shirkalThe Somalia Conference took place at Lancaster House on 7 May 2013, co-hosted by the UK and Somalia, and attended by fifty-four friends and partners of Somalia.

We met at a pivotal moment for Somalia. Last year Somalia’s eight-year transition ended and Somalia chose a new, more legitimate Parliament, President and Government. Security is improving, as Somali and AMISOM forces, and their Ethiopian allies, recover towns and routes from Al Shabaab. The number of pirate attacks committed off the coast of Somalia has drastically reduced. The famine has receded. The diaspora have begun to return. The economy is starting to revive.

But many challenges remain. Al Shabaab is still a threat to peace and security. The constitution is not complete. Piracy and terrorism remain threats. Millions still live in Internally Displaced Persons and refugee camps. The country lacks developed government structures, schools, hospitals, sanitation and other basic services.

The Federal Government of Somalia has set out its plans to address these challenges in its Six Pillar Policy. At the Conference, the international community came together to agree practical measures to support the Federal Government’s plans in three key areas – security, justice and public financial management. The Federal Government presented its vision for the implementation of federalism, the adoption of a permanent constitution and holding of elections. We also agreed to work together to tackle sexual violence in Somalia.

We agreed that partnership between Somalia and the international community would form the basis of our future cooperation: the international community is committed to provide coordinated and sustained support for implementation of the Federal Government’s plans.

Political

We agreed that political progress remains the key to ensuring long-term stability for Somalia. We welcomed the Federal Government’s plans to resolve outstanding constitutional issues, including the sharing of power, resources and revenues between the Federal Government and the regions. We further welcomed the Government’s commitment to hold democratic elections in 2016. We reiterated our support for building capacity in democratic institutions throughout Somalia, beginning with support for local elections in Puntland next month.

We welcomed the dialogue on the future structure of Somalia that has begun between the Federal Government and the regions. We welcomed progress on forming regional administrations and looked forward to the completion of that process. We encouraged the regions to work closely with the Federal Government to form a cohesive national polity consistent with the provisional constitution.

We welcomed the IGAD Extraordinary Summit, held in Addis Ababa on 3 May under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, which agreed a framework for dialogue on regional issues. We looked forward to further progress ahead of a meeting of IGAD in the margins of the African Union Summit in May.

We welcomed the dialogue between the Federal Government and Somaliland at Ankara in April 2013 to clarify their future relationship, building on the meeting at Chevening in June 2012, and welcomed the Ankara communiqué. We expressed our appreciation for the facilitating role played by Turkey.

We welcomed the protection of fundamental rights in the constitution, and the Federal Government’s commitment to uphold human rights, including by establishing an independent National Human Rights Commission. We further welcomed the Federal Government’s commitment to protect women and children, and take steps to end the involvement of children in armed conflict. We commended the recent visit of the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict to Somalia, and the plan for a Somali and international team of experts to make recommendations on how sexual violence could be addressed. We agreed on the important role a free and independent media should play in Somalia, and welcomed the Federal Government’s commitment to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the killing of journalists, and to promote press freedom.

Security

We shared the Federal Government’s view that security is the essential prerequisite for further progress in all other spheres. We commended the bravery and commitment of Somali and AMISOM forces, and those fighting alongside them. We expressed appreciation to countries contributing troops and police. We applauded the forces’ successes in freeing towns and routes from Al Shabaab. We reiterated the need for adequate and sustained funding for AMISOM, welcomed partners’ support to date, and called upon new donors to contribute.

We welcomed the Federal Government’s determination to take responsibility for providing Somalia’s security. We welcomed the Government’s plans for national security architecture and for developing its armed forces, including the integration of militias, and police. We welcomed the commitment to ensure that these security structures are accountable, inclusive, proportionate and sustainable; and respect a civilian chain of command, the rule of law, and human rights. We recognised the need for support to help the Government manage disengaged fighters.

We agreed to support implementation of the Federal Government’s security plans including through existing structures. We also agreed to provide assistance which should be coordinated by the Federal Government.

