FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Date: April 25, 2025
Contact: IsmailWarsame] | iwarsame@ismailwarsame.blog |Tel/WhatsApp +252 90 703 4081

Somali Voices Demand Greater Ownership in EU–Somalia Partnership:

New White Paper Calls for a Shift Toward Transparency and Inclusivity

Mogadishu — A newly published white paper critically examines the EU–Somalia Joint Operational Roadmap, arguing that despite its ambitious goals, major gaps remain in addressing Somalia’s complex realities.

The paper warns against sidelining Federal Member States, ignoring ISIS threats, politicizing aid, and maintaining unaccountable foreign missions. It proposes urgent reforms to align the EU–Somalia partnership with Somali public demands for ownership, federalism, transparency, and concrete outcomes.

“We must move beyond rhetoric and create a true partnership based on Somali leadership and constitutional respect.”

The full white paper is available at https://ismailwarsame.blog. Contact Ismail Warsame at +252 90 703 4081.

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/the-imperative-of-mass-accountability

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/the-erosion-of-somali-sovereignty

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/turkiye-is-exposed-in-somalias-hydrocarbons

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https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/the-legacy-of-clan-politics-and-ethnic

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https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/turkeys-role-in-somalia-a-centralized

The recent expulsion of Anna Saleem Högberg, head of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) in Somalia, has unveiled a web of corruption and conspiracy implicating high-ranking Somali officials. While the Somali government cited procedural errors in her expulsion order—a persona non grata (PNG) designation typically reserved for diplomats—the true motives appear rooted in a clandestine financial scheme and retaliation against principled governance. This scandal exposes not only the misuse of power within Somalia’s Prime Minister’s Office but also risks undermining international aid efforts and diplomatic trust.

The Facade of Protocol Errors
In June 2024, Somali authorities expelled Högberg, claiming the PNG letter was mistakenly applied, as she represented a development agency, not a diplomatic mission. Yet their refusal to revoke the letter, despite admitting the error, hints at ulterior motives. Investigations reveal the expulsion followed a contentious Nairobi meeting between Swedish and Somali officials. The Somali delegation, led by Kamal Gutale (Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office) and Prime Minister Hamse Abdi Barre’s advisor, Ahmed Ulex, clashed with Sweden over Högberg’s refusal to funnel $10 million into questionable channels.

The Repatriation Deal and Secret Payments
At the heart of the conflict is a covert agreement to repatriate individuals from Swedish prisons—some convicted of serious crimes, others not even Somali nationals. Sources indicate that Somali officials demanded $10 million in exchange for accepting these returnees. While repatriation programs are not uncommon, the involvement of monetary demands and the Prime Minister’s Office’s direct profiteering reek of extortion.
Högberg initially transferred 4million to the World Bank for development projects, bypassing Somalia’s Central Bank, which lacks transparency and is notorious for graft.This decision, endorsed by Sweden, infuriated Somali officials, who insisted funds be routed through their control. When Hogberg channelled another 6 million to the UNDP—another independent entity—the Prime Minister’s Office retaliated, weaponizing the PNG order to expel her.

Corruption, Conspiracy, and Abuse of Power
The scandal underscores systemic corruption within Somalia’s government. By demanding payments into opaque accounts, officials sought to exploit international aid for personal or political gain. Their readiness to expel a respected aid representative—and the involvement of Prime Minister Barre’s inner circle—suggests high-level collusion. Notably, Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi reportedly approved the PNG order without understanding its basis, highlighting either gross negligence or deliberate obfuscation.
Sweden’s defense of Högberg underscores the legitimacy of her actions. By prioritizing accountability, she exposed a regime more interested in profit than justice or development. The Somali government’s actions not only jeopardize foreign aid but also betray vulnerable citizens reliant on transparent governance.

Implications and the Path Forward
This scandal has dire repercussions. For Somalia, it risks alienating international partners critical to its stability. For Sweden, it raises questions about engaging with corrupt systems. Globally, it exemplifies how aid can be hijacked by predatory elites.
The international community must demand accountability. Investigations into the Prime Minister’s Office’s financial dealings, coupled with pressure to rescind Högberg’s expulsion, are essential. Donors should condition aid on institutional reforms, ensuring funds reach their intended beneficiaries.

Conclusion
The expulsion of Anna Saleem Högberg is not a bureaucratic misstep but a calculated act of retaliation by officials threatened by transparency. It lays bare a culture of corruption that undermines Somalia’s progress and international partnerships. Only through unwavering accountability and ethical leadership can such cycles be broken—for Somalia’s sake and the integrity of global solidarity.

The fall of Adan Yabaal, a strategic town in Somalia’s Middle Shabelle region, has sent shockwaves through the country’s political and security circles. Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qaeda-linked jihadist group, executed a swift and calculated offensive, overwhelming government forces and captured the town on April 16, 2025. Located roughly 245 kilometres north of Mogadishu, Adan Yabaal has long been a stronghold for government operations against insurgents. Its loss raises a daunting question: could Mogadishu be next?

Who’s Who in Al-Shabaab?

To understand Al-Shabaab’s growing threat, it’s crucial to know the figures driving the organization:

Ahmad Diriye (Abu Ubaidah) – As the emir (leader) of Al-Shabaab since 2014, Diriye has kept the group closely tied to Al-Qaeda and expanded its regional networks.

Mahad Karate – The deputy leader and head of the Amniyat, Al-Shabaab’s feared intelligence wing, which orchestrates assassinations, infiltration, and internal discipline.

Ali Mohamed Rage (Ali Dheere) – The group’s spokesperson and propaganda strategist, responsible for shaping Al-Shabaab’s public messaging and ideology.

Fuad Qalaf (Fuad Shangole) – A seasoned commander on the Shura Council, influential in the group’s expansion toward the Puntland region.

Guled Ilkacase – Recently named head of the military wing, Jabha, Ilkacase is believed to be behind recent tactical offensives, including the push into Middle Shabelle.

Ikrima (Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir) – A top-level planner and facilitator known for his logistical expertise and connections with other terror networks.

This tight-knit leadership allows Al-Shabaab to operate with remarkable discipline and adaptability, despite being under constant pressure from Somali and international forces.

Why Adan Yabaal Matters

Adan Yabaal is more than just a dot on the map. It serves as a logistical hub that connects several key regions and has historically been used by Somali security forces as a staging ground for operations into Al-Shabaab-held territory. Its capture is not just symbolic—it provides Al-Shabaab with a platform to project power closer to Mogadishu and disrupt transport and supply routes in the region.

How Real Is the Threat to Mogadishu?

While it’s too early to predict a full-scale takeover of the capital, there are growing concerns about Al-Shabaab’s increasing momentum:

What Favours Al-Shabaab:

Military Gaps: Somali forces are stretched thin and are grappling with the drawdown of ATMIS (African Union Transition Mission in Somalia).

Local Support in Rural Areas: In some territories, clan grievances and distrust in the federal government create fertile ground for Al-Shabaab recruitment and presence.

Operational Agility: Al-Shabaab’s hit-and-run tactics, suicide bombings, and ambushes are designed to exploit weaknesses without engaging in prolonged battles.

What’s Working Against Them:

Urban Fortifications: Mogadishu is well-defended with a strong security presence and surveillance.

Public Rejection: The population in the capital, weary of extremism and violence, remains largely hostile to Al-Shabaab’s ideology.

International Partnerships: Despite funding issues, the Somali government still enjoys critical support from international partners in terms of intelligence, air support, and training.

What’s Next?

Al-Shabaab’s resurgence in Middle Shabelle is a stark reminder that the group remains one of the most dangerous insurgent movements in Africa. While a full seizure of Mogadishu is unlikely in the immediate future, the fall of Adan Yabaal proves that complacency is not an option.

To prevent further territorial losses, Somalia’s government must move quickly—reorganize its military strategy, enhance local governance, and foster genuine reconciliation with marginalized communities. The fight against Al-Shabaab is no longer just military; it is also political and ideological.

Final Thought:
Al-Shabaab’s eyes may be on Mogadishu, but the battle for Somalia’s soul will be decided in its rural heartlands. Unless those are secured, the threat will keep inching closer to the gates of the capital.

Introduction
The security landscape in South-Central Somalia has deteriorated alarmingly in recent months, marked by the resurgence of Al-Shabab militants and the Somali government’s faltering response. The fall of Adan Yabaal again, a strategic town in the Middle Shabelle region, to Al-Shabab in late 2025—and reports of Somali National Army (SNA) commanders fleeing the battlefield—underscore a crisis of governance and military capability. This essay examines the roots of the escalating violence, the Somali federal government’s controversial handling of the threat, and the implications for regional stability.
Al-Shabab’s Resurgence and Territorial Ambitions
Al-Shabab, an Islamist militant group active since 2006, has capitalized on Somalia’s political fragmentation to regain control of key territories. Despite decades of counterterrorism efforts by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM,  ATMIS, now AUSSOM) and U.S.-backed airstrikes, the group dominates rural areas and increasingly encroaches on urban centers. Their tactics—a blend of guerrilla warfare, taxation systems, and ideological appeals—have enabled them to besiege towns like Adan Yabaal, disrupting supply routes to Mogadishu and emboldening claims of encircling the capital.

Government Incompetence and Deflection
Critics argue that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s administration has downplayed the severity of the threat. The loss of Adan Yabaal, a town critical to securing Middle Shabelle, exposed systemic military weaknesses: poor troop morale, inadequate equipment, and leadership failures. The humiliation of an SNA commander reportedly fleeing on foot during the battle epitomizes these institutional cracks. Instead of addressing these issues, government officials have shifted blame, accusing AUSSOM commanders of sympathizing with militants—a move perceived as scapegoating international partners to mask domestic mismanagement.
Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi’s role in deflecting criticism has drawn particular scrutiny. As the regime’s spokesperson on global platforms, Fiqi has framed the crisis as a failure of the international community rather than a product of Somalia’s governance deficits. This rhetoric risks alienating allies whose support remains crucial for financial aid and security assistance.

