



# **REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT TEAM ON THE AFRICAN UNION'S ENGAGEMENT IN AND WITH SOMALIA POST 2021**

**ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA**





**SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT TEAM ON THE AFRICAN UNION'S ENGAGEMENT IN AND WITH SOMALIA POST 2021**

The AU Independent Assessment (AUIA) Team of Experts undertaking the assessment on the AU engagements in and with Somalia post 2021 presents its compliments to the Commissioner of PAPS and has the honour to submit its report on the assessment. The report emanates from engagements with the interlocutors. The report contains the analysis on the political, security and other factors impacting stabilisation in Somalia

The Team wishes to express its utmost appreciation for the honour bestowed on it to conduct the assessment.

The Team avails itself of the opportunity to renew to the Commissioner PAPS the assurance of its highest consideration.

**Addis Ababa, 30 May 2021**

**MAJOR GENERAL XOLANI MANKAYI  
CHAIRPERSON INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT TEAM OF EXPERTS**

**COMMISSIONER (PAPS)**

**Copy:**

- Ms Fiona Lortan – Acting Director Peace and Security Department/Conflict Management
- Mr Sivuyile Bam – Head PSOD
- Mr Zinurine Alghali – Head Policy Development Unit



TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I.INTRODUCTION

II.OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSESSMENT

III. ISSUES ON SOMALIA AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE BROADER STATE BUILDINGPROCESS

IV. OVERVIEW OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SOMALIA

V. SOMALIA STABILISATION PROCESS

VI. AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM)

VII. COORDINATION BETWEEN THE AFRICAN UNION (AU) AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

VIII. OPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR AU ENGAGEMENT IN AND WITH SOMALIA POST 2021

IX. FINDINGS

X. RECOMMENDATIONS

XI. CONCLUSION



## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The African Union Independent Assessment (AU-IA) Team was established pursuant to the Communiqué of the 978<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of 9 February 2021. The independent assessment comes in the wake of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 2520 and 2568 (2021). UNSCR 2568 reaffirms the international community's desire to see a Somali-led Transition in which Somali forces assume responsibility for its security, and a reconfiguration of AMISOM post 2021.

Significant progress has been made in Somalia since the civil war and collapse of the state in the 1990s. There is broad agreement among all political actors in Somalia that the 2012 Provisional Federal Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, is key to resolving fundamental issues related to the delimitation of powers, and that the management of security and public resources remain unresolved. The Provisional Federal Constitution lays down the foundation for both federalism and multiparty politics based on universal suffrage but progress towards this critical goal has been limited. Clans continue to play a key role in all aspects of socio-political life in Somalia. Forging a common understanding and consensus among various clans and sub-clans will enable a transition to more inclusive politics. The immediate priority is to facilitate consensus on how to restore the federal constitutional order and focus on finalizing the constitutional review process.

The AU-IA Team commends the AU PSC and the international community for remaining engaged in Somalia, following the PSC 993rd Meeting, and its Communiqué dated 22 April 2021. The Team takes note and commends the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS) for the successful conclusion of their Summit on 27 May 2021, which agreed to revert to the 17 September electoral model, and to conduct inclusive and transparent elections without any delay.

Somalia's location in the Horn/East Africa, and adjacent to the Gulf region, places it at the epicenter of a complex highly strategic geo-political region. External actors have historically exerted significant influence over the development of the Somali nation. The Somalia economy has remained fragile since the beginning of the process of stabilization beginning in 2007. The absence of state authority for a long period of time has led to the private sector that has operated in a largely unregulated environment.

The security situation is relatively calm but unpredictable, with increased AS kinetic and enabling activities across all sectors. Joint AMISOM-SNA operations enabled the recovery of territory and degraded AS. AS retained the capacity to infiltrate and capability to carry out complex attacks in Mogadishu and other parts of the country. The security situation is complex because of the existence of other armed groups, such as clan militias, armed pastoralists and ISIS Somalia.

The dysfunctional relationship between the FGS and FMS has contributed to political instability and insecurity. The key to the stabilisation of Somalia is the implementation of the STP, requiring the SSF to take primary responsibility for Somalia defence and security functions.



There are no public administration structures such as courts and police stations, medical facilities, education, and other social services. Public services and social infrastructure have not followed the recovery of territory.

AMISOM is the cornerstone of security and stabilization in Somalia. It is the fundamental framework for strategic UN-AU partnership in Somalia. AMISOM has significantly degraded AS capability, but is constrained by inadequate ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), as well as logistics support, all of which are currently in the control of other partners. AMISOM Police has contributed to the stabilisation process in Somalia by training, mentoring, advising, reforming and restructuring SPF at strategic, tactical and operational levels. COVID 19 pandemic severely hampered the mission's operations and activities. Civilian staff and troops were forced to work in isolation while military work requires teamwork.

AMISOM is dependent on UN and donor funds. AMISOM has been funded by a combination of UN assessed contributions through the UN Support Office in Somalia which provides logistical support, the EU African Peace Facility, which has provided troop and COE reimbursements, but which is being transformed into the European Peace facility, which has radically different funding modalities. The lack of capacity by the AU to fund AMISOM's operations in Somalia should not allow the country to revert once again into a failed state. UN-assessed contributions are the most predictable and sustainable source of funding.

For any future AU engagement it is essential to identify the key impediments that have become persistent challenges to security and stability in Somalia. The success or failure of a future reconfigured AMISOM will depend on improved engagements between the AU and UN, and the need for closer coordination and resumption of joint assessments

AU-IA discussed various options for the future engagement:

**Option 1** was to establish an AU-UN Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AU-UNMIS). AMISOM would fully transition into an AU-UN multidimensional stabilisation mission in Somalia deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the current context, there is the need for a holistic and comprehensive multidimensional approach, beyond the security and stabilisation process, which has dominated the last 14 years. The nucleus of the security components would be constituted by the contingents currently serving in AMISOM, subject to assessment of their capabilities and would be augmented as necessary to respond to the new realities such as the opening of new sectors.

The mission will be constituted with the right balance of civilian, police and military capability, including a Rapid Strike Force(RSF), and intervention Brigades tailored to the specific operational requirements of the Somalia environment, established following joint AU-UN strategic assessment, planning as well as collaborative decision making, together with representatives of potential troops and police contributing countries.



## STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The number of formed police units (FPUs) will be increased substantially to protect the increased civilian personnel and IPOs. UN-assessed contributions are the most predictable and sustainable source of funding.

**Option 2** could be an AU Multidimensional Stabilisation Support to Somalia (or Reconfigured AMISOM). The perception that AMISOM is predominantly a combat force is therefore obsolete. A new AU mission in Somalia must include a strong political component, which is AU led, coordinating with UN and other international partners. AMISOM has operated as a multidimensional peace enforcement operation deployed in a non-permissive environment. Finding the right balance for AMISOM's multidimensional components is constrained by lack of financial support and the mission's core mandate. The strategic objective of a reconfigured AMISOM would be to contribute to a sustainable political and security environment, through the elimination of the presence and influence of AS and OAG.

The new AU mission needs to build on existing mechanisms and experience gathered as well as successes already achieved. The primary mandate of the reconfigured AMISOM will be to enhance the capacity of SSF to assume their security responsibilities. The Reconfigured mission should have a specific capability in the form of a rapid strike force (RSF) with specialized military systems, intervention Brigades tailored to the specific operational requirements of the Somalia environment. Financing of Option 2 must be predictable and sustainable, derived from a UNSC authorized mandate under UN assessed contributions.

**Option 3** could be the deployment of the East Africa Standby Force (EASF). The AU PSC shall utilize the African Standby Force (ASF) concept by mandating the East Africa Standby Force (EASF) and other regional Standby Forces to deploy to enhance peace, security and stabilization in Somali. Some of the countries in the region are currently deployed as part of AMISOM. Securing coordinated, predictable and sustainable financing from the UN and international partners. The countries of the region will mobilize the necessary equipment for the implementation of the mandate.

