Introduction

Since the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012, the nation has grappled with persistent opposition stemming from federal member states (FMS), political alliances, civil society, and armed groups. This opposition reflects deep-rooted tensions over governance structures, resource allocation, and national identity. Understanding the dynamics of this opposition is crucial for Somalia’s path toward stability and unity.

1. Historical Context and Evolution of the Opposition

The roots of opposition to the FGS trace back to the collapse of the central government in 1991, leading to the emergence of clan-based administrations and regional entities. The 2012 provisional constitution introduced a federal system intended to balance power between Mogadishu and the regions. However, the implementation of federalism has been fraught with challenges, leading to friction between the central government and FMS over issues like resource sharing, security, and political representation.

2. Main Forms of Opposition

A. Federal Member States (FMS) as Opposition

FMS have often acted as de facto opposition to the FGS, asserting their autonomy and challenging central authority:

Puntland: Established in 1998, Puntland has been a vocal critic of the FGS, especially concerning constitutional reforms perceived to centralize power. In March 2024, Puntland announced its withdrawal from the federal system, citing unilateral constitutional amendments by the FGS  .

Jubbaland: Under President Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe), Jubbaland has clashed with the FGS over electoral processes and autonomy. In November 2024, Jubbaland suspended ties with the FGS following disputes over regional elections and constitutional amendments  .

B. Political Alliances and Movements

Political figures and former leaders have formed alliances to challenge the FGS:

Forum for National Parties (FNP): Founded in 2019 by former Presidents Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the FNP advocates for political reforms and has been critical of the FGS’s approach to federalism and elections  .

Council of Presidential Candidates (CPC): Formed during the 2021 electoral crisis, the CPC opposed term extensions and called for transparent elections, highlighting the need for consensus between the FGS and FMS  .

C. Civil Society and Media

Journalists, scholars, and civil society organizations have played a role in opposing the FGS by advocating for transparency, accountability, and inclusive governance. However, they often face challenges such as censorship and limited freedom of expression.

D. Armed Opposition: Al-Shabaab

While not part of the political opposition, Al-Shabaab remains a significant threat to the Somali state, exploiting governance vacuums and conflicts between the FGS and FMS to expand its influence.

3. Strengths of the Opposition

Regional Autonomy: FMS like Puntland and Jubbaland have established functioning administrations, providing them with leverage in negotiations with the FGS.

Territorial Control: Control over strategic regions allows FMS to assert authority and resist centralization efforts.

Public Support: In some regions, local populations support FMS leaders who they perceive as better representing their interests compared to the FGS.

International Engagement: FMS have engaged with international actors independently, seeking support and investment, which enhances their political standing.

4. Weaknesses of the Opposition

Fragmentation: The opposition lacks a unified agenda, with differing priorities among FMS and political alliances, leading to inconsistent strategies.

Clan-Based Politics: Reliance on clan affiliations can undermine national cohesion and limit the appeal of opposition movements beyond specific groups.

Limited Institutional Capacity: Some FMS struggle with governance challenges, including limited administrative capacity and financial resources.

Susceptibility to External Influence: Engagements with foreign actors can lead to perceptions of external interference, potentially undermining legitimacy.

5. Key Actors in the Somali Opposition

Said Abdullahi Deni (Puntland President): A prominent critic of the FGS’s centralization efforts, advocating for greater regional autonomy.

Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe) (Jubbaland President): Opposes FGS interventions in regional affairs, emphasizing the importance of respecting FMS autonomy.

Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Former President): Leader of the FNP, advocating for political reforms and inclusive governance.

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (Current President): Previously part of the opposition during Farmaajo’s tenure, now leading efforts to reconcile with FMS while facing criticism over constitutional reforms.

6. International Dimensions

International actors have influenced Somalia’s political landscape:

United States: Has engaged with both the FGS and FMS, including military cooperation with Puntland in counterterrorism efforts  .

Gulf States: Countries like the UAE and Qatar have supported different Somali factions, contributing to regional rivalries and political alignments  .