Humanitarian and Regional Implications
The security collapse has dire humanitarian consequences. Over 3.8 million Somalis are displaced, and Al-Shabab’s blockade tactics restrict aid access, exacerbating famine risks. Meanwhile, the group’s cross-border ambitions threaten regional stability, with Kenya and Ethiopia facing recurrent attacks.

International Community at a Crossroads
The Somali government’s accusations against AUSSOM complicate the already fraught transition, which aims to gradually transfer security responsibilities to Somali forces. However, the SNA’s unreliability and political infighting have stalled this process. The U.S. and EU, key funders of Somalia’s security sector, now demand accountability for their investments, urging reforms to curb corruption and improve military oversight.

Pathways to Stability
A sustainable solution requires a dual approach: robust international support paired with Somali-led governance reforms. Strengthening local governance, integrating clan militias into formal security structures, and addressing grievances that fuel Al-Shabab’s recruitment are critical. The international community must balance pressure for accountability with sustained engagement to prevent state collapse.

Conclusion
The crisis in South-Central Somalia is a stark reminder of the costs of political short-sightedness. President Mohamoud’s administration must confront internal rot rather than externalize blame. Without urgent reforms, Somalia risks descending into another cycle of violence, with devastating repercussions for its people and the Horn of Africa. The window for action is narrowing, but a coordinated strategy prioritizing governance and inclusivity could yet steer the nation toward stability.

The Somali National Army (SNA), tasked with defending the nation against insurgency and restoring state authority, stands as a symbol of both hope and despair. Under the DamulJadiid administration, the SNA has been crippled by systemic mismanagement, clan-based politicization, chronic underfunding, and a lack of cohesive national identity. These factors have rendered the army ineffective in countering Al-Shabaab’s relentless insurgency, while deepening public distrust and international skepticism. This essay examines the structural and operational failures of the SNA, arguing that without urgent reforms, the army will remain incapable of fulfilling its constitutional mandate.
Clan-Based Recruitment and the Erosion of National Unity.

A critical flaw in the SNA’s structure is its recruitment strategy, which disproportionately draws from a single clan, undermining its legitimacy as a national institution. Historically, Somali military forces have been fragmented along clan lines, but the DamulJadiid administration’s reliance on clan loyalty to consolidate power has exacerbated this division. By prioritizing one clan in recruitment and promotions, the SNA has alienated other communities, fostering perceptions of the army as a partisan entity rather than a guardian of the nation. This lack of inclusivity weakens morale, discourages cross-clan cooperation, and fuels grievances that Al-Shabaab exploits to recruit disenfranchised youth. A military that mirrors Somalia’s clan divisions cannot unify the country or command broad public support.
Chronic Underfunding and Operational Paralysis
The SNA’s operational capacity is severely hampered by financial neglect. Soldiers endure months of unpaid salaries, dilapidated equipment, and inadequate logistics, leaving them vulnerable in combat. While Al-Shabaab leverages illicit financing to sustain its operations, the SNA struggles to procure basic supplies, such as ammunition, medical kits, and vehicles. This disparity has dire consequences: demoralized soldiers often desert their posts or collude with militants for survival. Moreover, the absence of air support, intelligence infrastructure, and modern weaponry leaves the SNA outgunned in asymmetrical warfare. Underfunding is not merely a budgetary issue but a strategic failure, reflecting the government’s inability to prioritize national security over political patronage.
Political Interference and the Collapse of Command.

The SNA’s chain of command has been repeatedly undermined by political interference. Military appointments are often based on clan allegiance or loyalty to the DamulJadiid elite rather than merit, resulting in inexperienced leadership and incoherent strategies. Politicians routinely override military decisions for short-term gains, such as delaying offensives to appease clans or diverting resources to secure votes. This meddling has led to catastrophic battlefield losses, including the 2023 fall of key bases in Galmudug and Hirshabelle, where Al-Shabaab overran SNA positions due to poor coordination and last-minute political directives. Such interference erodes discipline and perpetuates a culture of impunity, where accountability is absent.
Strained Relations with International Partners.

The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the UN-supported AUSSOM have long underpinned Somalia’s security framework. However, their partnership with the SNA is marred by mistrust and condescension. ATMIS officials often sideline SNA commanders in planning operations, viewing them as incompetent or corrupt. This patronizing dynamic fosters dependency rather than empowerment, leaving the SNA ill-prepared to assume security responsibilities as ATMIS withdraws. Furthermore, international donors, wary of mismanagement, channel resources through parallel structures, bypassing the SNA entirely. This cycle of marginalization stifles institutional growth and perpetuates the army’s reliance on external actors.

Conclusion: A Failing Institution in a Fragile State.
The Somali National Army, as currently constituted, is a microcosm of Somalia’s broader governance crisis. Clan favoritism, financial neglect, political exploitation, and international skepticism have coalesced into an existential threat to the army’s viability. Without radical reforms—including inclusive recruitment, depoliticization of command structures, increased budgetary transparency, and equitable international partnerships—the SNA will remain incapable of defeating Al-Shabaab or securing Somalia’s future. The DamulJadiid administration’s failure to address these issues not only jeopardizes national security but also risks entrenching Somalia’s status as a perpetually fragmented state. The choice is stark: rebuild the SNA as a truly national institution, or accept its collapse—and with it, the collapse of hopes for lasting stability.

The long-standing aspiration for Somaliland’s independence has recently been overshadowed by a growing pattern of regional destabilization and troubling allegations of collusion with extremist groups. Once viewed as a model of relative stability in the Horn of Africa, Somaliland’s territorial ambitions, particularly over the contested SSC-Khatumo region, have resulted in significant political fallout and increased regional isolation.

The Crumbling Claims Over SSC-Khatumo

Somaliland’s territorial claims over SSC-Khatumo (Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn regions) have long been contested by local populations and rival administrations. Recent developments have seen Somaliland’s grip over these regions falter dramatically. Widespread resistance, particularly from the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans, has delegitimized Somaliland’s authority in the area. The failure to secure SSC-Khatumo through military means or political dialogue marks a critical blow to Somaliland’s secessionist ambitions and calls into question its ability to function as a viable state across diverse clan territories.

Internal Discontent and Regional Disintegration

Meanwhile, discontent is spreading to other regions under Somaliland’s control. The Awdal region, dominated by the Gadabuursi clan, is experiencing a resurgence of anti-Hargeisa sentiment, with increasing calls for self-determination and alignment with federal Somalia. Similarly, the Issa clan in the far western part of Somaliland maintains stronger ties to neighboring Djibouti than to Hargeisa, further eroding national unity. These fractures reflect the inability of the Somaliland administration to foster inclusive governance and accommodate the diverse aspirations of its constituent regions.

Regional Fallout: Ethiopia and the Berbera Port

Somaliland’s once-promising commercial relationship with Ethiopia, particularly through the Berbera Port, is also deteriorating. Recent hostilities involving Ethiopia’s Somali Region (Region Five) and suspicion around Somaliland’s military posturing have made Ethiopia reassess its strategic partnerships. The viability of Berbera Port as a regional trade hub is being undercut by rising insecurity and mistrust, threatening one of Somaliland’s few economic lifelines.

Alarming Allegations of Extremist Collaboration

Perhaps most concerning are the grave allegations implicating Somaliland authorities in the support of terrorist networks. Intelligence sources and regional actors have accused elements within Somaliland’s leadership of facilitating the movement of ISIS and Al-Shabaab fighters, especially through territory under their control. The Galgala mountains in Puntland have reportedly become a theater of conflict fueled by such movements, with fleeing fighters from Calmiskaad using Somaliland-administered corridors to regroup. Even more alarming are reports that foreign fighters are finding safe passage through Somaliland, and that some Al-Shabaab leadership hail from Somaliland regions.

While these allegations require thorough investigation, the optics are damaging. The perceived support or tolerance for terrorist elements undermines Somaliland’s claims to sovereignty and further alienates potential international supporters. Alleged celebrations by some Somaliland-affiliated political actors over Al-Shabaab victories in south-central Somalia only compound these concerns.

The Path Forward: Countering the Threat

To address these destabilizing trends, a multi-pronged approach is essential:

1. Independent Investigations: The Federal Government of Somalia and international actors must support independent investigations into the alleged collaboration between Somaliland authorities and extremist groups. Transparency is key to either validating or refuting these serious accusations.

2. Regional Cooperation: Somaliland must engage constructively with Puntland, Djibouti, and Ethiopia to restore trust and promote regional stability. This includes intelligence sharing and border security coordination.

3. Internal Dialogue and Federalism: A political solution to Somaliland’s internal fractures requires inclusive dialogue that recognizes the autonomy and aspirations of regions like Awdal and SSC-Khatumo. Federalism may offer a viable path toward decentralization and coexistence under the Somali state.

4. Counterterrorism Efforts: The Somali government, with international partners, must prioritize counterterrorism operations in Galgala and surrounding regions. Disrupting the flow of fighters and resources through Somaliland territory is essential to regional security.

5. Sanctions and Accountability: Should investigations confirm collaboration with terrorist groups, targeted sanctions against implicated Somaliland officials must be considered. Accountability will be a deterrent against future collusion.

Conclusion

The dream of Somaliland independence has lost its moral high ground in the face of regional unrest, rising secessionist sentiments within its own borders, and troubling links to extremist networks. The destabilization attributed to Somaliland authorities poses a grave threat to the peace and security of Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa. Reversing this dangerous trajectory requires firm regional cooperation, international vigilance, and a recommitment to inclusive governance. Only then can Somalia chart a path toward unity and stability.

In 1991, the collapse of the Somali government thrust the country into a state of chaos, pushing hundreds of thousands of Somalis to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, especially Kenya. This mass displacement marked the beginning of a long and painful journey for a nation that, decades later, remains trapped in cycles of instability, corruption, and failed statehood. While international efforts have aimed at reviving Somalia, a paradox has emerged—many Somalis who once fled the country now return from overseas not to rebuild it, but in some cases to exploit it, investing instead in Kenya and other more stable regions while serving as ineffective or self-serving officials in Somalia. This dual reality highlights the contradictions at the heart of the Somali diaspora’s relationship with their homeland.