**Option 4** involves the possibility of an AMISOM Exit and assumption by SSF of security responsibilities under STP post 2021. There is a perception that FGS is increasingly losing confidence in the AU involvement in stabilization in Somalia. The rejection of the AU Envoy by the FGS, and the failure by FGS to engage the AU-IA Team until after the final report had already been submitted to the Commission, at a time of uncertainty in the security and political situation, and mistrust among the political actors in Somalia, sends a message that African Union involvement in Somalia is not welcomed by the political actors.

Option 4 will require the direct support of the international community and bilateral partners to FGS, in view of the strategic interests pursued by these partners in Somalia. AMISOM exit could be accomplished in six months.

Based on the above analysis the AU-IA Team made findings, some of which include the status of the SRCC, who is not currently mandated to provide political leadership in the Mission. The



fundamental challenge to stabilization in Somalia emanates from the failure by the FGS/FMS to resolve outstanding constitutional review, power sharing and resources issues. Political actors in Somalia continue to show deference to the clan rather than to the federal constitutional order. The FGS and FMS agreed to conduct inclusive and transparent elections. The peace process in Somalia has been open to many players. Some of the bilateral partners serve partisan interests which perpetuate the political differences rather than promote the Somali national stabilization agenda.

The security challenges posed by the threat of Al-Shabaab (AS) and other armed groups (AOG) remain unresolved. Joint AMISOM/SSF operations have recovered considerable amounts of territory. However, AS retains the capability to carry out kinetic activities including complex attacks. The generation of cohesive federal security forces has been hampered by regionalism and the persistence of clan-based politics. Somali Security Sector Reform (SSR) has made considerable progress, however integration of militia groups into the SNA remains a challenge in the absence of an overarching political compact amongst political groups in Somalia. Notwithstanding the mentoring of SNA by AMISOM and training by bilateral partners, SNA still lacks capacity to secure newly liberated areas. The training offered to the SNA by different bilateral partners under different military philosophies and doctrines hamper the evolution of a cohesive SNA.

AMISOM operational capabilities are constrained by a lack of adequate intelligence and logistical support. Any future AMISOM exit must be based on the SNA's capacity to protect the civilian population, to engage AS, to protect Main Supply Routes (MSR) and secure liberated territory. The Force HQ is understaffed and this fetters the optimum, efficient and effective functioning of the mission. The UN and international partners favour a drawdown of forces, whilst Somali stakeholders canvas for more AMISOM involvement in the area of operations. The current funding model of AMISOM is dependent on UN and donors. The AU cannot fund AMISOM operations in Somalia.

The operational infrastructure is not sufficient to meet the operational and training requirements for the SPF. The current strength of AMISOM IPOs is not adequate to undertake the current tasks of training, advising, mentoring, reforming and restructuring the SPF. The current level of Formed Police Units (FPU) is not adequate to undertake the tasks of patrolling, security to IPOs, escort of convoys and VIPs.

The current authorized strength is 70 international civilian staff and the current deployed strength is 66. Somalia's location in the Horn of Africa places it at the epicenter of a complex geo-political region.

Based on the aforesaid findings the AUIA Team recommends, *inter alia*, that the SRCC should be mandated to provide political leadership and coordination with the UN and other partners. FGS and FMS should genuinely implement their 27 May 2021 Agreement. The FGS to be formed after the 2021 elections should finalise the Constitutional review process and resolve all outstanding political issues. The FGS/FMS should hold regular consultative meetings in accordance with the



## **STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

Provisional Federal Constitution. The FGS and FMS should ensure that women, youth, persons with disability, minority clans and other marginalized communities take part in electoral and peace processes, and in national governance structures and institutions. The FGS/FMS should cooperate to establish a unified SSF.

All bilateral partners assisting Somalia to build its security capabilities must ensure that the SSF training is guided by a Somalia National security philosophy and doctrine. The FGS should provide the SSF with all necessary logistical and operational support to defeat AS. There is a need to review and improve the SSF conditions of service so as to attract the voluntary recruitment and enhance force generation. FGS to establish a framework for a national dialogue to forge political consensus and national reconciliation.

There is a need to establish a transitional justice framework for truth, justice, reconciliation and accountability. The reconfigured AMISOM should provide a multi-dimensional and comprehensive approach to peace, security, political, development and humanitarian issues in Somalia. The AU should mobilise resources for economic activities to support peoples' livelihoods. The AU should encourage its Member States to pledge and contribute the required capabilities in the reconfigured AMISOM. The UN should fund AMISOM operations in Somalia in a coherent, predictable, and sustainable manner.

Force HQ should be capacitated in accordance with the AU policies and doctrine. Drawdown of the mission should be the outcome of a field assessment and not by strategic and/or political considerations and budgetary constraints. There should be adequate provision of equipment to the SPF such as vehicles, boats, police helicopters, forensic science equipment, mounted units, general stationery and office equipment, etc at both the FGS and FMS levels.

The current strength of IPOs should be increased to enable AMISOM Police to train, advise, mentor, reform and restructure the SPF in line with the reconfigured AMISOM mandate post 2021. The current strength of FPU should be increased to adequately undertake the tasks of patrolling, security to IPOs, and escort of convoys and VIPs in line with the reconfigured AMISOM mandate post 2021. The PCCs should deploy adequate personnel, transport and equipment to effectively undertake the tasks in line with reconfigured AMISOM mandate post 2021.

The current authorized strength of the international civilian staff should be increased to take into account the tasks at hand. The international civilian staff should cover the entire area of deployment adequately in their respective areas of specialisation. The AU and UN should resume joint assessments of a reconfigured AMISOM post 2021.

The International Community should support the reconfigured African Union mission in order to achieve its objective as mandated by the UNSC. The international community should prioritize support to FGS and FMS to achieve a genuine political settlement and stable governance arrangements. Bilateral Partners should harmonise their interests in Somalia with the broader objectives of international community's support for stabilisation of Somalia.



**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

The findings and recommendations are informed by various factors that impact the peace and security situation in Somalia. They will be critical not only in the overall political, security and stabilisation process in Somalia, but will inform the AMISOM reconfiguration post 2021.

Out of the three options, the AUIA Team recommends Option 1 on AU-UN Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AU-UNMIS), as the most appropriate option for a future reconfigured AMISOM post 2021. This option is the most appropriate because it will address many of the challenges identified in this report, in particular the lack of sustainable financing, inadequate logistics, command and control issues, remuneration of staff, troops and police, manpower and staff shortages, and force generation for the mission. It is for the foregoing reasons that AU-IA Team commends this Report to PAPS.

A comprehensive multidimensional approach, beyond the security and stabilisation process, should include Political affairs, Civil affairs, Human rights, Child protection and protection of other vulnerable groups, and Humanitarian assistance. A nucleus of the security components will be constituted by the contingents currently serving in AMISOM. The right balance of civilian, police and military capability, including a Rapid Strike Force (RSF), and intervention Brigades tailored to the specific operational requirements of the Somalia.

The aggregated force levels will be composed 50% Formed Police Units (FPUs) and Individual Police Officers (IPOs), 35% of military component and 15% international civilian staff during Phase 1 and Phase 2. Phase 3 will undergo a drawdown of 20% military, 30% of police and 7.5% of civilian within every six month as part of the exit strategy ending in December 2025.



**LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

APF	African Peace Fund
AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AU-IA	African Union Independent Assessment
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AS	Al-Shabaab
ASF	African Standby Force
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
EASF	East African Standby Force
EU	European Union
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member State
FPU	Formed Police Units
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices
IPOs	Individual Police Officers
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
MS	Member States
MAF	Malian Armed Forces
MSR	Main Supply Route
NSA	National Security Architecture
OAG	Other Armed Groups
PAPS	Political Affairs Peace and Security
PCC	Police Contributing Countries
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
PSC	Peace and Security Council
RSF	Rapid Strike Force
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SNA	Somali National Army
STP	Somalia Transition Plan



**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

SSF	Somali Security Force
SPF	Somali Police Force
SRCC	Special Representative of the African Union Commission Chairperson
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TOR	Terms of Reference
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
UN	United Nation
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
UNSCR	United Nation Security Council Resolutions
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNSOS	United Nations Support Office in Somalia
UK	United Kingdom
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police

SOMALIA



**REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT TEAM ON THE AFRICAN UNION'S ENGAGEMENT  
IN AND WITH SOMALIA POST 2021**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. The African Union Independent Assessment(AU-IA) Team was established pursuant to the Communiqué of the 978<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of 9 February 2021 which directed the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) to “expedite the deployment of the AU-Led Independent Assessment Team to begin a comprehensive assessment of the way forward for a multidimensional African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the African Union (AU)’s overall engagement in and with Somalia beyond its current mandate and to report back to Council in May 2021”.