We welcomed the extension of AMISOM’s mandate for a further year in UN Security Council Resolution 2093. We noted the partial suspension of the arms embargo as recognition of political progress, and urged the Federal Government to fulfil its obligations to provide safeguards to protect Somalia’s citizens and neighbours.

We commended the Somalis and international partners for progress made in combating piracy over the last year including the efforts of Puntland and other regional or local governments and welcomed the Federal Government’s Maritime Resource and Security Strategy. We reiterated our determination to work with Somalia to eradicate piracy and other maritime crimes, and expressed our support for the Federal Government’s ongoing efforts to establish internationally recognised Somali waters, which will help it protect its abundant maritime resources and revitalise economic activities, as well as end toxic dumping and illegal fishing. We welcomed international support to develop Somali maritime security capacities and looked forward to the UAE conference in Dubai on 11-12 September. We welcomed partners’ continued efforts to bring to justice to those behind piracy and positive, ongoing initiatives in Somalia and the region. We recognized the need for these efforts to be complemented by work on land to generate alternative livelihoods and support communities affected by piracy.

Justice and Policing

We welcomed the Federal Government’s vision for equal access for all to a robust, impartial and effective justice system. We commended its justice action plan setting out immediate priorities for assistance, developed at the National Dialogue on Justice in Mogadishu, and applauded this inclusive dialogue with stakeholders.

We welcomed the Government’s four-year action plan to create an accountable, effective and responsive police service for Somalis. We agreed to align our assistance for both justice and police behind Federal Government plans. We looked forward to the establishment of a Rule of Law Fund, under the leadership of the Federal Government, and invited UNDP and the Federal Government to present the agreed governance and technical arrangements for the fund at the Brussels Conference in September.

We committed to support the Government’s efforts to combat terrorism. An effective and secure criminal justice system, including the establishment and maintenance of prisons administered with respect for human dignity, will be central to Somalia’s ability to tackle terrorism in a human rights-compliant manner and reduce the threat from Al Shabaab in the long-term.

Public Financial Management

The Federal Government set out its determination to tackle corruption, and fund public services. We welcomed the Government’s four-year plan to establish transparent and effective public financial management systems. We encouraged the Federal Government to establish more robust controls through the Ministry of Finance’s operations including public reporting of budgets, expenditure and audits. We committed to coordinate assistance using the structure set out by the Government.

We acknowledged the Government’s financing gap and urgent need for short-term support to pay for salaries and operations while public financial management reforms are underway and until sufficient domestic revenues can be collected. In this context we welcomed the Federal Government’s creation of a Special Financing Facility as an early opportunity for the Federal Government to demonstrate its commitment to financial accountability and transparency.

In line with the outcomes of the G8 Foreign Ministers’ meeting, we welcomed the re-engagement of the International Financial Institutions (the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), including IMF recognition of the Federal Government and progress made at the Spring Meetings.

We recognised the importance of investment and economic growth to increase domestic revenue. We encouraged investment into Somalia, recognising the important role the diaspora could play.

Rationalisation of Funding

The Federal Government appealed to its international partners to provide funding for Somali national plans. The Federal Government expressed its appreciation for continued bilateral support and asked partners to channel funding through mechanisms agreed with the Federal Government, such as the Special Financing Facility and the Rule of Law Fund, wherever possible. We looked forward to development of a longer term sustainable financing architecture for Somalia including a World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund which will be important on the path to normalisation of Somalia’s financial relationship with the International Financial Institutions.

Stabilisation

We welcomed the Federal Government’s efforts to develop major initiatives on stabilization, including a comprehensive strategy on disengaged fighters, alternative dispute resolution and at-risk youth. The Federal Government appealed for immediate support for stabilisation projects, to enable local administrations to provide services for their people.

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

We recognised the importance of scaling up efforts to create the conditions for the voluntary return and reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees, in accordance with international law. We praised neighbouring countries for providing protection and assistance for refugees, and agreed to continue supporting them in shouldering this burden. We recognised that the return of refugees and IDPs should take place within a context of increased security conditions and livelihoods opportunities. We endorsed the tripartite dialogue initiated by the Somali and Kenyan governments alongside UNHCR to develop modalities and a framework for safe, orderly, sustainable return and resettlement of Somali refugees on a voluntary basis, and looked forward to the forthcoming conference in Nairobi.