African Union and United Nations: Have facilitated dialogues and supported peacekeeping missions, aiming to stabilize the country and promote governance reforms.

7. Conclusion and Outlook

The opposition to Somalia’s Federal Government is multifaceted, encompassing regional administrations, political alliances, and civil society actors. While the opposition has strengths in regional autonomy and public support, challenges such as fragmentation and clan-based politics persist. Moving forward, fostering inclusive dialogue, respecting the autonomy of FMS, and implementing constitutional reforms through consensus are essential steps toward national unity and stability.

In a small teashop in Garowe, the capital of Puntland, an intense debate reflects the broader currents of international politics playing out in Somalia. The topic? Turkey’s deepening presence in Somalia and the strategic rivalries involving the UAE, Qatar, the United States, and the specter of rising threats from geopolitical instability in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Somalia, a nation long beset by internal conflict, is now an epicenter of great power competition in the Horn of Africa.

I. Turkey’s Strategic Entry into Somalia

Turkey’s modern engagement with Somalia began in earnest in 2011, when then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Mogadishu at the height of a famine crisis. His visit was the first by a non-African leader in over two decades and marked a significant shift in Turkey’s foreign policy — a blend of humanitarian outreach, religious solidarity, and strategic ambition. Ankara launched a range of humanitarian and development initiatives, from building hospitals and roads to opening its largest embassy in Mogadishu.

But what started as humanitarian support quickly evolved into a robust, long-term strategic presence:

Military cooperation: In 2017, Turkey opened Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, one of its largest overseas military bases. The facility trains Somali National Army (SNA) units, helping shape a Turkish-aligned military core within Somalia.

Economic investment: Turkish companies control key infrastructure, including Mogadishu’s main port and airport. They have also been active in construction, energy, and education sectors.

Diplomatic leverage: Turkey has positioned itself as a key external actor in Somalia’s politics, often bypassing traditional Western donors and institutions.

II. Centralization vs Federalism: The Critique of Turkey’s Policy

One of the central critiques emerging from within Somalia — echoed in the Garowe debate — is Turkey’s over-reliance on Mogadishu’s central government. This approach, critics argue, ignores the realities of Somalia’s federal structure, where semi-autonomous member states like Puntland, Jubaland, and Galmudug wield significant power and territorial control.

Turkey’s preference for working exclusively with the federal government has created friction with federal member states. These entities often view Ankara’s approach as undermining Somalia’s federal model and centralizing power in Mogadishu, a city with tenuous control beyond its immediate surroundings. Turkey’s alignment with weak or embattled central governments, as seen during the Farmaajo administration, has further exacerbated distrust in regions like Puntland, where political independence and territorial autonomy are zealously guarded.

III. Turkey’s Enduring Footprint and Realpolitik

Despite critiques, another view — espoused in the same debate — argues that Turkey has already cemented a near-permanent presence in Somalia. Its deep institutional ties, military base, and control over revenue-generating infrastructure mean that even if the federal government collapses or is replaced by another force, including Al-Shabaab, Turkey is likely to retain its foothold.

This perspective reflects a realist understanding of foreign policy: Turkey is in Somalia not merely as a humanitarian actor but as a geopolitical competitor seeking influence in a strategic maritime corridor. Somalia offers Turkey a base on the western flank of the Indian Ocean, adjacent to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most critical shipping chokepoints.

IV. The Gulf Rivalry: UAE, Qatar, and the Shadow of Proxy Politics

Turkey’s position in Somalia cannot be understood without examining the fierce geopolitical rivalry playing out between Turkey-Qatar on one side and the UAE-Saudi Arabia on the other.

UAE’s strategy: The UAE has pursued a “federal-first” strategy, cultivating ties with Puntland and Somaliland, where it has built the Berbera port and military facilities. Abu Dhabi views Turkish and Qatari influence in Mogadishu as a threat to its broader Red Sea and Indian Ocean strategy.

