By Ismail H. Warsame Founder,Puntland State of Somalia • Chief of Staff, 1998–2004, Author, Talking Truth to Power
Abstract
The 4.5 Clan Power-Sharing Formula is the most consequential yet contentious institutional innovation in modern Somali politics. While widely criticized for institutionalizing clan identity, this paper argues that it functioned as a critical pragmatic compromise—a necessary social contract that provided the sole viable pathway from utter statelessness to a nascent constitutional order. To reject its foundational role is to ignore the socio-political realities of post-collapse Somalia and to overlook the unprecedented protections it afforded marginalized communities. The formula must be understood not as an end-state, but as a transitional bridge that must be dismantled only once the structure of a civic state is secure.
Introduction: The Engine of a Fragile State
Since its formal adoption at the 2000 Arta Conference in Djibouti, the 4.5 formula has been the paradoxical engine of Somalia’s state-building project. It allocates political representation among the four major clan-families (Darod, Hawiye, Dir, and Digil-Mirifle), with a critical “half-share” reserved for minority clans and groups, creating a collective, if unequal, stake in governance (Menkhaus 2004, 16).
Though publicly derided by the very elites it empowers, the formula is the bedrock upon which every post-2000 government has been built. It transformed zero-sum clan competition into a structured, albeit flawed, positive-sum game. As Warsame (2023) contends, this “pragmatic genius” provided the necessary incentive for warring factions to lay down arms and negotiate, creating a political table where none existed.
Historical Context: From Anarchy to Structured Negotiation
The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 resulted in a landscape defined by clan-based militias and warlord fiefdoms (Lewis 2002). Early reconciliation conferences in Addis Ababa (1993) and Cairo (1997) failed precisely because they attempted to impose a civic nationalist model on a society that had reverted to its primary, segmentary lineage structures for security and identity.
The breakthrough of the Arta Process was its stark realism. Rather than denying clanism, it codified it into a clear, predictable, and inclusive arithmetic of power-sharing. This was not a surrender to tribalism, but a strategic co-optation of it. As Samatar (2002, 104) observed, Arta’s success lay in its “acceptance of the social facts on the ground,” turning a source of conflict into a framework for collaboration.
The Progressive Core: The Revolutionary Half-Share
A common oversight in critiques of the 4.5 system is the disregard for its most transformative element: the guaranteed representation for minority clans and communities (e.g., Bantu/Jareer, Benadiri, Gabooye). This “0.5” was a radical democratic innovation.
In the pre-1991 Somali Republic, these groups were systematically excluded from political power. The 4.5 formula, for the first time, constitutionally embedded an affirmative action principle, guaranteeing them a voice in the national legislature (Bradbury 2008, 85). It acted as a proto-bill of rights, protecting the most vulnerable from the tyranny of the majority in a context where no other protections existed.
Political Hypocrisy: The Public Critique and Private Reliance
A profound hypocrisy defines the Somali political class’s relationship with the 4.5 system. Politicians publicly vilify “clanism” as a backward scourge while privately relying on their clan networks as the fundamental base of their power and legitimacy.
This duality is not merely cynical; it is structurally logical. In a pastoral society where the state’s monopoly on violence is absent or weak, the clan remains the primary unit of security, trust, and mobilization (Besteman 1999). This creates a political reality where, as Warsame (2023) astutely notes, “denouncing clanism is the required public performance, while mastering its calculus is the essential private practice.” This mirrors societies that rhetorically condemn racism while being structured by it, revealing the gap between aspirational politics and on-the-ground realities.
Addressing the Critiques: Scaffolding, Not a Pillar
The primary critique—that 4.5 entrenches clan identities and impedes the development of a merit-based, civic political culture—is not without merit (International Crisis Group 2011). However, this argument presupposes a stable political environment where civic identity can flourish, a condition Somalia has not enjoyed for decades.
The formula was never intended to be permanent. Its purpose was always transitional: to be the scaffolding that allows the state structure to be rebuilt. As Warsame (2023) warns, the danger lies not in the desire to move beyond 4.5, but in dismantling this scaffolding prematurely. Abolishing it without a consensus-based, secure, and clearly defined alternative risks catastrophic backsliding into the very clan-driven conflict it was designed to mitigate. The imperative is not rejection, but managed reform.
Charting a Post-4.5 Future: A Phased Transition
The ultimate goal of a one-person, one-vote democracy remains valid. Achieving it requires a deliberate and phased strategy to ensure stability:
1. Piloting Civic Elections: Implementing direct elections first at the local municipal level, where issues of service delivery can help forge a civic identity distinct from clan loyalty.
2. Intensive Civic Education: A national curriculum focused on citizenship rights and responsibilities, teaching Somalis that political identity can be rooted in shared residence and national interest, not just lineage.
3. Constitutional Entrenchment of Minorities: Ensuring that any future electoral model constitutionally preserves the hard-won political rights of minority groups, safeguarding the spirit of the 0.5 share.
The 4.5 formula was a masterstroke of realpolitik that forged a precarious stability from outright anarchy. This crude but necessary compromise arrested Somalia’s spiral into permanent disintegration, functioning not as a final destination but as a critical bridge. It was a pragmatic acknowledgment of a foundational sociological truth: that Somali politics is inextricably rooted in clan identity. By guaranteeing all groups—including marginalized minorities—a seat at the table, it manufactured a collective stake in the peace process. The profound irony lies in its critics: elites who leverage clan patronage for power while publicly decrying the very “tribalism” that enables it, all while offering no viable alternative. Ultimately, the legacy of 4.5 will be judged not by the hypocrisy of its opponents, but by whether Somalia uses this negotiated framework to mature into a genuine constitutional democracy based on one-person-one-vote. This was the historic, pragmatic breakthrough of the 1997 Sodare Group, which institutionalized 4.5 as the sole antidote to warlordism and the essential first step toward rebuilding a state.
Conclusion: The Indispensable Bridge
The 4.5 Clan Power-Sharing Formula is not an antithesis to democracy; it was its necessary precondition in a context of state collapse. It represents a pragmatic, culturally-grounded solution to the existential problem of statelessness. While its clan-based mechanics are incongruous with liberal democratic ideals, it provided the minimal consensus required to restart a state. It is the bridge that carried Somalia across the river of anarchy. The task ahead is not to curse the bridge for being imperfect, but to carefully cross it and build a more durable political home on the other side, ensuring everyone has a room within it.
References
Besteman, Catherine. Unraveling Somalia: Race, Violence, and the Legacy of Slavery. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.
Bradbury, Mark. Becoming Somaliland. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.
International Crisis Group. “Somalia: Transforming Hope into Stability.” Africa Report No. 170, December 2011.
Lewis, I. M. A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. Oxford: James Currey, 2002.
Menkhaus, Ken. State Collapse and the Threat of Violence in Somalia. Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2004.
Samatar, Abdi Ismail. “Somalia’s ‘Arta’ Process: Success or Illusion?” Review of African Political Economy 29, no. 91 (2002): 97–111.
Warsame, Ismail H. “Why Somalis Complain about Clan Power-Sharing Formula.” Warsame Digital Media (WDM), 2023.
Warsame Policy & Media Network (WAPMEN) 