Introduction
Prime Minister Hamse Abdi Barre’s recent visit to Laascaano has ignited controversy, with critics alleging that its stated objectives—promoting federal unity and recognizing SSC-Khatumo’s administrative status—mask a deeper, more politically charged agenda. Behind the rhetoric of empowerment lies a two-fold mission: advancing President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s contentious electoral reforms and negotiating the release of Somaliland detainees. This essay dissects the alleged deception, urging SSC-Khatumo leaders and residents to scrutinize federal overtures and prioritize regional sovereignty.

Context: SSC-Khatumo’s Precarious Position
The SSC-Khatumo region (encompassing Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn) has long been a flashpoint in Somalia’s complex territorial disputes. While Somaliland claims the area as part of its self-declared independent state, SSC-Khatumo seeks autonomy under Somalia’s federal system. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), led by President Mohamud, has intermittently engaged the region, balancing promises of inclusion with strategic political maneuvers. Against this backdrop, Barre’s visit emerges as a critical test of trust.

The Two-Fold Agenda: Beneath the Surface

1. Electoral Engineering via NIRA:
   The establishment of a National Identification & Registration Agency (NIRA) office in Laascaano, framed as a step toward “one person, one vote” elections, raises red flags. Critics argue that Mohamud’s electoral model risks centralizing power under Mogadishu, using SSC-Khatumo as a testing ground to legitimize federal authority. By positioning the region as a polling station, the FGS may co-opt local governance structures, marginalizing SSC’s autonomy in favour of top-down control.
2. Prisoner Release: A Bargaining Chip?
   Barre’s purported efforts to free Somaliland-linked prisoners in Laascaano suggest backdoor negotiations with Hargeisa. While framed as humanitarian, this move could undermine SSC-Khatumo’s resistance to Somaliland’s territorial claims. Trading detainees for political favors risks normalizing Somaliland’s presence in the region, eroding SSC’s stance against external domination.

The Smokescreen of Federal Recognition
The FGS’s pledge to recognize SSC-Khatumo as a federal administration is lauded as progress. Yet, this gesture lacks substance without enforceable commitments to resource-sharing, security, or self-governance. Historically, Mogadishu’s recognition of regions has often served as a tool to dilute dissent rather than empower. By dangling administrative status, the FGS may seek to co-opt SSC leadership, diverting attention from contentious agendas like electoral reforms and prisoner swaps.

Implications for SSC-Khatumo
The region faces three critical risks:

1. Political Exploitation: SSC-Khatumo could become a pawn in federal-Somaliland negotiations, with its sovereignty bargained away for Mogadishu’s interests.
2. Erosion of Autonomy: NIRA’s presence might enable federal overreach, supplanting local decision-making with centralized electoral controls.
3. Distraction from Priorities: The theatrics of recognition could sideline urgent needs—security, development, and reconciliation—in favor of symbolic federalism.

Conclusion: A Call for SSC-Khatumo’s Vigilance
SSC-Khatumo must approach federal engagements with skepticism. Leaders should demand transparency on NIRA’s role, reject backchannel deals with Somaliland, and insist on binding agreements that guarantee resources and autonomy. Residents must hold both local and federal authorities accountable, resisting hollow symbolism. In a landscape rife with political theatre, SSC-Khatumo’s resilience lies in unity, critical scrutiny, and an unwavering commitment to self-determination. The region’s future must not be scripted by Mogadishu’s deception but shaped by its people’s aspirations.

The recent account of a repairman’s wife denied basic drugs and hygiene supplies after delivering her child at Garowe Government General Hospital is not an isolated tragedy—it is a searing indictment of Puntland’s collapsing healthcare system. This incident, emblematic of systemic neglect, exposes a dire reality: in one of Somalia’s most politically significant regions, mothers and newborns are left vulnerable to preventable suffering, while years of warnings about deteriorating health infrastructure go unheeded. Puntland’s failure to safeguard maternal health is not merely a policy failure; it is a moral crisis demanding immediate redress.

The Garowe Incident: A Microcosm of Systemic Collapse
The ordeal faced by the repairman’s family—a newborn welcomed into the world without access to sterile equipment, pain relief, or postnatal care—illustrates the human cost of Puntland’s healthcare decay. Garowe Government General Hospital, a facility intended to serve as a cornerstone of public health, could not provide even the most rudimentary supplies. This reflects a broader pattern: clinics and hospitals across Puntland frequently lack essential medicines, functional equipment, and trained staff. Maternal health services, which require consistent resources and expertise, are particularly crippled. Stories of women sharing beds, reusing gloves, or paying out-of-pocket for basics like antiseptics are tragically common, underscoring a system in freefall.
Chronic Underfunding and Institutional Apathy

Puntland’s healthcare crisis is rooted in chronic underfunding and misprioritization. Despite its semi-autonomous status and revenue from ports and local taxation, healthcare remains a low budgetary priority. Corruption and mismanagement further divert scarce resources. In 2022, a report by the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies noted that Puntland allocates less than 5% of its annual budget to health—far below the 15% target set by the African Union’s Abuja Declaration. Meanwhile, international aid, often earmarked for specific projects, fails to address systemic gaps due to poor coordination and accountability.
The consequences are stark: maternal mortality rates in Somalia, already among the world’s highest at 692 deaths per 100,000 live births, are likely exacerbated in Puntland due to inaccessible care. Neonatal survival is equally precarious, with preventable infections claiming lives daily.

The Brain Drain and Broken Infrastructure
Compounding these issues is a debilitating exodus of skilled healthcare workers. Doctors and nurses, disillusioned by unpaid salaries and hazardous working conditions, flee to urban centers or abroad. Rural areas bear the brunt: clinics stand empty, and midwives—often the sole lifelines for pregnant women—are overburdened and undersupplied. Even in Garowe, the capital, hospitals rely on erratic donations and the heroism of underpaid staff.

A Legacy of Warnings Ignored
For years, civil society groups, healthcare workers, and international partners have sounded alarms. In 2019, the Puntland Health Professionals Association warned of “imminent collapse” without urgent investment. Local media routinely highlight drug shortages and strikes by unpaid medical staff. Yet the government’s response has been tepid, prioritizing security and political infrastructure over health. This neglect reflects a broader devaluation of women’s lives in policymaking, where maternal health is relegated to an afterthought.
The Path Forward: Accountability and Equity.

Addressing this crisis requires multifaceted action:
• Increased Budgetary Allocation: Puntland must honor its Abuja Declaration commitments, prioritizing healthcare funding and ensuring transparency in expenditure.
• Strengthening Supply Chains: Partnerships with NGOs and UN agencies could stabilize medical supply pipelines, avoiding stockouts of essentials.
• Workforce Investment: Competitive salaries, training programs, and incentives for rural postings can stem the brain drain.
• Community Health Networks: Empowering local midwives and mobile clinics can bridge gaps in remote areas.
• Public Accountability: Civil society and media must hold leaders accountable, transforming healthcare from a political slogan into a tangible right.
Conclusion: A Matter of Life and Death
The repairman’s story is a wake-up call. Each day Puntland delays reform, it sentences mothers and children to unnecessary risk. Healthcare is not a luxury—it is the foundation of human dignity and social stability. As Puntland aspires to position itself as a model of governance in Somalia, it must confront this crisis with the urgency it demands. The lives of its most vulnerable citizens depend on it.
To ignore their suffering is to betray the very notion of governance.

In the intricate tapestry of Somali politics, Prime Minister Hamse Abdi Barre’s high-profile visit to Laascaano—a burgeoning city-state shaped by the influx of SSC-Khatumo residents fleeing poverty and instability—has ignited a flurry of speculation, conspiracy theories, and geopolitical intrigue. The visit, marked by an oversized delegation of ministers, lawmakers, lobbyists, and political brokers, underscores the delicate balancing act between federal authority, regional aspirations, and unresolved historical tensions. Beneath the veneer of photo opportunities and symbolic gestures lie deeper currents of political manoeuvring, contested sovereignty, and the unacknowledged influence of Puntland, Somalia’s oldest federal member state.

Laascaano: A City-State in the Making
Laascaano’s rapid transformation into a quasi-city-state is emblematic of Somalia’s fractured governance and the vacuum left by weak central institutions. Populated largely by SSC-Khatumo communities displaced by economic collapse and marginalization in their home regions, the city has become a microcosm of resistance against both Somaliland’s claims of sovereignty and the federal government’s struggle to assert control. Its rise reflects broader regional dynamics: communities seeking autonomy or recognition often coalesce around urban centers that challenge existing power structures. For Barre, Laascaano represents both a political opportunity and a minefield. By courting its residents, he aims to project federal legitimacy while navigating SSC-Khatumo’s demand for statehood—a legal and political hurdle he cannot unilaterally resolve.

