1. Background: The Puntland–SSC‑Khaatumo schism
In October 2023, Somalia’s Federal Government recognized SSC‑Khaatumo as an interim federal member state (administration covering Sool, Sanaag, Cayn regions) with its capital in Las Anod . That move sharply conflicted with Puntland’s constitutional claim: Puntland insists SSC regions are legally part of its territory, rejecting separation without inclusive clan consensus or referendum .
Tensions escalated in mid‑2025, particularly over Sanaag, where SSC‑Khaatumo-affiliated leaders organized conferences backing federal recognition. Puntland responded by banning unapproved gatherings and vehicles (including those with SSC‑Khaatumo or Somaliland plates) in the region, and deploying elite forces to disrupt political activity .
2. Puntland ends recognition of SSC‑Khaatumo
According to local reporting, Puntland no longer recognizes SSC‑Khaatumo, viewing it as a federal-provoked entity destabilizing governance in Sanaag. Officials allege coordination between Mogadishu and SSC‑Khaatumo leadership in orchestrating “security provocations” within Puntland’s territory. The move forms part of Puntland’s broader assertion of sovereignty in SSC, rejecting any federal-backed entity that bypasses Puntland’s constitutional framework.
3. ISIS threat in Cal‑Miskaad and Puntland’s counterterror response
Separately, Puntland continues intensive operations against ISIS-Somalia cells entrenched in the Cal‑Miskaad mountains:
Operation Hilaac launched in December 2024 and extended into 2025, targeting IS hideouts across the Golis/Cal‑Miskaad ranges. Security forces collaborated with US and UAE air strikes, seizing over 250 km² of territory, destroying 50+ bases, eliminating dozens of militants and eliminating senior ISIS facilitators like Ahmed Muse Said .
As late as May–June 2025, operations continued—neutralizing logistic hubs, repelling large-scale attacks, and consolidating control over critical terrain .
Puntland leadership insists ISIS aimed to establish Cal‑Miskaad as a global command center, a plot thwarted by “heroic forces” in parliamentary remarks by President Deni on June 15, 2025 .
4. Will Puntland impose taxes or regulatory restrictions on SSC‑Khaatumo?
While Puntland has not publicly announced new taxation plans targeting SSC‑Khaatumo, the available measures indicate a tightening of administrative controls:
The ban on unauthorized meetings and vehicle plate prohibitions in Sanaag signal an escalation in regulatory pressure .
Puntland may enforce existing tax schemes and regulatory requirements (e.g. licensing, checkpoints) more strictly in SSC-aligned areas, especially those hosting SSC‑Khaatumo political activity.
Considering Puntland’s broader posture of rejecting SSC‑Khaatumo’s legitimacy, economic sanctions or heightened enforcement are plausible: entry checkpoints, confiscation of non‑Puntland plates, duties on trade, or restrictions on formal services to SSC‑run institutions may be imposed or intensified.
Given the institutional standoff, SSC‑Khaatumo territories may find Puntland withholding administrative approvals, business licenses, or local tax exemptions as leverage. While no explicit new tax law has been quoted publicly yet, increasing regulatory friction is clearly underway.
5. Broader implications: security, politics, and governance
Federal–regional feud: Puntland’s refusal to recognise SSC‑Khaatumo and its operational bans are part of a broader confrontation with Mogadishu, whom it accuses of unconstitutional interference .
Security connections: Puntland faces a dual-front threat—SSC‑Khaatumo’s politicization in Sanaag and rolling operations against ISIS in Cal‑Miskaad. Each front intersects, as instability in one region can undermine counterterrorism gains elsewhere.
Clan politics and local legitimacy: Puntland cites traditional clan elders in Sanaag who reaffirm Puntland’s territorial rights and reject SSC‑Khaatumo affiliation as destabilizing .
Issue and Current Status
Recognition: Puntland no longer recognises SSC‑Khaatumo; federal recognition viewed as unconstitutional.
Security measures Bans on meetings and non‑Puntland plate vehicles in Sanaag; deployment of Puntland security forces.
ISIS threat Ongoing. large‑scale counterterror operations across Cal‑Miskaad — major gains under Operation Hilaac.
Tax/regulatory crackdown. No formal new taxes yet, but increased enforcement of permits, licensing, and vehicle regulations in SSC‑aligned areas.
Outlook Likely more regulatory and administrative pressure, potentially economic restrictions, as Puntland asserts control over its claimed territory.
✅ Conclusion
Puntland has taken a firm stance: ceasing recognition of SSC‑Khaatumo, banning its affiliated activities in Sanaag, and positioning itself as the sole authority in SSC regions. Parallel to escalating security operations against ISIS in Cal‑Miskaad, these moves suggest a dual strategy of political consolidation and territorial control. Although no formal new taxes have been announced explicitly targeting SSC‑Khaatumo, the existing bans on meetings, vehicle movements, and likely administrative restrictions count as de facto pressure. As federal–regional tensions deepen, look for further institutional measures—economic or regulatory—to limit SSC‑Khaatumo’s operation within Puntland’s claimed zones.
Warsame Policy & Media Network (WAPMEN) 