Qatar’s alignment: Doha, often aligned with Turkey, has funded political actors in Mogadishu and has supported Islamist-leaning political movements such as Damul Jadiid — a factor that aligns poorly with UAE’s secular authoritarian model.

The result is a complex web of local and regional alliances, with Somali factions often serving as proxies for competing Gulf powers. The rivalry spills into domestic politics, clan dynamics, and even armed conflicts.

V. The United States and the Resource Factor

Adding another layer is the role of the United States. Although historically supportive of Somalia’s federal government, Washington has become increasingly wary of foreign actors such as Turkey, China, and the Gulf states entrenching themselves in Somalia’s institutions and infrastructure. Of particular concern is the potential exploitation of untapped offshore hydrocarbons — believed to exist in Somalia’s Indian Ocean waters.

U.S. officials are especially cautious of Turkey gaining exclusive energy rights in Somalia, particularly in light of Ankara’s assertive energy policies in the Eastern Mediterranean. American interests also include counterterrorism, maritime security, and preventing Chinese or Russian encroachment in this strategic corridor.

VI. The Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Bigger Chessboard

Beyond Somalia itself, the Horn of Africa is embedded in a larger geopolitical theater. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are now areas of intense interest due to:

Increased naval traffic and global trade routes.

The militarization of strategic ports (Djibouti, Berbera, Assab).

Rising Houthi-Iranian influence in Yemen, directly across the water from Somalia.

New military alliances, such as the Red Sea Council (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.), seeking to control maritime routes and exclude rival powers like Turkey and Iran.

Somalia’s long coastline — the longest in mainland Africa — makes it a pivotal node in this maritime network. Any power with influence in Somalia has a say in broader Indian Ocean geopolitics.

VII. Conclusion: Somalia as a Geopolitical Battleground

The debate in the Garowe teashop captures a microcosm of a larger truth: Somalia, once seen solely through the lens of state failure and humanitarian crisis, is now a stage for global strategic competition. Turkey’s presence is deep and likely enduring, but it is also challenged by Emirati pragmatism, Qatari alliances, American caution, and Somali federal complexity.

In the years to come, the key questions will be:

Can Somalia navigate these external rivalries without becoming a client state of any particular axis?

Will Turkey broaden its engagement beyond Mogadishu to federal states like Puntland, or continue to alienate regional power centers?

How will hydrocarbons, port politics, and military rivalries reshape Somali sovereignty?

Somalia’s future lies not just in peace-building and governance reform but in managing its geography — a blessing and a curse in the current world order.

By WDM
May 18, 2025

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In the bustling port city of Bosaso on the Gulf of Aden, Puntland’s economic heartbeat, a quiet storm is brewing. Along its sun-scorched coastline, foreign flags fly over a sprawling military facility—a base reportedly hosting U.S. intelligence operatives, Emirati naval and military assets, and drone launchpads targeting ISIS militants in nearby Calmiskaad. While officials tout it as a critical tool for regional security, whispers of backroom deals, civilian risks, and shadowy missions beyond Puntland’s borders demand a closer look. Is this base a lifeline for stability or a ticking time bomb for Somali sovereignty? Let’s unpack the debate.

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Whose Agenda Rules in Bosaso?

Foreign military bases are rarely just about “security.” In Bosaso, two global heavyweights—the U.S. and UAE—are playing very different games.

• The U.S. Counterterrorism Playbook: Washington’s focus is laser-sharp: degrade ISIS-Somalia, a faction that’s carved out hideouts in Puntland’s mountains. Drone strikes from Bosaso have reportedly pummeled insurgent positions, but as we’ve seen in Yemen and Afghanistan, such tactics can backfire. Civilian casualties breed resentment, and “surgical” strikes often leave political wounds that fester.
• The UAE’s Grand Chessboard: For the Emirates, Bosaso is a strategic jewel in its crown of Horn of Africa investments. With ports in Eritrea and Yemen already under its belt, the UAE seems intent on dominating trade routes and countering rivals like Turkey and Qatar. But at what cost? Leaked reports suggest murky agreements with Puntland’s leadership, including sweetheart deals for port access and presidential security. Critics argue this isn’t aid—it’s a transaction.