The Optics of Power and Conspiracy Theories
The spectacle of Barre’s delegation—lavish in size and symbolism—serves multiple purposes. Photo opportunities with SSC-Khatumo leaders and displaced communities reinforce the narrative of a federal government engaged in grassroots reconciliation. However, the visit’s theatrics have fueled conspiracy theories. Notably, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s remarks from Türkiye insinuated that Barre’s true mission was to broker a prisoner exchange with Somaliland, a breakaway region that claims Laascaano as part of its territory. This theory, though unverified, highlights the fragility of Somalia’s territorial disputes and the federal government’s precarious position as both mediator and claimant in such conflicts. Barre’s ambiguous rhetoric—declaring SSC-Khatumo “under federal authority” while sidestepping its quest for statehood—exposes the gap between political posturing and constitutional reality. To SSC-Khatumo, such statements are empty promises; to the federal government, they are pragmatic dodges in a landscape where formalizing new states risks alienating powerful stakeholders like Puntland.

SSC-Khatumo’s Unmet Aspirations
At the heart of the tension lies SSC-Khatumo’s unresolved status. The group seeks recognition as Somalia’s sixth federal member state, a process requiring parliamentary approval and a referendum—procedures mired in bureaucratic and political delays. Barre’s inability to fast-track this ambition reflects broader systemic challenges: the federal government’s limited capacity to manage state formation amid competing clan interests and external pressures. Meanwhile, Somaliland’s vocal objections to the visit—framed as a violation of its “sovereignty”—add another layer of complexity. While the international community does not recognize Somaliland’s independence, its de facto control over parts of the Sool and Sanaag regions complicates Mogadishu’s outreach to SSC-Khatumo. Barre’s visit thus becomes a high-stakes gambit, aiming to bolster federal influence without provoking open conflict.

The Elephant in the Room: Puntland’s Shadow
Amid the noise surrounding Somaliland’s grievances, the conspicuous silence of Puntland looms large. As a founding federal member state with historical ties to SSC-Khatumo communities, Puntland’s tacit opposition to Laascaano’s ascendancy cannot be ignored. Puntland has long positioned itself as a defender of SSC interests, but its reluctance to endorse SSC-Khatumo’s statehood bid reveals a fear of losing influence in a reconfigured federal system. The absence of Puntland officials from Barre’s delegation speaks volumes, hinting at unresolved rivalries and the federal government’s struggle to reconcile competing regional agendas. For Mogadishu, sidelining Puntland risks destabilizing the fragile equilibrium of Somalia’s federalism; accommodating it could undermine SSC-Khatumo’s aspirations.

Conclusion: A Balancing Act on Shifting Sands
Prime Minister Barre’s visit to Laascaano epitomizes the paradoxes of Somali governance. While the photo ops and rhetoric aim to project unity and federal resolve, they also expose the fissures in a nation still grappling with decentralization, clan politics, and external interference. The SSC-Khatumo question remains unresolved, Somaliland’s claims persist as a geopolitical irritant, and Puntland’s unspoken resistance underscores the fragility of federal alliances. In this context, Barre’s delegation is less a solution than a symptom of Somalia’s enduring challenges—a reminder that in the absence of institutionalized power-sharing, political theatre often substitutes for progress. As Laascaano’s skyline rises, so too do the stakes for a nation, navigating the thin line between unity and fragmentation.

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In brief:

1. Collapse Factors: Donor Dependency and Institutional Decay

• Designed for Donor Projects, Not Sovereignty:
  • Many government agencies were structured to operate on donor-funded projects rather than sustainable domestic revenue streams. This created a “project-based governance” model, where salaries, services, and infrastructure depended on external aid. With donors disengaging (due to shifting priorities, fatigue, or dissatisfaction with corruption), these agencies lack the financial and operational capacity to function, leading to paralysis.
• Erosion of Public Trust:
  • As departments collapse, basic services (healthcare, education, sanitation) vanish, deepening public disillusionment. Citizens may turn to informal networks, clans, or extremist groups for support, further destabilizing the state.

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2. The “One-Man Rule” Problem

• Centralized Power and Accountability Gaps:
  • Concentrated authority in the hands of a single leader (or a small clique) stifles institutional autonomy, innovation, and checks on corruption. Departments become extensions of patronage networks rather than functional entities, with appointments based on loyalty, not competence.
• Systemic Decay:
  • Under one-man rule, institutions atrophy because they are not allowed to operate independently. For example:
    • Finance Ministries may lack authority to audit spending.
    • Judiciaries cannot hold leaders accountable.
    • Local Governments are sidelined, eroding grassroots governance.

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3. Donor Withdrawal: A Double-Edged Sword

• Short-Term Crisis:
  • Donors often fund governments to meet humanitarian or geopolitical goals (e.g., counterterrorism, migration control). When they withdraw, they leave vacuums. In Puntland, this has exposed the state’s failure to build self-reliant institutions or revenue systems (e.g., taxation, resource management).
• Long-Term Lessons:
  • Donor dependency masked governance failures for years. The collapse reveals that no genuine institution-building occurred—agencies were hollow shells propped up by external cash. This underscores the need for domestic resource mobilization (e.g., fair taxation, leveraging ports/livestock exports) to reduce reliance on donors.

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4. Pathways Forward (Amid Crisis)

Immediate Priorities

• Negotiate Donor Re-engagement with Conditions:
  • Lobby donors for emergency funding tied to governance reforms (e.g., audits, anti-corruption mechanisms). Transparency could rebuild donor trust.
• Decentralize Power:
  • Empower local councils and technocrats to bypass centralized bottlenecks. Communities often self-organize effectively in Somalia—harness this social capital.

Long-Term Reforms

• Expand Domestic Revenue Systems:
  • Formalize taxation (e.g., port tariffs, business licenses), combat smuggling, and invest in sectors like fisheries and livestock to generate state income.
• Institutional Overhaul:
  • Restructure agencies to prioritize merit-based hiring, clarify mandates, and depoliticize roles. For example, create independent civil service commissions to end clan-based appointments.
• Public Accountability Mechanisms:
  • Support media, civil society, and citizen oversight to pressure leaders. Social accountability tools (e.g., participatory budgeting, grievance redress systems) could empower communities.

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5. Risks of Inaction

• State Failure and Extremism:
  • Collapsing institutions create vacuums that groups like Al-Shabaab could exploit, framing themselves as providers of security and services.
• Mass Displacement and Regional Instability:
  • Economic collapse may trigger migration waves, straining neighboring regions (e.g., Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda) and international aid systems.

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Conclusion

Puntland’s crisis is a symptom of deeper pathologies: governance designed for external validation (not public service), leadership that conflates personal power with statehood, and a citizenry abandoned by both their government and donors. Breaking this cycle requires radical transparency, inclusive governance, and economic pragmatism. While challenging, the alternative—total state failure—would destabilize not just Puntland but the entire Horn of Africa.

* Clan Primacy (Qabilka First):
• Unwritten Rule: The clan’s survival and supremacy override national unity. Loyalty to the clan is non-negotiable, even at the expense of collective progress.
• Manifestation: Political alliances, resource distribution, and social trust are determined by clan lines, stifling national cohesion.
• Vengeance as Justice:
• Unwritten Rule: Retaliation against perceived slights (historical or recent) is a moral duty, perpetuating cycles of violence.
• Manifestation: Disputes escalate into inter-clan wars, as justice is equated with revenge rather than reconciliation.

• Distrust of Central Authority:
• Unwritten Rule: Governments are seen as tools for rival clans to dominate others, leading to sabotage of state-building efforts.
• Manifestation: Resistance to federal institutions, preferring clan-based governance or warlordism.
•
• Collective Guilt:
• Unwritten Rule: Entire clans are held accountable for individual actions, justifying collective punishment.
• Manifestation: Mass displacements or attacks on clans due to one member’s crime, as seen in retaliatory violence.
•
• Historical Grievance Eternalization:
• Unwritten Rule: Past conflicts (e.g., colonial-era marginalization, 1991 civil war) are weaponized to legitimize present-day hostility.
• Manifestation: Clan narratives fixate on victimhood, blocking forgiveness or compromise.
•
• Elder Worship (Oday Dhaqan):
• Unwritten Rule: Clan elders’ authority is absolute, even when their decisions prioritize tribal interests over peace.
• Manifestation: Elders may veto inter-clan cooperation to retain power, reinforcing divisions.

• Might Equals Right (Awood Baa Dhaanta):
• Unwritten Rule: Power and resources are seized through dominance, not equitable sharing.
• Manifestation: Militarized clans monopolize land/ports, excluding “weaker” groups from development.
• Short-Term Gains Over Long-Term Peace (Fursad Maanta):
• Unwritten Rule: Immediate clan advantage (e.g., grabbing a checkpoint) trumps sustainable nation-building.
• Manifestation: Fragile, clan-negotiated truces collapse when opportunistic leaders spark violence.
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Slogans Reflecting Tribal Mentality:
• “Qabilkaaga ama qofkaaga” (“Your clan or your life”).
• If you’re not our clan, you’re inherently wrong.
• A feud is answered with a feud.
• “Dowlad waa qabiil kale” (“The state is just another clan”).
• The one who strikes first prevails.