The Refugee Experience and Initial Flight

The fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991 unleashed a torrent of civil strife that disintegrated Somalia’s central government. Clan warfare, famine, and lawlessness left the country in ruins. Kenya, sharing a porous border and cultural ties, became a primary destination for Somali refugees. Camps such as Dadaab grew rapidly, becoming one of the world’s largest refugee settlements. While some Somalis remained in Kenya, many others sought asylum in Western countries—Europe, North America, and Australia—where they gained education, wealth, and a renewed sense of security.

Efforts at Revival and Repeated Collapse

Over the years, Somalia has seen repeated attempts at political reconstruction. Transitional governments were formed, peace agreements signed, and international conferences hosted. Yet, each effort has often ended in disillusionment. Corruption, weak institutions, external interference, and clan-based politics have continually sabotaged progress. The leaders meant to steer the country toward stability have frequently failed, focusing more on short-term gain than long-term nation-building.

The Return of the Diaspora: Hope or Harm?

In recent years, a new trend has emerged: Somalis from the diaspora returning to play political, economic, and administrative roles in Somalia. While this could be seen as a hopeful development, the reality is more complex. Many returnees come not to sacrifice or serve, but to benefit. They arrive with foreign passports, foreign education, and sometimes foreign interests, securing powerful positions within Somalia’s fragile government. Yet rather than strengthening the state, many contribute to its dysfunction—entrenched in corruption, detached from the people, and unaccountable due to their ties abroad.

Simultaneously, these same individuals invest heavily in Kenya. Nairobi’s Eastleigh neighborhood, for example, has transformed into a booming business hub driven by Somali capital. Real estate, import-export businesses, and banking ventures flourish, yet this wealth is not reinvested in Somalia. Kenya, ironically, benefits more from Somali enterprise than Somalia itself. This is the core of the paradox: those who fled a failed state, having gained success abroad, return not to fix what was broken, but to participate in its continued failure while building futures elsewhere.

The Identity Crisis and National Accountability

This situation reveals a deeper identity crisis within the Somali diaspora. For many, Somalia is an emotional homeland, but not a political or economic priority. It is a place of heritage, not responsibility. This mindset allows for a dangerous disconnection: one can hold a Somali title, govern Somali people, and wield Somali power—while living, spending, and investing abroad. It creates a hollow government: Somali in name, but lacking the will, courage, or sincerity to uplift its own nation.

Conclusion: Learning From History or Repeating It

The story of Somalia over the past three decades is a lesson in the dangers of unaccountable leadership, fractured identity, and misplaced priorities. The diaspora has a vital role to play in Somalia’s future, but that role must be rooted in genuine commitment to the country’s reconstruction, not just exploitation of its resources and status. If history is to stop repeating itself, Somalis—both at home and abroad—must reckon with this paradox and make a conscious choice: to rebuild Somalia not just in name or nostalgia, but in action, sacrifice, and accountability.

1. Al-Shabaab Captures Strategic Town in Middle Shabelle, Somalia

Al-Shabaab militants have captured a key strategic town of Adan Yabaal in the Middle Shabelle region, marking a significant escalation in the group’s operations across South-Central Somalia. This town, situated along a vital corridor for movement and supply, had been under government control in recent months and played a critical role in the federal campaign to reclaim territory from the insurgents.

The fall of this town underscores the growing momentum of Al-Shabaab in central Somalia and raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of the Somali National Army and its allied clan militias. Humanitarian sources indicate that thousands have begun fleeing the area amid fears of reprisals and instability. The group’s ability to retake such ground points to tactical weaknesses within government operations and persistent logistical challenges.

New reports today suggest that these gains have sparked widespread fear in the capital, Mogadishu, with foreign expatriates and diplomats housed in the heavily fortified Halane International Compound reportedly fleeing the city throughout the day and night. The exodus signals mounting concern among the international community about the deteriorating security landscape, and possibly foreshadows a shift in foreign engagement if the capital itself comes under threat.

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2. Puntland Electoral Commission (PEC) Members Accused of Selling Registration Data

At least three members of the Puntland State Electoral Commission are under investigation after being accused of selling voter registration data to the Federal Government in Mogadishu, according to Gaylan Media. This explosive allegation has provoked strong political backlash and raised serious concerns over data privacy, electoral integrity, and interference in regional governance.

The move is seen by some Puntland officials and observers as an attempt by federal actors to assert influence in Puntland’s internal electoral processes. If verified, the accusations could spark a constitutional showdown between the Puntland administration and the federal authorities.

Civil society groups, opposition leaders, and international observers are calling for an independent inquiry and for measures to ensure the integrity of electoral processes in all federal member states.

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3. Somali Ambassador to U.S. Promotes Sool Oil Blocks Under Federal Control

Somali Ambassador to the United States, Hassan Nur “Cadami”, has briefed American oil firms that exploration blocks in the Sool region—part of the SSC-Khatumo territory—fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government of Somalia and are now open to foreign investment.

This statement, delivered during meetings with U.S. energy representatives in Washington, is a bold assertion of federal authority over contested territories and is likely to inflame tensions with both the SSC-Khatumo administration and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, both of which lay claim to the region.

Analysts warn that Cadami’s remarks may destabilize already fragile federal-regional relations and provoke backlash from local authorities who view such moves as undermining autonomy and violating the principle of equitable resource sharing. The move, however, also signals Mogadishu’s growing push to court international investment in the oil and gas sector as a pathway toward economic revitalization.

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4. Electoral Violence Disrupts Registration in Shagaani District, Banadir

Electoral registration activities in the Shagaani District of Banadir Region were violently disrupted today after unknown assailants attacked registration centers. Reports confirm that essential materials were destroyed or looted, while election officials fled the scene.

This appears to be a coordinated attempt to sabotage the democratic process in one of the capital’s most densely populated districts. The attack could delay or derail preparations for local elections and raises fears of further political violence or interference.

Authorities have vowed to restore operations and pursue those responsible, but the incident highlights the vulnerability of Somalia’s democratic institutions, especially in urban zones where control is fragmented and political tensions remain high.

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Conclusion

The security and political landscape in Somalia is entering a period of heightened volatility. Al-Shabaab’s territorial gains, political corruption in Puntland, federal overreach in resource allocation, and the disruption of democratic activities all point to a fragile state under multiple pressures.

The flight of foreign diplomats and personnel from Mogadishu is a particularly stark signal of how seriously the international community is viewing the current deterioration. Without immediate and coordinated responses from both Somali actors and their international partners, the country risks descending into deeper instability.

The world is undergoing a seismic shift in political and economic dynamics. The Western world, once seen as the pillar of global stability and prosperity, is now facing growing internal crises—economic stagnation, political division, and declining global influence. The prolonged Ukraine war has exposed both the financial and strategic limits of Western countries. As the war drains Western resources and patience, there are signs that donor fatigue is setting in, with implications far beyond Europe. For countries heavily reliant on external aid—such as Somalia—the question arises: can they survive if Western donor-related assistance disappears?

The Current State of External Assistance in Somalia

Somalia has depended for decades on foreign aid for humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, health, education, and infrastructure development. Organizations like the United Nations, USAID, the European Union, and various NGOs have played a pivotal role in helping Somalia manage crises, from famine to conflict. The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, now AUSSOM), supported largely by Western donors, has been central in fighting al-Shabaab and maintaining fragile stability.

Yet, this aid has often come with challenges—dependency, corruption, lack of long-term strategy, and donor-driven priorities that do not always align with Somali realities. Nonetheless, external assistance has been a lifeline, particularly in times of drought, displacement, and terrorism.

The Cracks in Western Commitment

The war in Ukraine has drained Western treasuries and political focus. Billions of dollars are being poured into military support and humanitarian relief for Ukraine. As inflation rises and domestic social needs intensify, Western voters and governments are increasingly questioning the wisdom of funding faraway conflicts or humanitarian missions. Aid budgets are being cut, peacekeeping missions are being downsized, and “aid fatigue” is becoming more pronounced. Somalia and many other aid-dependent nations risk falling off the global priority list.

Moreover, geopolitical shifts—such as rising nationalism in the West, growing distrust in global institutions, and new power centers like China and the Gulf states—are reshaping aid dynamics. Western hegemony is fading, and with it, the old models of humanitarianism may disappear.

Can Somalia Survive Without Western Aid?

The short answer is: not easily—but not necessarily forever.

Challenges:

1. Security: The Somali government still lacks the military strength to confront al-Shabaab without support. A withdrawal or reduction of external funding for ATMIS could create a security vacuum.

2. Humanitarian Crises: Climate shocks, displacement, and food insecurity would likely worsen without donor-backed relief programs.

3. Economic Stability: Somalia’s economy is fragile, heavily reliant on remittances, livestock exports, and foreign assistance. A sudden aid cut could trigger economic collapse in some sectors.

4. Institutional Fragility: Government institutions remain underdeveloped and often lack the capacity to fill the gap left by international agencies.

Opportunities for Survival:

1. Regional and Islamic World Support: Turkey, Qatar, and the UAE have increasingly stepped in with investment and development aid, often without the heavy political strings attached by the West.

2. Diaspora Power: The Somali diaspora sends over $1.3 billion annually—this remittance economy is resilient and could be a foundation for a more independent financial future.

3. Self-Reliance Movement: With the right leadership and vision, Somalia could harness local entrepreneurship, build agricultural self-sufficiency, and reform governance to reduce dependency.

4. Alternative Alliances: A multipolar world may allow Somalia to diversify its partnerships—China, the Gulf, or even African regional blocs may become more influential players.

The Path Forward: From Survival to Sovereignty

Somalia must begin preparing for a post-Western aid world. That means investing in local governance, encouraging private sector growth, building domestic revenue systems, and enhancing regional cooperation. Civil society, the business community, and the diaspora must be empowered to play larger roles. External aid, if it continues, should shift from emergency response to capacity building.

The West’s decline may be a wake-up call—a painful but necessary turning point that forces Somalia to embrace a new era of self-determination. Survival is not guaranteed, but with strategic planning, Somalia can pivot from fragile dependence to resilient independence.