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The Tightrope Walk: Security vs. Somali Sovereignty

Puntland’s government, which operates semi-independently from Mogadishu, faces a brutal calculus. Partnering with foreign powers brings cash, weapons, and intelligence to fight groups like ISIS and Al-Shabaab. But reliance on outsiders risks turning Puntland into a pawn in someone else’s war.

• The Presidential Bubble: The fact that Puntland’s president now resides in the military base speaks volumes. While his safety may be guaranteed, what about the people? Locals have little say in deals struck behind closed doors, and rumours of U.S.-led strikes spilling into neighbouring regions could spark backlash.
• Mission Creep: A Slippery Slope: Media reports hint at operations stretching beyond Puntland’s borders. If true, this risks inflaming tensions with Somalia’s federal government and neighbouring states in the sub-region. Without clear rules or oversight, the base could become a hub for proxy wars, not peace.

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Risks of Foreign Presence: More Than Just Bombs?

Foreign bases often come with unintended consequences:

1. Blowback: Concentrating foreign troops and drones in Bosaso makes it a prime target for insurgent attacks. Civilians, not soldiers, often pay the heaviest price.
2. Proxy Wars: The UAE’s rivalry with Turkey (which backs Mogadishu) could turn Puntland into a battleground for regional power plays.
3. Eroding Trust: Secrecy fuels distrust. If locals view the base as a tool of foreign exploitation—not protection—it could fuel the very extremism it aims to crush.

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A Better Path Forward?

Security is vital, but it can not come at the cost of Somali sovereignty. Here’s what’s missing from the Bosaso equation:

• Transparency: Puntland’s government must disclose the terms of its foreign partnerships. Who’s funding the base? What’s the scope of operations?
• Accountability: Civilian harm from drone strikes must be investigated and compensated. No more “oops” apologies.
• Invest in People, Not Just Drones: Jobs, schools, and hospitals do more to counter extremism than any drone. Why is 90% of foreign aid still military-focused?

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Final Thoughts: Who Wins, Who Loses?

The Bosaso base is a double-edged sword. For now, it may keep ISIS at bay and line the pockets of a few elites. But if history teaches us anything, it’s that foreign military interventions in Somalia rarely end well. Without transparency, equity, and local buy-in, Bosaso’s base risks becoming another chapter in Somalia’s long story of external exploitation—dressed up as a “security partnership.”

What do you think? Is foreign military presence a necessary evil in fragile states like Somalia or a recipe for disaster? Drop your thoughts in the comments.

Background information

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has maintained a notable presence in Bosaso, the commercial hub of Somalia’s Puntland State, since 2017.  This involvement encompasses both maritime security initiatives and infrastructure development.

UAE Presence in Bosaso

The UAE has been instrumental in supporting the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), a regional security entity established in 2010 to combat piracy.  This support includes training, equipment provision, and operational assistance. 

In addition to security collaborations, the UAE, through its subsidiary P&O Ports, secured a 30-year concession in 2017 to manage and develop the Port of Bosaso.  The development plans involve constructing a 450-meter quay, dredging to a depth of 12 meters, and enhancing port infrastructure to accommodate larger vessels. 

Reports of Radar Installation

In April 2025, open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts reported the presence of a structure near Bosaso’s UAE-operated airbase that resembles an Israeli-manufactured ELM-2084 Multi-Mission Radar system.  This radar is known for its capabilities in tracking drones, missiles, and aircraft over distances up to 470 kilometres.  The installation, if confirmed, could enhance surveillance and air defence in the region. 

Official Denials and Regional Dynamics

The Puntland government has officially denied the existence of any UAE military base or radar installations in Bosaso.  Minister of Information, Mahmoud Aydid Dirir, labelled the reports as “fabricated propaganda” aimed at undermining Puntland’s stability and progress in counter-terrorism efforts. 