Case Study: Dafle’s Death & Social Media Reactions
The polarized responses to Ahmed Saleebaan Abdalla’s death exemplify these laws. Supporters (often his Darod/Marehan/Dhulbahante clans) framed him as a “heroic stabilizer,” while opponents expressed disappointment that his death saved him  from facing justice in life. These reactions reflect Clan Primacy and Vengeance as Justice, reducing complex governance issues to tribal binaries. Social media’s immediacy amplifies spontaneous, clan-driven emotions, sidelining nuanced dialogue.

Pathways to Change:
• Civic Identity Over Clan: Promote narratives valuing Somali citizenship (e.g., education campaigns, art).
• Institutional Justice: Replace clan-based retaliation with independent courts addressing grievances.
• Inter-Clan Economic Projects: Foster interdependence via shared resources (e.g., cooperative farming).
• Youth & Women’s Leadership: Bypass elder-centric systems with inclusive decision-makers.
“Until Somalis unlearn the laws that chain them to the past, the future will remain a hostage to the clan.”

The upcoming visit of Somali Prime Minister Hamse Abdi Barre to Laascaano, a town in SSC Sool region, has ignited debate over its political ramifications. While the trip is framed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) as a gesture of unity and peace, it inadvertently casts a spotlight on Somaliland—a self-declared independent republic seeking international recognition since 1991. For Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, this visit presents a paradoxical opportunity: rather than viewing it as a challenge to its sovereignty, Somaliland’s administration could leverage the occasion to amplify its long-standing demands for global attention and legitimization. By welcoming dialogue—or even daring the FGS leader to extend his trip to Hargeisa—Somaliland could transform the narrative, sharing the limelight with Laascaano to underscore its socio-economic aspirations and governance credentials.

1. International Attention: A Double-Edged Sword
Somaliland’s struggle for recognition has long been hampered by geopolitical indifference. The FGS’s high-profile engagement in Laascaano, however, disrupts this status quo. International media and diplomatic circles will inevitably focus on the region, creating a rare window for Somaliland to showcase its relative stability, democratic governance, and developmental progress. Hargeisa could seize this moment to contrast its functional institutions with the FGS’s fragmented authority, positioning itself as a viable partner for foreign investment and humanitarian aid. By reframing the visit as a chance to highlight Somaliland’s de facto statehood, Hargeisa could turn the FGS’s symbolic act into a platform for global advocacy.

2. Legitimizing Dialogue and Countering FGS Narratives
The FGS’s presence in Laascaano risks reinforcing Somalia’s territorial claims over Somaliland. Yet Hargeisa could subvert this narrative by engaging pragmatically. Inviting PM Barre to Hargeisa would signal confidence in Somaliland’s governance and openness to dialogue—a stark contrast to Mogadishu’s refusal to acknowledge Somaliland’s autonomy. Such a bold move would force the FGS to either engage on Somaliland’s terms or expose its inflexibility, both outcomes beneficial to Hargeisa’s cause. Moreover, it would demonstrate Somaliland’s maturity as a political entity capable of hosting high-level diplomatic exchanges.

3. Socio-Economic Development as a Shared Priority
Laascaano, like much of Somaliland, faces challenges such as drought, poverty, and infrastructure gaps. The Prime Minister’s visit—ostensibly to address these issues—offers Hargeisa an opportunity to align its developmental goals with international agendas. By welcoming collaboration (even if symbolic), Somaliland could position itself as a proactive actor in regional stability, appealing to donors who prioritize practical outcomes over political recognition. Joint initiatives, even mediated through the FGS, might inadvertently validate Hargeisa’s administrative capacity, further eroding Mogadishu’s claims of exclusivity.

4. Humanitarian Diplomacy and Soft Power
Somaliland’s humanitarian challenges, including displacement and climate crises, often go underreported. The influx of attention generated by the Laascaano visit could redirect resources and advocacy to the region. Hargeisa could capitalize on this by coordinating with NGOs and UN agencies to highlight its own needs, framing itself as a distinct—and deserving—recipient of aid. This would not only address immediate crises but also reinforce Somaliland’s institutional identity in the eyes of the international community.

5. A Challenge to Hargeisa: From Defiance to Strategic Pragmatism
Somaliland’s instinct might be to reject the FGS’s encroachment. However, a smarter approach would involve embracing the visit as a catalyst for engagement. By inviting PM Barre to Hargeisa, Somaliland could shift the dynamic from confrontation to cooperation, forcing Mogadishu to either acknowledge Hargeisa’s autonomy or risk appearing obstructionist. Such a gesture would resonate with global actors weary of Somalia’s internal strife, positioning Somaliland as a pragmatic peacebuilder.

Conclusion: Turning Visibility into Legitimacy
The FGS’s foray into Laascaano need not undermine Somaliland; rather, it is a test of Hargeisa’s diplomatic ingenuity. By reframing the visit as an opportunity rather than a threat, Somaliland can amplify its message, attract development partnerships, and challenge the FGS’s narrative of unity. The path to recognition is fraught with complexities, but moments like these—when the world briefly turns its gaze to the Horn of Africa—are invaluable. Hargeisa must dare to share the stage, transforming a symbolic visit into a strategic victory in its decades-long quest for legitimacy.

Addendum: Navigating the Recognition Paradox
A potential visit by Prime Minister Hamse Abdi Barre to Hargeisa—should Somaliland’s administration extend an invitation—would inevitably spark contentious interpretations. Critics, particularly Somaliland’s hardline sovereigntists, might view such a gesture as tacit acceptance of Mogadishu’s authority, fearing it undermines their three-decade pursuit of formal recognition. For these factions, any engagement with the FGS risks legitimizing Somalia’s constitutional claim over Somaliland as a “federal member state,” a narrative Hargeisa has vehemently rejected since declaring independence in 1991. However, this perspective overlooks the nuanced dynamics of diplomatic signalling.
International recognition is not conferred through symbolic visits but through formal state-to-state agreements and multilateral endorsements. By inviting Barre, Somaliland could instead weaponize the optics of parity. Hosting a Somali PM on its own terms—as leaders of distinct entities—would project Somaliland’s confidence in its governance and territorial control. It would force Mogadishu to grapple with the reality of Hargeisa’s autonomy, whether through awkward protocol negotiations (e.g., flags, titles) or media coverage framing the two as de facto equals. Such a scenario would subtly erode Somalia’s insistence on “unity” while amplifying Somaliland’s case for statehood.
For hardliners, the fear of normalization with Mogadishu is understandable but short-sighted. Engagement need not equate to capitulation. By steering the narrative, Somaliland could use Barre’s presence to spotlight its achievements: holding successive elections, maintaining security without foreign troops, and hosting diaspora investments—all contrasts to Somalia’s instability. This would resonate with international observers who already treat Somaliland as a sui generis case. Moreover, if Mogadishu refuses the invitation, it would expose the FGS’s reluctance to acknowledge ground realities, further isolating its position.
In essence, the risk of misinterpretation is outweighed by the strategic gains. Somaliland’s recognition quest hinges on relentless visibility and pragmatic statecraft, not isolation. A bold overture to share the stage with the FGS could redefine the conversation, turning a symbolic visit into a masterclass in diplomatic manoeuvring.

Introduction
Puntland State of Somalia, established in 1998 as a beacon of stability and decentralized governance, once prided itself on its aspiration to create a “smaller and smarter” government. Yet, recent accounts from residents like Dahir, a diaspora returnee to Garowe, paint a troubling picture of institutional decay, clan favouritism, and bureaucratic bloat under President Said Abdullahi Deni’s administration. Dahir’s stories—of a justice system held hostage by bribery, a police force paralyzed by clan loyalties, and a government expanding while services crumble—highlight systemic failures that betray Puntland’s founding principles. This essay examines the dual crises of under-resourced institutions and clan-based governance, alongside the contradictions of unchecked governmental growth, to explore why Puntland risks squandering its promise as a model of local governance.

Institutional Fragility and the Cycle of Corruption
Puntland’s struggle to uphold law and order begins with its skeletal institutional framework. As Dahir observed, even basic public services like policing are crippled by a lack of operational funds and trained personnel. When a teenager’s misconduct requires familial bribes to resolve—rather than formal legal processes—it underscores a system reliant on informal negotiations, not rule of law. Such scenarios are symptomatic of broader dysfunction: police departments lack vehicles, stations lack electricity, and officers go unpaid for months. This vacuum of resources fosters corruption, as underpaid officials turn to extortion or clan patronage to survive.
The problem extends beyond the police. Health clinics, courts, and municipal offices suffer similar neglect, perpetuating a cycle where citizens lose faith in state structures. Without funding, institutions cannot attract skilled professionals or implement reforms, leaving Puntland’s governance trapped in a self-defeating loop of incapacity.

Clan Loyalty vs. State Authority
Compounding institutional weakness is the infiltration of clan identity into state apparatuses. In Garowe, the police force’s homogeneity—recruited predominantly from a single sub-clan—erodes impartiality. Officers hesitate to act against kin, while victims from rival clans face bias. This subversion of meritocracy undermines trust in the state, as seen in the teenager’s case: justice becomes a transactional commodity, contingent on clan ties and bribes rather than accountability.
Puntland’s founders envisioned a government transcending clan divisions, but in practice, clan loyalty often supersedes civic duty. Such nepotism not only weakens law enforcement but also deters investment and diaspora repatriation, as Dahir’s disillusionment suggests. When state roles are clan sinecures, competence and public trust erode.