Role of Multilateral Organisations and International Support

We recognised the role of the United Nations and the African Union in Somalia and welcomed their commitment to a strengthened strategic partnership. We underlined the importance of close coordination by both organisations with the Federal Government, other international and regional organisations, and Member States. We welcomed the creation of a new UN Assistance Mission (UNSOM) in Somalia and urged the UN to deploy the mission by the target date of 3 June. We recognised the important role of Somalia’s neighbours in promoting long-term stability in the region, and encouraged IGAD to continue to work to promote dialogue and mutual understanding. We underlined the importance of EU action through its commitments in the fields of security, development and humanitarian aid. We also recognised the role of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Conference.

We recognised the valuable support provided by bilateral partners, and encouraged them to continue their efforts in coordination with others.

We acknowledged that the Somalia Conference was one of a series of events in 2013 aimed at providing international support to Somalia. We looked forward to the planned Special Conference on Somalia on the socio-economic development agenda in the margins of the fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V) in late May. Taking note of the Federal Government’s commitment to implement the New Deal engagement in fragile states in the form of a Compact, we welcomed Somalia’s efforts to develop an overarching reconstruction plan encompassing Somali priorities on inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations, revenue and services. We looked forward to the EU/Somalia Conference in Brussels in September.

Conclusion

The Conference agreed that Somalia had made significant progress. We congratulated all who had made that possible, notably the Somali people, Federal Government, Members of Parliament, civil society and diaspora. We commended the sustained commitment of Somalia’s international partners, and urged continued results-orientated support. We recognised the need to consolidate progress quickly and reiterated our determination to support Somalia over the long-term.

 Source: Wardheernews.com; world media

Somaliland: “Article 4 of the Ankara Communique is Ambiguous” Weinstein

Sunday, 05 May 2013
Prof M Weinstein "Gamboole"Prof M Weinstein “Gamboole”Prof Weinstein talks to Somalilandsun on the Ankara communique and 7th May London conference on Somalia.By: Yusuf M Hasan

Somalilandsun) – “The key article of the accord is #4 in which the parties “Agreed to encourage and facilitate International aid and development provided to Somaliland.”

” Depending up how one reads that sentence, it is possible to conclude that Somaliland has submitted to the supremacy of the Somali Federal Government (S.F.G.) and has lost its claim to sovereignty, or that the S.F.G. has acquiesced in Somaliland’s claim to independence and, in consequence, has surrendered its sovereignty over Somaliland”

This is according to views expressed by Mr Michael Weinstein ‘Gamboole during an interview with Somalilandsun in which he also says that Somaliland’s sovereignty would be compromised if it participated in the 7th May London.

The Somalilandsun posted seven questions in which Prof Gamboole had this to say before providing his input.

“My responses to your questions appear below. I have responded to questions 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. I have put responses to 1, 3 under the heading: Somaliland-S.F.G.; and responses to 4, 5, 6 under the heading: Somaliland-“Donor”-Powers. I did not answer 2 because I am not an expert on security policy, but I can say that a Federal body to facilitate the full implementation of the agreement in regard to security is not needed for cooperation. It could be done by meetings among the officials of the two governments without a special instrumentality.

To this effect we have rearranged our questions thus rhyme with the Weinstein responses.

Below are the verbatim excerpts of the interview

Is the Ankara Communique of advantage or disadvantage to Somaliland, Why?

Somaliland-S.F.G.

1. It is not possible to determine whether the Ankara Communique is advantageous or disadvantageous to Somaliland, because the Communique is so vaguely worded that it lends itself to alternative constructions. The key article of the accord is #4 in which the parties “Agreed to encourage and facilitate International aid and development provided to Somaliland.” Depending up how one reads that sentence, it is possible to conclude that Somaliland has submitted to the supremacy of the Somali Federal Government (S.F.G.) and has lost its claim to sovereignty, or that the S.F.G. has acquiesced in Somaliland’s claim to independence and, in consequence, has surrendered its sovereignty over Somaliland. Indeed, both of those viewpoints have been advanced in the debates following the issuance of the Communique.

