By WDM Staff Writer

Introduction
The regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) in northern Somalia have long been a flashpoint in the contest for territorial control, autonomy, and clan identity. The SSC-Khaatumo movement, born out of a desire to liberate these areas from Somaliland’s administration, now faces a crisis of legitimacy and direction. Despite sacrifices by local communities and Puntland’s support, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has been accused of undermining SSC-Khaatumo’s aspirations, leaving residents trapped between Somaliland’s oppression and Mogadishu’s indifference. This essay examines the historical roots of the conflict, the post-liberation challenges, and pathways toward a sustainable resolution.

Historical Context: Clan, Colonialism, and Contested Borders
The SSC regions are inhabited predominantly by the Dhulbahante clan, a sub-group of the Harti Darod. Their historical ties to the Somali National Movement (SNM), which spearheaded Somaliland’s secession in 1991, were tenuous. Somaliland bases its claim on colonial-era borders, while Puntland asserts kinship with the Dhulbahante. This duality has left SSC residents politically fractured, navigating between Somaliland’s quest for recognition and Puntland’s clan-based governance.
The SSC-Khaatumo movement emerged in the 2000s as a third way, advocating self-governance. Its formation reflected local disillusionment with both Hargeisa’s heavy-handedness and Garowe’s political manoeuvres. The liberation struggle, particularly the 2023 recapture of Las Anod from Somaliland, was fueled by Puntland’s military backing and diaspora funding. Yet, victory has not translated into stability.

The Liberation Struggle and Post-Conflict Realities
The ousting of Somaliland forces from Las Anod in 2023 marked a symbolic triumph. However, the euphoria faded as SSC-Khaatumo struggled to transition from rebellion to governance. Key challenges include:
• Security Vacuum: Somaliland’s intermittent incursions and clan militias’ rise have perpetuated instability.
• Economic Collapse: Years of conflict destroyed infrastructure, leaving healthcare and education in disarray.
• Political Fragmentation: Internal divisions among Dhulbahante elites hinder cohesive leadership.
Puntland’s support, while instrumental, has also drawn accusations of overreach, with critics alleging Garowe seeks to absorb SSC into its administration. Meanwhile, the diaspora’s financial contributions have sometimes exacerbated factionalism, as competing groups vie for resources.

The Federal Government of Somalia: A Partner or Adversary?
The FGS’s role has been contentious. While Somalia’s Provisional Constitution (2012) allows regions to form federal states, Mogadishu has withheld recognition of SSC-Khaatumo. Critics argue this stems from:
• Political Calculations: The FGS fears antagonizing Somaliland, seen as a potential partner in future unification talks.
• Centralization Efforts: Mogadishu may view robust regional states as threats to its authority.
• Resource Allocation: The FGS, grappling with insurgencies like Al-Shabaab, prioritizes other regions.
Moreover, allegations persist that Mogadishu has tacitly supported Somaliland’s operations to weaken SSC-Khaatumo. This perceived betrayal has deepened local resentment, with residents feeling abandoned after risking lives to reject Somaliland’s secessionist agenda.

The Humanitarian Toll and Diaspora Dynamics
Civilians bear the brunt of this geopolitical stalemate. The UN reports over 200,000 displaced since 2023, with aid access restricted by conflict. Clan militias exploit the chaos, engaging in extortion and violence. The diaspora, while vital in funding relief and advocacy, often struggles to align its vision with on-the-ground realities, sometimes prioritizing symbolic victories over governance.

Pathways Forward: Autonomy, Alliances, or Arbitration?
Resolving the crisis requires addressing both immediate needs and structural inequities:
• Strengthening Local Governance: SSC-Khaatumo must prioritize inclusive institutions, integrating traditional elders and civil society to bridge clan divides.
• Engaging the FGS: Mogadishu should honor constitutional provisions for state formation, offering technical and financial support conditional on transparency.
• International Mediation: The AU and UN could broker talks between SSC-Khaatumo, Somaliland, and the FGS, ensuring residents’ voices are central. In doing so, don’t ignore that Puntland State is a critical stakeholder in these negotiations.
• Regional Alliances: Closer ties with Puntland or other federal states might provide interim security but risk dependency.

Conclusion: Toward a Dignified Future
The SSC regions’ plight underscores the fragility of Somalia’s federal experiment. Residents, having rejected Somaliland’s authoritarianism, deserve more than Mogadishu’s neglect. A sustainable solution demands courage from SSC leaders to transcend clan politics, sincerity from the FGS to uphold federalism, and international pressure to safeguard human rights. Only through inclusive dialogue can SSC-Khaatumo realize its founding ideal: a dignified existence free from oppression.