Every so often, a book comes along that doesn’t just tell a story—it redefines how we think about courage, leadership, and what’s truly possible in the fight against terrorism. The Sword That Broke Terror is that book.

Set against the harsh backdrop of northern Somalia’s Calmiskaad mountains, this 400-page powerhouse chronicles how Puntland, an often-overlooked region, pulled off one of the most stunning counterterrorism victories in recent memory. With no support from Somalia’s federal government, minimal resources, and a heavily fortified ISIS enemy, Puntland’s forces achieved what some of the world’s strongest militaries couldn’t.

What makes this book so compelling isn’t just the action (though there’s plenty of that—think mountain raids, drone warfare, and night assaults). It’s the broader message: that victory doesn’t always come from numbers or high-tech gear. Sometimes, it comes from unity, grit, and fearless leadership.

The book doesn’t shy away from making bold comparisons—drawing sharp lines between Puntland’s triumph and the failures of more powerful nations like the U.S. in Afghanistan or Nigeria’s ongoing struggle with Boko Haram. These comparisons are sobering but necessary, and they elevate the story from regional success to global significance.

Beyond the battlefield, The Sword That Broke Terror dives into political dysfunction, especially highlighting the Somali federal government’s two-decade struggle against Al-Shabaab. It’s a tough but fair critique, backed by facts and history.

Why you should read it:

It’s inspiring and deeply relevant.

It challenges assumptions about power and military effectiveness.

It tells a story that the world has largely ignored—but desperately needs to hear.

Whether you’re into military history, African affairs, or just love stories about underdogs flipping the script, this book is a must-read.

Bottom line:
The Sword That Broke Terror is not just a book. It’s a wake-up call—and a reminder that sometimes, the strongest sword is forged not in steel but in unity, determination, and the will to fight for what’s right.

The cancellation of this year’s Somali National Army Day (April 12) marks a sobering moment for Somalia, underscoring the profound struggles facing its armed forces. The decision, attributed to shortages of personnel, funding, and equipment, is not merely a logistical setback but a symbolic indictment of the systemic issues plaguing the nation’s security apparatus. This development reflects decades of instability, underscoring the urgent need for comprehensive reforms to stabilize a country still grappling with existential threats.

Historical Context and the Army’s Role

Since the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalia has endured cycles of conflict, warlordism, and insurgency. The Somali National Army (SNA), once a symbol of national pride, disintegrated during this period, leaving the country vulnerable to fragmentation. Efforts to rebuild the SNA over the past two decades have been central to restoring state authority, particularly in the fight against Al-Shabaab, the Islamist militant group that controls swathes of rural Somalia. The SNA’s role extends beyond combat; it is a pillar of state legitimacy, critical to securing governance, elections, and public trust.

The Triad of Crises

1. Personnel Shortages: The SNA’s capacity is hamstrung by a lack of trained soldiers. Factors include low recruitment, high casualty rates, desertions due to unpaid salaries, and competition from regional forces and militias. Reports suggest that the SNA’s operational strength is far below the projected 20,000 troops needed, with many units existing only on paper.
2. Funding Deficits: Somalia’s government, burdened by limited domestic revenue and debt, relies heavily on international donors to fund its security sector. Corruption and mismanagement exacerbate the problem, with leaked audits revealing that stipends for soldiers often vanish before reaching frontline troops. This financial precarity undermines morale and operational effectiveness.
3. Equipment Gaps: Outgunned by Al-Shabaab, which profits from illicit taxation and smuggling, the SNA lacks modern weapons, armored vehicles, and communication systems. Soldiers frequently report entering battles with outdated gear, placing them at a severe disadvantage.

Broader Security Implications

The SNA’s weaknesses have dire consequences. Al-Shabaab continues to launch devastating attacks, including recent assaults on military bases and hotels in Mogadishu. The army’s reliance on the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, now AUSSOM) and foreign donors—such as the U.S., Turkey, and the EU—highlights a precarious dependency. While international partners provide training and equipment, their support is often inconsistent or undermined by local corruption.

Moreover, the cancellation of Army Day erodes morale and public confidence. The event, meant to honor sacrifices and foster unity, instead becomes a reminder of institutional neglect. For soldiers risking their lives without adequate pay or protection, this symbolic blow may deepen disillusionment.

Pathways to Reform

Addressing these challenges requires a multi-pronged approach:

• Security Sector Reform: Streamlining the SNA’s structure, improving accountability, and professionalizing ranks through rigorous training.
• Domestic Revenue Mobilization: Expanding tax collection and combating corruption to reduce reliance on volatile foreign aid.
• International Coordination: Ensuring donor funds are transparently managed and aligned with Somalia’s priorities, not external agendas.
• Community Engagement: Winning local support by integrating clan militias into formal structures and addressing grievances that fuel Al-Shabaab’s recruitment.

Conclusion

The cancellation of Somali National Army Day is a poignant metaphor for a nation at a crossroads. While the government has made security a stated priority, progress remains hamstrung by systemic dysfunction. Without urgent reforms, the SNA’s vulnerabilities will persist, leaving Somalia trapped in a cycle of fragility. The international community must recalibrate its support, but ultimately, Somalia’s future hinges on its ability to forge a resilient, sovereign security force—one capable of defending its people and reclaiming its dignity.

Andrew J. Bacevich’s the Age of Forever Wars is a critical examination of the failures of modern military strategy, particularly in the context of America’s prolonged and inconclusive conflicts in the Middle East and beyond. A retired Army colonel and historian, Bacevich argues that the U.S. has entered an era of endless warfare, where traditional notions of victory and defeat no longer apply—yet policymakers continue to rely on military force as a primary tool of statecraft.

Key Themes and Arguments

1. The Illusion of Victory – Bacevich dismantles the idea that modern wars can be “won” in the conventional sense. From Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. has repeatedly misjudged the political and cultural complexities of its interventions, leading to quagmires rather than decisive outcomes.
2. Militarized Foreign Policy – The book critiques the over-reliance on military solutions for geopolitical problems. Bacevich highlights how the post-9/11 era saw an unprecedented expansion of U.S. military engagements, often with little strategic coherence or measurable success.
3. The Costs of Forever War – Beyond battlefield casualties, Bacevich emphasizes the financial, moral, and societal toll of perpetual conflict. The trillions spent on war, the erosion of civil liberties, and the normalization of endless deployments have, in his view, weakened rather than strengthened American security.
4. Strategic Myopia – The U.S. foreign policy establishment, Bacevich argues, suffers from a failure to adapt. Instead of reevaluating failed strategies, leaders double down on militarism, driven by institutional inertia, defense industry influence, and a misguided belief in American exceptionalism.

Strengths and Weaknesses

Bacevich’s analysis is sharp, well-researched, and persuasive, particularly in his critique of the bipartisan consensus favoring military intervention. His personal experience as a career soldier lends credibility to his arguments.

However, some readers may find his pessimism overwhelming. While he effectively diagnoses the problem, his proposed solutions—greater restraint, diplomatic engagement, and redefining national security—remain broad and face significant political obstacles.

Conclusion

The Age of Forever Wars is a vital read for anyone concerned with U.S. foreign policy and military strategy. Bacevich’s sobering assessment forces a reckoning with the reality that more firepower does not equate to lasting success. In an era where new conflicts continually emerge, his call for a fundamental rethink of America’s approach to war is both timely and necessary.

Rating: 4.5/5 – A compelling, if grim, analysis that challenges conventional wisdom on warfare and security.

Introduction
Prime Minister Hamse Abdi Barre’s recent visit to Laascaano has ignited controversy, with critics alleging that its stated objectives—promoting federal unity and recognizing SSC-Khatumo’s administrative status—mask a deeper, more politically charged agenda. Behind the rhetoric of empowerment lies a two-fold mission: advancing President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s contentious electoral reforms and negotiating the release of Somaliland detainees. This essay dissects the alleged deception, urging SSC-Khatumo leaders and residents to scrutinize federal overtures and prioritize regional sovereignty.

Context: SSC-Khatumo’s Precarious Position
The SSC-Khatumo region (encompassing Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn) has long been a flashpoint in Somalia’s complex territorial disputes. While Somaliland claims the area as part of its self-declared independent state, SSC-Khatumo seeks autonomy under Somalia’s federal system. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), led by President Mohamud, has intermittently engaged the region, balancing promises of inclusion with strategic political maneuvers. Against this backdrop, Barre’s visit emerges as a critical test of trust.

The Two-Fold Agenda: Beneath the Surface

1. Electoral Engineering via NIRA:
   The establishment of a National Identification & Registration Agency (NIRA) office in Laascaano, framed as a step toward “one person, one vote” elections, raises red flags. Critics argue that Mohamud’s electoral model risks centralizing power under Mogadishu, using SSC-Khatumo as a testing ground to legitimize federal authority. By positioning the region as a polling station, the FGS may co-opt local governance structures, marginalizing SSC’s autonomy in favour of top-down control.
2. Prisoner Release: A Bargaining Chip?
   Barre’s purported efforts to free Somaliland-linked prisoners in Laascaano suggest backdoor negotiations with Hargeisa. While framed as humanitarian, this move could undermine SSC-Khatumo’s resistance to Somaliland’s territorial claims. Trading detainees for political favors risks normalizing Somaliland’s presence in the region, eroding SSC’s stance against external domination.

The Smokescreen of Federal Recognition
The FGS’s pledge to recognize SSC-Khatumo as a federal administration is lauded as progress. Yet, this gesture lacks substance without enforceable commitments to resource-sharing, security, or self-governance. Historically, Mogadishu’s recognition of regions has often served as a tool to dilute dissent rather than empower. By dangling administrative status, the FGS may seek to co-opt SSC leadership, diverting attention from contentious agendas like electoral reforms and prisoner swaps.

Implications for SSC-Khatumo
The region faces three critical risks:

1. Political Exploitation: SSC-Khatumo could become a pawn in federal-Somaliland negotiations, with its sovereignty bargained away for Mogadishu’s interests.
2. Erosion of Autonomy: NIRA’s presence might enable federal overreach, supplanting local decision-making with centralized electoral controls.
3. Distraction from Priorities: The theatrics of recognition could sideline urgent needs—security, development, and reconciliation—in favor of symbolic federalism.