3. What is your take on the assertions by Somalia MP Ali Khalif Galayd that by signing the Communique the Somalia president and his government recognized the existence of Somaliland as a sovereign country?

Ali Khalif Galayd says Ankara Communique recognizes Somaliland's statehoodAli Khalif Galayd says Ankara Communique recognizes Somaliland’s statehood3. MP Ali Khalif Galayd is on one side of the debate over Article 4, holding that the S.F.G. “. “had already granted Somaliland full independence ” by signing on to Article 4, which in his view treats Somaliland as a separate entity from the S.F.G., by virtue of the words “…provided to Somaliland.”

In contrast, on the other side, Mohamud Hassan Arale has argued that Article 4 “closes the lid” on Somaliland’s independence because henceforth external aid would be “endorsed” by the S.F.G.

Actually, Article 4 is so vague that either Galayd’s or Arrale’s construction could be given to it. Perhaps Galayd is correct that by mentioning Somaliland as separate from the S.F.G., the former has been granted “full independence,” but it is just as plausible to argue that “Somaliland” is understood in the Communique as a regional state under the S.F.G.’s sovereignty (which is certainly the way the S.F.G. sees it). Similarly, perhaps Arrale is correct to substitute “endorse” for “endorse” for “encourage and facilitate ,” but it could just as plausibly be said that Somaliland is simply allowing that it will accept help and cooperation from the S.F.G. without any “endorsement” attached or implied.

Article 4 is so vaguely worded, because the issue of sovereignty has not yet been resolved.

II. Somaliland-“Donor”-Powers

4. Is Somaliland justified in boycotting the 7th May London conference on Somalia? Why?

From the viewpoint of retaining its claim to independence, there is no benefit to Somaliland from  attending the London conference. It is doubtful that the Western “donor”-power will act to alienate Somaliland by decreasing aid or by directing aid to Somaliland through the S.F.G. exclusively; Somaliland’s geo-strategic position and its relative stability limit the severity of pressure that the “donor”-powers would exert on it, even though it does appear that, for the moment, the “donor”-powers would prefer that Somaliland be absorbed into a single state, under the S.F.G., covering the territories of post-independence Somalia.

5. What are the consequences, Negative & Positive of President Silanyo’s refusal to accede to both UK (Cameron) and USA (Ms Sherman) requests to attend the conference?

It is likely that the main consequence of Somaliland’s decision to opt out of the London Conference will be to freeze the status quo. Limited in their ability to punish Somaliland, the “donor”-powers surely will not reward it; that is, David Cameron welcomes President Silanyo to 10 Downing streetDavid Cameron welcomes President Silanyo to 10 Downing streetSomaliland cannot expect any help from the “donor”-powers in its bid for independence. Somaliland can expect to remain in international political limbo with no discernible prospect for change, and it will be subject to continuing pressure to bring it into a “united” Somalia, as the U.S. State Department puts it. That pressure on it to make concessions would only be greater if Somaliland attended the London Conference.

6. Was the opening of the UK embassy a show of displeasure with Somaliland or a genuine diplomatic move?

In light of the “donor”-power preference for a “united” Somalia, the opening of the U.K. embassy in Mogadishu is a genuine diplomatic move and not at all a show of displeasure with Somaliland. The “donor”-powers have no animus against Somaliland; they simply want to bring Somaliland into their current program for “Somalia,” but they are aware of their limits.

2. How will the two entities share Intelligence, Training and funds as per the communique? Doesn’t this necessitate the establishment of a Federal body to facilitate the full implementation of the same?

I shall not answer 2 because I am not an expert on security policy, but I can say that a Federal body to facilitate the full implementation of the agreement in regard to security is not needed for cooperation. It could be done by meetings among the officials of the two governments without a special instrumentality

7. Should the Somaliland-Somalia dialogue continued to be hosted by foreign governments or shifted to alternate venues in the two countries?

I did not respond to 7 because I stick strictly to analysis and do not let myself fall into the temptation of entering the discourse of “should.