2. The independent assessment comes in the wake of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 2520 and 2568 (2021). UNSCR 2568 reaffirms the international community’s desire to see a Somali led Transition in which Somali forces assume responsibility for its security and a reconfiguration of AMISOM post 2021.

3. The AU-IA Team of Experts was composed of the following members:

- a. Major General Xolani Mankayi from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), Chairperson.
- b. Commissioner (Rtd) Clement Munoriarwa, Commissioner of Police Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP).
- c. Brigadier General Cheick Dembele, Malian Armed Forces (MAF).
- d. Advocate Bahame Tom Nyanduga, Former member of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and Former Independent Expert of the United Nations Human Rights Council on the Human Rights Situation in Somalia from Tanzania.

**II.OBJECTIVES**

4. The terms of reference (TOR) for the independent assessment were as follows:

- a. Ascertain current political issues and their effect on the broader state-building process.
- b. Examine the short- and long-term threats posed by al-Shabaab (AS) and other armed opposition groups (AOG), including the implications for the extension of state authority across Somalia.
- c. Analyse the risks and opportunities for the successful implementation of the revised Somalia Transition Plan (STP) when adopted, to enable AMISOM’s support in this regard.
- d. Assess the pace of force generation of the Somalia National Army (SNA) and broader stabilisation processes, including the challenges and opportunities for



the extension of state authority and effective governance at the federal and regional levels.

- e. Assess what strength is required of the AMISOM military, police and civilian components to match the threats within its area of responsibility (AOR) and enable AMISOM to achieve its objectives.
- f. Take note of financial challenges experienced by AMISOM and recommend options for predictable and sustainable financing of a future mission.
- g. Consider Somalia's political, security and broader stabilisation requirements and underscore current regional and extra regional dynamics and their impact on these processes in Somalia.
- h. Analyse what realistic objectives, operational plans and structures are necessary to realign the scale, scope and format of an AU mission in Somalia post-2021. Within this context, provide recommendations regarding the key elements that AU Political Strategy and options for AU engagement in and with Somalia post-2021.
- i. Assess the continued international presence in Somalia and propose required collaboration between the AU and the broader international community for post-2021 engagement and support to Somalia.

5. The independent assessment was conducted during the second wave of the COVID- 19 pandemic. The AU-IA Team worked under severe time and logistical constraints, while adhering to COVID-19 protocols. It conducted extensive desk review to acquaint itself with different aspects of the situation in Somalia. The AU-IA Team conducted virtual interviews with 40 interlocutors.

### **III. ISSUES ON SOMALIA AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE BROADER STATE BUILDING PROCESS**

#### **a. Political Settlement**

6. Significant progress has been made in Somalia since the collapse of the state and the civil war in the 1990s. Despite decades of numerous local, national and international efforts, there is still no political settlement. While there is broad agreement on a 2012 Provisional Federal Constitution on the FGS, fundamental issues related to the delimitation of powers and the management of security and public resources for the benefit of all within a federal framework remain unresolved. There is an absence of inclusive politics, political consensus and the environment is dominated by multiple actors with competing interests.

7. The state-building process in Somalia is highly contested at both FMS and FGS levels. Against this backdrop, some of the key state-building objectives, such as reconstructing Somalia's security and law enforcement institutions have made variable progress. In the absence of a political settlement there can be no effective security institutions. This represents one of the most critical challenges to the STP and AMISOM's exit from Somalia.



8. Somaliland and Puntland enjoy relative stability in comparison with the rest of Somalia. Somaliland exercises a great deal of autonomy. The state formation process in southern and central Somalia began in earnest in 2012 and the federal map was largely concluded in 2016 following the establishment of Jubaland, the South West State, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle States.

9. The Provisional Federal Constitution lays down the foundation for both federalism and multiparty politics based on universal suffrage but progress towards this critical goal has been limited. Clans play a key role in all aspects of socio-political life in Somalia. Forging a common understanding and consensus among various clans and sub-clans will enable a transition to more inclusive politics. The immediate priority is to facilitate consensus on how to restore the federal constitutional order and focus on finalizing the constitutional review process.

10. The political contestation between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS) regarding resources and power sharing has undermined the implementation of the National Security Architecture (NSA) and the Security Pact adopted at the May 2017 London Conference on Somalia. It also continues to impede the integration of forces and force generation process to establish effective security institutions that would take over primary security responsibility from AMISOM post December 2021.

11. The AU-IA commends the AU PSC and the international community for remaining engaged with the Somalia situation, following the PSC 993rd Meeting, and its Communiqué dated 22 April 2021. AU-IA took note and commended FGS and FMS for the successful conclusion of their Summit on 27 May 2021, which agreed to revert to the 17 September electoral model, and to conduct inclusive and transparent elections without any delay.

**b. Regional and Geopolitical Dynamics**

12. Somalia's location in the Horn of Africa, and the geopolitical and security dynamics in the Gulf region, impact on the political and security situation in Somalia. External actors have historically exerted significant influence in Somalia. Relations with some of the Gulf States are equally complex, as they exercise influence over both the FGS and FMS. Despite these complexities and challenges, Somalia and its neighbors are confronted by a number of shared security challenges.

**c. Economy**

13. The Somalia economy has remained fragile since the beginning of the process of stabilization in 2007. In order to restore confidence in stabilization and nation building, FGS and FMS can play a positive role in the economic development of the country, by ensuring that the private sector becomes the engine of economic growth and stabilization. However, the absence of state authority for a long period of time has led to the private sector operating in an unregulated environment during this period. Due to insecurity and instability, key sectors of the



economy such agriculture, fisheries and livestock were not properly developed and therefore contributing to the high rate of poverty and unemployment.

**IV. OVERVIEW OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SOMALIA**

14. The security situation is relatively calm but unpredictable, with increased AS kinetic and enabling activities across all sectors. Joint AMISOM-SNA operations enabled the recovery of territory and degraded AS. The lack of the capacity by the SNA to hold newly liberated territory has allowed AS in some instances to reoccupy their territory, and subsequently exacting revenge on the civilian population.

15. AS has retained the capacity to infiltrate and capability to carry out complex attacks in Mogadishu and other parts of the country. AS uses various types of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), raids, targeted assassinations, mortar bombings, targeting government institutions and other key locations. AS has also engaged in an aggressive recruitment drive, including abduction of children to replenish its numbers. The different clans are coerced to hand over their children and others are recruited from neighbouring countries and the Gulf States.

16. The security situation is complex because of the existence of OAG, such as clan militias, armed pastoralists and Islamic State (ISIS) in Somalia. The AS and ISIS in Somalia obtain material and financial support from international Islamist allies. The AS also collects taxes and exercises extortion of the local population. They train their rank and file through indoctrination with the pretext of Jihad.

**V. SOMALIA STABILISATION PROCESS**

17. The dysfunctional relationship between the FGS and FMS has contributed to political instability and insecurity. Failure to establish local governance structures and the absence of public services in the newly liberated areas affects the realisation of the stabilisation process. The intensive intra- and inter-clan clashes over resources has increased insecurity for communities. This has led AS to provide alternative governance, services, justice and even levy taxes which the FGS and FMS cannot do.

18. The key to the stabilisation of Somalia is the implementation of the STP, requiring the SSF to take primary responsibility for Somalia defence and security functions. Force generation and integration remains a major challenge. Lack of political consensus on the implementation of major decisions agreed at the national level, impact negatively on force generation and integration. Unless the political differences are resolved the STP will not be achieved in the short, medium and long term post 2021.