Conclusion: A Call for SSC-Khatumo’s Vigilance
SSC-Khatumo must approach federal engagements with skepticism. Leaders should demand transparency on NIRA’s role, reject backchannel deals with Somaliland, and insist on binding agreements that guarantee resources and autonomy. Residents must hold both local and federal authorities accountable, resisting hollow symbolism. In a landscape rife with political theatre, SSC-Khatumo’s resilience lies in unity, critical scrutiny, and an unwavering commitment to self-determination. The region’s future must not be scripted by Mogadishu’s deception but shaped by its people’s aspirations.

The recent account of a repairman’s wife denied basic drugs and hygiene supplies after delivering her child at Garowe Government General Hospital is not an isolated tragedy—it is a searing indictment of Puntland’s collapsing healthcare system. This incident, emblematic of systemic neglect, exposes a dire reality: in one of Somalia’s most politically significant regions, mothers and newborns are left vulnerable to preventable suffering, while years of warnings about deteriorating health infrastructure go unheeded. Puntland’s failure to safeguard maternal health is not merely a policy failure; it is a moral crisis demanding immediate redress.

The Garowe Incident: A Microcosm of Systemic Collapse
The ordeal faced by the repairman’s family—a newborn welcomed into the world without access to sterile equipment, pain relief, or postnatal care—illustrates the human cost of Puntland’s healthcare decay. Garowe Government General Hospital, a facility intended to serve as a cornerstone of public health, could not provide even the most rudimentary supplies. This reflects a broader pattern: clinics and hospitals across Puntland frequently lack essential medicines, functional equipment, and trained staff. Maternal health services, which require consistent resources and expertise, are particularly crippled. Stories of women sharing beds, reusing gloves, or paying out-of-pocket for basics like antiseptics are tragically common, underscoring a system in freefall.
Chronic Underfunding and Institutional Apathy

Puntland’s healthcare crisis is rooted in chronic underfunding and misprioritization. Despite its semi-autonomous status and revenue from ports and local taxation, healthcare remains a low budgetary priority. Corruption and mismanagement further divert scarce resources. In 2022, a report by the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies noted that Puntland allocates less than 5% of its annual budget to health—far below the 15% target set by the African Union’s Abuja Declaration. Meanwhile, international aid, often earmarked for specific projects, fails to address systemic gaps due to poor coordination and accountability.
The consequences are stark: maternal mortality rates in Somalia, already among the world’s highest at 692 deaths per 100,000 live births, are likely exacerbated in Puntland due to inaccessible care. Neonatal survival is equally precarious, with preventable infections claiming lives daily.

The Brain Drain and Broken Infrastructure
Compounding these issues is a debilitating exodus of skilled healthcare workers. Doctors and nurses, disillusioned by unpaid salaries and hazardous working conditions, flee to urban centers or abroad. Rural areas bear the brunt: clinics stand empty, and midwives—often the sole lifelines for pregnant women—are overburdened and undersupplied. Even in Garowe, the capital, hospitals rely on erratic donations and the heroism of underpaid staff.

A Legacy of Warnings Ignored
For years, civil society groups, healthcare workers, and international partners have sounded alarms. In 2019, the Puntland Health Professionals Association warned of “imminent collapse” without urgent investment. Local media routinely highlight drug shortages and strikes by unpaid medical staff. Yet the government’s response has been tepid, prioritizing security and political infrastructure over health. This neglect reflects a broader devaluation of women’s lives in policymaking, where maternal health is relegated to an afterthought.
The Path Forward: Accountability and Equity.

Addressing this crisis requires multifaceted action:
• Increased Budgetary Allocation: Puntland must honor its Abuja Declaration commitments, prioritizing healthcare funding and ensuring transparency in expenditure.
• Strengthening Supply Chains: Partnerships with NGOs and UN agencies could stabilize medical supply pipelines, avoiding stockouts of essentials.
• Workforce Investment: Competitive salaries, training programs, and incentives for rural postings can stem the brain drain.
• Community Health Networks: Empowering local midwives and mobile clinics can bridge gaps in remote areas.
• Public Accountability: Civil society and media must hold leaders accountable, transforming healthcare from a political slogan into a tangible right.
Conclusion: A Matter of Life and Death
The repairman’s story is a wake-up call. Each day Puntland delays reform, it sentences mothers and children to unnecessary risk. Healthcare is not a luxury—it is the foundation of human dignity and social stability. As Puntland aspires to position itself as a model of governance in Somalia, it must confront this crisis with the urgency it demands. The lives of its most vulnerable citizens depend on it.
To ignore their suffering is to betray the very notion of governance.

In the intricate tapestry of Somali politics, Prime Minister Hamse Abdi Barre’s high-profile visit to Laascaano—a burgeoning city-state shaped by the influx of SSC-Khatumo residents fleeing poverty and instability—has ignited a flurry of speculation, conspiracy theories, and geopolitical intrigue. The visit, marked by an oversized delegation of ministers, lawmakers, lobbyists, and political brokers, underscores the delicate balancing act between federal authority, regional aspirations, and unresolved historical tensions. Beneath the veneer of photo opportunities and symbolic gestures lie deeper currents of political manoeuvring, contested sovereignty, and the unacknowledged influence of Puntland, Somalia’s oldest federal member state.

Laascaano: A City-State in the Making
Laascaano’s rapid transformation into a quasi-city-state is emblematic of Somalia’s fractured governance and the vacuum left by weak central institutions. Populated largely by SSC-Khatumo communities displaced by economic collapse and marginalization in their home regions, the city has become a microcosm of resistance against both Somaliland’s claims of sovereignty and the federal government’s struggle to assert control. Its rise reflects broader regional dynamics: communities seeking autonomy or recognition often coalesce around urban centers that challenge existing power structures. For Barre, Laascaano represents both a political opportunity and a minefield. By courting its residents, he aims to project federal legitimacy while navigating SSC-Khatumo’s demand for statehood—a legal and political hurdle he cannot unilaterally resolve.

The Optics of Power and Conspiracy Theories
The spectacle of Barre’s delegation—lavish in size and symbolism—serves multiple purposes. Photo opportunities with SSC-Khatumo leaders and displaced communities reinforce the narrative of a federal government engaged in grassroots reconciliation. However, the visit’s theatrics have fueled conspiracy theories. Notably, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s remarks from Türkiye insinuated that Barre’s true mission was to broker a prisoner exchange with Somaliland, a breakaway region that claims Laascaano as part of its territory. This theory, though unverified, highlights the fragility of Somalia’s territorial disputes and the federal government’s precarious position as both mediator and claimant in such conflicts. Barre’s ambiguous rhetoric—declaring SSC-Khatumo “under federal authority” while sidestepping its quest for statehood—exposes the gap between political posturing and constitutional reality. To SSC-Khatumo, such statements are empty promises; to the federal government, they are pragmatic dodges in a landscape where formalizing new states risks alienating powerful stakeholders like Puntland.

SSC-Khatumo’s Unmet Aspirations
At the heart of the tension lies SSC-Khatumo’s unresolved status. The group seeks recognition as Somalia’s sixth federal member state, a process requiring parliamentary approval and a referendum—procedures mired in bureaucratic and political delays. Barre’s inability to fast-track this ambition reflects broader systemic challenges: the federal government’s limited capacity to manage state formation amid competing clan interests and external pressures. Meanwhile, Somaliland’s vocal objections to the visit—framed as a violation of its “sovereignty”—add another layer of complexity. While the international community does not recognize Somaliland’s independence, its de facto control over parts of the Sool and Sanaag regions complicates Mogadishu’s outreach to SSC-Khatumo. Barre’s visit thus becomes a high-stakes gambit, aiming to bolster federal influence without provoking open conflict.

The Elephant in the Room: Puntland’s Shadow
Amid the noise surrounding Somaliland’s grievances, the conspicuous silence of Puntland looms large. As a founding federal member state with historical ties to SSC-Khatumo communities, Puntland’s tacit opposition to Laascaano’s ascendancy cannot be ignored. Puntland has long positioned itself as a defender of SSC interests, but its reluctance to endorse SSC-Khatumo’s statehood bid reveals a fear of losing influence in a reconfigured federal system. The absence of Puntland officials from Barre’s delegation speaks volumes, hinting at unresolved rivalries and the federal government’s struggle to reconcile competing regional agendas. For Mogadishu, sidelining Puntland risks destabilizing the fragile equilibrium of Somalia’s federalism; accommodating it could undermine SSC-Khatumo’s aspirations.

Conclusion: A Balancing Act on Shifting Sands
Prime Minister Barre’s visit to Laascaano epitomizes the paradoxes of Somali governance. While the photo ops and rhetoric aim to project unity and federal resolve, they also expose the fissures in a nation still grappling with decentralization, clan politics, and external interference. The SSC-Khatumo question remains unresolved, Somaliland’s claims persist as a geopolitical irritant, and Puntland’s unspoken resistance underscores the fragility of federal alliances. In this context, Barre’s delegation is less a solution than a symptom of Somalia’s enduring challenges—a reminder that in the absence of institutionalized power-sharing, political theatre often substitutes for progress. As Laascaano’s skyline rises, so too do the stakes for a nation, navigating the thin line between unity and fragmentation.

In brief:

1. Collapse Factors: Donor Dependency and Institutional Decay

• Designed for Donor Projects, Not Sovereignty:
  • Many government agencies were structured to operate on donor-funded projects rather than sustainable domestic revenue streams. This created a “project-based governance” model, where salaries, services, and infrastructure depended on external aid. With donors disengaging (due to shifting priorities, fatigue, or dissatisfaction with corruption), these agencies lack the financial and operational capacity to function, leading to paralysis.
• Erosion of Public Trust:
  • As departments collapse, basic services (healthcare, education, sanitation) vanish, deepening public disillusionment. Citizens may turn to informal networks, clans, or extremist groups for support, further destabilizing the state.