The Irony of Expansion: Bigger Government, Weaker Governance
Paradoxically, President Deni’s administration has prioritized expanding bureaucratic structures—creating redundant agencies and overlapping mandates—while core institutions starve. Ministries multiply, but budgets remain opaque, and coordination falters. This growth, critics argue, serves political patronage, rewarding allies with government posts rather than addressing systemic flaws.
The original vision of a lean, efficient government has given way to bloat, mirroring failures of larger federal states. Expansion without investment in capacity or oversight exacerbates inefficiency: more departments compete for scarce funds, deepening service delivery gaps. Meanwhile, Deni’s focus on contentious issues like federal disputes with Mogadishu diverts attention from grassroots governance needs.

Conclusion: Reclaiming the Promise of Decentralization
Puntland’s crises are not insurmountable but demand urgent recalibration. First, institutional capacity must be rebuilt through budget prioritization, diaspora engagement, and international partnerships focused on training and infrastructure. Second, clan-neutral recruitment and anti-corruption measures are critical to restoring faith in state institutions. Finally, the government must halt counterproductive expansion, streamlining agencies to align with its original “smaller and smarter” ethos.
Dahir’s story is a microcosm of Puntland’s crossroads: a region struggling to balance tradition with modernity, clan with citizenship, and growth with governance. Without addressing these tensions, Puntland risks becoming a cautionary tale—a state that expanded its bureaucracy but forgot its people. The path forward lies not in mimicking failed models but in reclaiming the innovative, pragmatic spirit that once made it a Somali success story.

The question of whether a nation can be built on ethnic or regional hatred is not merely theoretical; it is a lived reality in Somalia. Since its independence in 1960, Somalia has grappled with the contradictions of a state that aspired to pan-Somali unity while being fractured by clan divisions, authoritarian rule, and regional marginalization. The legacies of military dictator Siyad Barre (1969–1991), followed by the polarizing policies of Presidents Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo (2017–2022) and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (2022–present), have entrenched a system of governance that prioritizes clan-based power struggles over inclusive nation-building. The resulting tensions, particularly between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in Mogadishu and the semi-autonomous Puntland State, reveal a profound crisis of legitimacy. For many in Puntland, the failure of successive Mogadishu regimes to address systemic marginalization has made confederation—a political arrangement granting maximal autonomy within a looser union—a compelling alternative to the current dysfunctional federalism. This essay examines how Somalia’s history of centralized oppression, clan politics, and regional neglect has fueled calls for confederation, arguing that such a model may offer a pragmatic path to stability, albeit one fraught with challenges.
Historical Context: From Barre’s Clan Tyranny to Fractured Federalism

1. Siyad Barre’s Divisive Legacy
The collapse of Somali statehood can not be understood without examining the regime of Siyad Barre. Initially celebrated for his nationalist rhetoric and modernization efforts, Barre’s dictatorship devolved into a system of clan-based repression. By the 1980s, his regime targeted specific clans, notably the Isaaq in the northwest (now Somaliland) and the Majeerteen in the northeast (Puntland), through massacres, forced displacements, and economic exclusion. The state became a tool of vengeance against perceived rivals, eroding trust in centralized governance. Barre’s overthrow in 1991 plunged Somalia into civil war, fragmenting the country into clan fiefdoms and sowing the seeds of enduring regional resentment.

2. The Illusion of Federalism
Post-2000 efforts to rebuild Somalia through federalism—a system enshrined in the 2012 Provisional Constitution—were well-intentioned but flawed. Federalism aimed to balance power between Mogadishu and regional states, recognizing the diversity of Somalia’s clans and regions. However, in practice, federalism has been co-opted by Mogadishu-based elites who manipulate clan divisions to maintain control. Under Farmajo, the FGS weaponized federalism by withholding resources from non-aligned regions, interfering in local elections, and centralizing security and financial institutions. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration has continued this trend, prioritizing political survival over equitable power-sharing.

Puntland’s Grievances: Marginalization and the Failure of Federalism
Puntland, established in 1998 as Somalia’s first autonomous state, has long positioned itself as a champion of decentralized governance. Its leadership argues that Mogadishu’s failure to honor federal principles has made confederation—a system where regions retain sovereignty over most affairs—a necessity. Key grievances include:

1. Economic Exclusion
Puntland, rich in resources such as fisheries, livestock, and potential hydrocarbons, accuses Mogadishu of monopolizing international aid and revenue. For instance, the FGS has consistently blocked Puntland from directly engaging with foreign partners or accessing its fair share of donor funds. This economic stranglehold stifles development and fuels perceptions of colonial-style extraction.
2. Political Marginalization
Puntland boycotted the 2021–2022 electoral process, citing Mogadishu’s refusal to implement a one-person, one-vote model and its interference in regional politics. The FGS’s unilateral extension of its mandate in 2021 further alienated Puntland, which views such actions as unconstitutional power grabs.

3. Security Neglect
While Puntland shoulders the burden of combating terrorism (e.g., ISIS affiliates in the Galgala mountains), Mogadishu often withholds support for regional security forces. The FGS’s focus on centralizing the Somali National Army (SNA) undermines local counterterrorism efforts, leaving Puntland State to defend itself alone. This neglect is starkly evident in Mogadishu’s refusal to equitably allocate international security funding or share critical intelligence, despite Puntland’s frontline role in battling extremist groups. For instance, the Puntland Security Force (PSF) and Puntland Dervish Force—key regional units actively engaging ISIS-Somalia in mountainous terrain—rely on outdated weaponry and limited logistical support, while the SNA, bolstered by foreign training and financing, remains disproportionately concentrated in south-central Somalia.
The consequences of this imbalance are dire. In 2021, Puntland launched Operation Dabaaldegg to dismantle ISIS strongholds in Galgala, a campaign conducted almost entirely without federal backing. The absence of aerial surveillance, medical evacuations, and reinforcements from Mogadishu stretched Puntland’s forces thin, allowing militants to regroup and retaliate against civilians. Meanwhile, the FGS’s insistence on integrating regional forces into the SNA—a move Puntland views as a bid to erode its autonomy—has further strained relations. “We are told to surrender our weapons and recruits to Mogadishu, but receive nothing in return except empty promises,” lamented a Puntland security official in 2023.
This security vacuum has forced Puntland to seek alternative partnerships, including reported collaborations with private military contractors and bilateral agreements with states like the UAE, which has provided training and equipment. Yet these ad hoc measures can not substitute for a cohesive national strategy. The FGS’s prioritization of political control over collective security has not only emboldened extremists but also deepened Puntland’s resolve to pursue confederation—a system where it could autonomously manage defence policy and international partnerships. Without meaningful reform, Mogadishu’s neglect risks transforming Puntland’s pragmatic push for self-reliance into an irreversible fracture of the Somali state.
This expansion contextualizes Puntland’s security challenges within the broader federal-regional rift, emphasizing operational realities, external alliances, and the human cost of Mogadishu’s policies. It ties the crisis to Puntland’s political calculus, reinforcing the essay’s thesis on confederation as a survival mechanism.

Introduction
Puntland State, a semi-autonomous region in northeastern Somalia, has long been hailed for its resilience in maintaining stability amidst Somalia’s protracted civil war. This stability was anchored in its time-tested system of traditional clan leadership, which filled the governance vacuum after the collapse of the central government in 1991. However, the relationship between Puntland’s traditional elders and its political leaders has grown increasingly fraught since the establishment of the Puntland State in 1998. This essay explores the transformation of this relationship, from one of collaboration to contention, and its implications for Puntland’s governance and stability.

Historical Context: The Pillars of Traditional Leadership
In Somali society, clan elders (Isimmo, Guurti) have historically served as custodians of customary law (Xeer), mediators in conflicts, and representatives of communal interests. Their role became indispensable after 1991, when Somalia descended into stateless chaos. In the northeastern regions (now Puntland), elders leveraged their moral authority and social networks to prevent large-scale violence, fostering a fragile peace. This contrasted sharply with southern Somalia, where clan militias fueled protracted conflict. Puntland’s elders thus emerged not just as cultural figures but as de facto governors.

The Founding of Puntland State: A Constitutional Role for Elders
In 1998, Puntland formalized its governance structure through a constitutional framework that recognized traditional elders as key stakeholders. The founding president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, a former military leader, collaborated with elders to establish legitimacy. The constitution enshrined elders’ roles in resolving constitutional crises and selecting members of the House of Representatives, blending traditional and modern governance. This hybrid model initially appeared successful, as Puntland avoided the factionalism plaguing other regions.

Cracks in the Foundation: The Overreach of Elders
The first major rupture occurred in 2001, when traditional elders, citing grievances over Yusuf’s authoritarian tendencies and his bid to extend his term, orchestrated his removal. This decision, while rooted in legitimate concerns, set a precedent for elders intervening directly in executive affairs—a move perceived as overstepping their advisory mandate. Yusuf’s ouster exposed tensions between the elders’ role as arbiters and the need for apolitical governance. His successors, wary of similar challenges, sought to curb elders’ influence.