Finally Yusuf, First, I want to thank you for the opportunity to respond to your important questions. Second, I want to tell you (as I’m sure you assume) that I am a regular and appreciative reader of the Somaliland Sun, which is a major source of news and opinion on Somaliland for me.

THANKS AGAIN!!! Gamboole

Michael Weinstein is currently Professor of Political Science at the College of Liberal Arts in the Purdue University where he specializes in Political theory.

While interested in in general political science and the analysis of ideology Professor Weinstein has a special affinity to the Horn of Africa especially Somalia in which he has written profusely about and addressed the issue of in various occasions several

Sample som of Prof Weinstein’s publications on Somalia

Source: The Somaliland Sun

Related article by the Professor.

The Show-down in Jubaland begins: No Simple Narrative in Somalia Drama:Commentary about Analysis of ‘SFG Political Strategy’ Puntland’s break up with the TFG

Speech by Somalia’s President at 2nd World Gathering in London, UK

Heads of State and Governments, Excellencies, Ambassadors, Special Representatives, Honored Guests – the Prime Minister and I welcome you to the second Somalia Conference in London.

Mr. Prime Minister, I wholeheartedly thank you and your government for your personal engagement in shaping our future and for your support in hosting this Conference. I particularly congratulate you for re-opening your Embassy on our soil in Mogadishu after more than two decades absence.

People may ask why Somalia matters at this time but there is a huge amount at stake right now: the future of our country, the security of the region and the wider world, and the removal of the piracy stranglehold on the Gulf of Aden.

I know you all understand this and I fully appreciate the political capital being invested to support Somalia.

Since the last meeting held here in London more than one year ago, more has been achieved than anyone would ever have imagined. In just one year the cornerstones of a new Somalia have been successfully and peacefully laid.

The political transition has ended and I stand here as the elected President of a sovereign nation, with an elected Speaker leading a new Parliament representative of all the regions and all communities and with a legitimate and effective government delivering our Six Pillar Policy Framework – the foundation of a new beginning. Progress has defied the skeptics. Somalia has rejoined the world community.

Under my leadership, we offer the world a legitimate partner you can trust, hard at work to deliver an integrated national security plan; economic reform and new financial management systems; rule of law and judicial reform; and an environment conducive to commercial growth. We are achieving real progress week by week, month by month. But challenges do remain.

Despite being militarily defeated, Al Shabaab have melted into society and begun a new phase of insurgency and a campaign of terror – an experience I know that Great Britain comprehends as well as any other. Our Constitution is only partially complete. Piracy must come to an end. Millions of Somalis still live in desperate conditions as refugees in neighbouring countries or as internally displaced persons in their own country. And we lack developed government institutions, schools, hospitals, roads, sanitation and other basic services.

As you will hear over the coming hours, however, we come to London to share with you our detailed plans to address these challenges.

We are rebuilding our armed forces. We are restructuring and developing our police force. We are reforming our justice sector. And we are revolutionizing our public finance management systems. We are driving Somalia from emergency to recovery; and from recovery to development and reconstruction.

Ultimately, however, it will be a Somali owned solution that will fix Somalia, but no country has ever recovered from such social and economic collapse without the help of the world. And so in partnership with our endeavors, we respectfully ask for your total and unflinching commitment, partnership and support. We hope that you will agree how you can support the implementation of our plans and put an end to our dependence on the international community.

The Federal Government of Somalia has now laid down the foundations for a new public finance management mechanism, which we believe will give enable our donors to agree funding arrangements with the confidence that funds will reach their intended recipient.

The progress that has been made in Somalia over the past three years would not have been possible without the courageous support of IGAD, the African Union and our brothers and sisters in AMISOM and the ultimate sacrifice paid by many brave African soldiers. We owe to it their memory to ensure that we do not take one single step backwards.

The progress that has been made in Somalia over the past three years would also not have been possible without the committed support of the United Nations, the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union. We owe it to the publics who contribute to these governments and institutions to see this process through to a successful conclusion.

We are also indebted to the kindness and generosity of countries like Turkey, Norway, the Arab League member states and other countries. Your assistance over the past few years has spread hope and belief among our people.