2. The “One-Man Rule” Problem

• Centralized Power and Accountability Gaps:
  • Concentrated authority in the hands of a single leader (or a small clique) stifles institutional autonomy, innovation, and checks on corruption. Departments become extensions of patronage networks rather than functional entities, with appointments based on loyalty, not competence.
• Systemic Decay:
  • Under one-man rule, institutions atrophy because they are not allowed to operate independently. For example:
    • Finance Ministries may lack authority to audit spending.
    • Judiciaries cannot hold leaders accountable.
    • Local Governments are sidelined, eroding grassroots governance.

3. Donor Withdrawal: A Double-Edged Sword

• Short-Term Crisis:
  • Donors often fund governments to meet humanitarian or geopolitical goals (e.g., counterterrorism, migration control). When they withdraw, they leave vacuums. In Puntland, this has exposed the state’s failure to build self-reliant institutions or revenue systems (e.g., taxation, resource management).
• Long-Term Lessons:
  • Donor dependency masked governance failures for years. The collapse reveals that no genuine institution-building occurred—agencies were hollow shells propped up by external cash. This underscores the need for domestic resource mobilization (e.g., fair taxation, leveraging ports/livestock exports) to reduce reliance on donors.

4. Pathways Forward (Amid Crisis)

Immediate Priorities

• Negotiate Donor Re-engagement with Conditions:
  • Lobby donors for emergency funding tied to governance reforms (e.g., audits, anti-corruption mechanisms). Transparency could rebuild donor trust.
• Decentralize Power:
  • Empower local councils and technocrats to bypass centralized bottlenecks. Communities often self-organize effectively in Somalia—harness this social capital.

Long-Term Reforms

• Expand Domestic Revenue Systems:
  • Formalize taxation (e.g., port tariffs, business licenses), combat smuggling, and invest in sectors like fisheries and livestock to generate state income.
• Institutional Overhaul:
  • Restructure agencies to prioritize merit-based hiring, clarify mandates, and depoliticize roles. For example, create independent civil service commissions to end clan-based appointments.
• Public Accountability Mechanisms:
  • Support media, civil society, and citizen oversight to pressure leaders. Social accountability tools (e.g., participatory budgeting, grievance redress systems) could empower communities.

5. Risks of Inaction

• State Failure and Extremism:
  • Collapsing institutions create vacuums that groups like Al-Shabaab could exploit, framing themselves as providers of security and services.
• Mass Displacement and Regional Instability:
  • Economic collapse may trigger migration waves, straining neighboring regions (e.g., Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda) and international aid systems.

Conclusion

Puntland’s crisis is a symptom of deeper pathologies: governance designed for external validation (not public service), leadership that conflates personal power with statehood, and a citizenry abandoned by both their government and donors. Breaking this cycle requires radical transparency, inclusive governance, and economic pragmatism. While challenging, the alternative—total state failure—would destabilize not just Puntland but the entire Horn of Africa.

* Clan Primacy (Qabilka First):
• Unwritten Rule: The clan’s survival and supremacy override national unity. Loyalty to the clan is non-negotiable, even at the expense of collective progress.
• Manifestation: Political alliances, resource distribution, and social trust are determined by clan lines, stifling national cohesion.
• Vengeance as Justice:
• Unwritten Rule: Retaliation against perceived slights (historical or recent) is a moral duty, perpetuating cycles of violence.
• Manifestation: Disputes escalate into inter-clan wars, as justice is equated with revenge rather than reconciliation.

• Distrust of Central Authority:
• Unwritten Rule: Governments are seen as tools for rival clans to dominate others, leading to sabotage of state-building efforts.
• Manifestation: Resistance to federal institutions, preferring clan-based governance or warlordism.
•
• Collective Guilt:
• Unwritten Rule: Entire clans are held accountable for individual actions, justifying collective punishment.
• Manifestation: Mass displacements or attacks on clans due to one member’s crime, as seen in retaliatory violence.
•
• Historical Grievance Eternalization:
• Unwritten Rule: Past conflicts (e.g., colonial-era marginalization, 1991 civil war) are weaponized to legitimize present-day hostility.
• Manifestation: Clan narratives fixate on victimhood, blocking forgiveness or compromise.
•
• Elder Worship (Oday Dhaqan):
• Unwritten Rule: Clan elders’ authority is absolute, even when their decisions prioritize tribal interests over peace.
• Manifestation: Elders may veto inter-clan cooperation to retain power, reinforcing divisions.

• Might Equals Right (Awood Baa Dhaanta):
• Unwritten Rule: Power and resources are seized through dominance, not equitable sharing.
• Manifestation: Militarized clans monopolize land/ports, excluding “weaker” groups from development.
• Short-Term Gains Over Long-Term Peace (Fursad Maanta):
• Unwritten Rule: Immediate clan advantage (e.g., grabbing a checkpoint) trumps sustainable nation-building.
• Manifestation: Fragile, clan-negotiated truces collapse when opportunistic leaders spark violence.
•
Slogans Reflecting Tribal Mentality:
• “Qabilkaaga ama qofkaaga” (“Your clan or your life”).
• If you’re not our clan, you’re inherently wrong.
• A feud is answered with a feud.
• “Dowlad waa qabiil kale” (“The state is just another clan”).
• The one who strikes first prevails.

Case Study: Dafle’s Death & Social Media Reactions
The polarized responses to Ahmed Saleebaan Abdalla’s death exemplify these laws. Supporters (often his Darod/Marehan/Dhulbahante clans) framed him as a “heroic stabilizer,” while opponents expressed disappointment that his death saved him  from facing justice in life. These reactions reflect Clan Primacy and Vengeance as Justice, reducing complex governance issues to tribal binaries. Social media’s immediacy amplifies spontaneous, clan-driven emotions, sidelining nuanced dialogue.

Pathways to Change:
• Civic Identity Over Clan: Promote narratives valuing Somali citizenship (e.g., education campaigns, art).
• Institutional Justice: Replace clan-based retaliation with independent courts addressing grievances.
• Inter-Clan Economic Projects: Foster interdependence via shared resources (e.g., cooperative farming).
• Youth & Women’s Leadership: Bypass elder-centric systems with inclusive decision-makers.
“Until Somalis unlearn the laws that chain them to the past, the future will remain a hostage to the clan.”

The upcoming visit of Somali Prime Minister Hamse Abdi Barre to Laascaano, a town in SSC Sool region, has ignited debate over its political ramifications. While the trip is framed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) as a gesture of unity and peace, it inadvertently casts a spotlight on Somaliland—a self-declared independent republic seeking international recognition since 1991. For Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, this visit presents a paradoxical opportunity: rather than viewing it as a challenge to its sovereignty, Somaliland’s administration could leverage the occasion to amplify its long-standing demands for global attention and legitimization. By welcoming dialogue—or even daring the FGS leader to extend his trip to Hargeisa—Somaliland could transform the narrative, sharing the limelight with Laascaano to underscore its socio-economic aspirations and governance credentials.

1. International Attention: A Double-Edged Sword
Somaliland’s struggle for recognition has long been hampered by geopolitical indifference. The FGS’s high-profile engagement in Laascaano, however, disrupts this status quo. International media and diplomatic circles will inevitably focus on the region, creating a rare window for Somaliland to showcase its relative stability, democratic governance, and developmental progress. Hargeisa could seize this moment to contrast its functional institutions with the FGS’s fragmented authority, positioning itself as a viable partner for foreign investment and humanitarian aid. By reframing the visit as a chance to highlight Somaliland’s de facto statehood, Hargeisa could turn the FGS’s symbolic act into a platform for global advocacy.

2. Legitimizing Dialogue and Countering FGS Narratives
The FGS’s presence in Laascaano risks reinforcing Somalia’s territorial claims over Somaliland. Yet Hargeisa could subvert this narrative by engaging pragmatically. Inviting PM Barre to Hargeisa would signal confidence in Somaliland’s governance and openness to dialogue—a stark contrast to Mogadishu’s refusal to acknowledge Somaliland’s autonomy. Such a bold move would force the FGS to either engage on Somaliland’s terms or expose its inflexibility, both outcomes beneficial to Hargeisa’s cause. Moreover, it would demonstrate Somaliland’s maturity as a political entity capable of hosting high-level diplomatic exchanges.

3. Socio-Economic Development as a Shared Priority
Laascaano, like much of Somaliland, faces challenges such as drought, poverty, and infrastructure gaps. The Prime Minister’s visit—ostensibly to address these issues—offers Hargeisa an opportunity to align its developmental goals with international agendas. By welcoming collaboration (even if symbolic), Somaliland could position itself as a proactive actor in regional stability, appealing to donors who prioritize practical outcomes over political recognition. Joint initiatives, even mediated through the FGS, might inadvertently validate Hargeisa’s administrative capacity, further eroding Mogadishu’s claims of exclusivity.

4. Humanitarian Diplomacy and Soft Power
Somaliland’s humanitarian challenges, including displacement and climate crises, often go underreported. The influx of attention generated by the Laascaano visit could redirect resources and advocacy to the region. Hargeisa could capitalize on this by coordinating with NGOs and UN agencies to highlight its own needs, framing itself as a distinct—and deserving—recipient of aid. This would not only address immediate crises but also reinforce Somaliland’s institutional identity in the eyes of the international community.

5. A Challenge to Hargeisa: From Defiance to Strategic Pragmatism
Somaliland’s instinct might be to reject the FGS’s encroachment. However, a smarter approach would involve embracing the visit as a catalyst for engagement. By inviting PM Barre to Hargeisa, Somaliland could shift the dynamic from confrontation to cooperation, forcing Mogadishu to either acknowledge Hargeisa’s autonomy or risk appearing obstructionist. Such a gesture would resonate with global actors weary of Somalia’s internal strife, positioning Somaliland as a pragmatic peacebuilder.

Conclusion: Turning Visibility into Legitimacy
The FGS’s foray into Laascaano need not undermine Somaliland; rather, it is a test of Hargeisa’s diplomatic ingenuity. By reframing the visit as an opportunity rather than a threat, Somaliland can amplify its message, attract development partnerships, and challenge the FGS’s narrative of unity. The path to recognition is fraught with complexities, but moments like these—when the world briefly turns its gaze to the Horn of Africa—are invaluable. Hargeisa must dare to share the stage, transforming a symbolic visit into a strategic victory in its decades-long quest for legitimacy.