Political Backlash: The Marginalization of Traditional Authority
Subsequent leaders, notably Abdirahman Faroole (2009–2014), and Said Abdullahi Deni, the current president, systematically weakened the elders’ political clout. Their administrations bypassed traditional selection processes, handpicking loyalists for the House of Representatives to consolidate power, a direct violation of Puntland Indirect Election Rules and Regulations. This marginalization alienated elders, who viewed such actions as undermining their constitutional role and the principles of inclusive governance. The erosion of trust between the two groups created a toxic dynamic, with political leaders dismissing elders as obstacles to reform, while elders accused the government of corruption and exclusion.

External Alliances and Internal Divisions
Compounding these tensions, some elders began seeking alliances with the federal government in Mogadishu (symbolized by Villa Somalia), ostensibly to counterbalance Puntland’s administrations. This shift risked drawing external actors into Puntland’s internal politics, potentially undermining its semi-autonomous status. For Villa Somalia, courting Puntland’s elders offered leverage in negotiations over resource-sharing and federalism. However, such alliances risked fragmenting Puntland’s political cohesion and fueling clan-based discord.

Consequences for Governance and Stability
The rift between traditional and political leaders has profound implications. Elders, once pillars of conflict resolution, now find their legitimacy questioned, weakening a critical mechanism for social cohesion. Meanwhile, political leaders face accusations of authoritarianism, as centralized decision-making alienates grassroots communities. The resulting governance vacuum could destabilize Puntland, which has already seen sporadic clashes over elections and resource disputes.

Conclusion: Toward a Balanced Governance Model
Puntland’s experience underscores the challenges of transitioning from traditional systems to formal state structures. While political leaders seek centralized authority, elders remain vital to local legitimacy. A sustainable path forward requires reconciling these spheres: elders must respect institutional boundaries, while political leaders should integrate traditional mechanisms into governance. Reviving the constitutional spirit of 1998—where elders advise rather than dictate—could restore balance. Ultimately, Puntland’s stability hinges on respecting its dual heritage: honouring the past while building an inclusive future.

Religious leaders across traditions are often expected to serve as moral guides, addressing societal injustices and advocating for ethical governance. In the Muslim world, however, critics have observed a perceived silence from many clergy (ulema) on pressing issues such as corruption, exploitation by foreign powers, and human rights abuses. This essay explores the complex reasons behind this phenomenon, considering historical, political, cultural, and theological factors that shape clerical engagement—or disengagement—with such topics.

1. Political Constraints and Fear of Repression

In many Muslim-majority countries, religious institutions operate under authoritarian regimes that tightly control public discourse. Clergy who criticize corruption or foreign exploitation risk persecution, imprisonment, or loss of patronage. For example, in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Pakistan, state-aligned religious bodies often avoid condemning government malpractice to maintain their institutional privileges. Conversely, dissenting voices—such as those of Iran’s reformist clerics during the 2009 Green Movement or Egypt’s Al-Azhar scholars during the 2011 revolution—have faced severe backlash. This climate of fear incentivizes silence, reducing clerical discourse to “safe” topics like ritual observance.

2. Historical Prioritization of Ritual Over Structural Reform

Classical Islamic scholarship emphasized personal piety and legal compliance (fiqh) over systemic critiques of power. While the Quran and Hadith explicitly condemn oppression (zulm), many traditional scholars historically focused on individual morality rather than holding rulers accountable. This legacy persists in conservative seminaries, where curricula prioritize theology and jurisprudence over political philosophy. As a result, some clergy lack the intellectual framework to connect Islamic ethics to modern issues like corporate exploitation or foreign-funded wars.

3. Co-option by Power Structures

Religious institutions in Muslim societies have often been financially and politically dependent on ruling elites. Ottoman caliphs, Mughal emperors, and modern Gulf monarchs have historically patronized clerics to legitimize their rule. Today, this dynamic continues: state-appointed muftis in countries like Malaysia or Morocco rarely challenge policies linked to foreign investors or military alliances. When clergy benefit from these relationships, their critiques of corruption or foreign interference become muted or selective.

4. Sectarian and Identity Politics

In fragmented societies like Iraq or Syria, clergy may prioritize sectarian solidarity over universal moral issues. For instance, during the Syrian civil war, some Sunni clerics framed the conflict as a sectarian battle against Shia-aligned forces, overshadowing critiques of war profiteering or foreign mercenaries. Similarly, in Pakistan, clerical groups often focus on blasphemy laws or Sunni-Shia tensions rather than systemic corruption. This sectarian lens distracts from broader injustices that transcend communal divides.

5. Geopolitical Alignments and Anti-Imperialist Narratives

Some clergy avoid criticizing foreign exploitation because their governments are complicit in it. For example, Gulf states’ alliances with Western powers—often criticized for militarism and resource extraction—are rarely condemned by local religious leaders. Conversely, in anti-Western contexts like Iran, clerical rhetoric may focus overwhelmingly on resisting “Western imperialism” while downplaying domestic corruption or human rights abuses. These narratives serve political agendas but leave systemic issues unaddressed.

6. Institutional Conservatism and Lack of Renewal

Many Islamic seminaries resist modernizing their curricula, leaving clergy ill-equipped to address 21st-century challenges. While the Quranic mandate for hisbah (public accountability) and amr bil ma’ruf (enjoining good) could inspire activism, rigid interpretations of texts often prevail. Additionally, the decline of ijtihad (independent reasoning) in conservative circles stifles innovative responses to issues like migrant labor exploitation in the Gulf or Chinese oppression of Uyghurs.

7. Exceptions and Countercurrents

It is crucial to acknowledge clerics who defy these trends. Figures like Tunisia’s Rached Ghannouchi, Indonesia’s Abdurrahman Wahid, and South Africa’s Farid Esack have blended Islamic ethics with critiques of tyranny and neoliberalism. Grassroots movements, such as Egypt’s pro-democracy clerics during the Arab Spring, also demonstrate the potential for Islamic leadership to confront injustice. However, their marginalization by both states and conservative religious establishments limits their influence.

Conclusion: Toward a Courageous Moral Voice

The silence of many Muslim clergy on critical issues stems not from indifference but from complex entanglements with power, tradition, and survival. Breaking this silence requires institutional reforms—such as democratizing religious education, reviving ijtihad, and fostering alliances with civil society—to empower clergy to speak truth to power. As the Quran reminds believers, “Do not let hatred of a people prevent you from being just” (5:8). For the ulema to reclaim their role as moral leaders, they must transcend political expediency and address the urgent struggles of their communities.

“[5.8] O you who believe! Be upright for Allah, bearers of witness with justice, and let not hatred of a people incite you not to act equitably; act equitably, that is nearer to piety, and he careful of (your duty to) Allah; surely Allah is Aware of what you do.”

Overview
Mohamed Haji Ingiriis critiques Lidwien Kapteijns’s Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991 (2013), challenging her central thesis of “clan cleansing” during Somalia’s 1991 clan conflicts. Ingiriis argues that Kapteijns’s work is biased, mythico-historical, and risks reigniting violence by assigning collective guilt to specific clans (notably the Hawiye) without robust evidence. Drawing on personal experience in Mogadishu and cross-clan interviews, he emphasizes the dangers of one-sided narratives in fragile post-conflict societies.

Key Arguments and Strengths
• Methodological Critique:
• Ingiriis highlights Kapteijns’s reliance on interviews from Daarood-affiliated diaspora communities in the U.S., which lack triangulation with other clan perspectives. This selective sourcing skews the narrative, ignoring atrocities committed by the Siad Barre regime against Hawiye, Majeerteen, and Isaaq clans.
• Factual inaccuracies in Kapteijns’s work (e.g., references to mobile phones in 1991 Mogadishu, mislocated historical sites) undermine her credibility. Ingiriis effectively uses these examples to question her rigor.

• Contextualization:
• The paper situates the 1991 conflict within Somalia’s longer history of state-sponsored violence (e.g., the Isaaq genocide in 1988), arguing Kapteijns overlooks this broader trajectory. Ingiriis stresses that clan vendettas predate 1991 and were exacerbated by Siad Barre’s divisive policies.

• Ethical Concerns:
• Ingiriis warns that assigning blame to specific clans without evidence risks perpetuating cycles of retaliation. This ethical stance resonates in a context where historiography is deeply politicized.

Weaknesses and Limitations
• Potential Bias:
• Ingiriis’s critique, while rigorous, occasionally mirrors the partisanship he condemns. His focus on defending Hawiye narratives and dismissing Daarood grievances (e.g., downplaying the 1991 Mogadishu massacres) may reflect his own clan affiliations, raising questions about objectivity.

• Lack of Alternative Framework:
• The critique effectively dismantles Kapteijns’s thesis but offers limited constructive alternatives. A more balanced historiography, integrating multi-clan perspectives and archival evidence, would strengthen his argument.

• Engagement with Scholarship:
• While citing scholars like Menkhaus and Lewis, Ingiriis does not deeply engage with their analyses of clan dynamics or Kapteijns’s responses to prior critiques. This limits the paper’s contribution to broader academic debates.