We welcome UNSOM, the new United Nations Mission in Somalia, and we are grateful for the consultation offered in agreeing both the mandate and the appointment of the SRSG. We congratulate His Excellency Mr. Nicholas Kay on his appointment as SRSG. We are looking forward receiving him and the new UN mission in Mogadishu. I wish to thank Ambassador Mahiga, the outgoing SRSG, for his relentless and determined efforts in leading the design of the roadmap and seeing the transition through. Our best wishes and tributes go to him. The people of Somalia are eternally grateful.

Winning the war in Somalia has been proved. Winning the peace in Somalia will take patience and great skill. We are at a critical junction. The time is now.

We have little time today and lots to achieve. All of us, especially those in the background who have worked so hard to make this conference happen, will want to depart with a real sense of progress.

I thank you all for coming, and for your dedicated support. Together we can make Somalia strong again. A tree standing tall in the African bush with deep roots binding it securely to its region and offering shade and protection to its people as they rebuild their lives.

Thank you.

Communique of the 21st extraordinary summit of Heads of State and government of IGAD

The IGAD Heads of State and Government held its 21st Extraordinary summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 3 May 2013, under the Chairmanship of H.E Mr. Hailemariam Desalegn, the Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and current Chairperson of the IGAD Assembly to discuss the political situation in the Federal Republic of Somalia. The Assembly was attended by H. E. Uhuru Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya; H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, H.E. SalvaKiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan; H. E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda; H.E. Ali Ahmed Kharti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of The Sudan; and H.E. Ahmed Ali Silay, Minister of International Cooperation the Republic of Djibouti.

The Assembly was preceded by the 47th Extra-ordinary Session of IGAD Council of Ministers held on 2 May 2013, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The Assembly conveyed its congratulations to the Republic of Djibouti and the Republic of Kenya on the conduct of peaceful and democratic elections. The Assembly also congratulated H.E Uhuru Kenyatta President of the Republic of Kenya on his assumption of office and welcomed him to the summit. The Assembly further welcomed H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia to the summit.

The Summit received a report from the chairperson of the IGAD Council of Ministers H.E Dr. Tedros Adhanom Minster of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and a briefing from H.E Amb.(Eng.)Mahboub M. Maalim, Executive Secretary of IGAD on the situation in the Federal Republic of Somalia.  After deliberations, the Assembly:

1.     Noted with appreciation the efforts made by the Government of Federal Republic of Somalia and the positive developments in recent months;

2.    Commended the ongoing and significant engagements of the Somali Federal Government with the Somali regions in relation to the set up of regional administration structures;

3.    Condemned the recent escalation of violence against civilians in Mogadishu and condemned all spoilers;

4.    Noted with appreciation the increased engagement, convergence of ideas and solidarity among IGAD member states in support of Somalia. In this regard, noted with appreciation the meeting between H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta, the President of Kenya, and H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia of April 27th 2013 in Mombasa, Kenya and welcomed the joint statement of understanding which elaborates principles of engagement. In this regard, urgedfor its full implementation;

5.    Appreciated the efforts made by the Ethiopian Prime Minister H.E Mr. Hailemariam Desalegn, in his capacity as IGAD Chair, in facilitating these engagements;

6.    Noted with appreciation and welcomed the Somali Federal government’s document titled National Stabilization Plan and reiterated the need for all processes particularly the ongoing efforts towards setting up Somali regional administration and stabilization efforts, to be anchored on the following principles:

–       Leadership of the government of the Federal Republic of Somalia in the process;

–       Respect of the provisional constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia;

–       All inclusive consultative process with the peoples of Somalia;

–       supportive role of IGAD based on the priorities of the Somali government; and

–       Fighting the Al Shabab as the primary focus of the Somali Federal government; AMISOM; regional and international partners;

And further requested the Somali federal government to align the document with the aforementioned agreed five principles.