These developments occur amid complex regional dynamics, with various international actors seeking strategic footholds in the Horn of Africa.  The UAE’s activities in Bosaso reflect its broader strategy to secure maritime routes and expand its influence in East Africa.

⚠️ Conclusion

While the UAE’s involvement in Bosaso is evident through its support for the PMPF and port development projects, reports of advanced military installations like the ELM-2084 radar remain unconfirmed and are officially denied by Puntland authorities.  The situation underscores the intricate interplay of local governance, foreign interests, and regional security concerns in Somalia’s northeastern corridor.

The suggestion that Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo could serve as a political blueprint for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is not merely misguided—it risks erasing the lessons of Somalia’s recent history. While both leaders have occupied the presidency, their approaches to governance, constitutional integrity, and national cohesion diverge sharply. To position Farmaajo as a model for Mohamud is to endorse a legacy of authoritarianism, foreign policy recklessness, and clan-based division—a path incompatible with Somalia’s fragile democratic aspirations.

1. Authoritarian Centralization vs. Sectarian Fragmentation

Farmaajo’s tenure was defined by a systematic erosion of democratic norms. His administration weaponized state institutions to silence critics, imprison journalists, and stifle opposition through tactics like the 2018 electoral meddling in Galmudug and Jubbaland. By centralizing power in Mogadishu, he destabilized Somalia’s federal framework, undermining hard-won progress toward inclusive governance.

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, while navigating Somalia’s complex clan dynamics, has faced accusations of favoring his Hawiye lineage, particularly in appointments and resource allocation. However, unlike Farmaajo’s overt power grabs, Mohamud’s challenges stem from the perennial tension between clan loyalty and national unity—a struggle inherent to Somalia’s political landscape. Emulating Farmaajo’s autocratic playbook would only exacerbate these divisions rather than resolve them.

2. Foreign Policy Gambles vs. Diplomatic Pragmatism

Farmaajo’s alignment with Qatar and Turkey alienated traditional partners like the UAE and Western donors, polarizing Somalia’s foreign relations during a critical period of state-building. His 2018 agreement ceding Somali airspace management to Ethiopia—crafted in secrecy without parliamentary oversight—exposed a blatant disregard for sovereignty. This deal, framed as “regional cooperation,” set a perilous precedent for external interference.

Mohamud, by contrast, has pursued a more balanced diplomatic strategy, reaffirming ties with multilateral institutions like the African Union while cautiously engaging Gulf partners. His administration’s support for the Somali National Army’s offensive against al-Shabaab, backed by international allies, reflects a pragmatic approach to security—one that avoids Farmaajo’s reliance on foreign patronage.

3. Clan Populism vs. Incremental Reconciliation

Farmaajo’s rhetoric of “Somali nationalism” often served as a veil for sub-clan favoritism, deepening societal fractures. His manipulation of clan loyalties, exemplified by the politicization of security forces and federal agencies, prioritized short-term control over long-term reconciliation.

Mohamud’s efforts, though imperfect, have leaned toward dialogue. His handling of the SSC-Khatumo crisis—a breakaway region challenging Puntland’s authority—illustrates this contrast. Where Farmaajo ignored the 2019 Las Anod protests, enabling violent crackdowns, Mohamud has cautiously supported SSC-Khatumo’s quest for representation, framing it as a constitutional rather than partisan issue. This shift, while contentious, acknowledges local agency—a marked departure from Farmaajo’s top-down coercion.

4. Constitutional Sabotage vs. Institutional Reform

Farmaajo’s most damaging legacy lies in his assault on electoral norms. His 2021 bid to illegally extend his term via a rubber-stamp parliament ignited street battles in Mogadishu, threatening a return to civil war. Such brinkmanship exposed a willingness to trade stability for personal power.