Contribution to Somali Studies
Ingiriis’s work underscores the high stakes of historical narratives in Somalia, where clan identities shape politics and memory. By exposing flaws in Kapteijns’s methodology, he advocates for nuanced, evidence-based scholarship that avoids simplistic blame. However, his critique would benefit from addressing how scholars can navigate clan biases while reconstructing Somalia’s complex history.

Conclusion
Ingiriis delivers a compelling methodological and ethical rebuttal to Kapteijns, emphasizing the need for balanced historiography in conflict zones. While his critique risks partisanship, it valuably highlights the intersection of academia, memory, and politics in Somali Studies. Future work should be built on this by integrating diverse voices and archival sources to transcend clan-centric narratives.

Introduction
Equitable representation in government institutions is a cornerstone of inclusive governance, fostering public trust and national cohesion. However, Puntland State of Somalia has faced persistent allegations of systemic bias in its civil service hiring practices. Reports indicate that over 50% of state employees hail from just two regions—Sool and Nugaal—with claims that this imbalance stems from the influence of former Vice-President Ahmed Karash and ex-Finance Minister Hassan Shire Abgaal. Despite pledges to uphold fairness, President Said Abdullahi Deni’s administration has yet to rectify this disparity, perpetuating a cycle of exclusion and undermining the principles of meritocracy and regional equity.

Historical Context and Promises of Equity
Puntland’s 1998 charter enshrined power-sharing among its regions, aiming to ensure balanced political and economic participation. This commitment was meant to prevent dominance by any single clan or region, fostering unity in a state historically fragmented by clan dynamics. However, the concentration of civil service roles in Sool and Nugaal—home to key political figures—suggests a departure from these ideals. The alleged roles of Ahmed Karash and Hassan Shire Abgaal in staffing ministries with loyalists illustrate how patronage networks can distort institutional integrity, prioritizing allegiance over competence.

Consequences of Imbalance
The overrepresentation of two regions has far-reaching implications:

1. Marginalization: Communities from regions like Bari, Mudug, Sanaag, Haylaan, and Karkaar face diminished opportunities, breeding resentment, and eroding national unity.
2. Governance Deficits: A bureaucracy skewed toward regional favoritism risks inefficiency, as merit may be sidelined for cronyism. This undermines public service delivery, critical in a state grappling with poverty and instability.
3. Distrust in Institutions: Perceived injustice in hiring corrodes citizen confidence, weakening the social contract and fueling political apathy or unrest.

President Deni’s Inaction: A Missed Opportunity
President Deni’s failure to address this issue raises questions about political will. Whether due to reliance on existing power structures or fear of destabilizing alliances, his silence perpetuates inequality. This inaction not only tarnishes his reformist image but also risks entrenching a legacy of division. By neglecting to implement transparent recruitment policies or audit current staffing, the administration implicitly endorses a system that privileges loyalty over capability.

Pathways to Reform
To restore equity, Puntland must:

• Enforce Merit-Based Hiring: Establish independent oversight bodies to ensure recruitment aligns with qualifications, not regional or clan affiliations.
• Conduct Audits: Review current civil service demographics to identify and redress imbalances.
• Promote Affirmative Action: Implement quotas or incentives to uplift underrepresented regions.
• Civic Engagement: Foster dialogue with marginalized communities to rebuild trust and inclusivity.

Conclusion
Puntland’s hiring malpractices are not merely administrative failures but existential threats to its unity and development. President Deni stands at a crossroads: he can either uphold a status quo that benefits a privileged few or champion reforms that honor Puntland’s founding principles of equity. The choice will define his legacy and determine whether Puntland evolves into a cohesive state or remains fractured by the very inequalities it once sought to overcome. The time for corrective action is now—before disillusionment turns into discord.

Introduction
Muslim-majority countries today present a paradox: once epicentres of intellectual and scientific advancement during the Islamic Golden Age, many now grapple with political stagnation, technological underdevelopment, and rising extremism. This essay explores how authoritarian governance, the clergy’s complicity in suppressing critical discourse, and the stifling of innovation have contributed to this decline. It argues that systemic repression fosters radicalization, necessitating structural reforms to revive intellectual and political agency.

Historical Context: The Islamic Golden Age Between the 8th and 13th centuries, the Islamic world was a beacon of knowledge. Scholars in Baghdad’s House of Wisdom translated Greek texts, advanced algebra (Al–Khwarizmi), optics (Ibn al-Haytham), and medicine (Ibn Sina). Cities like Cordoba (Spain) and Cairo thrived as multicultural hubs of learning. This era was marked by curiosity, state patronage of science, and a synthesis of diverse intellectual traditions. The decline began with political fragmentation, Mongol invasions, and the rise of rigid theological interpretations that prioritized dogma over inquiry.

Contemporary Political Landscape: Authoritarianism and Dynastic Rule
Today, many Muslim-majority nations are ruled by authoritarian regimes or dynastic families (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Gulf States). Power is concentrated in the hands of elites who suppress dissent, often justified under the guise of stability. Elections, where they exist, are performative, and civil liberties are curtailed. The 2011 Arab Spring exemplified grassroots demands for democracy, but its suppression (e.g., Egypt’s military coup) reinforced autocracy. Such environments deter innovation, as fear of dissent stifles creativity and critical thinking. Here, we are not talking about already failed states such as Somalia, Yemen, the Sudan, and fragile others.

Role of the Clergy: Otherworldly Focus and Political Complicity
Religious institutions often avoid challenging political authority. In Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabi clergy legitimizes the monarchy in exchange for influence over social policies. Iran’s theocracy merges religious and state power, silencing reformist voices. By emphasizing piety, prayer, and the afterlife, clergy divert attention from governance failures. This collusion entrenches stagnation, as questioning socio-political structures is framed as un-Islamic, discouraging youth from engaging in secular knowledge or activism.

Societal Impact: Technological Stagnation and Youth Disillusionment
Underinvestment in education and research perpetuates dependency on foreign technology. According to UNESCO, Muslim-majority countries spend less than 0.5% of GDP on R&D, compared to 2-3% in developed nations. Educational systems often prioritize religious studies over STEM (Science,  Technology, Engineering and Mathematics), limiting economic diversification. Youth unemployment rates exceed 25% in nations like Tunisia and Iran, fueling frustration. With legitimate avenues for expression blocked, some turn to extremism, seeking purpose in ideologies that promise empowerment through violence.

Extremism and Radicalization: The Cycle of Repression and Violence
Authoritarianism creates fertile ground for radical groups. Marginalized populations, denied agency, may gravitate toward movements like ISIS and Al-Shabab, which exploit grievances and offer a distorted sense of identity. The U.S. invasion of Iraq and Syria’s civil war exacerbated this, but internal repression remains a root cause. Extremist narratives glorify a mythologized past, contrasting it with present humiliation, thereby resonating with disillusioned youth.

Case Studies: Contrasting Trajectories
• Iran: The 1979 Revolution replaced a secular autocracy with a theocracy, stifling reform. Despite a educated youth, brain drain and sanctions hinder progress.
• Malaysia: A blend of Islamic governance and economic modernization shows potential, though political Islam risks polarizing society.
• UAE: Investment in tech hubs like Dubai contrasts with strict political control, illustrating selective modernity without democratization.

Pathways to Reform
Breaking the cycle requires multifaceted approaches:
• Educational Reform: Emphasize critical thinking and STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics), drawing on the Islamic Golden Age’s interdisciplinary spirit.
• Political Democratization: Foster inclusive governance to channel dissent constructively.
• Religious Reinterpretation: Encourage progressive theological discourses that reconcile faith with modernity.
• Economic Empowerment: Invest in innovation and job creation to reduce youth vulnerability to extremism.

Conclusion
The stagnation of many Muslim-majority societies is not inevitable but a product of repressive structures. By addressing governance failures, revitalizing education, and embracing intellectual heritage, these nations can combat extremism and reclaim their legacy of innovation. The choice lies between perpetuating cycles of violence or fostering renaissance through reform.

Introduction
In a poignant Friday sermon at Omar Banu AbdulAsis Mosque in Garowe today, Sheikh Ahmed, PhD, and political figure Ali Haji Warsame delivered intertwined messages of moral accountability and political critique. While Sheikh Ahmed invoked Islamic teachings on ethical conduct, Warsame highlighted Somalia’s notorious distinction as the world’s most corrupt nation, per Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This juxtaposition underscores a critical dialogue in Somalia: the interplay between individual morality and systemic governance failures.

Sheikh Ahmed’s Teachings: Moral Foundations
Sheikh Ahmed’s sermon centered on a Hadith of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), urging Muslims to safeguard six aspects of their being: the tongue (to speak truth), hands (to avoid harm), private parts (to reject unlawful acts), eyes (to resist obscenity), and a commitment to fulfilling promises. These tenets form a blueprint for personal integrity, emphasizing self-restraint, honesty, and social responsibility. By framing ethical behaviour as a pathway to spiritual reward, the sermon positions individual morality as a cornerstone of communal well-being. For instance, truth-telling and honouring commitments are not just virtues but acts of worship that combat societal discord.

