Day: April 6, 2025

Recurring Governance Failures in Somalia: A Cycle of Division and Instability

Introduction
Somalia’s political landscape has been marred by cyclical governance failures since the collapse of General Siad Barre’s military regime in 1991. Despite transitioning to a federal structure, successive governments, including President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s current administration, have repeated historical mistakes by sidelining national reconciliation and political inclusivity. This essay examines how these governance lapses—exacerbated by centralization, constitutional violations, and foreign interference—undermine Somalia’s fight against extremism and jeopardize its fragile state-building process.

Historical Context: Authoritarianism and Clan Fragmentation
The Barre regime (1969–1991) entrenched authoritarianism, suppressing dissent and manipulating clan divisions to maintain power. Its collapse plunged Somalia into civil war, fragmenting the nation along clan lines. Post-1991 efforts to restore stability, including the transitional governments of the 2000s, failed to address deep-seated grievances. The 2012 Provisional Federal Constitution (PFC) aimed to decentralize power through federalism but has been inconsistently implemented, perpetuating mistrust between Mogadishu and regional states.

The Recurring Failure of Reconciliation
A persistent flaw in Somali governance is the elite’s reluctance to prioritize national reconciliation. Power struggles among political actors, often rooted in clan loyalties, have taken precedence over inclusive dialogue. For instance, the 2017 electoral process, which marginalized opposition voices, and the violent aftermath of the 2021 delayed elections highlight this trend. Such exclusionary tactics mirror Barre’s playbook, fostering resentment and cyclical violence.

Mohamud’s Centralized Governance: “We Will Stop to Await Anybody”
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s second term (2022–present) has intensified centralization. His dismissal of federal member states’ perspectives—exemplified by clashes with Puntland and Jubaland over resource management and security—reflects a top-down approach. By marginalizing opposition groups and regional leaders, Mohamud risks alienating critical stakeholders. His declaration, “We will stop to await anybody,” epitomizes this unilateralism, undermining the PFC’s federal principles and deepening intergovernmental rifts.

Security Implications: Fractured Unity Amidst Extremist Threats
Al-Shabab and ISIS remain potent threats, controlling swathes of territory and exploiting governance vacuums. Effective counterterrorism requires coordination between federal and state authorities, yet Mogadishu’s strained relations with regional governments have led to fragmented military efforts. For example, Jubaland’s resistance to federal interference in its local security operations and elections has weakened offensives against Al-Shabab. Meanwhile, Somalia’s reliance on the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, now AUSSOM)) underscores the inadequacy of its nascent security forces, a vulnerability exacerbated by political disunity.

Constitutional Violations and Federalism Disputes
The PFC envisions a balance of power between Mogadishu and federal states, but its provisional status allows ambiguous interpretations. Recent controversies, such as the central government’s unilateral amendments to electoral laws and control over foreign aid, violate the PFC’s spirit of power-sharing. States like Puntland have responded by declaring autonomy, signaling a crisis of confidence in the federal project. These disputes hinder consensus on critical issues, including the constitution’s finalization and resource distribution.

Foreign Interference: Complicating Sovereignty
Somalia’s fragility has invited foreign actors to pursue competing interests. Ethiopia, Kenya, Turkey, and the UAE have invested in infrastructure, military bases, and political alliances, often exacerbating internal divisions. For instance, UAE support for certain regional leaders contrasts with Turkish backing of Mogadishu, creating parallel power centers. Such interference undermines national sovereignty and distracts from inclusive state-building.

Conclusion: Toward Inclusive Governance
Somalia’s path to stability demands breaking the cycle of exclusion. President Mohamud must prioritize dialogue with federal states and opposition groups, adhering to the PFC’s federal framework. International partners should condition support on inclusive processes rather than backing factions. Only through genuine reconciliation and shared governance can Somalia neutralize extremism, reduce foreign dependency, and achieve lasting peace. The alternative—a continuation of centralized, divisive politics—risks perpetuating the very crises that have plagued the nation for decades.

Final Reflection
Somalia’s governance challenges are a testament to the dangers of repeating past mistakes. Learning from history requires courage to embrace inclusivity, uphold the rule of law, and prioritize national unity over narrow interests. The stakes—a sovereign, stable Somalia—could not be higher.

Review of “Unmasking the Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Towards a Critique of the Conflicting Historiographies in Somalia” by Mohamed Haji Ingiriis

Overview
Mohamed Haji Ingiriis critiques Lidwien Kapteijns’s Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991 (2013), challenging her central thesis of “clan cleansing” during Somalia’s 1991 clan conflicts. Ingiriis argues that Kapteijns’s work is biased, mythico-historical, and risks reigniting violence by assigning collective guilt to specific clans (notably the Hawiye) without robust evidence. Drawing on personal experience in Mogadishu and cross-clan interviews, he emphasizes the dangers of one-sided narratives in fragile post-conflict societies.


Key Arguments and Strengths
• Methodological Critique:
• Ingiriis highlights Kapteijns’s reliance on interviews from Daarood-affiliated diaspora communities in the U.S., which lack triangulation with other clan perspectives. This selective sourcing skews the narrative, ignoring atrocities committed by the Siad Barre regime against Hawiye, Majeerteen, and Isaaq clans.
• Factual inaccuracies in Kapteijns’s work (e.g., references to mobile phones in 1991 Mogadishu, mislocated historical sites) undermine her credibility. Ingiriis effectively uses these examples to question her rigor.


• Contextualization:
• The paper situates the 1991 conflict within Somalia’s longer history of state-sponsored violence (e.g., the Isaaq genocide in 1988), arguing Kapteijns overlooks this broader trajectory. Ingiriis stresses that clan vendettas predate 1991 and were exacerbated by Siad Barre’s divisive policies.


• Ethical Concerns:
• Ingiriis warns that assigning blame to specific clans without evidence risks perpetuating cycles of retaliation. This ethical stance resonates in a context where historiography is deeply politicized.


Weaknesses and Limitations
• Potential Bias:
• Ingiriis’s critique, while rigorous, occasionally mirrors the partisanship he condemns. His focus on defending Hawiye narratives and dismissing Daarood grievances (e.g., downplaying the 1991 Mogadishu massacres) may reflect his own clan affiliations, raising questions about objectivity.


• Lack of Alternative Framework:
• The critique effectively dismantles Kapteijns’s thesis but offers limited constructive alternatives. A more balanced historiography, integrating multi-clan perspectives and archival evidence, would strengthen his argument.


• Engagement with Scholarship:
• While citing scholars like Menkhaus and Lewis, Ingiriis does not deeply engage with their analyses of clan dynamics or Kapteijns’s responses to prior critiques. This limits the paper’s contribution to broader academic debates.


Contribution to Somali Studies
Ingiriis’s work underscores the high stakes of historical narratives in Somalia, where clan identities shape politics and memory. By exposing flaws in Kapteijns’s methodology, he advocates for nuanced, evidence-based scholarship that avoids simplistic blame. However, his critique would benefit from addressing how scholars can navigate clan biases while reconstructing Somalia’s complex history.


Conclusion
Ingiriis delivers a compelling methodological and ethical rebuttal to Kapteijns, emphasizing the need for balanced historiography in conflict zones. While his critique risks partisanship, it valuably highlights the intersection of academia, memory, and politics in Somali Studies. Future work should be built on this by integrating diverse voices and archival sources to transcend clan-centric narratives.