7.    Reiterated the ownership of the Somali federal government to lead and set the priorities for its stabilization and reconstruction in an all-inclusive manner;

8.    Stressed the need for these processes to include a framework for sustainable and gradual return programme for refugees with the active participation of the Somalis in the Diaspora and in this regard called on UNHCR and the international community to develop modalities for safe and orderly return and resettlement of Somali refugees with definite timelines;

9.    Called for a commitment by all stakeholders to support the ongoing political outreach and reconciliation processes led by the Somali Federal government, and the building of the capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia particularly on governance, economic development and security sector reform;

10.  Decided to conduct a confidence-building mission to Kismayu led by the IGAD Executive Secretary and composed of representatives of the federal government of Somalia and one senior delegate from each member state of IGAD with the aim of assessing the situation and submitting a report to the IGAD summit to be held on the sidelines of the upcoming AU summit in May 2013;

11.   Underlined the speedy implementation of the Integration of Forces Plan including the enrolment and training of young officers and NCOs; and underscored the need for coordinated efforts of all stakeholders under the leadership of the Somali government;

12.  Noted with appreciation the continued commitment of the AMISOM forces, the courage and commitment of the Somali National Security Forces, and the support by all troops/ police contributing countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda) as well as Ethiopia;

13.  Appealed to the troop contributing countries/ police contributing countries and the Somali National Force to expand their operations and immediately recover the remaining areas controlled by Al Shabab;

14.  Reaffirmed the strong solidarity among IGAD members and their commitment to continue supporting the government-led reforms in the various priority areas, and in light of upcoming International Conferences on Somalia in particular the London conference to be held on 7 May 2013, appealed to the international community to redouble their support to the stabilization, reconstruction and long-term development of Somalia, on the basis of interalia the principles referred to in paragraph 6;

15.  Noted UNSC Resolution 2093 and expressed the hope that it will enhance the reconstruction efforts and the role of Somalia in the region; that it will build on progress made by AMISOM operations, and that it will form a sound basis for the reconstruction and development of Somalia;

16.  Underlined that the fight against al Shabaab remains the primary concern in ensuring Somalia’s stabilization and reconstruction;

Source: AMISOM Monitoring Service and IGAD Office

London conference awaits ‘vision to take Somalia forward’

Somali president expected to present plans for rebuilding military, police and justice systems, as civil society calls on nascent government to empower women and provide jobs

Part of Somalia‘s plans involve building credible military and police forces to ensure peace. Photograph: Reuters

On Tuesday next week, the UK hosts yet another big conference on Somalia, bringing together officials from 50 countries and organisations, including the UN, African Union and International Monetary Fund.

The most significant difference from last year’s London event is that instead of a tottering and discredited transitional regime, Somalia now has a fully fledged government, led by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Elected last September, the 57-year-old professor and activist is the first leader chosen inside Somalia since the 1991 overthrow of president Siad Barre, which sowed the seeds for the country’s descent into chaos.

Next week’s gathering can be seen as a concerted attempt to bolster the Somali government‘s legitimacy as it seeks to rebuild the country after more than two decades of conflict. The conference will be co-chaired by Mohamud and David Cameron, the UK prime minister, and its main aim is to signal international support for Somalia as the new government sets out its vision. But in a setback to the UK, Somaliland, which broke away from Somalia in 1991, refused British entreaties to attend on the grounds that it would not have been treated as equal to the Somali government. Somali officials, however, are upbeat.

“We hope the international partners will support Somalia’s implementation of its plans and priorities,” Nuradin Dirie, a presidential adviser, speaking from Mogadishu, the Somali capital, says. “We will be presenting plans for rebuilding the military, the police, the justice and public financial management systems. It is a vision of a political process to take Somalia forward.”

There may be some announcements of financial commitments, but those are expected to come at an EU-hosted conference in Brussels in September. Somalia will be very much on the international agenda this year. It will feature in meetings of the G8 group of industrialised countries, and the Tokyo international conference on African development, culminating in the Brussels meeting on the new deal for fragile states.

The new deal – strongly backed by countries recovering from conflict such as Timor Leste and Liberia – seeks to put poor countries in the driving seat on development strategy rather than donors. At its core are five peace- and state-building goals: legitimate and inclusive politics; security; justice; economic foundations (jobs); and revenues and services. The thinking is that unless aid focuses on peace, money will go to waste. Somalia has enthusiastically embraced the approach and now wants donors to back its plans.