19. Many interlocutors expressed scepticism on the SSF capacity to assume security responsibilities post 2021. The political mistrust, clannism, lack of logistical, infrastructural, operational and financial support to the SSF are some of the factors that impede their capacity to assume responsibilities.

**a. Local Administration and Basic Services**

20. Many interlocutors stated that a lot of effort has been concentrated on security infrastructure and the building of the institutions at the FGS and FMS levels. However the government has not invested in facilitating the emergence of inclusive local governance structures, partly because of lack of resources and insecurity.

21. Local governance structures exist in the urban centres in some of the FMS. There are no public administration structures such as the courts and police stations, medical facilities, education and other social services in the rural areas. Public services and social infrastructure have not followed the recovery of territory. The capacity of the SSF to secure territory captured from AS remains weak. Interlocutors commended AMISOM for providing some of the best services when they recover territory, even though its mandate in this domain is limited.

22. The establishment of local governance institutions will enhance visibility of local administration, attract community participation, provide a stronger basis for community reconciliation and access to a justice system for the settlement of disputes. It is imperative for the FGS and FMS to create conditions for the emergence of inclusive local authorities with the ability to provide, or facilitate, the delivery of basic services immediately after an area is liberated from AS.

**b. Humanitarian and Economic Context**

23. The economic and human development situation in Somalia varies substantially across the country's regions, rural and urban areas and social groups. Provision of basic services is poor, especially in education and health, contributing to low school enrolment rates and extremely poor health indicators. The civilian population is vulnerable to drought, flooding, climate change and famine, all of which cause severe malnutrition, with high mortality rates. Economic governance and growth in Somalia will benefit enormously from a stable security and political environment.

**VI. AMISOM**

24. AMISOM is the cornerstone of security and stabilisation in Somalia. It is the fundamental framework for strategic AU-UN partnership in Somalia. AMISOM has enabled a significant improvement in the political, security and humanitarian situation in Somalia over the past 14 years, improvements which have been attained at great human cost. AMISOM's initial deployment prevented an imminent takeover of the country by AS.



25. AMISOM has degraded, recovered territory, including major towns and population centres, from AS. AMISOM has played a major role in protecting two transitional governments, two federal governments and two national electoral processes. The mission has succeeded in creating the political space for Somalia's political class and the civilian population to address their key national objectives, internal governance challenges, and the urgent need to pursue national reconciliation.

26. The AU-IA Team was informed that although FGS bears primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the country, AMISOM remains essential for the maintenance of peace and security in the country in the short and medium term, because SSF are not yet ready to assume security responsibilities. The AU-IA Team believes that a premature withdrawal of AMISOM would lead to a dramatic reversal of the progress achieved in Somalia during the last 14 years. The events of 25 April 2021, which were precipitated by the political impasse between FGS and some FMS, saw militias and some SNA allied to the opposition temporarily take over parts of Mogadishu. The split that occurred in the SNA is a clear proof that the SNA is yet to develop into a unified national army. Any further deterioration of relations between the FGS and FMS will create an opening for AS.

**a. ISR and Logistics Support**

27. AMISOM has significantly degraded AS capability, but is constrained by inadequate ISR and logistical support, which are currently in the control of other partners. Logistical support for AMISOM operations is funded and carried out by the UN through UNSOS. The lack of mobile logistical support is one of the key weaknesses impacting negatively on the effectiveness of the troops. AS on the other hand is acquiring technological capability to attack FOBs, and other AMISOM and SNA deployments at will.

28. AMISOM Police has contributed to the stabilisation process in Somalia by training, mentoring, advising, reforming and restructuring SPF at strategic, tactical and operational levels. This has provided the transfer of knowledge and skills. The SPF is able to conduct patrols, cordon and searches, investigations and localised law and order maintenance operations. AMISOM Police facilitated the construction, refurbishment, and equipping of some police stations and training institutions.

29. The COVID 19 has pandemic severely hampered the mission's operations and activities. Civilian staff and troops were forced to work in isolation while military work requires teamwork. The AMISOM Police was equally affected, as the pandemic has disrupted the co-location programme.

**b. Lack of Predictable Financing for AMISOM**

30. AMISOM is dependent on UN and donor funds. AMISOM has been funded by the EU African Peace Facility (APF) which is being replaced by the European Peace Facility, whose modalities, while still unclear, will differ radically from the APF. Any future EU funding is likely



to be considered as part of the new global facility, which will not fund stipends for troops, or which will drastically reduce the amount provided per troop. Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and Police Contributing Countries (PCC) are compelled to use own finances for logistic support for their troops.

31. The AU is not able to finance Peace Support Operations (PSO). However, the lack of capacity by the AU to fund AMISOM's operations in Somalia should not allow the country to backtrack into a failed state again. The Somalia crisis is an international peace and security issue that requires international involvement. The provision of predictable and sustainable funding for any AU presence in Somalia post 2021 is critical for AMISOM troop morale.

32. The lack of predictable and sustainable funding undermines the effectiveness of AMISOM operations. AMISOM is vital in creating a conducive environment to enable multilateral and bilateral support to Somalia. Without this, the entire state-building project in Somalia is at risk. UN-assessed contributions are the most predictable and sustainable source of funding. TCCs and PCCs are not covered by UN assessed contributions. Any future AU mission would need to secure clear commitments to ensuring predictable support from the UN and other key partners.

## **VII. COORDINATION BETWEEN THE AU AND THE BROADER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

33. The overall security and political environment in Somalia in 2007 was not conducive for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. The deployment of AMISOM is the embodiment of the collective interest of the international community, and of the African continent in particular, to establish security and stability in Somalia. In 2007, the AU demonstrated its will and ability, and deployed AMISOM as a "first responder" to address a major threat to international peace and security. Fourteen years later AMISOM remains deployed in Somalia. UNSCR 2568 commended the continued role for a reconfigured AMISOM mission post 2021.

34. The principles of consultation, division of labour, and burden sharing must be clarified and applied in any future AU engagement in Somalia. Concerted and co-ordinated action is required by all international partners in Somalia. Without this, all efforts to resolve the political and security issues in relation to the stabilisation of Somalia will fail.

## **VIII. OPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR AU ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA BEYOND 2021**

35. For any future AU engagement it is essential to identify:

- i. The key impediments that have become persistent challenges to security and stability in Somalia.
- ii. The preconditions to the success of any further international engagement in Somalia.



36. Key impediments and challenges to security and stability in Somalia:
- i. Absence of political settlement between Somali stakeholders, in particular the FGS and FMS.
  - ii. The role of some bilateral partners has deepened divisions and increased disagreement between the FGS and FMS in Somalia.
  - iii. Poor international coordination and engagement, in particular the different training philosophies and doctrines, enhance the division in the national security institutions.
37. Pre-conditions for success in any future engagement:
- i. Internal political settlement focused on resolving outstanding political and security issues, in particular power and revenue sharing within a federal framework;
  - ii. Regional co-operation framework that will support security, stabilization and economic development in Somalia.
  - iii. Improved international co-ordination and co-operation.
  - iv. Predictable and harmonized support for needs-based “train and equip” programs that enable Somalia’s security institutions to take responsibility in future.
38. Cooperation and co-ordination between the AU and UN:
- i. The nature of international peace and security threats has evolved, and no single organization has the legitimacy and capabilities required to act alone on the full spectrum of conflicts.
  - ii. Multilateral PSOs are increasingly confronting security challenges that are relatively new in terms of the risks and threats that do not respect borders, whose causes and effects cut across the international security, peacebuilding and development agendas.
  - iii. AMISOM is a test case for this new era of PSOs and for the strategic UN-AU partnership. It operates, at great cost, on the frontlines of the global fight against terrorism, in one of the most challenging environments. Its contribution to stability in Somalia benefits not only Somalia but the region and beyond. Major partners should acknowledge their shared interest in the success of AMISOM.
  - iv. Under normal circumstances, a PSO needs a minimum of three (3) months to show initial progress in the implementation of its mandate. The transition processes in the case of the AU missions in Republic of Mali and Central African Republic took not less than nine (9) months to show progress.
  - v. On the question of political leadership of any future AU mandate in Somalia, three (3) key considerations should govern any partnership between the AU and the UN, namely consultative decision-making, division of labour, and burden sharing. The current arrangement whereby AMISOM focuses on security and UNSOM on



the political engagements has proved unhelpful to the overall attainment of either organization's mandate.