Ali Haji Warsame’s Analysis: The Reality of Corruption
Contrasting this ideal, Warsame cited Somalia’s consistent ranking at the bottom of the CPI—a global index scoring 181 countries on perceived public sector corruption (0 = very clean, 100= highly corrupt). Somalia scores last 180-181, while South Sudan ranks 179-180. This systemic corruption manifests in embezzlement, bribery, and weak rule of law, crippling public services, deterring foreign investment, and perpetuating poverty. Warsame’s critique reflects a grim reality: institutions meant to uphold justice are often complicit in exploitation, eroding public trust and fueling cycles of instability.

The Intersection of Morality and Governance
The dissonance between Sheikh Ahmed’s moral exhortations and Somalia’s corruption crisis reveals a societal rift. Islamic ethics, which condemn dishonesty and exploitation, are overshadowed by a culture of impunity. Corruption thrives not merely through individual failings but via entrenched networks that normalize graft. For example, clan patronage systems often prioritize loyalty over merit, enabling elite capture of resources. Yet, the Sheikh’s sermon implies that ethical revival at the individual level could disrupt this cycle—if citizens refuse bribes, demand accountability, and uphold truth, collective change becomes feasible.

Pathways to Reform: Combining Ethics and Policy
Addressing Somalia’s crisis requires dual approaches. Religio-cultural institutions like mosques can amplify ethical education, framing anti-corruption efforts as both civic and religious duties. Simultaneously, structural reforms are imperative: strengthening anti-corruption agencies, ensuring judicial independence, and promoting transparency in public finance. International partnerships, such as the IMF’s governance benchmarks, offer frameworks, but local ownership is key. Grassroots movements, inspired by moral imperatives, could pressure leaders to enact reforms, bridging the gap between personal virtue and systemic justice.

Conclusion
The sermons in Garowe today reflect Somalia’s dual challenge: nurturing individual integrity while dismantling corrupt systems. Sheikh Ahmed’s call for self-discipline and Warsame’s indictment of institutional decay are not contradictory but complementary. A Somalia free from corruption demands citizens who embody ethical principles and leaders who translate these values into equitable governance. Only through this synergy can the nation ascend from the depths of the CPI and realize the moral vision espoused by its faith and advocates of justice.

Introduction
The relationship between Djibouti and Somalia, two neighbors in the Horn of Africa, is deeply intertwined with geopolitics, clan dynamics, and economic interests. Since Somalia’s state collapsed in 1991, Djibouti has positioned itself as a regional mediator and a haven for Somali elites. However, allegations of undue influence, corruption, and covert control by Djibouti’s President Ismail Omar Guelleh over Somali governance have sparked controversy. This essay explores the claims of Guelleh’s mentorship of Hawiye leaders, economic manipulation, intelligence agency infiltration, and complicity in refugee deportation schemes while contextualizing these issues within Somalia’s fragile statehood.

Historical Context: Djibouti’s Role in Post-1991 Somalia
Djibouti’s strategic location and relative stability have made it a key player in Somali affairs. Following Somalia’s disintegration, Djibouti hosted multiple peace conferences, including the 2000 Arta Process, which established the Transitional National Government (TNG) led by Hawiye politician Abdiqasim Salad Hassan. Critics argue that Guelleh exploited Somalia’s chaos to expand Djibouti’s political and economic reach. By fostering ties with Somali leaders, Djibouti secured leverage in regional diplomacy and gained access to lucrative ports and trade routes, vital for its economy.

Political Mentorship and Clan Dynamics
Central to the allegations is Guelleh’s purported role as a “mentor” to Hawiye leaders, a dominant clan in Mogadishu. From warlord Ali Mahdi Mohamed (1990s) to current President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, these figures allegedly rely on Guelleh’s backing to consolidate power. The claim that Mogadishu’s leadership is “ruled from Villa Djibouti” underscores perceptions of external control. Analysts suggest that Guelleh leverages clan networks to maintain influence, ensuring Somali policies align with Djibouti’s interests, such as countering Ethiopian dominance in the region.

Economic Entanglements: Passports, Banks, and Money Laundering
Somali elites, particularly Hawiye businessmen, reportedly use Djibouti passports for travel, circumventing Somalia’s weak diplomatic standing. This practice, while pragmatic, raises questions about loyalty and dual citizenship. More critically, Djibouti’s banking system is accused of enabling money laundering. A prominent example is Ahmed Nur Ali Jimale, founder of Hormuud Telecom and Salaam Bank, who allegedly operates from Djibouti. Critics claim his enterprises, integral to Somalia’s economy, funnel illicit funds through Djibouti, facilitated by lax financial regulations.

Intelligence Interference: The NISA Marriage Connection
A striking allegation involves Guelleh’s familial ties to Somali intelligence. Reports suggest his divorced daughter is married again to Sadiq John, Deputy Director of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). This union could signify Djibouti’s infiltration of Somalia’s security apparatus, ensuring Guelleh’s sway over counterterrorism strategies and political surveillance. Such nepotism risks compromising Somalia’s sovereignty, with NISA potentially serving dual loyalties.

The Refugee Deportation Scandal: Complicity and Corruption
Tensions now flared between Somalia and Sweden over a US$10 million agreement to deport Somali refugees. A Swedish diplomat, Anna Saleem Hogberg, Counsellor and SIDA Representative, has expelled after she exposed the deal, revealing that US$4 million had already been transferred to Mogadishu. The diplomat’s expulsion (declared persona non grata) highlighted the government’s prioritization of revenue over refugee welfare. Critics allege that funds were diverted into private pockets rather than aiding returnees, exacerbating Mogadishu’s humanitarian crisis. This incident underscores broader accusations of corruption within Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration and its collusion with Djibouti.

Implications for Somali Sovereignty and Regional Stability.
The alleged Guelleh-Mohamud nexus reflects Somalia’s vulnerability to external manipulation. Djibouti’s influence risks perpetuating dependency, undermining efforts to build robust institutions. Moreover, the use of Somali refugees as bargaining chips in deportation deals exposes ethical failures in global migration policies. For the European Union, partnering with corrupt regimes to curb migration may violate international refugee protections.
Counterarguments and Complexity
Djibouti’s role is not universally malign. Its mediation efforts have occasionally stabilized Somalia, and hosting Somali businesses aids economic recovery. Passport use may stem from necessity, not disloyalty. However, the lack of transparency in financial and political dealings fuels distrust. While some claims may be exaggerated, the pattern of clandestine dealings demands scrutiny.

Conclusion
The allegations against Ismail Omar Guelleh and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reveal a tangled web of power, profit, and patronage. Djibouti’s influence, whether as a stabilizer or manipulator, underscores the challenges of rebuilding a state amid regional rivalries and clan politics. For Somalia to achieve true sovereignty, it must confront external interference and internal corruption. The international community, meanwhile, must balance pragmatic diplomacy with ethical accountability, ensuring that refugee policies and foreign aid do not entrench exploitation. Only through transparency and institutional reform can Somalia break free from the shadows of Villa Djibouti.

Sources and Further Reading
• UN Monitoring Group reports on Somalia
• Investigative articles from The Africa Report 
• Academic analyses on Horn of Africa geopolitics (e.g., Ken Menkhaus, Stig Jarle Hansen)
NGO reports by Transparency International and Human Rights Watch.

Postscript

Somali money transfer companies (Xawaaladaha) can deposit money legally only in Djibouti, nowhere else in the world, following US strict regulations on money laundering and subsequent war on terror in the aftermath of 9/11. But, Djibouti can not keep these billions of dollars of Somali wealth in the country, so they transfer this huge equity to France and earn huge amounts on the interest. Now, what would happen to this money if something goes wrong in Djibouti? There is a huge risk of losing billions of dollars of Somali capital to French financial institutions forever.

Prepared by WDM/Ismail Warsame
Date: April 2, 2025

Executive Summary

Puntland State of Somalia, established in 1998 as a regional autonomy, has evolved from a modest administration of 9 ministers into a bloated bureaucracy of nearly 100 ministers, deputy ministers, and overlapping security forces. While this expansion initially served to balance subclan interests, it now imposes unsustainable economic and administrative burdens. This white paper argues that Puntland must urgently reform its governance model by adopting a lean, merit-based administration. We propose reducing the cabinet to 12 core ministries, dissolving redundant agencies, and rationalizing security forces to align with fiscal realities and strategic priorities. Such reforms will enhance service delivery, reduce waste, and position Puntland as a stable, self-reliant regional entity.

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1. Background: The Growth of Puntland’s Administration

Puntland’s founding vision prioritized pragmatism and inclusivity. Its original cabinet of 9 ministers reflected the urgency of post-conflict stabilization and resource constraints. However, over nearly three decades, political accommodations to subclan demands and short-term crisis management have inflated the government to nearly 100 ministers and deputy ministers. Concurrently, parallel security structures—often clan-aligned—have proliferated, creating confusion, inefficiency, and fiscal strain.