Britain – which has pledged to spend £80m this year and next on aid – is on board. It has voiced support for the new deal, which seeks to align donor funds with the priorities of the recipient country, and has emerged as a strong cheerleader for the new Somali government. Last week, Britain reopened its embassy in Mogadishu, the first EU country to do so since Barre’s overthrow. Turkey is committing diplomatic and financial resources.

Somalia needs all the international support it can get. Although security has improved since al-Shabaab militants were driven out of Mogadishuby Amisom peacekeepers, the group continues to kill.

Ban Ki-moon, the UN secretary general, this week expressed concern that the Islamist insurgents seem to be targeting Somalia’s legal system, after the Somali deputy state attorney, Ahmed Malim Sheikh Nur, was killed by gunmen as he was leaving a mosque after Friday prayers. The threat posed by al-Shabaab explains the urgency behind the government’s efforts to build a credible military and police to deal with hardcore elements who remain implacably opposed to reconciliation.

The Somali government says it will welcome dialogue with those who turn their backs on violence. “The doors are open to those who renounce violence [to] be part of the political process and we will take every step to include people,” Dirie says, adding that the president and prime minister want to rebuild the security infrastructure to provide law and order.

While noting the importance of peace- and state-building, civil society representatives, who attended events in London in the runup to the conference, say it is important to maintain development, particularly after the 2011 famine in which nearly 260,000 people died.

“Although the drought has ended, we need to build capacity to prepare for future emergencies, we need to invest in farming and livestock,” Aydrus Daar, executive director of Wasda, an NGO that works in the Horn of Africa, says. “There are short-term recovery projects but no three- to five-year programmes.”

Fartuun Adan, executive director of the Elman peace and human rights centre in Mogadishu, urged the Somali government to embrace civil society. “We have lots to contribute, we have been working in Somalia for the past 22 years, whereas the government is very new in its job,” she says, adding that the government should do its utmost to empower women and ensure enough jobs.

Abdirashid Duale, chief executive of Dahabshiil, a remittances company, who will take part in an investment conference following the event in London, is confident there will be jobs as Somalia rebuilds. “The young generation in Somalia is where the future lies and yes there will be jobs,” he says, “because we need people to build airports, electricity systems and infrastructure.”

Laura Hammond, senior lecturer at the School of Oriental and African Studies, however, says it is important not to get carried away with expectations. “The new government is a real gift to the international community and much better than it was expecting,” she says.

“But there is a danger of letting euphoria cloud our judgment. I hope people are patient enough with it and yet able to hold it to account, although international engagement has to be on Somali terms. That will be part of shoring up the government’s legitimacy.”

Source: The Guardian, UK.

AMISOM Thwart Terror Attacks on Kismayo

Kismayo, 01 May, 2013 – AMISOM troops in support of Somalia Government Forces this morning thwarted two planned terror attacks by suspected al Shabaab terrorists in the southern Somalia port city of Kismayo.

The joint forces apprehended a woman carrying explosives as she attempted to access the Kismayu University, where delegates are participating in the ongoing Jubaland process. The woman, a casual laborer at the University, was found to be carrying a grenade and Improvised Explosive Device.

The woman is in the custody of the Somalia Government Forces and the explosives she was carrying have been destroyed in a controlled explosion.

Elsewhere, AMISOM forces thwarted an attack on the Kismayo International airport. Around midday, a group planning the attack was picked by surveillance and promptly engaged by AMISOM troops. This forced the terrorists to hastily fire their mortars, which landed outside of the airport, and flee the scene.

AMISOM Force Commander, Lt Gen Andrew Gutti congratulated the forces on their alertness saying their speedy actions had saved many civilian lives.

“This is a reminder that though there is relative calm in the city and surrounding areas, we have to be vigilant against the terrorists who wish to harm the people of Somalia,” he said.

Ever since AMISOM and Somali National Forces forced the Al Qaeda affiliated terror group out of Kismayo in October last year, the area has experienced a period of relative peace. Many formerly displaced residents have been able to return to their homes and humanitarian aid agencies have resumed operations in the area.

Source: Wardheernews.com

 

Somalia’s 2011 famine killed 260,000 people, study finds, half under age five