- vi. The UN PKO model is not suitable for executing the mandate that has been entrusted to AMISOM. The UN prefers that regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions of states take on responsibility for peace enforcement on behalf of the UNSC.
- vii. When the AU intervenes in conflict and crisis situations on the continent, it does so on behalf of the UNSC, as has been the case of AMISOM.
- viii. The AU PSO in Somalia cannot be open-ended. Somali authorities must be aware that international support is not unlimited, as emphasized in the Joint AU-UN Report on AMISOM Financing of April 2018.

39. The AU-IA discussed various options for the future engagement by the AU and its partners in supporting Somalia and came up with the following options:

- a. **Option 1 : AU-UN Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AU-UNMIS)**
  - i. AMISOM would fully transition into an AU Led AU-UN multidimensional stabilisation mission in Somalia deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (a hybrid mission with shared responsibility). In the current context, there is a need for a holistic and comprehensive multidimensional approach, beyond the security and stabilisation process, which has taken the last 14 years.
  - ii. The nucleus of the security components will be constituted by the contingents currently serving in AMISOM, subject to assessment of their capabilities, and would be augmented as necessary to respond to the new realities such as the opening of new sectors.
  - iii. The mission will be constituted with the right balance of civilian, police and military capability, including a Rapid Strike Force (RSF), and intervention Brigades tailored to the specific operational requirements of the Somalia environment, established following joint AU-UN strategic assessment, planning as well as collaborative decision making, together with representatives of potential troops and police contributing countries.
  - iv. The number of Formed Police Units (FPUs) will be increased substantially to protect the increased civilian personnel and Individual Police Officers (IPOs). The police and civilian components of the new mission will oversee training and mentoring of their local counterparts on the whole spectrum of stabilisation.
  - v. Other responsibilities of both military and police components in the mission will be to provide protection of civilians by securing the main population centers, the Main Supply Routes (MSR) to sustain the economy and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and grow the nascent business in the newly liberated areas.



- vi. UN-assessed contributions are the most predictable and sustainable source of funding.
- b. **Option 2: AU Multidimensional Stabilisation Support to Somalia (or Reconfigured AMISOM)**
  - i. AMISOM is predominantly a combat force, but it has operated as a multidimensional peace enforcement operation deployed in a non-permissive environment. Finding the right balance for AMISOM's multidimensional components is constrained by lack of financial support and the core mission's mandate.
  - ii. A new AU mission in Somalia must include a strong political component, which is AU-led, coordinating with UN and other international partners.
  - iii. The mission has to be recalibrated to become more multidimensional in order to support the broader stabilization projects whilst continuing to degrade AS. The AU, UN, and bilateral partners to Somalia must embrace the multidimensional character of the reconfigured AMISOM.
  - iv. The strategic objective of a reconfigured AMISOM would be to contribute to a sustainable political and security environment, through the elimination of the presence and influence of AS and OAG. This objective cannot be achieved by military means alone, but through comprehensive and integrated approach to peace building.
  - v. The new AU mission needs to build on existing mechanisms and experience gathered as well as successes already achieved.
  - vi. The primary mandate of the reconfigured AMISOM will be to enhance the capacity of SSF to assume their security responsibilities. The reconfigured AMISOM mandate will include training, mentoring and advising, reform and restructuring of SSF.
  - vii. The Reconfigured mission should have a specific capability in the form of a rapid strike force (RSF) with specialized military systems, intervention Brigades tailored to the specific operational requirements of the Somalia environment.
  - viii. Financing of Option 2 must be predictable and sustainable, derived from a UNSC authorized mandate under UN assessed contributions.
- c. **Option 3: Deployment of the East Africa Standby Force (EASF)**
  - i. The AU PSC shall utilize the African Standby Force (ASF) concept by mandating the East Africa Standby Force (EASF) and other regional Standby Forces to deploy to enhance peace, security and stabilization in Somalia. Some of the countries in the region are currently deployed as part of AMISOM.
  - ii. EASF shall coordinate training, mentoring, and advising of SSF to manage security in Somalia and to enable an AMISOM exit.
  - iii. Creating a platform for regular security dialogue and co-ordination to address common security threats and challenges.



**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

- iv. Securing coordinated, predictable and sustainable financing from the UN and international partners.
- v. The countries of the region will mobilize the necessary equipment for the implementation of the mandate.
- vi. In order to move this option forward, the following conditions are necessary: strong mobilization of countries of the sub-region and commitment to ensure autonomous logistical support for their units, on the understanding that the AU will mobilize additional support from its partners; development of a strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and other operational documents; approval of the CONOPS by the PSC, which will determine the mandate of the force; and adoption by the UNSC of a resolution supporting the establishment and deployment of the force, so as to facilitate the mobilization of international support.

**d. Option 4: AMISOM Exit and assumption by SSF of security responsibilities under STP post 2021**

- i. There is a perception that FGS is increasingly losing confidence in the AU involvement in stabilization in Somalia. The rejection of the AU Envoy by the FGS, and the significant delays by FGS to engage the AU-IA Team until after the final report had been submitted to the AU Commission, at a time of uncertainty in the security and political situation, and mistrust among the political actors in Somalia, sends a message that African Union involvement in Somalia is not welcomed by the political actors.
- ii. One of the interlocutors informed the AU-IA Team that the AU should engage in mobilization of resources for development rather than engage in security operations.
- iii. Option 4 will require the direct support of the international community and bilateral partners to the FGS, in view of the strategic interests pursued by these partners in Somalia. AMISOM loss of lives cannot continue without a reciprocal appreciation of the principle of African solidarity, which underlies the existence of the African Standby Force Doctrine.
- iv. AMISOM exit could be accomplished in six months.

**IX. FINDINGS**

40. AU-IA Team made the following findings:

**a. SOMALIA**

- i. The fundamental challenge to stabilization in Somalia emanates from the failure by the FGS/FMS to resolve outstanding constitutional review, power sharing and resources issues.



## STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

- ii. There is a reluctance and failure by the FGS and FMS to adhere to the Provisional Federal Constitution of Somalia.
- iii. The FGS and FMS have failed to establish functional consultative structures to resolve their differences and disputes on governance and security sector issues. Somali political actors do not respect their own agreements.
- iv. Political actors in Somalia show deference to the clan rather than the federal constitutional order.
- v. There is an absence of genuine reconciliation across various sections of society.
- vi. The 4.5 indirect electoral model perpetuates clannism, and denies women, youth, marginalised and vulnerable groups the right to equal participation in governance of their country. However the AU-IA Team takes note of the legislated 30% quota of women in Parliament.
- vii. The FGS and FMS agreed to conduct inclusive and transparent elections.
- viii. The peace process in Somalia has been open to many players. Some of the bilateral partners serve partisan interests which perpetuate the political differences rather than promote the Somali national stabilization agenda.
- ix. The absence of inclusive politics and political consensus, the existence of mistrust caused by competing interests between the FGS and FMS on many issues, all contribute to the current political and security crisis in Somalia.
- x. The security challenges posed by the threat of AS and other armed groups (OAG) remain unresolved.
- xi. Joint AMISOM/SSF operations have recovered considerable territory, but AS retains the capability to carry out kinetic activities including complex attacks.
- xii. AS continues to wield influence over the civilian population in some parts of the country, provides repressive governance and justice alternatives, and is engaged in an aggressive recruitment drive, including abduction of children.
- xiii. Access to a justice system for the settlement of disputes remains limited.
- xiv. The generation of cohesive federal security forces has been hampered by regionalism and clannism.
- xv. Somali Security Sector Reform (SSR) has made considerable progress, however integration of militia groups into the SNA remains a challenge.
- xvi. Notwithstanding the mentoring of SNA by AMISOM and training by bilateral partners, SNA still lacks the capacity to secure newly liberated areas.
- xvii. The training offered to the SNA by different bilateral partners under different military philosophies and doctrines hamper the evolution of a cohesive SNA.
- xviii. The lack of political consensus and mistrust impacts generation of effective security institutions and has negative implications on the realisation of the STP.
- xix. The nation-building process is highly contested at state and federal levels. This represents one of the most critical challenges to the STP and AMISOM's exit from Somalia.