Mohamud, meanwhile, has cautiously advanced constitutional reforms, including controversial amendments to Somalia’s electoral model. While critics argue these changes centralize power, they also aim to universalize suffrage—a step toward one-person, one-vote elections absent since 1969. The difference? Farmaajo sought to bend institutions; Mohamud, however haltingly, seeks to rebuild them.

Conclusion: Charting a New Path Beyond Populism

Somalia’s next chapter demands leaders who transcend the zero-sum politics of the past. Farmaajo’s tenure—a case study in the perils of populism—offers no roadmap for progress. His foreign gambles, clan patronage, and disdain for federalism exacerbated the very crises he vowed to solve.

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud need not replicate these failures. Instead, his administration must prioritize inclusive dialogue, strengthen judicial independence, and depoliticize security forces. The SSC-Khatumo question, for instance, should be resolved through constitutional mechanisms, not backroom clan deals.

Somalia’s future hinges on rejecting the false choice between strongman rule and sectarian fragmentation. Leaders must embrace compromise over coercion, transparency over secrecy, and nationhood over clanhood. Farmaajo’s legacy is a warning, not a model—and Mohamud’s success depends on learning from it, not reviving it.

Somalia deserves leaders who build bridges, not walls. The stakes are too high for anything less

Prepared for Somali Policymakers, Constitutional Experts, and Academic Stakeholders
May 2025

Executive Summary
Three decades after the collapse of central authority, Somalia remains trapped in a cyclical crisis of political fragmentation, weak institutions, and contested sovereignty. The federal model, formally adopted to distribute power and promote reconciliation, has not delivered the intended outcomes. The persistent gap between constitutional theory and governance practice has produced a stalemate, enabling extremist actors to exploit the resulting vacuum.

This paper proposes that Somali leaders consider a transition from federalism to confederation as a pragmatic response to political paralysis. A confederal framework could provide the necessary flexibility for self-governance while preserving a shared national identity, laying the groundwork for long-term stabilization.

1. Background: Post-Conflict Governance in Somalia
The post-1991 Somali political agenda prioritized five critical goals:

National reconciliation among fragmented communities and regions.

Conflict resolution and peace-making to end violence.

Equitable power-sharing across clans and territories.

Anti-corruption and public accountability.

Reconstruction of national institutions

While some progress has been made, especially with external support, foundational challenges persist due to unresolved political structure.

2. The Federal Project: Ambitions and Breakdown
Somalia’s Provisional Constitution (2012) institutionalized federalism as a compromise mechanism. In practice, implementation has stalled due to:

Ambiguity in constitutional powers between federal and member states.

Mogadishu-centric centralism, often undermining local autonomy.

Irregular recognition of federal member states (e.g., SSC-Khatumo, Somaliland).

Interference in regional elections and internal affairs by the federal government.

Incomplete constitutional review process and absence of judicial enforcement mechanisms.

These systemic weaknesses have led to growing disillusionment among stakeholders.

3. Political Paralysis and National Security Risks

Electoral gridlocks have become normative rather than exceptional.

Security coordination failures have emboldened extremist groups like Al-Shabaab and ISIS.

State capture and clientelism are widely reported in both federal and regional institutions.

Citizens increasingly view both the federal and state authorities as illegitimate.

Without a structural reset, the federation may continue to unravel from within.

4. The Confederation Option: Conceptual Foundations
Confederation offers a flexible model based on voluntary association of sovereign entities, with minimal central authority. This could entail:

Shared responsibilities in foreign policy, national defense, and currency

Full autonomy for member states in domestic governance, taxation, security

Coordinated rather than hierarchical policymaking

Structured opt-in mechanisms for policy harmonization

Comparative Lessons: Historical precedents (e.g., early Swiss Confederation, Senegambia, the United Arab Emirates to some extent) suggest that confederations can serve as transitional frameworks in post-conflict or diverse societies.