Key Statistics:

• Administrative Growth: From 9 ministries (1998) to ~100 ministers/deputies (2023).
• Economic Impact: Up to 70% of Puntland’s limited budget is consumed by salaries and operational costs of its oversized bureaucracy.
• Security Overlap: Multiple uncoordinated forces (e.g., Darawish, PMPF, PSF, PIS, and clan militias) compete for resources and authority.

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2. The Problem: Unsustainable Governance

A. Economic Burden

Puntland’s economy relies on modest domestic revenue, livestock exports, and irregular donor support. The current administrative model is fiscally untenable:

• Salary Overload: Bloated payrolls divert funds from critical infrastructure, healthcare, and education.
• Duplication: Redundant ministries waste resources.
• Debt Risks: Wage bills outpace revenue growth, risking dependency on unsustainable borrowing or donor-driven aid projects.

B. Administrative Inefficiency

• Decision-Making Paralysis: Large cabinets delay policy consensus.
• Corruption Risks: Proliferation of offices creates opportunities for graft.
• Poor Service Delivery: Citizens face bureaucratic hurdles to access basic services.

C. Security Fragmentation

Unregulated security forces undermine cohesion and public trust:

• Clan Loyalties: Forces prioritize subclan interests over state mandates.
• Resource Competition: Rival units vie for budgets, weakening counterterrorism and law enforcement.

D. Political Trade-Offs

While clan-based appointments have preserved short-term stability, they sacrifice long-term governance quality. Meritocracy is sidelined, breeding incompetence and public disillusionment.

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3. Proposed Reforms: A Leaner, Smarter Puntland

To secure Puntland’s future, the government must prioritize efficiency, accountability, and strategic focus.

A. Streamline the Cabinet

• Reduce Ministries to 12 Core Portfolios:
  1. Finance & Economic Planning
  2. Interior & Federal Affairs
  3. Security & Defense
  4. Justice & Constitutional Affairs
  5. Education & Vocational Training
  6. Health & Social Services
  7. Agriculture & Livestock
  8. Infrastructure & Energy
  9. Commerce & Industry
  10. Environment & Climate Resilience
  11. Fisheries & Marine Resources
  12. Religious Affairs & Community Reconciliation
• Eliminate Deputy Ministers: Assign technical advisors instead of political deputies.

B. Rationalize Parastatal Agencies

• Merge or dissolve redundant agencies (e.g., combine disaster management and climate units).
• Establish independent oversight bodies to audit performance and spending.

C. Security Sector Reform

• Unify all forces under a single command structure.
• Retrain and redeploy excess personnel into civilian roles (e.g., infrastructure projects).

D. Merit-Based Appointments

• Replace clan quotas with competitive hiring and promotion criteria.
• Create a Civil Service Commission to enforce transparency.

E. Fiscal Discipline

• Cap administrative spending at 40% of the budget, redirecting savings to development.
• Digitize payrolls to eliminate “ghost workers.”

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4. Benefits of Reform

• Economic Relief: Savings from wage cuts could fund hospitals, schools, and roads.
• Faster Growth: A competent bureaucracy will attract investment and aid.
• Social Trust: Meritocracy reduces grievances and fosters national unity.
• Security Cohesion: Unified forces improve counterterrorism and rule of law.

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5. Challenges & Mitigation Strategies

• Clan Resistance: Engage elders and influencers through dialogue; emphasize job creation in lieu of political posts.
• Transition Costs: Seek donor support for retraining programs and severance packages.
• Implementation Risks: Phase reforms over 18 months, prioritizing high-impact ministries first.

6. Conclusion

Puntland stands at a crossroads. Maintaining its bloated administration risks fiscal collapse and social unrest. By embracing a streamlined, merit-driven model, Puntland can become a beacon of governance reform in Somalia. This requires bold leadership, public engagement, and international partnership. The time to act is now.

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To be endorsed by Relevant Stakeholders/Entities
Contact: WDM at iwarsame@ismailwarsame.blog/WhatsApp: +252 90 703 4081

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This white paper is a call to action for Puntland’s policymakers, civil society, and international partners to prioritize sustainable governance over short-term political fixes.

By Warsame Digital Media 
Uncategorized 
April 30, 2019 

Translation from WDM Somali Article:

There is an outcry coming from the waters of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea along the Somali coastline in Garacad, Obbia, Merka, Kismayo, Berbera, Lasqoray, Bosaaso, and Alula—both cries for help and anger arising from illegal fishing practices. This distress signals a need for assistance and a call to stop illegal fishing, toxic waste dumping, environmental degradation, and the destruction of fish habitats (fish nurseries), as well as local fishermen’s boats and fishing nets.

With thousands of foreign fishermen operating off the Somali shores mentioned above, the lights from their vessels illuminate the nighttime like major cities of the 21st century.

Most of these vessels are engaged in deep-sea fishing, disrupting marine ecosystems, hindering fish spawning, destroying millions of eggs, and leaving behind wide-ranging debris. Local fishermen are despairing as they witness the destruction of their boats and the nets they rely on for their daily livelihoods. They are also concerned about the toxic fish and pollutants being dumped along the shores, along with suspicious containers washing ashore. Many residents of the coastal areas are suffering from strange diseases, skin ailments, and premature births.

Illegal fishing and toxic dumping are known to be the primary causes of piracy off the Somali coastline. This piracy has evolved into organized crime linked to global trafficking.

In recent years, various governments in Somalia and warlords have been issuing fishing licenses to foreign vessels and companies involved in a corrupt system. The Federal Government has now begun to enter the fray by signing fishing contracts with foreign entities; providing licenses that they are unable to enforce or have any expertise to prevent the use of prohibited fishing equipment.

Today, in Garowe, the capital city of Puntland, a conference featuring the ministers of fisheries from Somalia—both Federal and state—was hosted, ostensibly to discuss fishing resources, but they have never spoken about environmental protection.

This is a chaotic situation in which all economic and trade thieves in the world are competing. There is an outcry coming from the Somali sea.

By Ismail Warsame

Ismailwarsame@gmail.com

https://www.facebook.com/share/v/15vhNvPtNp/

Warsame Digital Media | Uncategorized | April 2, 2025

The recent call for national consultations by Somalia’s federal president has been met with widespread apathy and outright rejection, exposing a deepening political crisis. The absence of willing participants underscores the president’s eroded legitimacy and the lack of a cohesive civil society capable of meaningful dialogue. Rather than a sincere effort to address Somalia’s challenges, many perceive this initiative as a desperate ploy to extend a failing mandate. With federal member states refusing to engage, the proposed consultations have only deepened the fractures in Somalia’s fragile political system.

The Collapse of Moral and Political Legitimacy

Effective leadership requires both moral authority and political legitimacy—qualities the current administration has demonstrably lost. Accusations of corruption, electoral interference, and exclusionary governance have tainted the president’s tenure. The controversial term extension of former President Farmajo in 2021 set a damaging precedent, eroding public trust in federal leadership. Today, history repeats itself under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, whose government faces similar skepticism.

The reluctance of federal member states—including Puntland —to participate in these consultations – speaks volumes. These states have long accused Mogadishu of undermining federalism by centralizing power, contrary to Somalia’s provisional constitution. Without their buy-in, any national dialogue is doomed to fail, as these regions represent critical constituencies that cannot be ignored.

The Vacuum of Civil Society

Decades of conflict, displacement, and institutional decay have stifled the growth of an independent civil society in Somalia. What remains is often fragmented, co-opted by political elites, or too weak to facilitate genuine discourse. In this environment, the president’s call for consultations rings hollow. Without credible grassroots movements, think tanks, or advocacy groups, any dialogue orchestrated by the federal government risks being a performative exercise—scripted to legitimize predetermined outcomes rather than reflect the will of the Somali people.

A Tactical Delay, Not a Solution

Given the overwhelming disinterest in these consultations, many Somalis see them as a stalling tactic rather than a step toward resolution. The president’s term has been marked by persistent insecurity, economic stagnation, and unresolved disputes over federalism and elections. Instead of confronting these issues, the call for dialogue appears to be a smokescreen—an attempt to manufacture the illusion of progress while evading accountability.

Federal member states have recognized this gambit and refused to lend it credibility. Their resistance sends a clear message: superficial talks cannot substitute for genuine political reform.

The Way Forward: Rebuilding Trust and Governance

For Somalia to break this cycle of dysfunction, decisive steps must be taken:

1. Leadership Transition: The current administration must acknowledge its diminished legitimacy and prioritize a fair, transparent transition over political survival.
2. True Federalism: Mogadishu must recommit to decentralization, treating federal states as equal partners rather than subordinates.
3. Reviving Civil Society: International partners and local stakeholders must invest in independent institutions that can foster accountability and inclusive dialogue.
4. Electoral Integrity: A clear roadmap for free and fair elections is essential to ensure future leaders derive authority from the people—not backroom deals.

Conclusion

The failure of the federal government’s national consultations reflects a broader crisis of leadership in Somalia. Without credibility, the cooperation of federal states, or a functioning civil society, such initiatives are destined to collapse. Rather than clinging to power, Somali leaders must embrace genuine reforms that restore trust and lay the foundation for sustainable governance. Only then can the nation hope to achieve stability and progress.