### **b. AU/AMISOM**



**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

- i. The AU PSC expected that the UN would take over the mission when it was conceived in 2007 after six months, but this did not take place.
- ii. Many AU Member States are not comfortable to deploy troops to Somalia.
- iii. The SRCC is not mandated to provide political leadership in the Mission.
- iv. Finding the right balance for AMISOM's multidimensional components is constrained by lack of financial support and the core mission's mandate.
- v. All the three components in AMISOM are not remunerated equally and in line with other UN missions in Africa and other parts of the world.
- vi. AMISOM operational capabilities are constrained by lack of adequate intelligence and logistical support.
- vii. Shortage of language assistants impacts the mission mandate.
- viii. The COVID-19 pandemic has severely hampered both AMISOM personnel and activities.
- ix. Some of the interlocutors commended AMISOM for its sacrifices, for bringing in relative peace and stability in Somalia since 2007.
- x. Any future AMISOM exit must be based on SNA's capacity to protect the civilian population, to engage AS, to protect MSR and secure liberated territory.
- xi. The success or failure of a future reconfigured AMISOM will depend on improved engagements between the AU and UN, and the need for closer coordination and resumption of joint assessments.

**c. MILITARY**

- i. UNSOS Support Concept is not appropriate for the current Combat Operations conducted by AMISOM.
- ii. The Force HQ is understaffed and this fetters the optimum, efficient and effective functioning of the mission. The UN and international partners favour drawdown of forces, whilst Somali stakeholders canvas for more AMISOM involvement in the area of operations.
- iii. The recommended drawdown is a result of budgetary constraints, and not based on realities on the ground.
- iv. The UNSC mandated drawdown impacted on AMISOM's capacity to engage AS in new areas of operation.
- v. The current funding model of AMISOM is dependent on UN and donors. The AU cannot fund AMISOM operations in Somalia.
- vi. The AMISOM Annual Reports from 2012 to 2020, revealed undermentioned challenges, which were never fully addressed:
  - a) Lack of critical enablers and force multipliers, especially Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) asset coverage.
  - b) Turn-around time of critical field logistics from TCCs, such as spare parts for vehicles.
  - c) Low serviceability of fighting, logistics vehicles and equipment.



**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

- d) Inadequate logistics, lack of adequate airlift capability impacts operations efficiency.
- e) The over reliance on air logistics transportation is very expensive and not sustainable in the long term.
- f) The changing and evolving nature of IEDs.
- g) There is apparent interference in operational and tactical command of the Force by the TCCs.
- h) Joint operations and mentoring between AMISOM and Somali Security Forces (SSF) are taking place as per STP and CONOPS.
- i) Lack of adequate force generation, desertion and inadequate remuneration remain stumbling block to the implementation of STP as planned.

**d. SOMALI POLICE FORCE**

- i. The current SPF infrastructure is inadequate to provide meaningful residential and office accommodation.
- ii. The operations infrastructure (Police Stations and training establishments) are not enough to meet the operational and training requirements for the SPF.
- iii. The SPF is underequipped in terms of vehicles, boats, police helicopters, forensic science equipment, mounted units, general stationery and office equipment.
- iv. The SPF does not have a proper accounting system for arms and ammunitions.
- v. Somalia does not have a proper firearms registration mechanism leading to a large number of unregistered weapons circulating throughout the country.
- vi. The SPF is trained by different bilateral partners, as a result the training is not unified.
- vii. The SPF does not have the full capacity to establish and maintain law and order in the newly recovered areas.
- viii. The SPF is not properly remunerated.

**e. AMISOM POLICE**

- i. The current strength of IPOs is not adequate to undertake the current tasks of training, advising, mentoring, reforming and restructuring the SPF.
- ii. The current level of FPU is not adequate to undertake the tasks of patrolling, security to IPOs, escort of convoys and VIPs.
- iii. Some PCCs cannot maintain and service their equipment to effectively undertake the tasks at hand.

**f. CIVILIAN COMPONENT**

- i. The current authorized strength is 70 AMISOM international civilian staff and the current deployed strength is 66.



- ii. The areas of speciality by international civilian staff are not adequately covered given the size of the operational area.
- iii. Due to the limited number of international civilian staff, there has been no meaningful interaction between the international civilian staff with the local Somali civil service and governance institutions.

**g. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS**

- i. Somalia's location in the Horn of Africa places it at the epicenter of a complex geo-political region.
- ii. External actors have historically exerted significant influence over the political and security dynamics of Somalia.
- iii. Some of the Gulf States influence the FGS and FMS differently, thereby increasing the political mistrust between the two.

**X. RECOMMENDATIONS**

**a. SOMALIA**

- i. FGS and FMS should genuinely implement their 27 May 2021 Agreement.
- ii. The FGS to be formed after the 2021 elections should finalise the Constitutional review process, resolve all outstanding issues.
- iii. The FGS should urgently establish the Constitutional Court to resolve future disputes between the FGS and the FMS regarding their respective powers and responsibilities under the Federal Constitution of Somalia.
- iv. FGS and FMS, in collaboration with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), should undertake civic education to inculcate the principles of federalism enunciated under Chapter V of the 2012 Provisional Federal Constitution of Somalia.
- v. Political actors in Somalia should contribute towards building political consensus by ensuring that they respect the constitutional order, rather than placing their political interest in clans and sub clan.
- vi. The FGS/FMS to hold regular consultative meetings in accordance with the Provisional Federal Constitution.
- vii. The FGS and FMS should ensure that women, youth, persons living with disability, minority clans and other marginalized communities take part in electoral and peace processes, and in national governance structures and institutions.
- viii. The FGS/FMS should cooperate to establish a unified SSF respecting the Provisional Federal Constitution allocation of security responsibilities.
- ix. All militias be integrated in the SSF in order to enhance the SSR process.
- x. All bilateral partners assisting Somalia to build its security capabilities must ensure that the SSF training is guided by a Somalia national security philosophy and doctrine to generate cohesive security forces.



- xi. The FGS should provide the SSF with all necessary logistical and operational support to defeat AS in order to secure newly liberated areas, protect the civilian population and to open and secure MSRs in conformity with the STP.
- xii. There is a need to review and improve the SSF conditions of service so as to attract the voluntary recruitment and enhance force generation.
- xiii. The FGS must respect the autonomy of the FMS in their respective areas of territorial jurisdiction and political responsibilities.
- xiv. FGS should establish a framework for a national dialogue to forge political consensus among various political actors, CSO, clans and sub-clans to build inclusive politics and national reconciliation.
- xv. Somali stakeholders should establish a transitional justice framework for truth, justice, reconciliation and accountability.
- xvi. There is need for job creation in order to absorb the youth and deny AS an opportunity to recruit them.
- xvii. There is need to establish local government institutions from the grassroots level. This will enhance visibility of governance, attract community participation and provide a stronger basis for community reconciliation.
- xviii. There is a need to establish credible rule of law and justice system at all levels.

**b. AU/AMISOM**

- i. The reconfigured AMISOM mandate should provide a multi-dimensional and comprehensive approach to the peace process where security, political, humanitarian and developmental issues are tackled holistically.
- ii. The new mandate must provide for both political and financial support to achieve the desired outcomes.
- iii. AU should mobilise resources for economic activities such as farming, livestock sector development, fishing and other economic activities that support peoples' livelihood.
- iv. The Joint Special Representative should be mandated jointly but the PSC and UNSC to provide political leadership in a reconfigured mission, including coordination with UN and other partners.
- v. The AU should encourage MS to pledge and contribute required capabilities in the reconfigured AMISOM.
- vi. The UN should fund AMISOM operations in Somalia in a coherent, predictable, and sustainable manner.
- vii. The need for closer AU-UN coordination and resumption of joint assessments.

**c. MILITARY COMPONENT**

- i. The AU should engage its MS and strategic partners to source the required critical enablers and force multipliers in order to capacitate reconfigured AMISOM in accordance with the CONOPS during the transition and post 2021.