5. Policy Rationale for Somali Confederation

Current Challenges of Federalism:

Incomplete and contested autonomy for member states

Centralized implementation bottlenecks

Weak national ownership and political legitimacy

Zero-sum competition among political elites

High potential for conflict due to power centralization

Potential Advantages of Confederation:

Guaranteed and formalized regional autonomy

Decentralized flexibility in governance

Stronger local accountability and legitimacy

Incentives for negotiated cooperation over competition

Reduced conflict through clearly defined and shared sovereignty

6. Risks and Mitigation Strategies

Potential Risks:

Fragmentation into mini-states

Diplomatic isolation of the central authority

Resource inequalities among regions

Misuse of confederation as a step toward secession.

7. Recommendations for Policymakers and Researchers

1. Launch a National Commission on State Architecture Reform, including confederalism as a legitimate option.

2. Fund academic studies and policy dialogues across universities and think tanks to analyze comparative confederation models.

3. Revise the constitutional review agenda to include confederation as a transitional or permanent framework.

4. Engage in inclusive consultations with unrecognized or marginalized regions.

5. Negotiate a compact on shared sovereignty, drawing from international mediation support if needed.

8. Conclusion:

The Strategic Imperative of Rethinking Unity
Somalia’s struggle is not with federalism alone but with the assumptions underpinning its governance model. Confederation does not signify disintegration—it offers an opportunity to rebuild legitimacy from the ground up, turning imposed unity into negotiated coexistence.

Inaction risks entrenching the current deadlock and empowering non-state actors further. Policymakers and scholars must now lead a proactive, evidence-driven exploration of Somalia’s next constitutional chapter.

Prepared by:
Ismail Warsame/ Warsame Digital Media
iwarsame@ismailwarsame.blog
For distribution to Somali Federal Government, Federal Member States, Constitutional Review Committee, Somali Research Community.

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/trumps-gulf-tour-power-women-and

https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/the-brics-in-trouble-the-global-geopolitical

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https://ismailwarsame.substack.com/p/analytical-report-us-response-to

Author: WDM
May 2025
Publisher: Warsame Digital Media

Executive Summary

This report examines the recent political direction of SSC-Khatumo, a regional administration representing Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn, which has chosen to distance itself from Puntland in favor of asserting independent governance. While hailed by some as a bold move toward self-determination, this analysis argues that SSC-Khatumo’s leadership has adopted a misguided path shaped by political naivety and manipulation from Mogadishu-based factions. By falling into the orbit of groups like Damul Jadiid and Aaran Jaan, SSC-Khatumo risks political isolation, strategic vulnerability, and internal disillusionment. The report urges a reassessment of current trajectories and advocates for renewed regional cooperation.

1. Introduction

The political experiment currently underway in SSC-Khatumo has been hailed by some as a long-overdue assertion of self-governance. However, a closer examination reveals a trajectory marked by shortsighted strategy, external manipulation, and a weakening of foundational alliances. At the heart of this transformation is a leadership that, while buoyed by grassroots support, has increasingly distanced itself from long-standing partners like Puntland and aligned itself with factions in Mogadishu known more for political subterfuge than regional empowerment.

This report critically examines SSC-Khatumo’s separation from Puntland and its alignment with opportunistic factions in Mogadishu. Drawing on historical alliances, political patterns, and stakeholder dynamics, the report argues that SSC-Khatumo is being lured into a political trap that threatens the long-term viability of its autonomy and governance.

2. Historical Context and Strategic Foundations

SSC-Khatumo originated from a defensive movement aimed at countering Somaliland’s territorial claims over Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn. These territories are demographically aligned with the Darod-Harti clan family, which also forms the backbone of Puntland. The mutual interest in resisting Somaliland created a strong alignment between SSC forces and Puntland.

Puntland provided critical support—military, financial, and diplomatic—allowing SSC to establish a foothold. The relationship, while uneven at times, was based on shared identity and strategic necessity. SSC also benefited from Puntland’s decentralized governance model and international partnerships.

However, internal dissatisfaction grew within SSC ranks, especially over perceptions of marginalization and limited autonomy within Puntland’s structure. These grievances were gradually politicized, setting the stage for SSC’s reassertion of independence in 2023–2024. This period also saw increasing overtures from Mogadishu-based actors, who viewed the SSC-Puntland rift as a means to weaken Puntland’s defiance of Mogadishu centralization policies.