Addendum: Navigating the Recognition Paradox
A potential visit by Prime Minister Hamse Abdi Barre to Hargeisa—should Somaliland’s administration extend an invitation—would inevitably spark contentious interpretations. Critics, particularly Somaliland’s hardline sovereigntists, might view such a gesture as tacit acceptance of Mogadishu’s authority, fearing it undermines their three-decade pursuit of formal recognition. For these factions, any engagement with the FGS risks legitimizing Somalia’s constitutional claim over Somaliland as a “federal member state,” a narrative Hargeisa has vehemently rejected since declaring independence in 1991. However, this perspective overlooks the nuanced dynamics of diplomatic signalling.
International recognition is not conferred through symbolic visits but through formal state-to-state agreements and multilateral endorsements. By inviting Barre, Somaliland could instead weaponize the optics of parity. Hosting a Somali PM on its own terms—as leaders of distinct entities—would project Somaliland’s confidence in its governance and territorial control. It would force Mogadishu to grapple with the reality of Hargeisa’s autonomy, whether through awkward protocol negotiations (e.g., flags, titles) or media coverage framing the two as de facto equals. Such a scenario would subtly erode Somalia’s insistence on “unity” while amplifying Somaliland’s case for statehood.
For hardliners, the fear of normalization with Mogadishu is understandable but short-sighted. Engagement need not equate to capitulation. By steering the narrative, Somaliland could use Barre’s presence to spotlight its achievements: holding successive elections, maintaining security without foreign troops, and hosting diaspora investments—all contrasts to Somalia’s instability. This would resonate with international observers who already treat Somaliland as a sui generis case. Moreover, if Mogadishu refuses the invitation, it would expose the FGS’s reluctance to acknowledge ground realities, further isolating its position.
In essence, the risk of misinterpretation is outweighed by the strategic gains. Somaliland’s recognition quest hinges on relentless visibility and pragmatic statecraft, not isolation. A bold overture to share the stage with the FGS could redefine the conversation, turning a symbolic visit into a masterclass in diplomatic manoeuvring.

Introduction
Puntland State of Somalia, established in 1998 as a beacon of stability and decentralized governance, once prided itself on its aspiration to create a “smaller and smarter” government. Yet, recent accounts from residents like Dahir, a diaspora returnee to Garowe, paint a troubling picture of institutional decay, clan favouritism, and bureaucratic bloat under President Said Abdullahi Deni’s administration. Dahir’s stories—of a justice system held hostage by bribery, a police force paralyzed by clan loyalties, and a government expanding while services crumble—highlight systemic failures that betray Puntland’s founding principles. This essay examines the dual crises of under-resourced institutions and clan-based governance, alongside the contradictions of unchecked governmental growth, to explore why Puntland risks squandering its promise as a model of local governance.

Institutional Fragility and the Cycle of Corruption
Puntland’s struggle to uphold law and order begins with its skeletal institutional framework. As Dahir observed, even basic public services like policing are crippled by a lack of operational funds and trained personnel. When a teenager’s misconduct requires familial bribes to resolve—rather than formal legal processes—it underscores a system reliant on informal negotiations, not rule of law. Such scenarios are symptomatic of broader dysfunction: police departments lack vehicles, stations lack electricity, and officers go unpaid for months. This vacuum of resources fosters corruption, as underpaid officials turn to extortion or clan patronage to survive.
The problem extends beyond the police. Health clinics, courts, and municipal offices suffer similar neglect, perpetuating a cycle where citizens lose faith in state structures. Without funding, institutions cannot attract skilled professionals or implement reforms, leaving Puntland’s governance trapped in a self-defeating loop of incapacity.

Clan Loyalty vs. State Authority
Compounding institutional weakness is the infiltration of clan identity into state apparatuses. In Garowe, the police force’s homogeneity—recruited predominantly from a single sub-clan—erodes impartiality. Officers hesitate to act against kin, while victims from rival clans face bias. This subversion of meritocracy undermines trust in the state, as seen in the teenager’s case: justice becomes a transactional commodity, contingent on clan ties and bribes rather than accountability.
Puntland’s founders envisioned a government transcending clan divisions, but in practice, clan loyalty often supersedes civic duty. Such nepotism not only weakens law enforcement but also deters investment and diaspora repatriation, as Dahir’s disillusionment suggests. When state roles are clan sinecures, competence and public trust erode.

The Irony of Expansion: Bigger Government, Weaker Governance
Paradoxically, President Deni’s administration has prioritized expanding bureaucratic structures—creating redundant agencies and overlapping mandates—while core institutions starve. Ministries multiply, but budgets remain opaque, and coordination falters. This growth, critics argue, serves political patronage, rewarding allies with government posts rather than addressing systemic flaws.
The original vision of a lean, efficient government has given way to bloat, mirroring failures of larger federal states. Expansion without investment in capacity or oversight exacerbates inefficiency: more departments compete for scarce funds, deepening service delivery gaps. Meanwhile, Deni’s focus on contentious issues like federal disputes with Mogadishu diverts attention from grassroots governance needs.

Conclusion: Reclaiming the Promise of Decentralization
Puntland’s crises are not insurmountable but demand urgent recalibration. First, institutional capacity must be rebuilt through budget prioritization, diaspora engagement, and international partnerships focused on training and infrastructure. Second, clan-neutral recruitment and anti-corruption measures are critical to restoring faith in state institutions. Finally, the government must halt counterproductive expansion, streamlining agencies to align with its original “smaller and smarter” ethos.
Dahir’s story is a microcosm of Puntland’s crossroads: a region struggling to balance tradition with modernity, clan with citizenship, and growth with governance. Without addressing these tensions, Puntland risks becoming a cautionary tale—a state that expanded its bureaucracy but forgot its people. The path forward lies not in mimicking failed models but in reclaiming the innovative, pragmatic spirit that once made it a Somali success story.

The question of whether a nation can be built on ethnic or regional hatred is not merely theoretical; it is a lived reality in Somalia. Since its independence in 1960, Somalia has grappled with the contradictions of a state that aspired to pan-Somali unity while being fractured by clan divisions, authoritarian rule, and regional marginalization. The legacies of military dictator Siyad Barre (1969–1991), followed by the polarizing policies of Presidents Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo (2017–2022) and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (2022–present), have entrenched a system of governance that prioritizes clan-based power struggles over inclusive nation-building. The resulting tensions, particularly between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in Mogadishu and the semi-autonomous Puntland State, reveal a profound crisis of legitimacy. For many in Puntland, the failure of successive Mogadishu regimes to address systemic marginalization has made confederation—a political arrangement granting maximal autonomy within a looser union—a compelling alternative to the current dysfunctional federalism. This essay examines how Somalia’s history of centralized oppression, clan politics, and regional neglect has fueled calls for confederation, arguing that such a model may offer a pragmatic path to stability, albeit one fraught with challenges.
Historical Context: From Barre’s Clan Tyranny to Fractured Federalism

1. Siyad Barre’s Divisive Legacy
The collapse of Somali statehood can not be understood without examining the regime of Siyad Barre. Initially celebrated for his nationalist rhetoric and modernization efforts, Barre’s dictatorship devolved into a system of clan-based repression. By the 1980s, his regime targeted specific clans, notably the Isaaq in the northwest (now Somaliland) and the Majeerteen in the northeast (Puntland), through massacres, forced displacements, and economic exclusion. The state became a tool of vengeance against perceived rivals, eroding trust in centralized governance. Barre’s overthrow in 1991 plunged Somalia into civil war, fragmenting the country into clan fiefdoms and sowing the seeds of enduring regional resentment.

2. The Illusion of Federalism
Post-2000 efforts to rebuild Somalia through federalism—a system enshrined in the 2012 Provisional Constitution—were well-intentioned but flawed. Federalism aimed to balance power between Mogadishu and regional states, recognizing the diversity of Somalia’s clans and regions. However, in practice, federalism has been co-opted by Mogadishu-based elites who manipulate clan divisions to maintain control. Under Farmajo, the FGS weaponized federalism by withholding resources from non-aligned regions, interfering in local elections, and centralizing security and financial institutions. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration has continued this trend, prioritizing political survival over equitable power-sharing.

Puntland’s Grievances: Marginalization and the Failure of Federalism
Puntland, established in 1998 as Somalia’s first autonomous state, has long positioned itself as a champion of decentralized governance. Its leadership argues that Mogadishu’s failure to honor federal principles has made confederation—a system where regions retain sovereignty over most affairs—a necessity. Key grievances include:

1. Economic Exclusion
Puntland, rich in resources such as fisheries, livestock, and potential hydrocarbons, accuses Mogadishu of monopolizing international aid and revenue. For instance, the FGS has consistently blocked Puntland from directly engaging with foreign partners or accessing its fair share of donor funds. This economic stranglehold stifles development and fuels perceptions of colonial-style extraction.
2. Political Marginalization
Puntland boycotted the 2021–2022 electoral process, citing Mogadishu’s refusal to implement a one-person, one-vote model and its interference in regional politics. The FGS’s unilateral extension of its mandate in 2021 further alienated Puntland, which views such actions as unconstitutional power grabs.