- ii. The AU should investigate the reasons for non- resolution of the recurring challenges identified in the AMISOM annual reports since 2012 to date.
- iii. The Force HQ should be capacitated in accordance with the AU policies and doctrine.
- iv. Contingent Commanders and their staff should be separated from Sector Commanders. The Contingent Commander to communicate to the TCC HQs, whilst Sector Commander should communicate with the Force Commander (FC). There is need for separation of roles between the Sector and Contingent Commanders in accordance with PSO doctrine.
- v. The reconfigured mission should have forces that are to hold territory, conduct peace keeping activities, training, advising, mentoring and a Rapid Strike Force (RSF) with specialized military systems, intervention Brigades tailored to the specific operational requirements of the Somalia environment.
- vi. Drawdown should be recommended by a field assessment and not by strategic assessment and budgetary constraints.
- vii. The AU should do a field assessment and appreciation prior to the reconfiguration.

**d. SOMALIA POLICE FORCE**

- i. Adequate residential and office accommodation to be provided for the SPF at both FGS and FMS levels.
- ii. Adequate police stations and police training establishments be provided at both FGS and FMS levels.
- iii. Adequate provision of equipment to SPF such as vehicles, boats, police helicopters, forensic science equipment, mounted units, general stationery and office equipment, etc at both the FGS and FMS.
- iv. The FGS and FMS should develop a proper accounting system for arms and ammunitions within their respective areas of jurisdiction.
- v. FGS and FMS should develop and commission a proper firearms registration process.
- vi. FGS and FMS should develop a mechanism to recover all unregistered weapons and put them in the FGS and FMS inventory.

**e. AMISOM POLICE**

- i. The current strength of IPOs should be increased to enable AMISOM Police to train, advise, mentor, reform and restructure the SPF in line with the reconfigured AMISOM mandate post 2021.
- ii. The current strength of FPU should be increased to adequately undertake the tasks of patrolling, security to IPOs, and escort of convoys and VIPs in line with the reconfigured AMISOM mandate post 2021.



- iii. The PCCs should deploy adequate personnel, transport and equipment to effectively undertake the tasks in line with reconfigured AMISOM mandate post 2021.
- iv. Some of the PCCs should create capacity to maintain and ensure serviceability of their equipment.
- v. The AMISOM Police Commissioner should have the mandate to:
  - a) Assist the SPF to generate force level(recruitment and selection);
  - b) Train, advise, mentor, reform and restructure SPF;
  - c) Develop an effective co-location program at strategic, tactical and operational levels to facilitate transfer of knowledge and skills.

**f. CIVILIAN COMPONENT**

- i. The current authorized strength of the international civilian staff should be increased to take into account the tasks under the reconfigured AMISOM.
- ii. The following areas of speciality should be adequately funded and covered by international civilian staff:-
  - a) Political affairs;
  - b) Civil affairs;
  - c) Human rights;
  - d) Child protection and protection of vulnerable groups affairs;
  - e) Humanitarian assistance.
- iii. The international civilian staff should cover the entire area of deployment adequately in their respective areas of specialisation.
- iv. The international civilian staff should enhance interaction with Somalia's civil service and governance institutions.
- v. The political affairs division of the new configured AMISOM mandate should foster political consensus in the leadership, promote and encourage dialogue among the Somalis.
- vi. The political affairs division should similarly promote and encourage the creation of peace and reconciliation structures at grass root level.
- vii. The civil affairs division should build the capacity of the civil service, train and mentor the Somali authorities on the functioning of local government structures.
- viii. The Human Rights division should be mandated to ensure that all the mission components are compliant to human rights, and shall carry out investigations on all allegations of violations of human rights to guarantee accountability.
- ix. The Human Rights division should cooperate with Somali authorities to address challenges affecting vulnerable groups affected by the conflict in Somalia.
- x. The Human Rights division should train Somalis on human rights principles and their applicability to Somalia.
- xi. The Child Protection Unit should engage the Somali authorities on child protection issues.



- xii. The Humanitarian Affairs division should be mandated to assist the Somali authorities in dealing with humanitarian challenges, including the reintegration of displaced persons into society.
- xiii. The Humanitarian Affairs division will also assist the Somalis in developing water management strategies, poverty alleviation programs, developing systems and structures which support livelihoods in times of droughts and floods.

**g. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS**

- i. The AU should coordinate an integrated sub-regional response to the complex transnational security threats to the sub region.
- ii. The AU and UN should resume joint assessments of a reconfigured AMISOM post 2021.
- iii. The international community should support the reconfigured AMISOM in order to achieve its objective as mandated by the UNSC.
- iv. The international community should prioritize support to FGS and FMS to achieve a genuine political settlement and stable governance arrangements.
- v. Bilateral Partners should harmonise their interests in Somalia with the broader objectives of international community's support for stabilisation of Somalia.
- vi. The international community should provide adequate resources to FGS and FMS to support the establishment of rule of law and justice institutions, in particular the judiciary and local government institutions.

**h. RECOMMENDED OPTION**

- i. The AU-IA Team recommends Option 1: **AU-UN Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AU-UNMIS)** as the most appropriate option for a future reconfigured AMISOM post 2021. The AU-IA Team finds this option as the most appropriate since it will address many of the challenges identified in this report, in particular the lack of sustainable financing, inadequate logistics, command and control issues, remuneration of staff, troops and police, manpower and staff shortages, and force generation for the mission. The mandate will be as follows:
  - a) An AU-UN multidimensional stabilisation mission in Somalia deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The leadership of mission shall be by Joint Special Representative, who shall be appointed in consultation between the PSC and the UNSC.
  - b) A comprehensive multidimensional approach, beyond the security and stabilisation process, to include Political affairs, Civil affairs, Human rights, Child protection and protection of vulnerable groups affairs, and Humanitarian assistance.
  - c) A nucleus of the security components will be constituted by the contingents currently serving in AMISOM, subject to assessment of their capabilities and



augmented as necessary to respond to the new realities such as the opening of new sectors.

- d) The right balance of civilian, police and military capability, including a Rapid Strike Force (RSF), and intervention Brigades tailored to the specific operational requirements of the Somalia environment, established following joint AU-UN strategic assessment and planning together with representatives of potential troops and police contributing countries.
- e) The aggregated force levels will include a majority of between 50% Formed Police Units (FPU) and Individual Police Officers (IPOs), 35% of military component and 15% international civilian staff during Phase 1.
- f) The IPOs strength should be increased to enable AMISOM Police to train, advise, mentor, reform and restructure the SPF in line with the reconfigured AMISOM mandate post 2021.
- g) The FPU shall undertake the tasks of patrolling, protection of the civilian population, MSR, security to IPOs, escort of convoys, VIPs, and protection of national key points.

iii. Operational Timelines:

- a) **Phase I: Transition Stage - 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2022.** This period will be the time when the AU led AU-UN Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission will deploy in Somalia. The nucleus of the new mission will be composed of the current AMISOM troops, police and civilians. The personnel will be increased based on the following percentages; Military 35%, Police 50%, and the civilians 15%.
- b) **Phase II: Stabilization Stage - 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2025.** Phase 2 will be composed of same numbers as in Phase 1 in order to consolidate the NSA, and enhance the capacity of SPF and SNA, and ensure completion of the Roadmap agreed between FGS and FMS under the 27 May 2021 Agreement. The AU-UN Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission will decrease.
- c) **Phase III: Exit and handing over Stage - 1 January 2026 to December 2026.** During Phase 3, the SSF shall assume security responsibilities in accordance with STP. The AU Led AU-UN will then handover to SSF and withdraw whereby the Military will draw down to 20%, the Police will reduce by 30%, the civilians will reduce by 7.5% every six months.
- d) During this exit QRF's will be on standby for force protection until all forces has withdrawn.

XI. CONCLUSION



41. This report is an outcome of extensive consultations that the AU-IA Team conducted with many stakeholders including the FGS, FMS, AU PAPS and PSOD officials, the UN, academics, and Somalia-based CSOs. The findings and recommendations of the AU-IA Team are informed by various factors that impact the peace and security situation in Somalia. They will be critical not only in the overall political, security and stabilisation process in Somalia, but will inform the AMISOM reconfiguration post 2021.

