Abstract: While international counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia have historically focused on Mogadishu and South-Central regions, the semi-autonomous state of Puntland has for three decades served as a critical bulwark against the entrenchment of jihadist groups in the strategic littoral-highland nexus of the Horn of Africa. This analysis synthesizes scattered field reports and operational data to trace an untold strategic arc: Puntland’s iterative adaptation against five successive extremist projects, culminating in a locally-led doctrine that severs the connection between mountain sanctuaries and port logistics. This historical examination, structured around the interplay of ports, mountains, and organizational evolution, argues that regional initiative, terrain-specific strategies, and an evolving force structure have been decisive in denying militants a permanent foothold.
Introduction: The Littoral-Highland Battlespace
The conflict in Northern Somalia is defined by a geographic dichotomy: the rugged Cal Miskaad and Golis mountain ranges provide natural sanctuary for insurgents, while the porous coastline offers critical access for logistics and support. The constant strategic objective for extremist groups has been to fuse these two domains into a durable operational base. Puntland’s sustained resistance to these efforts represents a critical case study in regional counter-insurgency (COIN). The following history is structured along three concurrent strands that illustrate the evolution of this conflict:
1. The Struggle for Ports & Littorals: The battle to control logistics hubs and landing points.
2. The War in the Mountains: The fight to deny insurgent sanctuary in the rugged interior.
3. Organizational Shifts: The evolution of both jihadist groups and Puntland’s security apparatus.
This triad provides the framework for analyzing the distinct “Puntland Doctrine.”
The Chronological Evolution of the Conflict
The Precedent: Establishing the Strategic Paradigm (Early–Mid 1990s)
· Ports & Littorals: The major port city of Bosaso was the initial prize. AIAI’s seizure of it was a deliberate attempt to establish a governance project and secure a primary logistics hub.
· Mountains: While not the main battleground, the northern ridges were recognized as a potential rear base and force-multifier, establishing their strategic value from the outset.
· Organizational Shifts: This period featured the first organized jihadist challenge from Al-Itihaad al-Islami (AIAI). Puntland’s response was conducted by ad-hoc SSDF-aligned militias, setting the baseline from which all future adaptation would occur.
Phase I: Conventional Threat and Mountain Defense (December 2006)
· Ports & Littorals: (This round emphasized land-based conventional advance, though it aimed to ultimately control all territory, including coasts.)
· Mountains: The Battle of Bandiradley was a decisive mountain engagement. Halting the ICU surge here protected the strategic approaches to Galkayo and the vital Bari road.
· Organizational Shifts: The rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) introduced a new, powerful challenger. Puntland’s response evolved into a coalition of its militias with key Ethiopian military support, demonstrating an early understanding of the need for partnered operations.
Phase II: Protracted Insurgency and Attritional Denial (2009–2011)
· Ports & Littorals: The strategy shifted to littoral denial. Puntland focused on disrupting Atom’s ability to draw supplies from coastal towns, making his mountain holdings unsustainable.
· Mountains: The Galgala-Caladow range became the epicenter of a protracted guerrilla campaign under Mohamed Said “Atom”, who expertly leveraged the complex limestone terrain.
· Organizational Shifts: Atom’s group operated as a semi-autonomous al-Shabaab affiliate, illustrating the franchise model of jihad. In response, Puntland professionalized its forces, establishing the more capable Puntland Security Force (PSF).
Phase III & IV: The Littoral Gambit and Jihadist Fracture (2016)
The year 2016 saw two nearly simultaneous challenges that highlighted the integrated nature of the battlespace and a shifting organizational landscape.
· Ports & Littorals (Mar 2016): Al-Shabaab executed a strategic pivot with the Gara’ad incursion, a seaborne assault to capture a minor port and open a new logistical front.
· Ports & Littorals (Late 2016): The ISIS-Somalia splinter faction then occupied the port town of Qandala, demonstrating that multiple groups now coveted a coastal foothold.
· Mountains: Throughout this period, the Galgala range remained an active insurgency, forcing Puntland to contend with a potential two-front conflict linking the coast to the highlands.
· Organizational Shifts: This period was defined by fracture and competition. The emergence of ISIS-Somalia created a rival to al-Shabaab, fracturing the jihadist movement and complicating Puntland’s threat landscape.
Phase V: Doctrine Culmination – Integrated Systems Control (2024–2025)
· Ports & Littorals: The overarching goal of the Cal Miskaad Offensive was to permanently sever all clandestine coastal supply lines feeding the mountain insurgency.
· Mountains: The operation represented the largest-ever push to clear ISIS-Somalia strongholds in the rugged Cal Miskaad range, treating the mountain system as a single, integrated battlespace.
· Organizational Shifts: This campaign showcased the full maturation of Puntland’s model: an integrated command of PSF, PMPF, Dervish, and police units, effectively leveraged partner-provided precision strike capabilities. This validated the doctrine of local lead with targeted external support.
Analysis: The Through-Lines of a Doctrine
Synthesizing these five conflicts through the lens of the three strategic lanes reveals consistent principles:
1. The Primacy of Logistics (Ports & Littorals): Every militant surge, from AIAI to ISIS, targeted a port. Puntland’s core strategic imperative has been to deny and disrupt this link, understanding that terrain without supply is ultimately indefensible.
2. Terrain Control via Economic Warfare (Mountains): Military control of mountainous terrain is secondary to controlling its sustenance. Success was achieved not merely through clearances but by systematically isolating insurgents from the local micro-economies and supply chains that made their presence viable.
3. Adaptive Learning (Organizational Shifts): Puntland’s command structure demonstrated a capacity to learn and adapt at a pace that matched, and often exceeded, that of its adversaries. Its evolution from militias to a integrated, specialized force capable of combined arms operations is a testament to organizational learning under fire.
Conclusion: An Unwritten History and Its Implications
This history has remained largely “untold” due to its occurrence in inaccessible terrain, its overshadowing by events in Mogadishu, and its manifestation in tactical engagements that mask strategic weight. By reconstructing it along the interwoven strands of ports, mountains, and organizational change, the consistent application of a deliberate Puntland Doctrine becomes clear. The 2024-25 Cal Miskaad campaign is not an isolated event but the logical culmination of a strategy honed over thirty years: control the coastline, isolate the highlands, and prevent any tactical victory from becoming a strategic permanent base. This case study offers critical lessons for COIN strategies in similar littoral-mountain environments elsewhere, highlighting the efficacy of regional, terrain-literate forces operating with targeted external enablement.
WDM 