3. Security Neglect
While Puntland shoulders the burden of combating terrorism (e.g., ISIS affiliates in the Galgala mountains), Mogadishu often withholds support for regional security forces. The FGS’s focus on centralizing the Somali National Army (SNA) undermines local counterterrorism efforts, leaving Puntland State to defend itself alone. This neglect is starkly evident in Mogadishu’s refusal to equitably allocate international security funding or share critical intelligence, despite Puntland’s frontline role in battling extremist groups. For instance, the Puntland Security Force (PSF) and Puntland Dervish Force—key regional units actively engaging ISIS-Somalia in mountainous terrain—rely on outdated weaponry and limited logistical support, while the SNA, bolstered by foreign training and financing, remains disproportionately concentrated in south-central Somalia.
The consequences of this imbalance are dire. In 2021, Puntland launched Operation Dabaaldegg to dismantle ISIS strongholds in Galgala, a campaign conducted almost entirely without federal backing. The absence of aerial surveillance, medical evacuations, and reinforcements from Mogadishu stretched Puntland’s forces thin, allowing militants to regroup and retaliate against civilians. Meanwhile, the FGS’s insistence on integrating regional forces into the SNA—a move Puntland views as a bid to erode its autonomy—has further strained relations. “We are told to surrender our weapons and recruits to Mogadishu, but receive nothing in return except empty promises,” lamented a Puntland security official in 2023.
This security vacuum has forced Puntland to seek alternative partnerships, including reported collaborations with private military contractors and bilateral agreements with states like the UAE, which has provided training and equipment. Yet these ad hoc measures can not substitute for a cohesive national strategy. The FGS’s prioritization of political control over collective security has not only emboldened extremists but also deepened Puntland’s resolve to pursue confederation—a system where it could autonomously manage defence policy and international partnerships. Without meaningful reform, Mogadishu’s neglect risks transforming Puntland’s pragmatic push for self-reliance into an irreversible fracture of the Somali state.
This expansion contextualizes Puntland’s security challenges within the broader federal-regional rift, emphasizing operational realities, external alliances, and the human cost of Mogadishu’s policies. It ties the crisis to Puntland’s political calculus, reinforcing the essay’s thesis on confederation as a survival mechanism.

Introduction
Puntland State, a semi-autonomous region in northeastern Somalia, has long been hailed for its resilience in maintaining stability amidst Somalia’s protracted civil war. This stability was anchored in its time-tested system of traditional clan leadership, which filled the governance vacuum after the collapse of the central government in 1991. However, the relationship between Puntland’s traditional elders and its political leaders has grown increasingly fraught since the establishment of the Puntland State in 1998. This essay explores the transformation of this relationship, from one of collaboration to contention, and its implications for Puntland’s governance and stability.

Historical Context: The Pillars of Traditional Leadership
In Somali society, clan elders (Isimmo, Guurti) have historically served as custodians of customary law (Xeer), mediators in conflicts, and representatives of communal interests. Their role became indispensable after 1991, when Somalia descended into stateless chaos. In the northeastern regions (now Puntland), elders leveraged their moral authority and social networks to prevent large-scale violence, fostering a fragile peace. This contrasted sharply with southern Somalia, where clan militias fueled protracted conflict. Puntland’s elders thus emerged not just as cultural figures but as de facto governors.

The Founding of Puntland State: A Constitutional Role for Elders
In 1998, Puntland formalized its governance structure through a constitutional framework that recognized traditional elders as key stakeholders. The founding president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, a former military leader, collaborated with elders to establish legitimacy. The constitution enshrined elders’ roles in resolving constitutional crises and selecting members of the House of Representatives, blending traditional and modern governance. This hybrid model initially appeared successful, as Puntland avoided the factionalism plaguing other regions.

Cracks in the Foundation: The Overreach of Elders
The first major rupture occurred in 2001, when traditional elders, citing grievances over Yusuf’s authoritarian tendencies and his bid to extend his term, orchestrated his removal. This decision, while rooted in legitimate concerns, set a precedent for elders intervening directly in executive affairs—a move perceived as overstepping their advisory mandate. Yusuf’s ouster exposed tensions between the elders’ role as arbiters and the need for apolitical governance. His successors, wary of similar challenges, sought to curb elders’ influence.

Political Backlash: The Marginalization of Traditional Authority
Subsequent leaders, notably Abdirahman Faroole (2009–2014), and Said Abdullahi Deni, the current president, systematically weakened the elders’ political clout. Their administrations bypassed traditional selection processes, handpicking loyalists for the House of Representatives to consolidate power, a direct violation of Puntland Indirect Election Rules and Regulations. This marginalization alienated elders, who viewed such actions as undermining their constitutional role and the principles of inclusive governance. The erosion of trust between the two groups created a toxic dynamic, with political leaders dismissing elders as obstacles to reform, while elders accused the government of corruption and exclusion.

External Alliances and Internal Divisions
Compounding these tensions, some elders began seeking alliances with the federal government in Mogadishu (symbolized by Villa Somalia), ostensibly to counterbalance Puntland’s administrations. This shift risked drawing external actors into Puntland’s internal politics, potentially undermining its semi-autonomous status. For Villa Somalia, courting Puntland’s elders offered leverage in negotiations over resource-sharing and federalism. However, such alliances risked fragmenting Puntland’s political cohesion and fueling clan-based discord.

Consequences for Governance and Stability
The rift between traditional and political leaders has profound implications. Elders, once pillars of conflict resolution, now find their legitimacy questioned, weakening a critical mechanism for social cohesion. Meanwhile, political leaders face accusations of authoritarianism, as centralized decision-making alienates grassroots communities. The resulting governance vacuum could destabilize Puntland, which has already seen sporadic clashes over elections and resource disputes.

Conclusion: Toward a Balanced Governance Model
Puntland’s experience underscores the challenges of transitioning from traditional systems to formal state structures. While political leaders seek centralized authority, elders remain vital to local legitimacy. A sustainable path forward requires reconciling these spheres: elders must respect institutional boundaries, while political leaders should integrate traditional mechanisms into governance. Reviving the constitutional spirit of 1998—where elders advise rather than dictate—could restore balance. Ultimately, Puntland’s stability hinges on respecting its dual heritage: honouring the past while building an inclusive future.

Religious leaders across traditions are often expected to serve as moral guides, addressing societal injustices and advocating for ethical governance. In the Muslim world, however, critics have observed a perceived silence from many clergy (ulema) on pressing issues such as corruption, exploitation by foreign powers, and human rights abuses. This essay explores the complex reasons behind this phenomenon, considering historical, political, cultural, and theological factors that shape clerical engagement—or disengagement—with such topics.

1. Political Constraints and Fear of Repression

In many Muslim-majority countries, religious institutions operate under authoritarian regimes that tightly control public discourse. Clergy who criticize corruption or foreign exploitation risk persecution, imprisonment, or loss of patronage. For example, in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Pakistan, state-aligned religious bodies often avoid condemning government malpractice to maintain their institutional privileges. Conversely, dissenting voices—such as those of Iran’s reformist clerics during the 2009 Green Movement or Egypt’s Al-Azhar scholars during the 2011 revolution—have faced severe backlash. This climate of fear incentivizes silence, reducing clerical discourse to “safe” topics like ritual observance.

2. Historical Prioritization of Ritual Over Structural Reform

Classical Islamic scholarship emphasized personal piety and legal compliance (fiqh) over systemic critiques of power. While the Quran and Hadith explicitly condemn oppression (zulm), many traditional scholars historically focused on individual morality rather than holding rulers accountable. This legacy persists in conservative seminaries, where curricula prioritize theology and jurisprudence over political philosophy. As a result, some clergy lack the intellectual framework to connect Islamic ethics to modern issues like corporate exploitation or foreign-funded wars.

3. Co-option by Power Structures

Religious institutions in Muslim societies have often been financially and politically dependent on ruling elites. Ottoman caliphs, Mughal emperors, and modern Gulf monarchs have historically patronized clerics to legitimize their rule. Today, this dynamic continues: state-appointed muftis in countries like Malaysia or Morocco rarely challenge policies linked to foreign investors or military alliances. When clergy benefit from these relationships, their critiques of corruption or foreign interference become muted or selective.

4. Sectarian and Identity Politics

In fragmented societies like Iraq or Syria, clergy may prioritize sectarian solidarity over universal moral issues. For instance, during the Syrian civil war, some Sunni clerics framed the conflict as a sectarian battle against Shia-aligned forces, overshadowing critiques of war profiteering or foreign mercenaries. Similarly, in Pakistan, clerical groups often focus on blasphemy laws or Sunni-Shia tensions rather than systemic corruption. This sectarian lens distracts from broader injustices that transcend communal divides.

5. Geopolitical Alignments and Anti-Imperialist Narratives

Some clergy avoid criticizing foreign exploitation because their governments are complicit in it. For example, Gulf states’ alliances with Western powers—often criticized for militarism and resource extraction—are rarely condemned by local religious leaders. Conversely, in anti-Western contexts like Iran, clerical rhetoric may focus overwhelmingly on resisting “Western imperialism” while downplaying domestic corruption or human rights abuses. These narratives serve political agendas but leave systemic issues unaddressed.

6. Institutional Conservatism and Lack of Renewal

Many Islamic seminaries resist modernizing their curricula, leaving clergy ill-equipped to address 21st-century challenges. While the Quranic mandate for hisbah (public accountability) and amr bil ma’ruf (enjoining good) could inspire activism, rigid interpretations of texts often prevail. Additionally, the decline of ijtihad (independent reasoning) in conservative circles stifles innovative responses to issues like migrant labor exploitation in the Gulf or Chinese oppression of Uyghurs.

7. Exceptions and Countercurrents

It is crucial to acknowledge clerics who defy these trends. Figures like Tunisia’s Rached Ghannouchi, Indonesia’s Abdurrahman Wahid, and South Africa’s Farid Esack have blended Islamic ethics with critiques of tyranny and neoliberalism. Grassroots movements, such as Egypt’s pro-democracy clerics during the Arab Spring, also demonstrate the potential for Islamic leadership to confront injustice. However, their marginalization by both states and conservative religious establishments limits their influence.

Conclusion: Toward a Courageous Moral Voice

The silence of many Muslim clergy on critical issues stems not from indifference but from complex entanglements with power, tradition, and survival. Breaking this silence requires institutional reforms—such as democratizing religious education, reviving ijtihad, and fostering alliances with civil society—to empower clergy to speak truth to power. As the Quran reminds believers, “Do not let hatred of a people prevent you from being just” (5:8). For the ulema to reclaim their role as moral leaders, they must transcend political expediency and address the urgent struggles of their communities.

“[5.8] O you who believe! Be upright for Allah, bearers of witness with justice, and let not hatred of a people incite you not to act equitably; act equitably, that is nearer to piety, and he careful of (your duty to) Allah; surely Allah is Aware of what you do.”