3. The Fall into the Damul Jadiid–Aaran Jaan Orbit

Damul Jadiid and Aaran Jaan are networks within Somali federal politics, often associated with centralized authority, behind-the-scenes influence, and a history of political manipulation. These factions have long viewed Puntland’s assertiveness as a threat to Mogadishu’s control and have sought to undercut it using proxy actors.

SSC-Khatumo’s leadership, either out of political naivety or personal ambition, appears to have welcomed this overture. The Damul Jadiid-Aaran Jaan axis offered rhetorical support, minimal funding, and vague promises of recognition, which appealed to a leadership eager to escape Puntland’s association. In doing so, SSC-Khatumo opened itself up to exploitation by a political faction with no history of supporting genuine regional autonomy.

4. The Rift with Puntland

SSC-Khatumo’s unnegotiated departure from Puntland is framed by its leaders as a move toward full self-determination. However, this move has come at the cost of severing ties with the only regional partner that consistently supported SSC’s struggle against Somaliland occupation of SSC territories.

Instead of negotiating for greater autonomy or formal separation within Puntland, SSC-Khatumo chose a confrontational approach, driven by mistrust and encouraged by external actors. This rift could weaken both entities in the face of growing threats from Mogadishu and Hargeisa.

5. The Federal Government’s Calculated Silence

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has maintained an ambiguous stance toward SSC-Khatumo, apart from legally unbinding statement by prime minister Hamse Abdi Barre through media channels and behind-the-scenes diplomacy, it has avoided formal recognition or material backing. This silence is strategic.

Mogadishu avoids antagonizing Somaliland while encouraging SSC to drift further from Puntland. SSC is effectively being used as a pawn in a broader political game—its struggle romanticized publicly but unsupported in practice. This calculated neglect may eventually leave SSC stranded.

6. Stakeholder Analysis

Internal:

SSC Elders and Youth: Increasingly divided; many support autonomy but question isolation.

Diaspora: Financially supportive but growingly skeptical about long-term strategy.

Regional:

Puntland ally may now feel betrayed and could pivot to a more assertive stance.

Somaliland: Watching SSC’s instability with interest; could exploit divisions.

National:

FGS: Seeks to weaken Puntland using SSC as leverage; offers minimal commitment.

External:

International Partners: Hesitant to engage SSC directly without federal recognition.

ATMIS/AUSSOM: Focused elsewhere; not equipped to mediate SSC’s crisis.

7. Consequences of Isolation

SSC-Khatumo’s current trajectory risks several negative outcomes:

Economic Weakness: No institutional or financial base to sustain governance.

Military Vulnerability: Limited capacity to defend against Somaliland or internal insurgency.

Political Fragmentation: Leadership lacks cohesion; multiple factions emerging.

Loss of Public Trust: Community expectations are high; delivery is low.

8. Possible Future Scenarios

1. Reconciliation with Puntland: A negotiated reentry or partnership based on autonomy guarantees.

2. Federal Recognition Gambit: Unlikely to succeed due to FGS’s weak credibility and Somaliland sensitivities.

3. Long-Term Isolation: SSC becomes a de facto isolated entity, vulnerable to infiltration and collapse.

9. Conclusion

SSC-Khatumo’s leadership has made a critical strategic error by alienating Puntland and aligning with self-interested factions in Mogadishu. While the desire for autonomy is legitimate, the path chosen is fraught with risk, driven by short-term pride rather than long-term viability. Without recalibration, SSC-Khatumo may find itself isolated, under-resourced, and politically adrift. The region’s future lies not in emotional separation but in strategic cooperation with like-minded regional partners.

Timeline of Key Events

2012–2017: Original Khatumo movement

2022: Las Anod protests escalate

2023: Re-declaration of SSC-Khatumo

2024: Unilateral break with Puntland

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