42. The AU-IA Team was unable to engage with the Federal Government of Somalia on key issues prior to the submission of the final report, in spite of having met the Somali Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the AU, who had deferred the key issues to Federal Government of Somalia. It was only after the submission of the final report to the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, that the FGS agreed to an interview.

43. The findings and recommendations will provide the opportunity for Somalia, AMISOM and the international community to align their efforts better to maximise the opportunity for success in the support of peace building and governance in Somalia.

44. The AU-IA Team believes that the option it has proposed is the best out of the three it considered because of the reasons that it stated, in spite of the overwhelming need to adhere to the principles that underlie the African security architecture. The Team is very conscious of the challenges that currently negate the full implementation of the African security framework and also the fact that the Somalia crisis constitutes a threat to international peace and security, which falls squarely under the purview of the UN Security Council, which has primary responsibility.

45. The success or failure of a future AU-UNMIS will depend on engagements between the AU and UN. They need to ensure that they maintain closer coordination, and resume joint assessments on the strategic objectives, size and composition of a reconfigured AU-UN mission in Somalia post 2021.

46. It is for the foregoing reasons that AU-IA Team commends this Report to PAPS.

Annexures:

- A. Name list of the interlocutors that were interviewed
- B. Force multipliers and enablers



**ANNEX A TO**  
**REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT**  
**ASSESSMENT TEAM ON THE**  
**AFRICAN UNION'S ENGAGEMENT**  
**IN AND WITH SOMALIA POST 2021**  
**DATED 31 MAY 2021**

**NAME LIST OF THE INTERLOCUTORS THAT WERE INTERVIEWED**

1. Representatives of Republic of Sierra Leone in Freetown, Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, 22 April 2021
2. The SRCC of AMISOM and Senior Mission Leadership in Mogadishu, 22 April 2021
3. Representatives of the United Kingdom, New York, London and Mogadishu, 22 April 2021
4. Representatives of the Republic of Ghana in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, 23 April 2021
5. The Representatives of the European Union in Brussels Addis Ababa, and Mogadishu, 23 April 2021
6. Prof. Paul Williams, USA, 23 April 2021
7. Ms. Hannah Tetteh, the UN Permanent Representative to the African Union, Addis Ababa, 26 April 2021
8. AU Somalia Task Force, 26 April 2021
9. Representative of the Republic of Kenya in Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Mogadishu, 26 April 2021)
10. Representatives of Republic of Zambia, Lusaka and Addis Ababa, 26 April 2021
11. Representative of the Republic of Burundi, Bujumbura, Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, 26 April 2021
12. Representatives of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Abuja and Mogadishu, 27 April 2021
13. Representatives of the UN Peace Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) Mogadishu, 28 April 2021)
14. Humanitarian, UN Mission in Somalia, 28 April 2021
15. UNSOM ROLSIG and UNMAS, in New York and Mogadishu, 28 April 2021
16. UNSOM PAMG and HRPG in Mogadishu, 28 April 2021
17. Representatives of the Republic of Uganda in Kampala, Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, 29 April 2021
18. Representative of AU Finance, 29 May 2021
19. Representatives of the Republic of Egypt in Cairo, Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, 29 April 2021



**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

20. Representatives of the Republic of Turkey in Ankara, Addis Ababa, Mogadishu, 29 April 2021
21. The Federal Member State of Hirshabelle, 30 April 2021
22. SRSG/DSRSG UNSOM, 30 April 2021
23. UN Department of Operations (DOS), UNHQ UN New York, 30 April 2021
24. UN Director: Somalia File, UNHQ, New York, 30 April 2021
25. Mr. Adam Abdelmoula, DSRSG/RC/HC Humanitarian Affairs, 3 May 2021
26. The IGAD Special Envoy to Somalia, 5 May 2021
27. Representatives of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Baidoa and Mogadishu, 6 May 2021
28. Representative of South West State (FMS), 7 May 2021
29. Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany in Berlin, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Mogadishu, 7 May 2021
30. Somali Youth Volunteers Association (SOYVA), Mogadishu, 10 May 2021
31. Representative of the State of Galmudug (FMS), 10 May 2021
32. MsAsli Duale, Representative of Women Education and Voicing Entrepreneurship (WEAVE), Mogadishu, 11 May 2021
33. Mr Ibrahim Hassan Labow, Minority Community Advocacy Network, Mogadishu, 13 May 2021
34. Mr Osman Moallim, Somalia Non-State Actors (SONSA), Mogadishu, 13 May 2021
35. Prof. A. Fitzgerald, Canada, 15 May 2021
36. Representative of the Federal State of Jubaland (FMS), Kismayu, 17 May 2021
37. AMISOM Sector Commanders in Somalia, 18 May 2021
38. A3 + 1, New York, 18 May 2021
39. H.E. Abdullahi AHMED Jama, Somali Ambassador to Ethiopia and Permanent representative to AU & UNECA, Addis Ababa, 27 May 2021
40. Representatives of the Federal State of Puntland (FMS), Garowe, 28 May 2021

SECRET



**ANNEX B TO  
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT  
ASSESSMENT TEAM ON THE  
AFRICAN UNION'S ENGAGEMENT  
IN AND WITH SOMALIA POST 2021  
DATED 31 MAY 2021**

**FORCE MULTIPLERS AND ENABLERS REQUIRED**

TYPE	REQUIREMENT
ISR aerial platforms.	26
Offensive Drones.	18
Counter IEDs/VBIEDs/RCIEDs/UVIEDs, and directional capability.	120
Indirect Fire tracking and Counter capability.	90
Language Assistants and Translators.	84
Satellite imagery.	40
Maritime capability including harbour patrol and protection assets.	12
Fixed Wing Combat Aircrafts.	14
Attack Helicopters.	14
Utility Helicopters including MEDIVAC and CASEVAC.	14
Small and medium airlift capability including MEDIVAC and CASEVAC.	13
Counter Insurgency units and training (COIN) and Counter Terror units and training.	12
Tactical Intelligence Units (TIUs).	6
Mobile Forces and Quick Reaction Forces (Special Forces, Commandos, Paratroopers, Sea Landed, etc.	12
Engineering capability (Water Purification and packaging,)	18
Command, Control, Communication, Computing, Information and Systems (C4IS) for operational and strategic levels.	8
Medical Capability (Teams with medical Doctors in order to conduct timely medical evacuation).	30
Media.	8
Humanitarian Enablers to assist towards the humanitarian aid.	UNHRC & ICRC



**LIST OF REFERENCES**

1. AU Led Independent Assessment of Somalia Post-2021 Terms of Reference.
2. 2012-2020 AU Strategic Assessment of AMISOM Reports.
3. 2018 AMISOM Concept of Operations.
4. AMISOM Civilian Concept of Operations.
5. AU-UN Joint Review 2019.
6. Background Paper on AMISOM Ten Year Lessons Learned.
7. Draft AMISOM History since 2007.
8. AU Doctrine on PSO.
9. London Somalia Conference 2017.
10. Somalia Strategic Assessment Report.
11. Report of the AU-UN Special Envoys on AMISOM Financing April 2018.
12. Macro Level Analysis Conflict Drivers and Dynamics in Somalia Sep 2017.
13. Force Commanders Brief for AU INDEPENDENT Assessment Team April 2021.
14. Draft Somalia Transition Plan February 14 May 2021
15. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2520(2020) of 29 May 2020.
16. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2568 (2021) of 12 March 2021.
17. The Peace and Security Council Communique of meeting No 978<sup>th</sup> of 9 February 2021.
18. African Union Agenda 2063, and the Silencing the Guns by December 2020 Roadmap. 19.
19. The Peace and Security Council Communique of the 993<sup>rd</sup> meeting on 22 April 2021.
20. Report of the 9 to 10 March 2017 Conference on AMISOM Ten Years Lessons Learned.
21. The Progress Towards the 2030 Agenda in Somalia: A Companion to the UN Common Country Analysis 2020.